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10preface
This edited volume serves as a background study for the wrr(Netherlands
Scientific Council for Government Policy) advice on innovation policy in the
Netherlands. This wrr-advice, which is released separate, emphasizes the
importance of effective functioning of innovation as a key determinant of wealth
creation and the role and responsability of the government for the functioning of
the innovation system.
The Netherlands seems to lose momentum with respect to innovation. Before 
we can say anything about policy directions for innovation, we need to have an
adequate understanding of how innovation works. To reach this understanding
the wrrhas asked several experts to conduct indepth studies on the different
facets of innovation. These studies resulted in the notion of innovation as a
system which needs further development of insight in what goes on in the inter-
actions between individual and organizational actors, in the creation of ideas
their application in innovations, and their diffusion. A central element of inno-
vation is that it thrives on cooperation between actors that are at a cognitive
distance that is sufficiently large to lead to a novelty, but sufficiently small in
order to make collaboration possible between the actors involved.
This background-study also builds bridges in order to come to a better under-
standing of innovation and the foundation of the possible role of government
policy. This book not only functions as a background study for the advice on
innovation policy in the Netherlands. It aims to make a contribution to the inter-
national debate on innovation and innovation policy, especially in the European
Union.
The volume brings together insights from wrrstaff (Gerrit Kronjee, Gerard de
Vries and Robert Went) and external staff from a range of disciplines such as
economics, sociology, geography and psychology. We (the wrr) are indebted to
Neil Anderson, Ron Boschma, Rosina Gasteiger, Leo van der Geest, Lars Heuts,
Patrick Kenis, Marius Meeus and Leon Oerlemans for the extensive scope of their
research, productive questions and comments during the preparation and execu-
tion of this project and the meetings they were willing to attend.
Prof.dr. W.B.H.J. van de Donk
wrr Chairman 
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12executive summary
This volume moves beyond macroeconomic conditions for innovation to micro-
level processes involving individual and organisational agents and their interac-
tions in the generation, utilisation, and diffusion of ideas, products, and
processes. We use the concept of ‘innovation systems’, to take into account inter-
actions between a variety of agents, various dimensions of innovation – going far
beyond science and technology– and a variety of economic and institutional
conditions. The analysis applies to innovation systems in general and gives an
application to the Netherlands.
The main line in our policy approach is a trade-off between arguments for and
against policy interventions. One reason for restraint in policy derives from the
insights of Austrian economics (Hayek) that knowledge is diverse and is distrib-
uted throughout society, and that government should mobilise that knowledge
rather than impose its own. A second argument against policy interventions,
derived from an evolutionary position, is that innovation is highly unpredictable
and full of surprises, which government should not try to second guess, and is a
system phenomenon, with complex interactions that produce partly unintended
consequences. On the other hand, there are market and system failures in inno-
vation that government should address. The question then is how to do this
while respecting unpredictability and the variety and distribution of knowledge.
This yields a policy perspective that keeps innovation as open as possible.
We call for an innovation policy that is open in four dimensions: open with
respect to collaboration with others, via open communication; open for surprises
and changes of direction during innovation projects and research and develop-
ment (r&d); open to new players (‘challengers’), in particular entrepreneurs; and
open to the world beyond the own region or country concerned and beyond
established industries, to prevent the confinement of innovation to individual
regions, countries, and existing industries. The different chapters of this volume
develop insights as to how these different forms of openness may be organised.
Radical, path-breaking innovation is rare. Most innovative activity lies in incre-
mental innovation, diffusion, and imitation. A key question that is asked in
policy is where we should choose to lead, creating radical innovation, and where
we should simply follow. Should we ‘pick winners’ or ‘back winners’, or are both
choices problematic?
This volume starts with an introductory chapter (chapter 1) on the meaning of
innovation, its economic significance, the roots and development of innovation
policy, and the perspectives on these topics presented in this book. Chapter 2
supplies a macroeconomic analysis of the economic importance of innovation, as
a source of productivity growth. Among other things, it confirms the idea that we
need to delve further into the micro-level. For that, we emphasise issues of
13
executive summaryknowledge and learning, with a conceptual elaboration in chapter 3. This is
needed as a basis for the analysis, and connects the book with the basic theme of
the ‘Lisbon agenda’ for an eu knowledge economy. The volume proceeds with an
analysis of the main features of innovation systems: the relation between
research, higher education, and innovation (chapter 4), entrepreneurship (chap-
ter 5) and the obstacles it meets (chapter 6), institutional conditions for trust to
support learning by interaction (chapter 7), forms of organisation for innovation
and innovation of organisation (chapter 8), conditions for innovation within
organisations (chapter 9), features of network structure between organisations
(chapter 10), and properties of regional systems of innovation (chapter 11).
Each chapter ends with implications and recommendations for policy. Here,
recommendations are directed primarily at public policy, but secondarily also at
policies of firms and other organisations, in the private and public sectors. The
latter recommendations, oriented towards industry, are still relevant for public
policy with a view to agenda setting, coordination, and stimulation. The final
chapter, chapter 12, compiles and integrates the implications for policy.
In particular, the following major policy issues are addressed:
–H o w  c an we manage the combination and tension between exploitation and
exploration and between stability and change, in research and in the relations
between university and industry, in the organisation of firms and government,
and in inter-organisational collaboration and networks?
–C an we determine where, in innovation, a country should be a leader and
where a follower? What are the merits and drawbacks of the current policy of
‘backing winners’? Can such choices be made while maintaining openness to
outsiders and challengers?
–H o w  c an we further improve openness for entrepreneurs, and deal with obsta-
cles, in market and system failures? How can this be done while taking into
account government failures?
–H o w  c an we provide openness to surprises in innovation projects and
processes? In government-funded projects and programmes, can we switch
from ex ante safeguards that lock up innovation to ex post accountability that
allows for changes of direction?
–H ow can we organise openness for collaboration and communication, in
alliances and networks? What is the role and what are the limits of trust? How
to combine trust and transparency? What are the effects of network structure?
–H ow can we combine the strengths of the local with the need for openness to
the non-local and the global, in organisations, networks, regions, and coun-
tries?
micro-foundations for innovation policy
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161i n n o v a t ion, the economy, and policy
Bart Nooteboom and Erik Stam
1.1 introduction
Innovation has been essential for economic growth in the last centuries (Mokyr
1990; Baumol 2004). In western economies, the importance of innovation for
economic growth has become more pressing given ageing populations, global
competition, increasing product variety, and shortening product life cycles. Inno-
vation is also needed to solve problems in society such as those concerning
climate change, health, and congestion. Innovation also has intrinsic value as a
manifestation of creativity. In this volume the focus is on the economic signifi-
cance of innovation, and on its conditions, in innovation systems. The aim is to
provide an analytical basis for innovation policy, primarily that of governments.
While macroeconomic analyses show the importance and the effect of innova-
tion for productivity and growth, as will be investigated in chapter 2, and show
effects of macro-level factors such as labour markets, they give little insight into
the underlying processes of innovation. As a result, innovation policy is still very
much a matter of improvisation and trial and error. In this book we aim to
improve insight into the micro level of individual agents and corporate agents
(organisations) and their interactions, in the generation, utilisation, and diffusion
of ideas, products, and processes. As noted by Lundvall and Borras (2005: 614):
“Innovation policy calls for ‘opening the black box’ of the innovation process,
understanding it as a social and complex process”. The aim of this volume is to
contribute to that. Another reason for a focus on the micro level of the economy
is that this volume is oriented towards the national government, and increasingly
macro-economic policy has shifted to the supra-national level of the eu.
Hence the title: micro-foundations for innovation policy. This does not mean
that we discount the value of macro policies (for example concerning taxes,
labour, and social security): these indeed present vital conditions for innovation
and economic growth. However, they have already been analysed to a large extent
in other studies, are commonly recognised as important elements of economic
policy, and we have little to add on that score. We take a complementary, rela-
tively new perspective of ‘innovation systems’, that takes into account interac-
tions between a variety of agents, various dimensions of innovation (going far
beyond science and technology), and a variety of economic and institutional
conditions. The analysis applies to innovation systems in general, with special
attention to the Netherlands.
The main line in our policy approach is a trade-off between arguments against and
in favour of policy interventions. One reason for restraint in making policy inter-
ventions derives from the insight gained from Austrian economics that knowl-
17
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mobilise that knowledge rather than impose its own. A second reason, derived
from an evolutionary perspective, is that innovation is highly unpredictable and
full of surprises that government should not aim to outguess, and is a system phe-
nomenon, with complex interactions that produce partly unintended conse-
quences. On the other hand, there are market and system failures in innovation
that government should address. The question then is how to do this while
respecting unpredictability and the variety and distribution of knowledge, and
taking into account government failures. This yields a policy perspective that
keeps the innovation process as open as possible. Open in four ways. Openness to
uncertainty in the innovation process, as opposed to determining the innovation
trajectory ex ante. Openness for collaboration at a sufficient ‘cognitive distance’, as
opposed to cooperation with equals in knowledge. Openness for new entrants, as
opposed to coalitions of incumbents. Openness to the world outside the own
region or country and outside established industries, as opposed to inward-look-
ing, parochial innovation policy. Such a policy would strengthen the position of
the Netherlands as an open knowledge economy, in multiple respects.
In this introductory chapter we discuss the meaning of innovation, its economic
significance, and the roots and development of innovation policy. After a brief
introductory section, the second section concerns the key notions of novelty and
creativity, and definitions of innovation. In the next section we give an inventory
of dimensions and measures of innovation. The fourth section concerns the role
of innovation in the economy, in the context of globalisation. This includes the
necessary openness of innovation to global markets. In the fifth section we
consider the position that innovation cannot be left to markets, and what
perspective of markets we can then take. We contrast ‘mainstream’ economic
views with views derived from Austrian and evolutionary economics, which
have led to the ‘innovation systems’ view that is now current in many policy
debates. We specify what we make of these perspectives for our own approach. In
the sixth section we provide a historical view on innovation policies. A final
section outlines the further contents of this book.
1.2  novelty, creativity, and innovation
Innovation denotes both an activity and its outcome. In its outcome, it is a novel
function or a novel way of performing an existing function. This is wider than
new goods, services, and processes in market sectors, and includes innovation in
the public sector. In its process, innovation denotes invention, the creation of
innovations, and their diffusion. A key element of innovation is novelty; literally
innovation means to introduce a novelty. In the current debates around innova-
tion, its meaning is largely reduced to the economic domain, and the dominant
interpretation is innovation as the successful exploitation of new ideas. In this
view, the creation of new ideas precedes innovation. Before we zoom in on the
economic aspects of innovation, we first explore the general meaning of innova-
tion.
micro-foundations for innovation policy
18It is debatable whether sheer novelty is possible at all: paraphrasing the biblical
Preacher (Ecclesiastes 1:9) and the economist Schumpeter “there is nothing new
under the sun, only new combinations”. Of course, new ideas do not arise from a
cognitive vacuum, but are somehow constructed , from ideas and experience
adopted, constructed, and accumulated along a path of life. This is further
discussed in chapter 3. The term ‘combination’ carries a connotation that appears
to underestimate the cognitive transformation or emergence involved in idea
generation. That is creation. Creativity is making a connection between or
combining two elements that have not previously been connected or combined
(Feinstein 2006: 31). This connects with Schumpeter’s view of innovation as
novel combinations. Cognitive psychologist Sternberg (1996: 375) defines creativ-
ity as “the process of producing something that is both original and worthwhile”.
Two central elements are thus novelty (originality) and value (worthwhile).
Creativity includes the process of finding a novelty and then transforming find-
ings into observable products (Schweizer 2004). Does the condition, universally
recognised to apply to innovation, that the novelty has direct value for, and is
appreciated by others than the creator, also apply to creativity? We don’t think so.
It is widely recognised and documented (see e.g., Mokyr 1990) in science, tech-
nology, and art that new ideas often find a useful application and acceptance only
later, sometimes much later.
Examples abound. In mathematics, consider non-Euclidean geometry. It was later taken up in
physics, but prior to that it was appreciated as an intriguing and consistent system of new axioms
and theorems. In technology there is the classic example of Marie Curie’s discovery of radioactivity,
later to be applied to X-ray photography, for example. In art the French impressionists were at first
ridiculed and scandalized, and were barred from museums and galleries. Yet the impressionists did
value each other’s work and later met with huge popularity.   
Would it make sense to say that those ideas become creative only then, when they
were more widely applied or appreciated, long after they were produced? If value
is a criterion for creativity, value to whom, and to how many? There is a double
subjectivity here. First, whether someone identifies something as a novelty
depends to a large extent on his prior knowledge. Second, when this novelty is
turned into an innovation, its performance and value depends on the subjective
judgment of its selectors. Some people may value an idea because they like it for
itself, or because it inspires the further development of ideas, without any applica-
tion beyond that. Creativity may have mostly or even exclusively intrinsic value to
the creator. A scientist or artist who produces ‘l’art pour l’art’ is not thereby barred
from creativity. Both the recognition one may get from innovative accomplish-
ment and the intrinsic value underlying creation contribute to the flourishing of
people. So, we propose to allow for creativity to include novelty even when it has
no identifiable value beyond intrinsic value to the creator.
This issue is more than an idle, innocuous semantic squabble. By looking only at
value in application or use, in innovation policy, one runs the risk of neglecting
19
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and accepted new ideas, there is no innovation without the underlying idea
generation, prior to application. Therefore, innovation policy should be oriented
not only toward innovation but also toward underlying creativity (as defined
here). The relation between idea creation (exploration) and application (exploita-
tion) is analysed in chapter 3.
According to the definition of innovation given above, innovative performance
depends on social judgement of others. In the case of technological creativity,
innovative performance depends on ‘peer reviewed’ journals, patent bureaus, but
also specific prizes (e.g., of national science foundations and Nobel Prize commit-
tees). Innovativeness in the arts is assessed for example by publishers and arts
foundations that provide grants and prizes. Economic creativity – entrepreneur-
ship – is rewarded by the market, i.e., customers that pay more for the products
than the costs of the sum of its inputs: from a company perspective this involves
value creation (sales) and capture (profits).
“The current discussion on the so-called ‘knowledge paradox’ can be translated
as a lack of economic creativity following on technological creativity: ‘In the end
the translation and transformation of knowledge into concrete products and serv-
ices leads to productivity and welfare in a broad sense. In essence it is about the
utilization, in a competitive environment, of opportunities that markets and
newly developed knowledge offer. Innovation and entrepreneurship’” (Innova-
tion Platform 2006: 17).
Innovation is mostly seen as primarily of economic value and purpose. However,
it is widely recognised that regardless of economic growth innovation is also of
value in solving societal problems, and has cultural value and intrinsic value for
the flourishing of people, in activities of creation and self-realisation. From a
more utopian perspective, innovation is seen as a means for world peace and
ecological preservation. These dimensions of value are not necessarily separate.
Solving societal problems may well go together with the furthering of economic
growth. As argued in chapter 4, university research may contribute to both
culture and economy. In chapter 9 it will be argued that creative teams in organi-
sations, which further innovation, are conditioned at minimum by certain
dimensions of the quality of labour, such as intrinsic motivation and autonomy.
Until now we have discussed innovation, creativity, and novelty in general
terms. The current public debate on innovation is however much narrower in
focus, in that it largely focuses on the economic aspects of innovation, as a ‘solu-
tion’ for economic ‘problems’ such as increasing global competition and ageing
populations. The macroeconomic significance of innovation is further analysed
in chapter 2. Here we discuss the position of innovation in economic structure
and processes. First we specify the dimensions, the further ‘ins and outs’ of inno-
vation.
micro-foundations for innovation policy
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The foundational definition of innovation as new combinations was provided by
Joseph Schumpeter (1934: 74). The carrying out of new combinations can take
several forms: (1) the introduction of a new good or quality thereof, (2) the intro-
duction of a new method of production, (3) the opening of a new market, (4) the
conquest of a new source of supply of new materials or parts, or (5) the carrying
out of the new organisation of any industry. In contrast to the often-used narrow
definition of innovation as technological change, Schumpeter also recognised
innovation as organisational change.
Economically, innovations can be ‘smaller or larger’, in terms of the volume of
sales involved, number of producers and users, the degree to which it is creatively
destructive of existing assets and competencies, with all the implications for the
destruction of capital, employment, and the restructuring of markets, industries,
and institutions (such as technical, administrative and educational standards, legal
rules, etc.). A well-known distinction is that between ‘radical’ or path-breaking, or
‘paradigm-switching’ innovation and ‘incremental’ innovation along a ‘techno-
logical trajectory’ (Dosi 1982, 1984). Radical innovation tends to have wider reper-
cussions, yielding more creative destruction, involving larger volumes of sales and
numbers of consumers and producers, and more markets and industries.
The transition from analogue to digital photography, for example, yielded a way to fulfil an existing
function (making pictures), but added new features and functions, such as miniaturization of
cameras, direct availability of pictures, digital modification and mixing with other media (image,
text, sound), and the possibility to transmit pictures by phone. It was radical in using a novel (digi-
tal) technology, and had a large volume of use and production of cameras.
The so-called shifts in techno-economic paradigms (Dosi 1984; Freeman and
Louca 2002) reflect the emergence and diffusion of new general-purpose tech-
nologies (gpts) like the steam engine, the combustion engine, nuclear power,
electricity, and information and communication technologies. The emergence,
diffusion, and adoption of these gpts is said to initially lower productivity levels
and economic growth (due to problems of integration and restructuring), but in
the longer term to improve productivity levels and ultimately economic growth
(see chapter 2). Technological innovation is often seen as the major motor of
economic growth (Mokyr 1990). Some authors however are quite critical of the
assumed relationship between the invention of gpts and national economic
growth. According to Edgerton (2007) most economic growth does not take place
in countries that heavily invest in the invention of new technologies, but takes
place in countries that adopt, adapt, and copy new technologies. The fact that
prosperous countries spend relatively much money on research and development
(r&d) is in this light seen as an effect of wealth, not a cause. Other gpts, such as
nuclear power, are far from driving economic growth, in contrast perhaps to their
geopolitical influence. Some very important innovations are not based on spec-
21
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duction of the shipping container, which has led to major cost-reductions in
transportation, and enabled for example the rise of China as a low-cost producer
country (Levinson 2006).
The distinction between incremental and radical innovation is related to the
distinction between “first and second order change” (Bateson 1972), “single and
double loop” learning (Argyris and Schön 1978), and “exploitation and explo-
ration” (March 1991), which denote change and learning within established basic
principles or logics, and changes of such principles and logics. A big difference is
that these concepts are relative to the level of analysis, while the notion of radical
innovation is more absolute, related to the world economy. A new way of
performing a small task within a firm may deviate from established logic or
design principles and would thus be exploratory; on the level of an entire indus-
try its impact may be small and it would hardly be called a radical innovation.
Generally, a distinction is made between invention/discovery, innovation, and
adoption/diffusion. Innovations can be new to a person, an organisation, a
market or industry, a country or the world. Such distinctions are made, for exam-
ple, in the eu Community Innovation Survey (cis). When the definition
includes novelty only for a given individual or organisation it overlaps with the
notion of adoption. There may be arguments for such a broad definition, in the
analysis of intra-organisational conditions and consequences of adoption, which
may entail organisational innovation. This happens in chapter 9 of this volume,
for example. However, in general we use the term innovation to denote some-
thing new for others than only the producer or adopter of an innovation.
There are stages in innovation processes, from idea creation and knowledge
sourcing via development and testing, in exploration; to application (with new
products or processes); improvement; diffusion; and differentiation (exploita-
tion). As one progresses along these stages, uncertainty mostly decreases. This
used to be seen as a linear process, in one direction. Later, it was recognised that
there are feedback loops. In particular, experience with testing and application
yield adaptation, differentiation, extension, and inspiration for new ideas, so that
the process is circular rather than linear (Kline and Rosenberg 1986). How that
process works is of course of crucial importance and will be analysed in chapter 3.
Empirical measures of innovation relate to different aspects of innovation, differ-
ent stages of the innovation process, and different conditions for innovation. The
development of innovation indicators reflects the development of policy ( to be
discussed later). First efforts, in science policy (S), concentrated on indicators of
science related to r&d. The fundamental shortcoming of this is that it concerns
invention rather than its use in innovation. While r&d may provide an input,
innovation also requires prototype development, testing, design, organisation,
marketing, and distribution. Those, in turn, require collaboration with
customers, suppliers, distributors, and others. Later, attention included some
micro-foundations for innovation policy
22output indicators concerning technology and its production and use, in a shift to
science and technology policy (st). Most recently, in the development of innova-
tion policy – including science, technology, and innovation (sti) – the arsenal of
indicators has been widened considerably, with plans to include not only product
and process innovation, but also marketing innovation (including design) and
organisational innovation (including knowledge management, the organisation
of collaboration, and even measures of social capital), as reported in the third
version of the Oslo Manual (oecd 2005, 2007). In other words, there has been a
growing recognition of the non-technological aspects of innovation. Also, in
addition to r&d another input is adoption, and we require measures of diffusion.
Gault (2007: 16) reports that 41 percent of innovative firms in the Community
Innovation Survey (cis) innovate by adopting technology from other organisa-
tions. The present repertoire of indicators can be ordered as concerning inputs,
process (e.g., linkages), outputs, and impacts. They are summarised in table 1.1
The categorisation in terms of inputs, process, outputs, and impacts is somewhat
problematic in the non-linear, recursive view of innovation where inputs may
also be outputs and vice versa. Skill, for example, is both an input and an output.
The indicators hardly correlate (cf. Kleinknecht et al. 2002), which suggests their
complementary nature. Some of the improved impact indicators still carry prob-
lems. An innovation that is new to a firm can be due to internal development but
also due to simple purchase of new technology from a supplier, in the form of
machinery or instruments (Arundel 2007). An innovation may be new to the
market of a firm not because the firm is very innovative but because that market
is backward. Some indicators are still lacking. Impacts from innovation take time,
can be indirect, and, in part, are difficult to trace (such as cultural effects or the
wide repercussions of creative destruction). We still lack indicators of institu-
tional effects that may enhance or obstruct innovation. Ultimately, of course, the
question is not what the merit is of individual indicators, but how they can be
used to measure the impact of policy. That requires an often difficult matching of
different databases. Generally, to evaluate the impact of a policy measure, one
needs to determine ‘additionality’: what effects do the measure generate that
would not have been generated without it. In principle, what one needs for that is
longitudinal data over a sufficiently long period to trace effects, both for firms
that participate in the programme and for firms that do not participate but are
similar in other respects. That can and has been done, but only rarely.
In spite of the recent rhetoric against focusing on r&d and against the linear
model of innovation, old practices still dominate the actual use of indicators
(Hawkins 2007). There are three reasons for this. First, r&d as input and patents
as output are more easily measured than many other, modern indicators (see
Kleinknecht et al. 2002). Second and third, there are path-dependencies in both
policy – with an ongoing focus on r&d – and in research, with an ongoing focus
on familiar measurements of productivity and of impacts of r&d (Arundel 2007).
In policy, r&d allows more grip for government than many other factors, such as
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in the eu’s Lisbon and Barcelona agendas.
A narrow focus on technological innovation and on innovation inputs, such as
r&d spending and science and engineering graduates, could be especially
misleading for innovation policy in small open economies like the Netherlands.
micro-foundations for innovation policy
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Table 1.1  Empirical Measures of Innovation
Inputs Skill or educational levels of employees or entrepreneurs
Science and engineering graduates
r&d (formal and informal, internal and external to a firm) 
Innovation expenditures
Use of ict (hard- and software)
Use of licences
Purchase of machinery, instruments
Information from trade fairs, conferences, press etc. 
High-tech industries
Creative class and industries
Risk capital, particularly seed capital
Process: linkages,  Linkages with knowledge institutes
marketing, organisation, 
strategy
Alliances, networks, chains of innovation, social capital
Marketing, customer relations, design
Supplier relations, co-makership 
Organisation, knowledge management
Communicative skills






Impacts Citations (of publications, patents)
Renewal of goods or services due to development or  application of new 
(to a firm) or recent technologies (adoption)
Renewal not necessarily based on technological knowledge (e.g. management, 
marketing or organisational renewal), ‘social’ innovation
Number or percentage of turnover of goods or services new to the 
firm / country / industry
Improved processes, reduced costs
Profit, market share growth
New market entry
High quality employmentFirst, although the Netherlands may be lagging behind with respect to such
things as the number of science and engineering graduates, business r&d expen-
ditures, and high-tech manufacturing (see chapter 2), it may be leading the indi-
cators on creative class, patents, and new designs, which may reveal more about
the particular nature of the Netherlands economy than about the ‘innovation gap’
that it should bridge. Second, for a small open economy it might be more effec-
tive to improve the international networks and the absorptive capacity of the
actors in the national economy than to aim at shifting the technology frontier
(Weterings et al. 2006; Nahuis and Van de Ven 1999).
Within one week the following two headlines were published in the same Dutch
newspaper (Trouw): “Innovation in the Netherlands lags behind neighbouring
countries” (July 10, 2007) “Multinationals lead the Netherlands to a third place on
the European innovation list” (July 16, 2007). These headlines may be puzzling to
many: is the glass half full or half empty, or are we talking about different glasses?
The latter seems to be the case: The Netherlands is lagging behind mainly in
private r&d expenditures and in entrepreneurship, while it has been the third
most productive patent applicant in Europe (after Germany and just behind
France). This shows that innovation is a process with many phases and a concept
with many faces that can thus be measured in multiple ways.
1.4 innovation and the economy
The construction of new combinations is seen as a driving force of economic
welfare. However, much that counts as innovation has dubious added value.
Two leading shaving equipment manufacturers – Gillette and Wilkinson Sword – spend billions of
dollars on r&d to develop ever more advanced shavers. Has the evolution from one-bladed razors
to eight-bladed razors really delivered a societal benefit that covers all these r&d investments?
According to free-market ideologists, the answer is yes, because these two firms still seem to be
profitable. According to Gillette, the key is to “provide benefits people think are worth paying for”.
However, one might wonder whether all the energy and creativity of all the thousands of talented
highly qualified researchers could be allocated to more productive activities.
Innovation can also lead to the ruin of culture and nature. As Schumpeter already
recognized, there is also ‘creative destruction’ involved in innovation: new
knowledge, technologies, markets, firms, and employment make old ones obso-
lescent, and adjustments in demand and supply can be very painful.
In the earlier example of digital cameras, there was creative destruction of the production and use
of chemical films and their processing, and hence of corresponding manufacture and retailing.
There were wide repercussions for the media, publishers, advertising, design and artists. It led to
cameras in mobile telephones that turn passers by into potential news photographers, who may
have to shift their profession.
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and subsequent innovations, which enhance their application; and incremental
innovations that widen their application, make improvements, and differentiate
them into varieties. While radical innovations are the most dramatic, incremen-
tal innovations are by far more frequent, and in their accumulation have the
greatest impact. Indeed, it is through incremental innovations that radical inno-
vations have most of their economic impact. Here, the distinction between minor
innovation and the diffusion of a major innovation becomes blurred. One might
envisage this as a pyramid, with radical innovations at the top, which fan out into
a broad basis of applications and incremental innovations. Incremental innova-
tions, being in the majority, mostly require limited creation of new knowledge,
and hence limited r&d, building on existing knowledge, and entail minor varia-
tions upon an existing theme, with adjustments in styling, branding, distribu-
tion, added services, etc. Thus, it is a misconception that all innovation requires
r&d and a linkage to knowledge institutes. However, such linkages are required
in the diffusion of new knowledge and technology, and for the inspiration of new
knowledge. Even radical innovation is not necessarily based on r&d and new
scientific knowledge, particularly if it is an innovation in organisation, marketing,
or distribution.
An example is self-service, which has revolutionized retailing, not only in the type of service
offered, but also in creating the opportunity for an enormous increase of scale, in large self-service
stores. From retailing it spilled over to wholesaling, cafés, restaurants, and even hotels.
As a result, when complaints are made concerning lack of r&d, lack of application
of knowledge generated by universities, and lack of connections between univer-
sity and industry, the question is how much one would expect is needed and
useful. What is the benchmark?
While economic value is not a precondition for all innovation, innovation is
needed for economic reasons, also for developed Western nations, if they want to
maintain their prosperity in the face of changing conditions in the global econ-
omy. As will be shown in chapter 2, total factor growth in the eu has slowed
down, as a result of, among other things, slow down of the increase of the volume
of the working population and of the volume of capital. In fact, due to an increase
in age, the share of working people in the population is declining. A major deter-
minant of total factor productivity is innovation, and for ongoing growth that
will have to increase, in order to compensate for lack of growth of the volumes of
labour and capital. This line of argument is further developed in chapter 2. There
is a shift of growth to emerging nations (e.g., China, India), which offer lower
wages and are bridging their gap in development. This is not necessarily a threat.
There might even be a net benefit from this aspect of globalisation for the Nether-
lands, due to lower prices of goods produced in lower-wage countries, opportu-
nities for exports to emerging markets, and opportunities for the Netherlands to
function as a gateway into Europe for imports from emerging economies (Suyker
micro-foundations for innovation policy
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change, where for a number of industries activities are shifting to emerging
economies. Opportunities for innovation should be grasped to fill the gaps.
With globalisation, industrial value chains are increasingly fragmented or ‘splin-
tered’, with different links of chains being distributed across the globe (Gereffi
1999; Dicken 2003). The front end of the chain, in r&d and design, may still
remain in a developed country, while production takes place elsewhere, after
which marketing, distribution, and user support may again be located at ‘home’,
to a greater or smaller extent. Thus, it is out of date to think in terms of domestic
versus foreign industries, and one should think in terms of segments of indus-
tries that need to be connected to other segments, across the globe. Nowadays,
this fragmentation of value chains applies not only to manufacturing but also to
services, in what has been called the “second unbundling” (Went 2007). Even
some provision of distribution hubs , a traditional specialty of the Netherlands,
has now been outsourced to China (Wright 2007).
There may no longer be a future for a full-fledged motor car industry in the Netherlands, but there
may still be a future for a cluster of parts, say the ‘front end’ of a car, or its carriage and suspension
system, provided it is well connected to, say, the German car industry. In the formerly extensive
Dutch textile industry, most production has been outsourced to low wage countries, but fashion
and design (Amsterdam) and logistics (Rotterdam) are still in the Netherlands.
This has an important policy implication: when instituting a programme for
developing economic activity, there is a tendency to frame it in national terms, if
only because in the eu a single nation is limited in what it can arrange in
subsidised programmes across different eu nations. This bias towards national
activities carries a risk of tying the initiative to the country while the opposite
should occur: a loosening of local ties to connect local activities to parts of frag-
mented value chains that are located abroad. This is one of the reasons why we
will argue for more openness to the world in national innovation policy.
We can no longer assume that all high value-added activities, such as r&d, will
remain in developed countries. The arguments are familiar: there are hosts of
engineers and other well-educated workers entering the global economy in less
developed countries. What, then, will not easily dissipate to emerging
economies? What may help us to survive is the condition, increasingly recog-
nised in recent economic thought, that innovation is a network phenomenon,
arising from interaction between a variety of firms, knowledge institutes, and
public authorities, together fashionably and pompously labeled as ‘the triple
helix’, embedded in local conditions of infrastructure and institutions, which
cannot so easily shift to other locations, and may not easily be imitated. This is
one reason for current policy attention to ‘regional innovation systems’ and ‘local
clusters’.
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achieved with contributions from external parties. In much research over many years (see e.g.,
Wever and Stam 1999, Pittaway et al. 2004), it has been shown that firms maintain relationships
first of all with customers, suppliers, and even competitors, more than with public and private
knowledge institutes. Before this is taken as evidence for some kind of failure in the knowledge
system, recall that much of the large volume of incremental innovation hardly requires new scien-
tific knowledge.
Conceptually, a reason for attention to collaboration is the increasing recognition
that innovation requires learning by interaction (Lundvall 1988, Nooteboom
2000). It is not quite clear, however, why, precisely, that is the case. It is clear that
it has something to do with variety as a source of Schumpeterian ‘novel combina-
tions’, but it is not clear how that works, cognitively and socially. Analysing that
is one of the objectives of this volume. Conceptual analysis of collaboration for
innovation is given, in particular, in chapter 3, which looks at the more cognitive
aspects, and chapter 7, which looks at the governance of collaboration. Analysis of
inter-organisational networks and regional clusters or innovation systems is
given in chapters 10 and 11. The focus on knowledge and learning, developed in
chapter 3, connects this volume to the ‘Lisbon strategy’ to make the eu the most
dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010, and
to the aim of the Innovation Platform to make the Netherlands one of the five
leading knowledge economies of the world.
1.5 what markets?
Before turning to innovation policy, the question for many is why we need policy
in the first place. Why wouldn’t markets work for innovation? Arguments for
innovation policy usually arise from market failures. But what are those? And are
there also other failures? Here we take the view from institutional economics
that there is co-evolution of markets and institutions: markets require institu-
tions – as has been shown in the difficult transition of former communist
economies to market economies – and market processes shift and create institu-
tions.
Market failures
In traditional economic versions of innovation policy, the main orientation is one
of laissez faire. The market should be allowed to do its work of achieving optimal
allocative efficiency, with incentives from competition, and the focus of policy is
on the reduction of barriers to firm entry, growth, and exit, in competition policy.
The changes brought about by innovation can require adjustments by policymak-
ers. Their prime task is to restore an optimal market structure. In such a perspec-
tive, results of technological change are supposed to be known, as antitrust
authorities intend to impose a specific (optimal) state of affairs. The only ration-
ale for state intervention is market failures, such as those connected with ‘public
micro-foundations for innovation policy
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and non-excludability of use, and external (dis)economies, such as pollution.
Public goods are goods for which an increase in one person’s consumption does
not reduce its availability for others (‘more for you means no less for me’). Exam-
ples of public goods are national defence, monuments, street lighting, light-
houses, or radio and television broadcasts. In addition to these most often
‘national public goods’, there are also public goods whose benefits extend beyond
national boundaries, such as peace, the environment, biodiversity, health, scien-
tific and technical knowledge, financial stability, and shared technical standards
(see Acocella 2005).
In particular, a problem for innovation lies in possible non-appropriability of
rewards for innovation, due to spillover of the results to imitators, which yields
an argument to postpone competition by protection of property rights. In tradi-
tional economics innovation is generally seen as the introduction of new more
efficient production technologies. Firms are assumed to immediately obtain
gains associated with the new technology once they have decided to implement
it. As a consequence, the only motive to innovate lies in the perspective of bene-
fiting from a monopoly rent that is at least transitory.
Within the traditional economics framework, “the best way to understand
market failure is first to understand market success, the ability of a collection of
idealised competitive markets to achieve an equilibrium allocation of resources
which is Pareto optimal” (Ledyard 1989: 185). This particular definition of market
success and hence of market failure is nothing but a reading of the first funda-
mental theorem of welfare, according to which: “if there are enough markets, if
all consumers and producers behave competitively, and if an equilibrium exists,
then the allocation of resources in that equilibrium will be Pareto optimal”
(ibid.). Therefore, “market failure, the inefficient allocation of resources with
markets, can occur if there are too few markets, non-competitive behaviour, or
non-existence problems” (ibid.). The main objective of public policy in this
perspective is to realize optimal (static) efficiency: optimal allocation of given
resources.
Often failure in financial markets is assumed when it is hard for certain innova-
tors to acquire capital for investments. However, lack of private financing might
well be the effect of rational choices: private financers perceive the market
prospects of certain innovations to be too limited due to obstacles to commer-
cialisation. Another frequently used argument in favour of policy (i.e., public
investments in r&d) is underinvestment in private r&d due to limited appropri-
ability of the returns to r&d. A conventional argument in market failure reason-
ing is that knowledge is a semi-public good. Because of the problem of non-
appropriability, government should take action to overcome underinvestment in
new knowledge through the provision of r&d subsidies or the establishment of
property rights. An example of government intervention is the support of new
technology-based firms, which is assumed to stimulate r&d investments and to
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commercialised in many new applications and sectors of the economy (see chap-
ter 5).
These conventional market failure arguments provide a basis for public interven-
tion in innovation policy. It is based on a linear model of innovation that focuses
on r&d infrastructure and technology transfer, as if these will automatically lead
to innovation. Sometimes targeted industrial policy is introduced, based on the
assumption of market failure, in that public intervention stimulates economic
growth not otherwise likely to occur. A standard argument in this line of reason-
ing is that knowledge is characterised by increasing returns to scale. For that
reason, investments in public r&d, technology transfer, and education are
expected to foster economic growth (Hall 1994). These increasing returns might
even give rise to selective government intervention, for example through subsi-
dies for industries characterised by this ‘imperfect competition’. With this inter-
vention government can ensure that a larger part of the supposed ‘excess returns’
is earned by domestic firms. The basic idea underlying such a strategic trade or
industrial policy (Krugman 1987) is that in the presence of increasing returns and
imperfect competition, firms in some industries may be able to earn excessive
returns, and that a country can ensure that the firms earning these excess returns
are domestic rather than foreign. This kind of policy could easily lead to ‘loca-
tional tournaments’ in which national governments compete with each other – in
a zero sum game – to attract foreign direct investment.
Markets for discovery
Most people, also those outside mainstream economics, would agree that it is
important that “markets are open, that they facilitate and create incentives to
challenge established positions and that they eliminate activities which are no
longer viable in the prevailing environment” (Metcalfe and Ramlogan 2005: 230).
Stimulating innovative entrants (outsiders) to compete with (obsolete) incum-
bents (Boone and Van Damme 2004, Aghion et al. 2006), or ‘backing the chal-
lengers’ is a key policy instrument (Jacobs and Theeuwes 2004).1 While markets
may fail by undersupply of innovation, policymakers may also fail. They are
susceptible to mistakes (due to information problems) and may be prone to
capture by private interests (Olson 1965). Some authors have argued that govern-
ment policy fails, giving rise to ‘deadweight’ and ‘substitution’ effects (Jacobs and
Theeuwes 2004a, 194; Santarelli and Vivarelli 2002). Deadweight effects occur
when the beneficiary of an innovation subsidy is a firm which would have started
or innovated in any case. In other words, there is a lack of ‘additionality’ of public
funding. See for innovation Irwin and Klenow (1994), Wallsten (2000), Cornet
and Van de Ven (2004)2; and for new firm formation: Santarelli and Vivarelli
(2002). Substitution effects lead to more distortions, since the subsidy is not only
a social waste but also implies the substitution of potentially more efficient new
firms or innovation projects by less efficient ones. In the presence of a – publicly
funded – incentive, the firm adjusts its own capacity not on the basis of either
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support brought about by the subsidy received. See for innovation Niosi (1995);
and for new firm formation Maggioni et al. (1999), Santarelli and Vivarelli (2002).
Outside mainstream economics, however, there is a notion of a market as a
‘discovery process’ rather than as an efficient mechanism for allocation of scarce
resources to given goals. This notion goes back to Austrian economics, in particu-
lar Hayek (1945).3 Knowledge is differentiated and distributed in society. In chap-
ter 3 we will use the notion of ‘cognitive distance’ between people. New
economic knowledge is best discovered by actors in a competitive process. In this
view, centralisation is inferior to a market system because the central actor
attempts to make decisions on the national economy despite inferior informa-
tion. Because the market system relies on the efficient exploitation of bits and
pieces of information held by different actors dispersed over society, a decen-
tralised market system can make most decisions better than a centralised one. As
a result, in a decentralised market society, people can make decisions about the
exploitation of innovation on the basis of idiosyncratic information gathered
through their life course (Shane 2000). Why would policymakers be better
informed about making the right choice than professionals in the marketplace
and people with access to local knowledge?
What sets this Austrian approach apart from the traditional one, is that it regards
uncertainty and information asymmetry as fundamental to the process of inno-
vation. Entrepreneurs make conjectures about new combinations that are uncer-
tain – that is, one cannot know (or even calculate the probability) ex ante whether
these conjectures will be correct (Knight 1921). Several types of uncertainty can
be distinguished: for example technical, market, and competition (Shane 2004:
205). The entrepreneur does not know in advance if the good or service he is
producing will work, and, if so, if it can be produced at a cost less than the price at
which it will be sold (technical uncertainty). The entrepreneur also does not
know if demand will exist for the product, and, if so, if customers will adopt in
large enough volumes, quickly enough, and at a high enough price, to make the
effort profitable (market uncertainty). Finally, the entrepreneur does not know if
she will be able to appropriate the profits from the exploitation of the opportu-
nity or if they will dissipate to competitors. This uncertainty will only be
resolved with entrance into the market (Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986: 257-258),
hence the description of the market as a discovery process.
Consistent with this aspect of the Austrian view, but going beyond it, is the more
recent approach inspired by evolutionary economics and institutional economics.
Evolution is driven by processes of variety generation, selection, and transmis-
sion of what survives selection. Here, innovation is conceived of as a process of
research, learning, and selection, which results in the appearance of new produc-
tive options that bring about a modification of the environment itself. The notion
of selection points to the – often forgotten – function of competition in economic
growth that it eliminates obsolete forms of economic activity, burying the
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This function is not to be taken for granted: consider the difficulty often experi-
enced by policymakers in getting rid of programs that are obsolete or that have
simply failed. Thus defined, innovation is a sequential process, which takes (and
can change) form, content, and direction at each successive step of its implemen-
tation. Firms do not know ex ante whether it is profitable to innovate.
“Indeed the answer to this question for any single firm depends on the choices made by other
firms, and reality does not contain any provisions for firms to test their policies before adopting
them. Thus there is little reason to expect equilibrium policy configurations to arise. Only the
course of events over time will determine and reveal what strategies are the better ones” (Nelson
and Winter 1982: 286).
This approach takes the radical uncertainty of innovation seriously, which pulls
the rug out from under rational choice analysis and analysis in terms of equilibria.
The efficient operation of markets is limited by the uncertainty of conditions and
outcomes of innovation, limited insights in demand and supply, transaction
costs, and the endogenous change of preferences.
Transaction costs are costs of contact (search, evaluation, distribution), contract (negotiation,
agreements, contracts) and control (monitoring, haggling, litigation). Internet and related tech-
nologies (credit cards, bar codes, electronic tracking and tracing, database management, intelligent
software agents) have drastically reduced such costs and have enabled novel and transformed rela-
tionships between producers, suppliers and customers. That is an important part of the technologi-
cal background of globalization, in particular the ‘splintering’ and fragmentation of value chains
across the globe.
While there may be forces that tend towards equilibrium, in the diffusion of
innovations, equilibria are never approached due to ongoing change. Under the
radical uncertainty of innovation, and consequent lack of foresight, one needs the
view of an evolutionary process where a variety of trial and error is submitted to a
selection environment of markets and institutions. One of the reasons equilibria
are not reached is that the selection environment co-evolves with innovations:
innovations affect the institutions upon which selection is based.
In such evolution one can get locked into path-dependencies. Institutional set-
ups limit and enable evolutionary processes, and this varies across countries and
regions. In other words: history and context matter. A policy that is effective in
one setting of time and place may not be so in another. Universally valid instru-
ments of policy are an illusion.
The evolutionary perspective recognises the possibility of system failures4 that
may obstruct the processes of variety generation, selection, and transmission,
which need to be tackled by policy. This deviates from the more radical laissez
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“highly beneficial to the economy” (Baumol 2001: 727), but a necessary condition
for innovative investment to be carried out. Practices usually perceived as anti-
competitive can be tolerated by antitrust authorities, at least so long as they do
not lead to actual market failures. In order to gain (dynamic) efficiency (innova-
tive choice), coordination among firms may be required (market imperfections),
but should not lead to abusive market power that would block innovative initia-
tives. From this perspective, innovative choice consists not so much in the choice
between given alternatives (whether based on complete or incomplete informa-
tion) as in a search for coordination. What matters is no longer the ‘rationality’ of
the choice between known alternatives. It is the ‘viability’ of the process through
which a different alternative is brought about: a viability that depends on how
coordination problems are dealt with step by step. In this light, competition is
not only aimed at equalising supply and demand in a given market and technolog-
ical environment, but “has also to adapt both structure and technology to the
fresh opportunities created by expanding markets” (Richardson 1975: 353).
The evolutionary perspective, and its connections to theory of knowledge and
learning, will be further discussed in chapter 3.
Variety and effects of scale
The importance of variety for innovation has implications for arguments of scale.
There is a persistent inclination to think that large scale is efficient. In innovation
policy this leads to arguments for ‘focus’ and ‘mass’ in research and development
by concentrating efforts in a given discipline or field of research or in a single large
institute or university, research programme, or project. And indeed, there are
several valid arguments of economy of scale. For example, some areas of research
require expensive instruments or installations, or specialised support and collab-
oration, whose cost can be justified only when they are used on a sufficiently
large scale (in terms of number of researchers, students, or patients). Thus, there
are good arguments for collaboration, in joint use of facilities, between the three
technical universities in the Netherlands, for example. However, there are also
diseconomies of scale, as the Dutch have learned from their experience of
increased concentration and scale of education and health care provision, which
came at a large cost. To some extent the advantages of scale may be utilised with-
out incurring disadvantages, by having decentralised, highly autonomous opera-
tional units that share resources for support, such as housing, administrative
support, ict services, recreational and catering facilities, and libraries.
As we will argue in more detail in the chapter on entrepreneurship (chapter 5),
many small, independent units allow for more variety of experimentation, at a
lower cost of failure per unit, which is bound to be frequent in innovation, since
the units are small. This yields more innovative output at lower cost of failure
than concentration in a large effort in a single large unit. Large scale can lead to
coordination failures, loss of motivation and, in particular, loss of variety.
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to everybody, communication explodes, with the square of n, together with its costs, confusion,
interpretive distortion of information, and delay, which crowd out effective work. This is a poten-
tial problem particularly, perhaps, in the Netherlands, with its deliberative tradition of the ‘polder
model’. The classic solution is to institute a hierarchy, with communication only between succes-
sive levels in the pyramid. Hierarchy entails delay and cumulative distortion and reduction of
information, which isolates the decision making apex of the pyramid, resulting in inappropriate
strategy, and frustrates the base which forms the front of the organization, and the main source of
information needed for improvement and innovation, from contacts with customers, suppliers and
technology. Decoupling of the system into separate, autonomous, specialized units that are never-
theless mutually dependent yields a problem of obstacles for coordination, novel combinations and
diffusion between them.
Upon closer inspection, in the policy debate arguments of scale often turn out not
to be proper arguments of scale, defined as more of the same, but arguments of
scope, defined as configuring different, complementary activities. This can be
closer to objectives of innovation than scale, in allowing for variety of insights and
a potential for ‘novel combinations’. It is not always clear when an argument is a
bad argument of scale or a valid argument of scope. Note however, concerning
arguments of scope, that in science the tapping of variety and the crafting of novel
combinations occurs in the process of scientists moving around the world to con-
ferences and seminars, and following it up with joint research, or participating in,
say, an eur&dprogramme. They do not necessarily have to be co-located for
longer periods of time. However, it can be a good idea to institute a substantial
research institute or university with a variety of specialisations within a disci-
pline, or a variety of disciplines that yield perspectives for novel combinations,
and attract the best talent in the world for each of the parts. An important argu-
ment may then be that this helps to attract the best talent, and contributes to what
we will later (in chapter 3) call a ‘knowledge ecology’. On the other hand, it is gen-
erally not a good idea to concentrate all efforts in a given field or specialisation in a
single location. It may be an excellent idea to set up an elite institute for finance in
Amsterdam, but not to concentrate all finance departments at a single university.
Discrepancies and agreement
Between mainstream economics and the Hayekian/evolutionary view there are
not only deep-level discrepancies but also surface-level agreements. In the
Hayekian/evolutionary view, the stuff out of which ‘market failures’ are made
from the perspective of mainstream economics – such as asymmetric informa-
tion, radical uncertainty, cumulative knowledge, path dependence, lack of equi-
librium, and rigidities – are from an evolutionary perspective the stuff from
which markets and innovation are made.
In view of differentiated and distributed knowledge it is nonsensical to assume
that prices carry all the information needed for markets to work. Prices do not tell
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ent consumers want. Prices do not tell users how products fit into their particular
needs and user practices, and what the switching costs between different prod-
ucts are. Transaction costs, such as search costs, are not imperfections that one
can tag onto an otherwise perfect market, but are endemic, part of how markets
work. Markets require coordination to deal with differentiated and dispersed
knowledge and transaction costs. Those are not market imperfections but part of
markets, and the basis for discovery. Also, product differentiation is not an excep-
tion but the rule.
Gasoline in itself is as homogeneous as a product can get. Yet it is differentiated by means of logos
and colour schemes of gas stations, projecting different images of being sportive, ‘green’, science
based, etc., and with discount, bonus and gift schemes, loyalty cards, goods sold at gasoline
stations, etc.
As argued by Anderson (2006), Internet and related technologies have enormously expanded
opportunities for product differentiation. Much market thinking is still oriented towards the idea
that only large volume sales are efficient, in view of the per unit cost of packaging, transportation,
advertising, shelf space in shops, and search by consumers. However, since Internet started to
dramatically reduce or even eliminate those costs, enormous opportunities have opened up to radi-
cally differentiate products, since very small volumes of sales now become economically feasible,
opening up very small market niches. This ‘fattens the tail’ of the distribution of sales: very small
volumes of demand that previously could not be served now can be.
What mainstream economists call rigidities to some extent are not only unavoid-
able but indispensable for markets to work. One example is that markets need
communication and communication needs a certain stability of meanings,
whereby new meanings tend to be ignored. Similarly, for technology to work one
needs technical standards and those also need sufficient stability. In other words,
to some extent efficiency requires orthodoxy. Interactions in markets require a
certain reliability of behavioural expectations, on the basis of rules or norms of
conduct. That entails rigidity. More generally, institutions, defined as enabling
conditions for action, can work only if they cannot instantly be changed by that
action. But enabling conditions are inevitably also limiting conditions. Hence
institutions inevitably yield rigidities. Another example is that in many cases,
investment for productivity and innovation require investments that are specific,
i.e., that cannot (efficiently) be employed for alternative uses, and require a
certain stability of activity to recoup the investment, or else they will not be
made, thus sacrificing opportunities for productivity and innovation. In other
words, they cause switching costs and when it is costly to switch one needs some
stability, i.e., rigidity.
Furthermore, in the new perspective intense price competition can eliminate the
slack in resources and time that are needed for exploration and coordination
required for innovation. There should not be excessive competition that hampers
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chapter 3. In sum, what in mainstream economics are seen as virtues of market
mechanisms are seen here as possible obstacles, and what are seen there as obsta-
cles for markets, are here seen as features of their functioning.
“the imperfections identified in the market failure approach, therefore, can be viewed in a different
perspective, as integral and necessary aspects of the production and the dissemination of knowl-
edge in a market economy” (Metcalfe 1998: 114).
Now we are facing a puzzle. On the one hand this perspective says that what
mainstream economics sees as imperfections of markets are not imperfections
but the very stuff markets are made of. The crux of markets is not optimal alloca-
tion given perfect information, but the utilisation of profit opportunities from
imperfect information and differences in knowledge and competence. It also says
that markets can be too perfect, in the sense that extreme price competition can
eliminate conditions for innovation. On the other hand, it agrees with the old
view that markets are needed and that some market failures can obstruct innova-
tion. The paradox can be resolved.
First, in the new view the notion of public goods and services still applies. If
knowledge is dispersed, asymmetrical, and cumulative, yielding limited absorp-
tive capacity, this means, in effect, that it does not spill over so easily. This means
that it becomes more excludable, and its returns become more appropriable, so
that the market failure concerning knowledge as a public good has less force, and
less policy may be needed, in that respect. In other words, limitations of market
operation through rigidity in the form of imperfect spillover limits market failure
that discourages investment in knowledge. However, there can still be spillovers
to a greater or lesser extent, and appropriability of innovation can still be a prob-
lem.
Second, in the new view one can still maintain that markets function better than
central planning (see Hayek 1945). The reason may be different – based on the
idea of dispersed knowledge, rather than optimal allocation – but the conclusion
is still the same. In other words, the coordination required should be left as much
as possible to decentralised actors that have the local knowledge.
Third, one may still agree that competition is needed. Here again, the reason may
be different, based on the idea of selection in an evolutionary process, to select
from the many trials and errors that emerge from a diversity of views and knowl-
edge, rather than efficient allocation of scarce resources, but again the conclusion
is still the same. One can still agree that entry barriers that obstruct entry of inno-
vators and ‘challengers’ are to be prevented or lowered. Not so much to increase
efficiency of allocation, but to give room for innovation. In evolutionary terms: to
open up the selection environment.
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enable markets, they can become excessive. We should look for optimal or
temporary, and hence ‘flexible’ rigidities (Dore 1986) that provide the basis for
investment for productivity and innovation while not eliminating variety gener-
ation and selection, maintaining openness to new ideas, products, processes and
institutions. This issue of how to combine rigidity and flexibility, which is a
manifestation of the ancient problem of stability and change, will re-appear later
in this book, in chapter 3, as the problem of combining exploration and exploita-
tion. It is arguably the most fundamental issue in innovation policy and research.
1.6 innovation policy
Science and technology policies emerged in the mid-twentieth century, triggered
by the challenges of World War ii and the subsequent Cold War (e.g., the space
race) (Lundvall and Borras 2005). These policies were focused upon universities,
research institutions, technological institutes, and r&d laboratories (see Bush
1945). In subsequent technology policy, emerging in the 1960s, attention was
widened from knowledge institutes to sectors of the economy using and produc-
ing technologies, and linkages between them and knowledge institutes. A classic
issue that is still with us, is to what extent universities should produce knowl-
edge for industry or remain autonomous. In some eu countries technology
policy has led to the promotion of industrial complexes, connecting public users
and segments of industries, and ‘national champions’ in selected industries.
Later, such industrial policies were seen to evoke too much public involvement in
private interests and to detract too much from market mechanisms. Since the
1990s, policy was further widened to include additional actors in the ‘innovation
system’ such as, in particular, entrepreneurs, but also users, and the public with
its perceptions of technology. Also, policy opened up to non-technological
aspects of innovation – such as design, marketing, and organisation – and innova-
tion in and by services.
According to Lundvall and Borras (2005: 612):
“The major reason for innovation policy becoming more broadly used as a
concept was the slow-down in economic growth around 1970 and the persistence
of sluggish growth as compared to the first post-war decades. The reasons for the
slow-down in the growth in ‘total factor productivity’ were, and still are, not well
understood but there was a feeling that it had to do with a lack of capability to
exploit technological opportunities”.
In the Netherlands in the 1950s policy was oriented towards reduction of unem-
ployment and regional backwardness, for the sake of equity (Raspe and Van Oort
2007). In the 1960s policy was more oriented towards growth potential, but in
the 1970s, during an economic slump, policy again became more defensive,
protecting firms and regions. In the 1980s, based on a report from the Nether-
lands’ Scientific Council for Government Policy (wrr1980), policy became
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areas, focusing on technological change, and innovation, in ‘arrowhead’ sectors.
In the 1990s the strategy shifted, with more attention given to knowledge,
networks and clusters, in the transition from an industrial to a knowledge econ-
omy, with a role for the government as a broker in relationships. More recently,
attention has shifted from picking winners, with the recognition that it is at odds
with the unpredictability of future success, as indicated by an evolutionary
perspective, to ‘backing winners’ that have demonstrated their viability in
market success (awt 2003).
Radical, path-breaking innovation is rare, and most innovative activity lies in
incremental innovation, diffusion, and imitation. A key question that is asked in
policy is where we should choose to lead, creating radical innovation, and where
to follow. Should we ‘pick winners’ or ‘back winners’, or are both choices prob-
lematic? If radical, path-breaking, paradigm-switching innovations are indeed
rare, relative to incremental innovation, diffusion, and imitation, one should
expect a small country like the Netherlands to be a leader, in the sense of creating
those radical innovations, only in few cases, compared to a mass of imitations
and improvements. Why would one want to be a leader rather than a follower in
the first place? In early stages of innovation, which carry an emphasis on product
innovation, profits are higher, allowing for higher real wages, while in later stages
competition increases, there is a shift to process innovation, and prices fall (Free-
man and Perez 1988). As a follower one benefits only from the latter, while as a
leader one benefits from both. This issue is taken up further in chapter 3. There
may be other advantages to being a leader, such as being able to set a technical
standard that fits established assets and competencies, while as a follower one
may have to accept a less congenial standard.
Given that one cannot be a leader everywhere, where, then, should one choose to
be a leader and where a follower? Is such a choice possible, or is leadership an
emergent phenomenon that cannot be planned? We note that also followers need
to build and maintain absorptive capacity, needed to implement what leaders
have created. In other words, even as a follower one would still need to have a
basis of knowledge and skill, in research and education, which is sufficiently
broad not to miss out on opportunities to be a follower, and sufficiently deep to
be a fast follower. Nevertheless, the question remains where to be a leader and
where a follower.
Note that the requirement to develop absorptive capacity, in order to be a follower, yields an argu-
ment for the policy of protecting an economy from world trade until it has built up absorptive
capacity, because otherwise it will loose out on both leadership and followership. Here, absorptive
capacity includes not only cognitive capabilities, based on education and research, but also physical 
and institutional infrastructure, health care, basic industries supporting transport and communica-
tion, and a variety of business services needed, among other things, to reduce transaction costs.
After World War ii this build-up occurred in Europe with the aid of the Marshall Plan. China and 
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tive policies to build up a basis of absorptive capacity.
Here, a perceived urge arises for policymakers to make a choice, on the basis of
expected unique strengths in the future (‘picking winners’), or to enhance
strengths that have been proven in the market (‘backing winners’). As noted
above, the former approach was taken, in the Netherlands, in the 1980s, with a
choice of ‘arrowhead’ sectors, and the latter policy is taken now, with the choice
of ‘key areas’. Picking winners is now recognised as going against the unpre-
dictability of future success, emphasised by an evolutionary perspective. But for
backing winners the question is why they should be backed if they are winners. If
they have been proven in the market, surely this means that they are generating
profits for their own expansion. We will pick up the issue of targeted industrial
policy again in chapter 12.
Whither innovation policy?
The Austrian and evolutionary views have yielded a perspective of ‘innovation
systems’. Originally this was a purely descriptive, analytical category: innovation
arises from interactions, of both competition and collaboration, between a multi-
plicity of individual and corporate actors, in science, industry, and government,
and interest groups, conditioned by historically and regionally or nationally spe-
cific institutions (shared habits, norms, routines, established practices, rules, and
laws). Innovation requires not only science, technology, and entrepreneurship,
but also finance, education, training, and a variety of institutions concerning 
property rights, standards, competition, and disclosure. Next to these supply fac-
tors, advanced users are also of the utmost importance. Organisation, within and
between organisations, conditioned by institutions, plays a central role. Innova-
tion is conditioned by institutions but also causes institutional change. For recent
summaries of the system view, see Borras (2003) and Chaminade and Edquist
(2006). The system view has been adopted by many innovation scholars, the
oecd, and in the Netherlands by the Dutch Advisory Council for Science and
Technology (awt) and, more recently, by the Innovation Platform instituted by
the Netherlands government in 2004. One policy implication of the system view
is that policy should be based on an ‘integral perspective’, taking into account
diverse actors, institutions, and linkages between them (Edquist 1997; awt 2003,
2007).
Systemic coherence of factors arises on the level of the entire innovation system, but also in parts of
it. Take finance. Venture capital is needed to supply capital for entrepreneurial ventures that banks
are too risk averse to supply. Even venture capital mostly fails to provide ‘seed capital’ at the early
start of new ventures. For this one has to fall back on friends, family or ‘business angels’, who
themselves are mostly successful entrepreneurs who have cashed in on their own successful
ventures. They are not in the position to coach firms along the full trajectory of development, and 
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to exit after the venture has proven itself, and require stock markets to capitalize successful
ventures, or private equity funds or firms that acquire them. Venture capitalists need to acquire
their funds from institutional investors (pension funds, insurance companies), banks and private
investors. Thus there is whole supply chain of finance. All the contracting involved requires appro-
priate legal forms and services. Hellman (2000) reports that in the us the sbic programme, insti-
tuted to help private markets to supply capital to new entrepreneurial firms, played an important
role in getting the venture capital business under way. Thus there is a whole web of firms and insti-
tutions that makes the finance subsystem work. It is an important part of innovation policy to
make it work.
Innovation is a distributed phenomenon, even from the single firm’s viewpoint.
As a matter of fact, most innovations are the result of new forms of coordination
among several firms and institutions rather than of the independent actions of
single dominant innovating firms. In this light, particularly important is how the
innovating firms acquire, accumulate, and develop knowledge other than scien-
tific and technical knowledge which is material to innovation, (namely) knowl-
edge about the specific characteristics of customers and markets, which in turn
has wider connections to knowledge about economic, social, and regulatory
changes (Metcalfe 2000). Such coordination among firms and institutions in the
innovation process is a core element of the innovation system literature, with its
core assumption that a number of organisations (such as research institutes,
educational facilities, and financial organisations) provide complementary inputs
essential to the innovation process (Edquist 1997).
The distributed, network nature of innovation is particularly pronounced in
services, which often perform a linkage function, and in the increasing inter-
twining of manufacturing and services, in the combination of technology, design,
marketing, distribution, organisation, the involvement of users and suppliers,
and learning by interaction. In the past we were inclined to see innovation as
technology, and a given technology as being related to a given industry, so that
innovation policy is prone to be given the form of industrial policy. Now, we see
innovation as a phenomenon of chains and networks that run, in principle, criss-
cross through all industries. This has important implications for policy, in partic-
ular the debate on ‘key areas’, which will be taken up in chapter 12.
Metcalfe (2003) argues that (innovation) system failure should be taken as a start-
ing point for policy intervention, instead of conventional policy, which is preoc-
cupied with market failure and optimal policy. Again, this is not to say that the
relevance of market failures for underpinning innovation policy is denied. On the
contrary, poor access to information, for instance, should be tackled by policy
intervention, but it requires additional policy actions to be effective. The objec-
tive of innovation policy is to encourage and facilitate the generation, application,
and diffusion of new ideas. The government might directly intervene, through
the supply of r&d, education, and capital that match the need of local firms, and
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policy can also stimulate the effective transfer of knowledge through various
mechanisms, such as spin-off dynamics, labour mobility, and collaborative
networks (see chapter 11).
For innovation, there are system failures of many kinds. One is the condition of
inconsistencies between different parts of a system innovation, or clashes of
interest and stalemates among multiple stakeholders involved. Examples are
given in chapter 6. System failures also include institutions that often were func-
tional in previous stages of development but now hinder radical innovation.
Examples are distribution channels, forms of organisation, standards, physical
infrastructure, educational structures and programmes, political views, social
practices, modes of thought, and ways of looking at the world, which developed
to suit earlier changes of technology, products, tastes, and styles. Strong forces of
social legitimation enforce conformity to established views and practices. In
evolutionary terms, the selection environment, with its market structures and
institutions, in due course moulds itself to suit successful breakthrough innova-
tions that have diffused, and then can form a powerful obstruction for the next
radical innovation. In other words, there is co-evolution between markets and
institutions. Systemic coherence between different elements of the selection
environment obstruct piecemeal deviations.
A problem for policy is that often market and system failures are case-specific,
and are difficult to cover with a generic, one-size–fits-all policy. For example,
when an innovation is competence-destroying, or when it does not fit the
installed base of assets of powerful incumbents, the conservative force of estab-
lished interests is clearly greater than when such conditions are not present.
Some innovations entail more externalities, and thus require more government
intervention, than others. Some innovations require more change of standards,
educational systems, distribution channels, or forms of organisations than
others. When price elasticity is low, established firms are less inclined to go for
cost-reducing innovations, since they will yield few extra sales, whereas new
entrants that can gain market share are more motivated to enter with the newest
technology (Langlois and Robertson 2005), so that there is more need to make
room for entrants.
Thus, there are good arguments against laissez faire, and in favour of specific
policy interventions. However, in time, among some innovation scholars the
innovation system perspective has developed from a purely descriptive category
to a normative one, with ambitions not only to eliminate system failures but also
to design and govern the system. Recognition of systemic coherence developed
into ambitions for systematic design. While we accept that system failures occur,
and government should address them, we are very wary of top-down system
designs.
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terms of the causalities involved in the processes of interaction between the vari-
ous actors, as is recognized in the literature (Borras 2003, Chaminade and
Edquist 2006). It is a frame of a painting that mostly still has to be painted. It
might even be said that the innovation systems approach is a rather vague frame-
work within which to speculate on some possible relationships between hypo-
thetical actors at a vaguely specified level of abstraction, and that it consequently
has only very limited utility for guiding innovation policy; theory has even been
led by policy, not the preferred other way around (see for example Lovering 1999;
Hers and Nahuis 2004).
1.7 outline of the book
We proceed with a macroeconomic analysis of innovation as a source of produc-
tivity, and we confirm the idea that we need to delve further into the micro-level
(chapter 2). For that, we start with an analysis of knowledge and learning 
(chapters 3 and 4), and proceed with an analysis of entrepreneurship (chapter 5), 
obstacles to innovation (chapter 6), institutional conditions for trust to support
learning by interaction (chapter 7), forms of organisation (chapter 8), conditions
for innovation within organisations (chapter 9), network structure as organisa-
tion between organisations (chapter 10), and properties of regional systems of
innovation (chapter 11).
Each chapter ends with implications for policy. These policy implications are
primarily for public policy, but secondarily also for policies of firms and other
organisations in the private and public sector. The latter implications, oriented
towards industry, are still relevant for public policy with a view to the diffusion
of best practices, which applies to organisational innovation no less than to tech-
nological ones. The final chapter integrates the insights from the preceding chap-
ters and discusses policy implications.
The occasion for the production of this volume was a study on innovation policy
produced for the Dutch government, and thus has a Dutch orientation and
flavour, both in the selection of illustrative cases and in the reference to existing
innovation policy. However, the analysis of micro-foundations, and types of
policy are, we expect, more generic and also of interest to policymaking else-
where.
In a little more detail, the further content of thos volume is as follows:
In chapter 2, Gerard de Vries presents a macroeconomic diagnosis of the Nether-
lands, in comparison with other eu countries and the us. As is customary in
macroeconomics, the core of this is an analysis of total factor productivity and an
attempt to understand its development. The conclusion is threefold. First, the
declining growth of total factor productivity indicates the need for enhanced
innovation. Second, there are some indications that the Netherlands could
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from this broad diagnosis, macroeconomic analysis does not help us much
further in the design of innovation policies, and for that we must proceed further
into micro-foundations, in the analysis of processes of interaction between rele-
vant agents, in the innovation system.
In chapter 3, Bart Nooteboom discusses, criticises, and extends the evolutionary
perspective of innovation. While that perspective is very useful, and yields some
important policy implications, it is also limited in that it does not provide a
theory of discovery or invention. To compensate for this, he brings in elements
from theories of cognition that underpin learning as a process of interaction.
The need and difficulty of combining exploration and exploitation is identified
as a key and pervasive issue. A model is applied of how exploration and exploita-
tion may build upon each other, in a ‘cycle of discovery’. Insight into processes
of innovation by interaction are further developed by means of the notion of
‘optimal cognitive distance’. The chapter ends with a call for an innovation 
policy that is open in four dimensions: open with respect to collaboration, 
with open communication; open for surprises and changes of direction during 
innovation projects; open to new players (‘challengers’); and open to global 
linkages.
In chapter 4, Gerrit Kronjee and Bart Nooteboom discuss the creation and appli-
cation of knowledge, in particular the role of universities, science policy, and the
relations between university and industry. They discuss the necessary openness
of innovation to variety and surprise in r&d. They argue that while efforts to
apply scientific knowledge, and to indicate priority themes for research are valid,
autonomy of fundamental university research should be preserved. There is a
natural division of labour between universities and institutes of higher voca-
tional education, with the latter focusing more on applied research, and they
should obtain the means and the authority to do so. Institutes of higher voca-
tional education are a natural ally for knowledge for smaller low-tech firms. For
the interaction between university and large firms and high-tech small firms
ideas are proposed to further activities of exploration between them, in a ‘third
space’ of activities, to support industry in activities of exploration and for univer-
sities to test their ideas and to gain inspiration for fundamental research.
In chapter 5, Erik Stam discusses the nature of entrepreneurship and its relation
to innovation. He addresses the necessary openness of innovation to outsiders
and challengers. An overview is given of theory and empirical research on the
effects of entrepreneurship on innovation and economic growth in oecd coun-
tries. An in-depth study is made of entrepreneurship and innovation in the
Netherlands from an international and historical perspective. This study shows
that the annual number of new firms has increased spectacularly (almost tripled)
during the period 1987-2006. However, the study shows more weaknesses than
strengths with regards to entrepreneurship. First, a large part of the new firms
seem to be self-employed individuals who continue with the same activities
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employee before. This is not likely to improve the (product) innovativeness of 
the economy. Second, on average small- and medium-sized enterprises (smes)
have become less and not more innovative in the last decade (1999-2007). 
The percentage of innovative smes is much lower than the eu average. Third, 
the Netherlands are lagging behind internationally with respect to ambitious 
entrepreneurship. The low number of ambitious entrepreneurship seems to 
be especially worrying, as such entrepreneurship is a strong driver of national
economic growth. The chapter continues with the role of entrepreneurship in
innovation policy. Several specific types of entrepreneurship – technology start-
ups, spin-offs and corporate venturing, and high growth start-ups – are consid-
ered.
In chapter 6, Leo van der Geest and Lars Heuts discuss four Dutch cases in which
innovation ran up against obstacles, and the policy implications. Thus, like chap-
ter 5, this chapter addresses the issue of openness of systems and institutions to
novelty. The cases are: energy from windmills and other alternative sources, an
electronic patient dossier, a ‘whisper’ coach, and energy neutral houses. These
cases give insightful examples of obstacles to innovation in general, and of
system failures in particular, where there are several stakeholders that each have
excellent reasons not to make the move they would need to make in order to set
the system going. Later, in chapter 12, this results in the ideas of a ‘deblocking
brigade’ and an ‘ombudsman for entrepreneurs’. The deblocking brigade should
help to unblock difficult stalemates among stakeholders in ways that only the
government can do. An ombudsman for entrepreneurs should help entrepre-
neurs through the density of rules and regulations, and monitor complaints
against obstacles from inconsistent or excessively complex institutional arrange-
ments, and against obstacles from vested interests.
In chapter 7, Bart Nooteboom considers the governance of collaboration for
innovation, within and between organisations, in particular the meaning, dimen-
sions, conditions, and limits of trust. He addresses the openness of innovation to
collaboration, within and between firms, and the corresponding need for open
communication. He considers the role of government in facilitating trust and
collaboration, and the implications of governance for the structure of networks
and regional ‘clusters’. One conclusion is that a mentality of excessive control has
developed, in both public and private organisations, for the sake of ‘accountabil-
ity’, that is detrimental to trust and excessively risk-averse, de-motivating, and
constrains discretion of professional judgement as well as innovation. Another
conclusion is that while in the emerging network economy there is a growing
demand for go-betweens to facilitate collaboration, government should be care-
ful in assuming that role.The development of a new branch of commercial serv-
ices is to be preferred. Yet another conclusion is that policy should switch from a
rhetoric of maximum flexibility of relationships, in labour and corporate gover-
nance, to a perspective of optimal flexibility that allows for minimum stability of
relations to evoke investments in mutual understanding and trust.
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‘social innovation’, in particular the relation between innovation and organisation.
They further develop the issue of openness of innovation with respect to relation-
ships within and between organisations. They look at both organisation forinno-
vation and innovation oforganisation. They consider conditions for work, forms
of organisation to meet the central challenge of combining exploration and ex-
ploitation, platforms for serving customers, the role of users in innovation, and
‘open source communities’. They also look at the scope that this, in particular the
notion of platforms, yields for innovation in government services. Much of this is
enabled by ictand Internet. They see a large and largely untapped potential for im-
provement of quality and increase of productivity. This untapped potential might
explain the lag in productivity behind the us, identified in chapter 2. In policy to
promote social innovation one should beware that also the urgency and relative
ease of exploitation tends to crowd out attention and resources for exploration.
In chapter 9, Neil Anderson and Rosina Gasteiger give a survey of the applied
psychology literature on organisational conditions for creative teams. They
address the openness of innovation with respect to collaboration and labour
within organisations. For example, they look at the role of things such as work
stress, autonomy, intrinsic motivation, trust, and type of leadership. This indi-
cates that key dimensions of high quality of labour favour innovation, which
yields scope for a coalition between employers and employees. A policy implica-
tion of this is that labour should be closely involved in innovation policy, in both
firms’ and public policy.
In chapter 10, Marius Meeus, Leon Oerlemans, and Patrick Kenis discuss inter-
organisational networks for innovation. They address the issue of openness of
innovation to collaboration between organisations, and the trade-off between
openness and closure. They summarise the literature on relevant dimensions of
network structure and their effects on innovation. They then try to trace what
instruments of innovation policy affect which of the relevant dimensions of
network structure. One conclusion is that few instruments appear to impact
those dimensions, which opens possibilities for further design of policy.
In chapter 11, Ron Boschma discusses the evolutionary view in economic geogra-
phy, and in particular the role of ‘related variety’ in regional growth. Among
other things, he addresses the necessary openness of agglomerations to outside
linkages, with other agglomerations, and to entry and exit of actors. He concludes
that regional innovation policy needs to account for the region-specific context
because it provides opportunities but also sets limits to what can be achieved by
public policy. In doing so, it should neither apply ‘one-size-fits-all’ policies nor
adopt ‘picking-the-winner’ policies. Instead of copying best practice models or
selecting winners, policy should take the history of each region as a basic starting
point, and identify regional potentials and bottlenecks accordingly. To avoid
regional lock-in, it is crucial that public policy is open to newcomers and new
policy experiments.
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conclusions. Innovation policy should take into account the radical uncertainty
of innovation, and the impossibility to predict and plan success. It should tap into
the variety of ideas and initiatives in society. This is not, however, a traditional
laissez faire policy.. Policy should condition, enable, and stimulate sources of
variety, in ideas and ventures, remove obstacles, and coordinate where necessary.
In addition to traditional arguments of market failure there are also system fail-
ures that require intervention. But in intervention we should take into account
government failures. These principles and the four dimensions of openness are
used to discuss policy implications. In particular, the following major issues are
addressed:
–H o w  c an we manage the combination and tension between exploitation and
exploration, and stability and change, in research and in the relations between
university and industry, in the organisation of firms and government, and in
inter-organisational collaboration and networks?
–C an we determine where, in innovation, a country should be a leader and
where a follower. What are the merits and drawbacks of the current policy of
‘backing winners’? Can such choices be made while maintaining openness to
outsiders and challengers?
–H o w  c an we further improve openness for entrepreneurs, and deal with obsta-
cles, in market and system failures? How can this be done while taking into
account government failures?
–H o w  c an we provide openness for surprise in innovation projects and
processes? In government-funded projects and programmes, can we switch
from ex ante safeguards that lock away innovation to ex post accountability
that allows for changes of direction?
–H ow can we organise openness for collaboration and communication, in
alliances and networks? What is the role, and what are the limits of trust? How
to combine trust and transparency? What are the effects of network structure?
–H ow can we combine the strengths of the local with the need for openness to
the non-local and the global, in organisations, networks, regions, and coun-
tries?
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1 It is not clear, however, what defines ‘the challengers’: are these all new firm
entrants, also including foreign direct investments, or only new firms that have
reached a substantial size and are really able to challenge incumbents?
2H o w e v e r ,  e v aluations of the Dutch wbsoprogram (r&d subsidies) found that
this triggered additional private investments of 2 to 94 percent (Brouwer et al.
2002; De Jong and Verhoeven 2007).
3W e   adopt only part of Hayek’s perspective: the heterogeneity, dispersion and
local nature of knowledge. We do not adopt Hayek’s view of laissez faire. What
Hayek neglects is the social, interactive nature of knowledge, and the resulting
importance of interaction, which encounters obstacles and system and institu-
tional failures that often require government action. 
4T h e   oecd (1998: 102) has defined ‘systemic failures’ as mismatches between 
the components of an innovation system. More specifically, it refers to a situation
in which organisations, institutions, or interactions between elements of the
innovation system are inappropriate or missing (Edquist 2001). 
5A s noted earlier, investment in education/human capital might be necessary to
improve the absorptive capacity of firms, in order to use new technologies in 
the production process (Bovenberg and Theeuwes 2004). A lack of investments
in education can be seen as institutional failure, instead of market failure (Boven-
berg and Theeuwes 2004).
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Gerard de Vries
2.1 economic growth, productivity and innovation
2.1.1 introduction: the importance of economic growth
The functioning of welfare states profits immensely from a fair measure of
economic growth. It enables them to cope with structural changes of their
economies and labour markets, to address new challenges such as those stem-
ming from the ageing of the population and climatic changes, and to enact
reforms to modernise its social arrangements. Furthermore, economic growth
provides the means for realising the demands of the population for more
economic progress and more welfare. Therefore, it is interesting to assess the
extent to which innovation can contribute to the emergence of economic growth.
2.1.2 the contribution of innovation to economic growth
Innovation is considered an important factor of economic growth, and more
often than not, as the single most important factor. William Baumol thinks that
it is obvious that “a reliable stream of innovation is the most important require-
ment for the remarkable long-run economic growth that has been experienced by
the industrialised economies in the past two centuries” (Baumol 2004: 186). In
the same vein, Paul Romer is convinced “beyond any doubt” that “discovery,
invention, and innovation are of overwhelming importance in economic growth”
(Crafts 2004: 205).
However, the role of innovation is seldom given its full due because its meaning
is limited usually to that of economic growth. Its importance in general with
regard to welfare is even greater. Of the seven major factors that affect happiness
only two concern economic values: income and work (Layard 2005: 63). The
other five are family relationships; community and friends; health; personal free-
dom and personal values, which can all profit immensely from innovation as
well. The scientific progress in the medicine and health care sector may be of vital
importance in many cases. The same can be said of the social sciences, which help
us to understand and improve human relationships.
The assertion that innovation is the “mainspring of economic growth” (The Econ-
omist 2007: 29) has been the subject of a great deal of research. From an historical
point of view, economic growth is a rather recent phenomenon. Over the past
two centuries, per capita income has risen 14-fold world-wide. Prior to 1820,
economic growth was quite limited and parallel to the increases in population,
which left per capita income roughly unaltered (Maddison 2004: 29). Over the
past two centuries, not only economic growth, but also increases in capital and
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capita income seems to be a salient one. Growth accounting was introduced to
investigate the contributions of the various factors. If one supposes that the tradi-
tional factors, labour and capital, show constant returns, one can thus calculate
what the rate of economic growth would have been without the contributions of
increases in the labour force and in capital. By subtracting the weighted growth
rates of the capital stock and the labour force (weighted by the share of wages for
labour and one minus this share for capital ) from the growth rate of gdp, the
result is a residual that can not be attributed to traditional factors. This residual is
the rate with which the so-called total factor productivity or multiple factor
productivity increases, because it is caused by an increase of their productivity
and not of their volumes.
This method of eliminating the roles of the growth of capital stock and labour can
be refined by also taking into account the increase in the quality of the traditional
factors. Thus, the impact of improved or longer education and of improvements
in machinery and equipment is eliminated as well. The resulting total factor of
productivity (tfp) can be distinguished from the ‘crude’ or ‘unrefined’ tfp,
which does not specify the improvements in quality. Because tfpis a residual,
which is derived after the exhaustive application of available statistical knowl-
edge, Abramovitz has called it “a measure of our ignorance” (Verspagen 2005:
490). Because tfpis the result of all of the factors that influence economic
performance other than labour and capital, each of these factors might be given
preference. Many authors have attributed the growth of tfp, largely or wholly, to
technological change (Helpman 2004: 34-5), but there is no evidence for this
claim (Crafts 2004: 216).
In order to give an impression of the main explanatory sources behind the growth
of tfp, one can use Denison’s pioneering work and Maddison’s studies as guides.
See table 2.1.
The authors have three sources in common: b, c and e. The catch-up effect results
from adopting technologies and business methods used in more productive and
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Table 2.1 Sources of tfp growth
Denison Maddison
aA d v a n c e s in knowledge
bC a t c h - u p  e f f e c t Catch-up effect
cI m p r o v ed allocation of resources Structural effect
dF o reign trade effect
eE c o n o mies of scale Scale effect
fU n e x p lained
Source: Baily and Kirkegaard 2004: 37; Crafts 2004: 210.better performing countries and industries. The structural effect occurs with a
shift of employment from low productive sectors to higher productive sectors.
The benefit of scale effects occurs when extensive production enables the applica-
tion of technologies that are only feasible for mass production. Compared with 
the growth of productivity that is realised within sectors, the growth that results
from shifts between sectors is currently rather small (Erken et al.2007, Table A.2).
One may notice that cultural, political, fiscal and cyclical factors are not listed
among the sources presented by Denison and Maddison, although it is clear that
tfpmust register any impact these factors may have on the growth of gdp.
This section is devoted to the assessment of the importance of innovation for
economic growth. It is therefore crucial to learn to what extent the categories
presented in table 2.1, are related to innovation. This question enters a difficult
area, which concerns the conceptual, analytical and size dimensions of innova-
tion, which makes a short digression on these issues permissible. The subject of
innovation has been analysed by economic theorists, econometric researchers
and statisticians. The founder of the theory of innovation is Joseph Schumpeter
who distinguished five types of innovation; the introduction of new products
and new methods of production; the opening of new markets; the development
of new sources of supply for inputs; and the creation of a new market structure in
an industry (oecd/ec 2005: 29)
Econometric research has concentrated on the quantification and interpretation
of tfp, the studies of which resulted in the categories mentioned in table 2.1,
which are rather different from those of Schumpeter. Statisticians have devel-
oped comprehensive frameworks to comprehend the sometimes elusive elements
of innovation. The Oslo Manual that was developed by the oecd and ec, has
reached its third edition, with the previous one focussing mainly on technology
and manufacturing. The third edition provides three extensions: the role of link-
ages in innovation processes; the inclusion of services and the acknowledgement
of organisation and marketing as a source of innovation (oecd/ec 2005b: 11).
The Oslo Manual defines innovation as “the implementation of a new or signifi-
cantly improved product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method,
or a new organisational method in business practices, workplace organisation or
external relations” (oecd/ec 2005b: 46).
Besides the Oslo Manual, three other manuals have also been developed espe-
cially for Research & Development (Frascati Manual), patents (Patents Manual)
and human resources (Canberra Manual) (oecd/ec 2005b: 23). The ec devel-
oped a survey based on the Oslo Manual in order to promote the comparability of
innovative activities in its member states (Smith 2005: 163).
The various concepts and definitions of innovation and their measurements need
to be brought in accordance because it does not make sense to attribute an impact
based on a broadly defined concept of innovation to a narrowly selected innova-
tive activity. Another problem is that much of the statistical information is
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as the ultimate goal of innovation is improved total production, inputs are poor
substitutes for outputs because of the often deficient relationship between inno-
vative inputs and their intended outputs (Economist Intelligence Unit 2007: 7).
Although the definition of the Oslo Manual mentions ‘newness’ as a consistent
requirement for an innovation, it is also clear that this novelty does not have to be
of a radical nature, nor does it mean new in the sense of nonexistent prior to the
introduction of the innovation. For this reason it seems clear that both the catch-
up effect and the scale effect mentioned in table 2.1 may be classified as resulting
from innovation.
2.1.3 the contribution of labour to economic growth
A country’s population contributes to its economic welfare by the extent to
which it is employed or self-employed. Several factors determine this extent:
–t h e  s h a r e of the population participating in the active labour force;
–t he number of hours of work for a full-time job per week and per year;
–t he share of part-time work;
–t h e  n umber of years people are employed over the course of a lifetime.
Economic welfare is measured in terms of gdp per capita, it therefore follows
that labour contributes to increases in economic welfare only when the labour
force grows faster than the population as a whole. Although this type of increase
has a lasting effect on economic welfare, the increase itself can only be realised
once for all. The opportunities for fostering economic growth by higher partici-
pation, as opposed to innovation, are limited over the long term.
The labour participation rate in the Netherlands is among the highest in Europe,
which means that the probability of any further increases seems rather limited.
Meanwhile, however, the participation levels of women and the elderly are in
terms of full-time equivalents (much) lower than those in the best performing
countries, which means that some improvements can be made in these areas
(wrr2007: 45-8).
Considering the second and third factors mentioned above, an increase seems to
be highly dependent on the preferences of the people involved. It seems that the
percentage of people in the eu (15) who prefer to work fewer hours is much
higher than the percentage of those who prefer to work longer hours (cpb/scp
2006: 67). The conclusion is that labour volume, notwithstanding the fact that
there is still some room for improvement, is not a factor that is likely to increase
economic growth substantially.
This can be illustrated by noting that all four factors, mentioned earlier in this
section, on balance, actually have had a negative impact on economic growth in
the Netherlands (and a minor positive impact in the eu-15 area) (ec 2006: 23).
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As has already been noted, economic growth as a source of economic prosperity
requires an increase in the output per work hour. The various factors which
constitute the growth of labour productivity are summarised in table 2.2., which
reveals how, by eliminating the three different contributions, the growth of
refined tfpcan then be derived from the rate of economic growth.     
Of course, it would be very interesting to learn which forces are behind the three
main factors mentioned at the end of table 2.2. This will require a switch from
macro to micro-economic analysis, because these forces lie within the entrepre-
neurial domain. The growth of labour productivity is presented in table 2.3.     
Based on the data presented in various studies concerning tfp, it can tentatively
be indicated that in the first half of the previous century (some major) oecd
countries showed (refined) tfpgrowth averaging 0.5 percent annually (Crafts
2004: 210), while in the third quarter, the percentages ranged from 0.5 to 3.5
(Crafts 2-4: 210; Baily and Kirkegaard 2004: 37), with the fourth quarter showing
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Table 2.2 Decomposition of labour productivity growth
Economic growth
Minus: Contribution of increases in the number of hours worked (1)
Growth of labour productivity
Minus: Contribution of the growth of capital stock (2)
Growth of unrefined tfp
Minus: Contributions of better education, and an increase in the quality of capital (3)
Growth of refined tfp
The main factors that explain the growth of tfp:
–C a t c h - u p  e f f e c t
–S t r u c t u r al effect
–S c a l e  e f f e c t







Source: Smid 2005growth rates averaging 1 percent (Crafts 2004: 210; Kets and Lejour 2003: 9;
Gomez-Salvador et al. 2006: 18).
Comparison of these figures with the ones in table 2.3 that correspond in period,
suggests that 30 to 60 percent of labour productivity growth can be explained by
tfpgrowth, the remainder being due to increased levels of education and
increases in capital stock and its quality (cf. also Crafts 2004: 211; Helpman 2004:
33-4). This margin of 30-60 percent is not uninteresting because it seems that the
share of tfpis higher when the growth rate of labour productivity is higher. This
is rather plausible, when one assumes that the increases in levels and duration of
education, and the increases in capital stock and its quality, may have had a fairly
stable impact during the long period concerned.
2.1.5 conclusions
Economic welfare in the near future will be mainly dependent upon the growth
of labour productivity, and not on labour utilisation. Moreover, labour productiv-
ity is dependent on both education and the increases in the quantity and quality
of labour, on the one hand, and the growth of tfp, on the other. The higher the
growth rate goal, the more crucial the growth of tfpbecomes. Furthermore, it is
very likely that, in view of the many factors discussed and summarised in table
2.2, innovation is the most important single factor explaining economic growth.
With the growth of tfpattributed, to a large extent, to innovation, policy meas-
ures to foster economic growth should ultimately be directed at the strengthen-
ing of the innovative capacities of the economy.
2.2 productivity in the eu, us and the netherlands
The conclusion that innovation is most likely the most important single factor
determining economic growth drawn in the previous section, seems to be more
relevant for the Netherlands than for the rest of the oecd area as a whole. Two
arguments support this observation. First, the contribution of labour to economic
growth has changed more drastically in the Netherlands than elsewhere and,
second, the prospect for growth based on innovation is poorer. In this section,
the Dutch case will be discussed vis-à-vis the ec and the us.
2.2.1 international comparison     
Table 2.4 presents growth data for the us, some major ec countries and the
Netherlands, with Finland as one of the outstanding performers gdp growth is
often considered the most important measure of economic performance.  
Average growth rates seem to be the best in the us, Finland and the Netherlands.
Economic growth divided by population growth yields the per capita gdp growth
rate, the most common key figure for increases in economic wealth. It appears
that the per capita figures tend to converge. If we subtract the contribution of a
higher participation rate from gdp per capita, gdp per employed person results,
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contribution resulting from an increase in hours worked per person, the hourly
gdp emerges.1
In table 2.4, the final column clearly reveals a narrow margin, with all of the 
countries’ showing figures within the range of 1.6 to 2 percent, with the exception
of Finland. Going from the third column to the final one, it isn’t clear why the
higher growth rate of the Netherlands, when compared to Germany, France and
the uk, results in the lowest hourly gdprate in the Netherlands among the four.
Figure 2.1 GDP per capita and hour worked in the EU-15 relative to the US, 1960-2006 (US=100)
Source: The Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Centre, Total Economy
Database, January 2007, http://www.ggdc.net
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Table 2.4 Growth data (annual percentage changes)
gdpgrowth gdpper capita gdpper employed  gdp
person hourly
years 70-80 80-90 90-00 70-80 80-90 90-00 70-80 80-90 90-00 90-00
us 3.2 3.2 3.2 2.1 2.2 2.2 0.8 1.4 1.9 1.6
Germany 2.7 2.2 1.6 2.6 2.0 1.3 2.6 1.7 1.5 1.8
France 3.3 2.4 1.8 2.7 1.8 1.4 2.7 2.1 1.3 1.7
uk 1.9 2.7 2.3 1.8 2.5 1.9 1.7 2.0 2.0 2
Finland 3.5 3.1 2.2 3.1 2.7 1.8 2.5 2.4 2.9 3
Netherlands 2.9 2.2 2.9 2.1 1.6 2.2 2.6 1.3 0.8 1.7












































































































6Presenting growth rates as averages for the past decades hides the breach that has
emerged since 1995. Until 1995, gdp per hour worked increased more in the eu-
15 than in the us. Since 1995, however, the eu-15 increase has been less than that
in the us, as shown in graph 2.1 and discussed in detail below. Meanwhile, it
becomes clear from table 2.4 that the Dutch growth record over the 1990s was
due to a population increase and increased labour participation, and not to
productivity, which ranks among the lowest among the countries investigated.
Countries can be compared with respect to both increases in productivity and
level of productivity. When measuring the latter, it appears that a number of Euro-
pean countries have productivity levels (well) above that of the us(see table 2.5).
Bouclès and Cette (2005) argue that, in order to make the figures more compara-
ble, two corrections must be made. First, Europeans work (when considering
both regular full-time and part-time work weeks) shorter hours than workers in
the us, which lowers the us level because of the law of diminishing returns.
Second, most European countries have employment rates that are (much) lower
than those in the us. The most productive people will be hired first, which means
that higher participation levels leads to lower levels of productivity. Taking into
account these differences gives the so-called ‘structural’ hourly productivity
figures. See table 2.6., which only presents the countries that, after the correc-
tion, still show higher productivity levels than the us. Data for the Netherlands
are also presented.
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Note: The authors refer to three sets of data H. This table presents two figures for each country to cover their range.
Source: Bourlès and Cette 2005




Source: see table 2.5It can be concluded that the superior productivity level of the Dutch economy
compared with the American is due largely to the more favourable composition
of its smaller labour force. Moreover, as a result of the recent slowdown in
productivity growth, the level of productivity in the Dutch market economy has
declined to below that of the American economy, even when structural values are
disregarded (Inklaar et al. 2006, table 4).
This slowdown in Europe dates from 1995, as is shown in figure 2.1, and has 
been discussed in numerous articles. Recent figures from the Groningen Growth
& Development Centre show that, notwithstanding the actual developments
(recording the lowest rate of productivity growth in more than a decade in the us
in 2006) there has been a remarkable reversal of positions between the eu-15 and
the us (see table 2.7).
It is clear that while the eu led in the first period when compared to the us, it has
now dropped below the us in the second, more recent period. This reversal is
even more detrimental to the Netherlands, which already had the lowest growth
rates in the period 1980-1995 (see table 2.8).
These figures show that the Dutch economy had the lowest productivity rates of




Table 2.7 gpdper hour worked (average annual percentages changes)
1980-1995 1995-2006
eu-15 2.3 1.4
United States 1.3 2.2
Source: ggdc/tcb Total Economy Database, January 2007, www.ggdc.net







Average of 15 eu countries 2.3 1.8
Source: see table 2.7There have been investigations to clarify the causes of this reversal in the produc-
tivity figure rankings for the eu and the us, and, before turning our attention to
the Dutch case, some of the reasons that emerged will be discussed in some detail
in the next section.
2.2.2 explaining the productivity gap between the eu and us
In this section the productivity gap between the eu and the us will be discussed.
Because the institutional arrangements and the size of the public sector in these
two areas differ so greatly, it may seem necessary for the eu to not try to dupli-
cate the us strategy. However, a comparison might indicate that there is room for
improvements in the eu.
‘European Paradox’
This paradox concerns the situation that, while the eu has a better record in the
area of scientific output than the us, it does not benefit from this fact because it is
unable to convert this scientific excellence into profitable innovation. Dosi et al.
(2005), however, have argued that there is no such paradox. In terms of top publi-
cations; expenditures for r&d; share of tertiary education; and the budgets avail-
able for these students, the us always outperforms the eu.
The Role of the ict
Much importance has been attached to the role of information and communica-
tion technology (ict) to explain the production gap. The eu allegedly had three
disadvantages in this respect when compared to the us: it produces less ict, it
uses less ict and it is slower in reaping the benefits from ict. These concerns
have received ample attention from Van Ark and other researchers at the Gronin-
gen Growth and Development Centre. In the Netherlands, an entire issue of the
economic biweekly esbwas devoted to this subject (Van Ark and Inklaar 2005,
note 1 and esb2006). However, the impact of ict is not as evident as it may seem.
Van Ark and Inklaar show that ict production in the us yielded more productiv-
ity than in the eu, but this is also the case for market services (Van Ark and
Inklaar 2005, fig. 4). Furthermore, the sectors which caused most of the produc-
tivity gap are on average not characterised by a large share of ict capital in total
capital services (ibid.; figs. 5 and 6). In addition, the slowdown of productivity
growth in the eu’s non-ict sectors was greater than in other sectors (Van Ark
2005a: 14; Gomez-Salvador et al. 2006, fig. 5). However, on the other hand,
successful ict applications seem indispensable for non-technological innova-
tions (Van Ark 2007: 61).
Service sector
The service sector currently accounts for more than 70 percent of gdpin the Euro
area (ea). This sector consists of three components: trade and transportation (ca.
20%), financial and business services (ca. 30%) and governmental services (ca.
20%). Increases in labour productivity in this sector have been very limited com-
pared to that of the manufacturing sector as well as when compared to the us. Pro-
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might explain (part of) the productivity gap. The most striking difference occurs
in two sub-sectors: wholesale and retail trade (ecb2007). Larger retail outlets like
Wal-Mart, Home Depot and Best Buy make the exploitation of economies of scale,
and a fuller use of ictpossible (Gordon 2004; ecb2007). Here, it should be noted
that the Netherlands have pursued a deliberate policy of limiting the location of
superstores, thus depriving itself from advantages of increasing scale. Another
conspicuous difference is that the ushas twice as many highly skilled workers in
market services than in the eu(Inklaar et al.2007, table 5).
And lastly, governmental services constitute an obstacle as increases in produc-
tion in this sector are difficult to determine. It is not easy to measure the output of,
say, a ministry. Government sector output in many oecdcountries is commonly
measured by its inputs. This, of course, obliterates any increase in productivity.
Hence, countries with larger public sectors tend to have lower productivity levels
than countries with smaller public sectors. This method of measuring the output
of the government sector has been regarded as unsatisfactory , especially when the
likelihood of real productivity increases is very strong. For example, with the
introduction of ictin administrative services, there is much evidence that there
are clear productivity gains. For this reason the uk, notwithstanding the obvious
problems it has encountered, has switched from measuring inputs to measuring
outputs (Atkinson 2005). In the Netherlands, productivity increases in the public
sector are supposed to equal the wage drift in this sector, which is 1/ 4percent for
2007 and 2008 (cpb2007: 110).
r&d
As r&d spending in percentages of gdp is substantially higher in the us than in
Europe, it has been suggested that the productivity gap could be lessened by
stimulating r&d in Europe (Daveri 2004: 31). However, the relationship between
r&d activities and successful innovations is far from clear and have not been
persuasively demonstrated (Jaumotte and Pain 2005b: 25, table 13). To innovate,
the productive useof new technology is crucial, and r&d is not necessarily the
right vehicle for this (Van Ark 2005b: 85). Most of the productivity growth
derived from r&d is obtained from r&d that originates abroad (Guellec and Van
Pottelsberghe 2001: 113). The importance of foreign r&d is not incompatible with
another finding that on average almost half of successful product innovations are
imitations (Jaumotte and Pain 2005b: 25).
Thus, it seems that the productivity gap that the Dutch economy appears to
suffer from more than the eu member states on average (see table 2.8), cannot be
explained, so it seems, by pointing to macroeconomic causes. And even if a
distinct explanation was offered, the question remains what the best remedy
would be.
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Ranking a country’s innovative potential is a hazardous enterprise. Ultimately, it
is the contribution to economic growth that matters, but the channels through
which this contribution is realised has neither been definitively identified nor
quantified. For this reason, comparative statistics continue to rely heavily on
innovation inputs and innovation enablers. Patents are often considered innova-
tion outputs, although it is their successful and profitable application that actu-
ally matters. Moreover, trademarks, design registrations and copyrights are also
used as means to protect intellectual property. Nevertheless, the Economist
Intelligence Unit has developed a ranking based primarily on patents, innovation
inputs and innovation enablers. Their index shows the Netherlands dropping
from ninth to 13th place in the forecast for the period 2007-2111 (2007: 13).
In this respect, the European Innovation Scoreboard (eis) is also important. It
compares the innovation performances of the eu countries and also includes
countries such as the us, Japan, Switzerland, Norway and Iceland. Here the
Netherlands ranks 11th, and does not belong to the category of innovation leaders.
Instead it is categorised as an ‘innovation follower.’ The scoreboard consists of 25
indicators, divided into five subcategories (see table 2.9).
Information about the three countries with the highest score on each of the 25
indicators is also presented. In this way the European member states can qualify
for 75 recognitions as best performer. For these 75 places for European innovation
leaders, the Netherlands only qualifies only once (eis, table 2).
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Table 2.9 Dutch ranking in the subcategories of the eis
Innovation drivers 10
Knowledge creation 10
Innovation and Entrepreneurship 18
Applications 18
Intellectual property 8
Source: eis 2006, www.proinno-europe.eu/inno-metrics.html
Table 2.10 Dutch ranking in sciences and research
Share of hrst occupations 4
Of which are researchers 20
Scientific articles 5
r&d expenditures 15
Attractiveness of foreign r&d location 9
Source: oecd 2006: 93; oecd 2005a: 159; oecd 2006: 23; oecd 2006: 135Other indicators concerning human resources in science and technology (hrst)
can be sampled from oecd sources (see table 2.10).
Although the Netherlands ranks fairly high as an r&d attractive country, it comes
in 20th place as a current foreign r&d location (oecd 2006: 134). The high costs
of r&d personnel, the limited co-operation between firms and knowledge insti-
tutes and the lower than average availability of private r&d capital may serve as
the primary reasons for this discrepancy (oecd 2005b: 110). The inability to
attract sufficient r&d investments from abroad, accounts for 40 percent of the
lower level of private r&d in the Netherlands when compared to the rest of the
oecd (Erken and Ruiter 2005: 78).
The Netherlands, together with Denmark, Ireland and Luxemburg, has the high-
est gdp per capita (Sapir 2003: 101), so one would expect better scores in the area
of innovation indicators. Moreover, when the Lisbon agenda is also taken into
consideration, the lack of progress is even more remarkable. The Netherlands
scores best in the sciences, which has led the oecd to describe ‘a Dutch paradox’
meaning “an excellent record in knowledge creation, but a mediocre record in
innovation activity, which is defined as the successful development and applica-
tion of new knowledge in new product and/or processes” (oecd 2005b: 104).
2.3 innovation in the market economy and innovation
policy in the netherlands
2.3.1 innovation in the dutch market economy
The Dutch bureau of statistics (cbs; Statistics Netherlands) collects plenty of data
concerning innovation, which is published annually in Kennis en economie
(Knowledge and Economy). Only 24 percent of all Dutch firms employing at least
10 workers, can boast having had an innovation in the period 2002-2004. Look-
ing at the various sectors it appears that this figure is roughly similar for the serv-
ice sector. As this figure of 24 percent is exceeded in the manufacturing sector
(40%), it is clear that this implies lower figures in the remaining sectors. Product
innovation occurs more frequently than process innovation. While firms
involved in both the innovation of their products and their processes, form a
minority (cbs 2006: 129-31). In most cases, product innovation leads to a broader
assortment of products and services offered, or new markets, or an improvement
in the quality of the services and/or products. Process innovation leads to more
flexibility or a greater capacity, or generates lower costs or a higher level of effec-
tiveness (cbs 2006: 153). If one were to concentrate solely on the novelty of a
product, the share of sales of products ‘new to the firm’ in terms of turnover is
about 24 percent in the manufacturing sector, 14 percent in the services sector,
with both figures being below the eu average, 29 percent and 19 percent respec-
tively (oecd 2005a: 166).
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one can conclude that social innovation occurs at a slightly higher rate than tech-
nological innovation. Social innovation may involve internal organisation, new
marketing concepts, or improved customer and supplier relationships (ser 2006:
27). It is intensely related to ‘tacit knowledge’, which includes skills, customs,
intuition, and cultures within the involved firms (Weehuizen and Soete 2001:
43). Research indicates that service sector firms that are actively engaged in social
innovation, experience the highest productivity increases (cpb 2002: 148).
It has been observed that better education is a decisive factor for fostering inno-
vation. Because of this skill levels have received renewed attention. Top perform-
ers, or those with the highest levels of skills, seem to be particularly important
when it comes to increased productivity. The Netherlands is in the top ten coun-
tries in the world, when countries are ranked according to the levels of the skills
of their labour force. However, when the ranking is focussed on the top five
percentage of the labour force with the highest skill levels, the Netherlands falls
out of this elite and ranks only as thirteenth (Minne et al. 2007: 25, 47).
In the Netherlands, r&d expenditures as a percentage of gdp is below both the
eu-15 and oecd average (cbs 2006: 79). As has already been mentioned, this is in
part explained by the Netherlands’ inability to attract a sufficient inflow of
foreign r&d. However, a larger factor is the very structure of the Dutch economy,
which is less knowledge-intensive than the average oecd economy. As Erken
and Ruiter rightly stipulate, it is very doubtful that this is an explanation, which
might serve as a justification. On the contrary, so it seems. In general, it is the
less-advanced economies that need to undergo an intensification of r&d activi-
ties, rather than merely being resigned to their predicament (Erken and Ruiter
2005: 78-79).
2.3.2 innovation policy in the netherlands
In assessing the Dutch system of innovation, the oecd highlights a number of
positive features: the high quality of its scientific research, the high rate of
patenting, the rich endowments with hrst and the positive framework condi-
tions resulting from generally sound economic policies. However, on the nega-
tive side, the oecd emphasises the low level of private r&d, the less than opti-
mal interaction between industry and academia, insufficient innovative
entrepreneurial activity and the limited ability to commercialise scientific output
(oecd 2005a: 153-4).
Dutch innovation policy, in some respects, addresses the problems listed above.
The Ministry of Economic Affairs spends some 1 billion Euros on innovation, or
about 0.2 percent gdp (ez2006: 7). About 60 percent of this is spent on a large
number of items related to either supportive measures aimed at facilitating inno-
vation or to specific industries to strengthen their innovation efforts. About 40
percent is spent on wbso, a fiscal incentive for innovation, i.e., a tax deduction
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Furthermore, there are numerous smaller measures that have been developed,
which has led, according to the oecd, to a plethora of instruments (oecd 2005b:
114). A comparable budget is also spent on research and science by the ministry of
Education, Culture and Science (oc&W 2006: 161-64). This budget is allocated
to a large number of institutes and organisations for research or for the chan-
nelling of this money to research projects based on various criteria, including the
degree of excellence of the research itself.
Although the abundance of instruments may reflect the manifold demands the
various parties involved in innovation have, a lack of transparency may be the
result. The Dutch Ministry for Economic Affairs has, for this reason, taken steps
to reduce the number of instruments and to improve the ease of access to the
various instruments for each target group (ez2006: 129). Tax incentives to
promote r&d, like the wbso, may be an effective measure as many studies have
shown (oecd 2003b: 24). The same can be said for the innovation voucher which
has been introduced to enable the sme in particular to use external resources for
technological innovation (Cornet et al. 2007: 48).
The desirability of stimulating promising innovative enterprises (‘backing
winners’) has been questioned frequently. Generally speaking, government fund-
ing can replace private payments. If the government pays for (or contributes to)
investments which would have been made in the absence of public funding by
the private sector, its impact might be very limited. The final result might be even
a negative one because of the distortion being caused by taxes. oecd case studies
indicate that the percentage of (partial) substitutions range from 25 percent to 80
percent (oecd 2006a). This percentage only increases when successful firms can
profit from this kind of funding. Another oecd study strongly suggests that r&d
in the private sector is not affected by tax relief (oecd 2003b, fig. 1).
A sometimes implicit evaluation of Dutch innovation policy can be derived from
prevailing opinions. Dutch economists, in their role as policy advisors, are greatly
concerned about the lack of productivity growth in the Netherlands. They have
thus recommended more competition (rea 2005; cpb 2005; kvs2004: 207)
although there is a clear indication that competition should not be promoted
beyond its optimum (Boone and Van Damme 2004). They also believe that there
should be less regulation because some regulations frustrate innovation and
entrepreneurship (rea, kvs) and that more attention should be paid to educa-
tion, science and research (cpb, rea, Van Wijnbergen 2004). That part of the
present policy mix that can be aptly labelled as ‘backing the winners’, has been
duly criticised, and should, in the view of its critics, be transformed into a policy
of ‘backing the challengers’ (Jacobs and Theeuwes 2004; rea). An original, albeit
singular explanation for the slowdown of the Dutch productivity growth has
been offered by Naastepad and Kleinknecht who regard the Dutch wage modera-
tion as its main cause (2004).
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2.4.1 the urgency of reinforcing the growth potential of the
dutch economy
There are three major reasons that denote that there is an urgency for the
strengthening of Dutch growth potential:
–a b s e n ce of factor accumulation as a source for economic growth
–g lobalisation
–s p e c i f i c  c h a r a c teristics of the Dutch innovation system.
Factor accumulation
The ageing of the population in the coming decades is, to varying degrees, rele-
vant for all of the eu countries. The consequences for the Netherlands are espe-
cially severe as the growth of the Dutch economy has until now to a large extent
been based on a steadily increasing participation rate. The labour force has
increased from about 40 percent to 48 percent of the population over the two last
decades. In the coming decades, this percentage, whatever the envisioned
scenario, will continue to decrease (Huizinga and Smid 2004, figure 4.6). Capital
accumulation will also exert a limited influence because the rate of its growth will
be less than that of the gdp (ibid., table 3.5).
Globalisation
The Dutch economy has always profited from economic openness and the cpb
forecasts that it will continue to benefit from international liberalisation. As the
oecd method of ranking countries according to their ‘globalisation-readiness
indicator’ suggests, this depends not only on the capacity to adapt to changing
circumstances but also on one’s capacity to innovate (Bergeijk 2007: 5-7).
In the second half of the twentieth century, the Netherlands made large gains as it
caught up with the advanced technological economy of the us. This situation has
changed drastically because most of the eu members states – including the
Netherlands – have been unable to keep pace with us increases in productivity
But it is not only the us that the European countries have to compete with. Asian
nations like South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia and China currently have
the highest growth rates per capita gdp. Some of these countries actually have
more university degrees per capita in the natural sciences and engineering
departments than eu countries. They also spend more on r&d and acquire more
patents (Fagerberg and Godinho 2005: 527-320). Thus, it is understandable that
the Esko Aho Report ‘Creating an Innovative Europe,’ warns that “Europe and its
citizens should realise that their way of life is under threat” (omc 2007: 11).
Dutch situation
Dutch productivity growth is substantially lower than both us rates, and that of
the eu-15 country average, as can be observed in tables 2.7 and 2.8 above. “No
comparable oecd member country evolved along a growth path that was less
productivity-driven,” than the Netherlands writes the oecd (2005a: 149). More-
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its expected position considering its gdp per capita. Figure 2.2 shows that the
Netherlands cannot even keep abreast with most of the eu averages, let alone the
countries exercising best practices.
Figure 2.2 presents some selected features of innovation systems in the eu. The
dotted line shows the best performers, the regular inner circle reveals the eu
averages, and the light irregular octagonal line represents the scores for the
Netherlands. Clockwise, and starting at the top, the rays show: business sector
r&d expenditures (1); technologically innovative firms in manufacturing (2); the
same in services (3); employment in high tech sectors (4); patents submitted to
epo (5); submitted triadic patents (6); share of technologically (re-) new(ed)
products in total sales in manufacturing (7); and the same in services (8). The
Netherlands appears to perform below the eu average in six out of the eight cate-
gories.
2.4.2 macroeconomic analysis and innovation policy
Macroeconomic analysis has been invaluable in determining the causes of
economic growth and in locating the factors that contribute to it. The importance
of innovation as the main driving force for economic progress is generally
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Netherlands Average Best in Classenigmatic: “we know much less about why and how innovation occurs than what
it leads to” (Fagerberg 2005: 20). In these circumstances, macroeconomists tend
to rely heavily on favourable macroeconomic conditions, as well as on education
and science as has already been mentioned in section 2.4.1. Although harmless,
these no regret policies scarcely address the actual shortcomings of the Dutch
innovation system. As the Economist Intelligence Unit’s report and the “knowl-
edge paradox show, it is not primarily a lack of knowledge which hampers the
Dutch innovation system. It is rather a lack of a profitable application of this
knowledge that needs the attention. A similar comment can be made regarding
the recommendation to reduce the number of regulations, because both the prod-
uct market and sectoral regulations are less strict than the eu average” (ecb 2007:
81-2).
However, as Jacobs and Theeuwes (2004: 197) have noted, it is “far from easy to
develop effective instruments” for innovation policy. These limitations may be
due to the very nature of the macroeconomic discipline, which is “usually unable
to determine the direction the causality flows from one event to the other,” as
Lewis, rather harshly, believes (2004: 7). One can, however, agree with Jan-
Willem Oosterwijk, the former Secretary-General of the Dutch Ministry of
Economic Affairs. He noted that although the need to reinforce Dutch macroeco-
nomic basics has largely been dealt with, there is currently a need for a reform
agenda inspired by microeconomic challenges regarding the labour market and
the innovation system (Oosterwijk 2007: 5) The better strategy for reinforcing
the Dutch innovation system seems to investigate micro-economic relationships
relevant to the development of innovation in order to improve the functioning of
the Dutch innovation system.
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1O n the basis of gdp/population = gdp/employed person x employed
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3.1 introduction
In chapters 1 and 2 one conclusion was that for a foundation of innovation policy
we need to move beyond macro analyses of factor productivity and into the inno-
vation system, with micro-level analyses of actions and interactions of the actors
involved, in the context of institutions and institutional change. r&d does not
directly yield innovation, but a pool of ideas and emergent technologies, prod-
ucts, and practices, which require testing, design, commercialization, marketing,
and the development of production. This requires entrepreneurship and organi-
sation, internally within firms and externally, within networks of firms. r&d
may also serve to explore new developments and opportunities, build up absorp-
tive capacity, knowledge on sources of knowledge and contacts for future collab-
oration. The innovation process is not linear, but entails feedback from testing, as
well as trial and application to the generation of new knowledge. In this chapter,
we attempt to contribute to further insight on the micro level of actions and
interactions, from the perspective of learning by interaction, which is also central
in the literature on innovation systems (Lundvall 1988).
As in the literature on innovation systems, an important source of inspiration
here is an evolutionary perspective, which recognises the fundamental impor-
tance of uncertainty and unpredictability, in the emergent nature of innovation,
and the crucial role of diversity as a source of novelty. This in itself has important
policy implications, as it points to the limitations of rational planning and design
of innovation. However, we also recognise that learning is inherently social, and
hence we should derive insight also from theory of cognition, communication,
language, and motivation, and these do not necessarily conform to details of
Darwinian evolution as found in biology. In other words, while cultural evolu-
tion may derive important insights from neo-Darwinian theory, it is not neces-
sarily isomorphic to it.
This chapter outlines and elaborates a ‘cyclical model’ of innovation, where the
development of new knowledge and new practices (exploration) and the
improvement of existing practices (exploitation) build upon each other. A key
theme is how such a combination can be achieved, in spite of fundamental differ-
ences between exploitation and exploration, and between the conditions of
markets and organisation that they require. Among other things, the analysis
offers a deepening of our understanding of why collaboration furthers innovation
and the positive role of differences in insight (‘cognitive distance’).
The analysis will have implications for policy concerning universities and rela-
tions between universities and industry (chapter 4), entrepreneurship (chapter
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ter 10), and regional innovation systems (chapter 11).
3.2 evolution and learning
According to the evolutionary perspective, new forms of life emerge without
prior, goal-directed design, in a process that is cumulative, and path- and context-
dependent, because development builds upon what has developed before. That
was a revolutionary insight in the field of biology, and presents a formidable chal-
lenge to thinking in management and public administration, including innova-
tion policy. A tenacious, deep-rooted intuition of good management is that
managers know where we should go (goals), the means for goal achievement, and
causal relations between means and goals, from which they can issue directives
(planning) for execution. But the question is how in an uncertain and volatile
world they could know all that. According to an evolutionary perspective, new
forms of life, and analogous to that innovations, can emerge through selection in
an ‘ecological niche’. This comes about as a result of survival pressures on a vari-
ety of more or less blind trials whose success is fundamentally unpredictable,
followed by a broad transmission and adoption of what turns out to be successful.
The maintenance of sources of diversity and mechanisms of selection, and the
recognition that success cannot be predicted are both crucial for innovation
policy. Management and administration become the facilitation of the creation of
variety, selection, and transmission.
In the economy, creation of variety lies in entrepreneurship, invention, and basic
research. Selection lies in experimental testing within firms, competition in the
ecological niche of an organisation, and regulation. Transmission lies in educa-
tion, training, and imitation. This connects with the notion of the market as a
discovery process, as suggested by Hayek, where perceptions, knowledge, and
ideas are widespread, diverse, and rich in local specificities, across a wide variety
of actors that interact to generate Schumpeterian ‘novel combinations’.
According to evolutionary theory, the development of new forms of life (species)
is stimulated by a change of ecological niche (‘niche selection’), as a result of
external events, such as a disaster or climate change, or because of migration to a
different but existing niche.1 Analogous to that I will argue that innovation is
stimulated by the application of products, knowledge, and technology in new
environments (countries, markets, industries, technologies, or organisations)
that are sought or imposed. Modern evolutionary theory also recognises ‘niche
creation’, where species have an impact on their selection environment, in co-
evolution with it. Analogous to that I will argue that innovations affect markets,
and that while markets require institutions, they also produce institutions, which
can provide obstacles to further innovation. Therefore, for innovation, one may
need to escape to an outside niche. Thus niche creation can create a need for the
selection of another niche. These considerations form an important part of the
basis for an argument for creating or maintaining openings, in innovation policy.
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markets and competition in a traditional economic perspective, the path- and
context dependence of evolution stands in contrast with economic claims of
universalistic structures and mechanisms, and similar universalistic pretensions
in innovation policy. In particular, local and regional agglomerations and clusters
of activity have emerged from an interplay of local specificities, deliberate poli-
cies, quirks of nature, chance events, institutional and political conditions, and
outside developments, in historical processes. As a result it is very hazardous to
infer general ‘recipes’ for activities that can be transplanted elsewhere. This point
is further taken up in chapter 11.
In political thought, the Austrian/evolutionary perspective has emerged,
although not under that banner, in the notion of ‘experimentalism’ or ‘directly-
deliberative polyarchy’ (Gerstenberg and Sabel 2002). Here also, the idea is that
local diversity of knowledge and insight, and room for experimentation, form 
a basis for learning and development, here of institutions and government. 
This notion of experimentalism forms perhaps the most fundamental idea for 
the policy view taken in this volume. It yields a preference for government 
that resists the urge to conduct centralised, top-down planning, and sees its 
task as granting the autonomy, and creating conditions and boundary conditions
for:
“... lower level actors to experiment with solutions of their own devising within broadly defined
areas of public policy. In return they furnish central or higher-level units with their rich informa-
tion regarding their goals as well as the progress they are making ..., and agree to respect in their
actions framework rights of democratic procedure and substance … With periodic pooling of
results ... (that) reveals the defects of parochial solutions, and allows the elaboration of standards for
comparing local achievements, exposing poor performers to criticism from within and without,
and making of good ones (temporary) models for emulation” (Gerstenberg and Sabel 2002).
However, the evolutionary perspective also has its limitations (Nooteboom
2001). It is useful for a conceptual twist away from intuitions of innovation as
central design and planning, and for the basic idea of variety, selection, and trans-
mission of success as the motor of change. However, the further content of those
notions in the economy is different from that in biology. In society, innovation
emerges from cognition and learning. These are social-cultural processes with
their own characteristics (Nooteboom 2001). These limitations of an evolution-
ary perspective are closely related to the limitations of a neo-Darwinian take on
cultural evolution, with its notion of ideas as ‘memes’ in analogy to genes. It is
enlightening to see concepts in a non-essentialist way as emergent, in a process
where new ideas build upon old ones and in the process shift their meanings. It is
also enlightening to recognise that ideas are subjected to survival or death in
selection, by adoption, citation, rejection, or neglect by scientific and policy
communities. It is also revealing to compare disciplines to species, to understand
why difficulties of interdisciplinary research may have a similar function to
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process. It is also useful to note that if invention is to a large extent trial and error,
then the detection of error is indeed needed in selection ‘to clear up the mess’ of
the massive failure of blind trials.
In a strict rendering of universal Darwinism, it should be plausible to explain
phenomena in terms of ‘replicators’ (genes in biology, memes in culture) carried
by “interactors” (Campbell 1974; McKelvey 1982; Hull 1988) or “vehicles”
(Dawkins 1983) that are subject to selection. To function as an interactor, an
entity must have a reasonably cohesive and stable set of components. This is the
ecological side of evolution (Baum and Singh 1994). Interactors carry replicators
that in the ontogenetic development of interactors generate characteristics that
affect their survival and the replication of their replicators. This generation of
characteristics (in biology: gene expression) takes place in interaction, within the
interactor, and between replicators and other features of the interactor, as well as
with the environment of the interactor. Replicators may lie dormant until trig-
gered by conditions. Note that it is not the replicators themselves that determine
survival but the characteristics that they produce. Replicators from surviving
interactors are replicated and re-combined, mostly within populations of interac-
tors that partake of a common pool of replicators. This is the genealogical side of
evolution, in the phylogenetic development of a species.
These conditions hardly apply in culture (as recognised, for example, by an
eloquent promulgator of evolutionary thought such as Daniel Dennet (1995)). In
cultural evolution, it is not clear what or who the interactors are. If ideas or
concepts are the replicators, what are the vehicles and interactors? Are they the
words or symbols in which ideas are expressed, coherent stories and theories, the
media (journals, books, films, computer programmes, websites) that carry them,
mental structures, or the people who generated the ideas or who adopt, reject, or
ignore the ideas? ‘Replication’ is a dubious term for communication. Cognitive
and linguistic theory show that in communication meanings of words get trans-
formed as they are assimilated and embedded in brains, and in the process are
transformed rather than replicated. In evolutionary terms, the implication is that
transmission is also a source of variety creation. Meanings of concepts shift as
they are combined with other concepts, and meanings are context-dependent.
Similarly, identities of people shift as they connect with other people, and identi-
ties are context-dependent. The rate at which meanings of concepts ‘mutate’ is 
so high that the effectiveness of the selection process is in doubt. As generally
recognised, in culture transmission is Lamarckian: new meanings acquired
during life are included in what is transmitted. Ideas mix between different 
carriers, and hence the notion of their ‘lineage’ is problematic. While in biological
evolution lineage only branches out, in culture lines of lineage may come
together again. While in biology extinct species cannot be revived, in culture,
old, discarded concepts can be revived.
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revived, but in a new form, with computer-directed aluminium sails. The idea was not, however,
put into practice, since oil prices fell again.
While genes are malleable in gene expression, in the sense that the characteristics
they generate depend on interaction between genes and the setting in which they
operate, meanings of words appear to vary much more radically as a function
their position in a sentence, a story and the context of action. The co-evolution of
ideas and their selection environment is much closer than co-evolution in biol-
ogy is: since people use communication, novelty and niche creation are much
faster than in biology, and with communicative strategies and political maneu-
vering people generating ideas and innovations can more easily create their own
selection environment. This enhances the importance of niche creation as a
possible obstacle to ongoing innovation.
Within disciplines or fields of research, new schools of thought are often rejected or ignored by the
established orthodoxy. Yet, regularly outsiders find a way out by setting up a society of their own
that subsequently sets up a proprietary journal, with its own editors and editorial board, develop-
ing its own brand of orthodoxy. In the field of innovation an example is the Joseph A. Schumpeter
Society, setting up its Journal of Evolutionary Economics, and in institutional economics an exam-
ple is the European Association for Evolutionary Political Economy, setting up its Journal of Insti-
tutional Economics.
In particular, creativity and the sources of invention remain a black box, and are
neglected in the theory of innovation. Partly, this is because, since Schumpeter,
innovation is defined as the successful application and market introduction of
novelty (cf. chapter 1). Invention is seen, or at least treated, as inexplicable. In
biology, variation is blind, resulting from random mutations of genes and chro-
mosome cross-over, in sexual reproduction. While invention is subject to radical
uncertainty (in the Knightian sense), and is subject to much trial and error, there
is creativity and a certain amount of intelligent inference of causes from phenom-
ena, on the basis of experience and smart experimentation. In evolutionary
terms, variety precedes selection but also arises from it. In other words, economic
evolution, and by implication innovation policy, is not entirely devoid of intelli-
gent design.
The tacit assumption, adopted by intellectual contagion from biological evolu-
tion, that invention and idea creation are blind or random and hence do not admit
of systematic explanation, has led to a focus on application, in innovation and
diffusion, and neglect of sources and processes of invention. That is highly unde-
sirable and unnecessary. It is undesirable because without idea creation there is
no innovation. What is worse, while invention is unpredictable, innovation, seen
as application of something that has proven itself in the market is subject to
rational choice, and innovation policy can fall back on either of two dominant
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resources to the achievement of identifiable goals by known means. The second
mode, when markets fail, is to fall back on rational selection, design and plan-
ning. The problem then is that market mechanisms or planning that are appropri-
ate for the promotion of application may have an adverse effect on idea creation.
This development has been apparent also in knowledge management. Old or ‘type one’ knowledge
management has focused on the efficient utilisation and sharing of existing knowledge, by the
identification of potential users, the specification of roles and tasks, technical standards, meanings
and rules, in which ambiguity is eliminated for the sake of efficiency. People realized that creativity,
in the generation of new ideas, was also important, but since it was ill understood, that was post-
poned to an indefinite future, in the reasonable drive to first grasp the low hanging fruits of exist-
ing knowledge. As for creativity, one would turn to that later. The problem with this is that meas-
ures taken to utilize existing knowledge may obstruct the generation of new insights and
opportunities, which would require an opening up to ambiguity and new meanings that would
upset existing efficiencies, roles, tasks and positions. In short: lack of openness to surprise. As a
result, knowledge management developed into an impasse that is well recognized, and is leading to
attempts to develop knowledge management ‘type two’, to open up to new knowledge creation.
The neglect of idea creation is unnecessary because the possibility to understand
it is not a priori hopeless. The idea that it is hopeless rests upon a misunderstand-
ing. The assumption is that a new idea is by definition unpredictable, because if it
were predictable it would no longer be a new idea. However, one can have some
insight into processes of idea creation without the pretension to an ability to
predict its outcomes. That is relevant for policy that is not geared to outcomes
that are fixed in advance but to processes that yield surprise.
The question for a foundation of innovation policy now is what such insight in
idea creation might be. For this, we need an excursion into theory of cognition. It
is hardly surprising that for an analysis of innovation, in the ‘knowledge econ-
omy’ and in a ‘learning society’, some insight is needed in knowledge and learn-
ing.
3.3 cognition
Learning can mean the adoption of existing knowledge and competence (learning
type 1), and it can mean the development of new knowledge (learning type two),
also called ‘experiential learning’ in the literature on organizaisational learning.
This distinction runs parallel to the distinction, in the innovation literature,
between the adoption and the production of innovations. As we shall see,
however, the adoption and production of innovations interact. In experiential
learning, the development of new knowledge is grounded in experience, i.e., the
application and adaptation of existing knowledge. It is important to understand
how this interaction between application and creation of knowledge works. For
policy, it has implications for how to stimulate not only the application of knowl-
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the other way around, how experience forms the basis for new scientific insights,
which is neglected in policy.
Here we employ a constructivist, interactionist perspective on cognition (Berger
and Luckmann 1967). The basic idea is that people perceive the world, and inter-
pret and evaluate it, on the basis of mental categories that are constructed in
interaction with other people. That implies that people see and understand the
world differently to the extent that they have developed their cognition along
different life paths, in different environments, with different experiences, in
different practices, and that consequently people never have identical knowledge
or views. There is, in other words, a greater or lesser ‘cognitive distance’.
An individual’s web of mental categories constitutes his ‘absorptive capacity’: the
ability to form perceptions, interpretations, and understandings. That ability at
the same time constitutes a limitation: we can only absorb what fits. However, in
absorption, or assimilation, there is always to some extent reconstruction. Even
memory is not ‘retrieval’ but reconstruction, conditioned by the contexts and
triggers of memory. The Dutch (and the German) term for memory ‘herinnering
(Erinnerung)’, i.e., ‘re-internalisation’, is literally an accurate term. Knowledge
‘transfer’ carries a misleading connotation since ‘transfer’ in fact entails recon-
struction and transformation. Goods get transferred, ideas get transformed.
Recall that this yielded an argument against a literal interpretation of the term
‘replication’ from evolutionary theory. In other words, learning type 1 can lead to
learning type 2, and indeed to some extent always does.
These ideas go back to the work of developmental psychologists Piaget (1970, 1972,
1974) and Vygotsky (1962), who both proposed, with some important differences,
that intelligence is ‘internalised practice’. One can only ‘assimilate’ perceptions
into existing cognitive frameworks, but assimilation entails processes that lead to
change of cognitive structure (‘accommodation’). Their insights, developed in the
first half of the previous century, were based on observation and experimentation
in the conduct of children. Interestingly, more recent developments in cognitive
science, in the stream of “embodied cognition” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999; Dama-
sio 1995, 2003), the idea is supported by neural research, e.g., in the work of Edel-
man (1987, 1992). That shows how neural-cognitive structures arise from action.
There also, an evolutionary perspective is used, in ‘neural Darwinism’.1This
shows how tentative ideas, grounded in neuronal groupings, in competition with
each other, can reinforce themselves and can dominate depending on the success
of actions that they support, and how new ideas can arise from connections
between old ones, in linkages between neuronal groupings.
The idea of intelligence as internalised practice is important for the analysis of the
knowledge paradox discussed in chapter 1. It suggests that the issue is not only
one of application of knowledge from universities, but goes both ways, meaning
that practice can be a source of inspiring ideas. That is very different from
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But it does suggest the need for interaction between theory and practice, on the
basis of a certain mobility of researchers and developers, between university and
industry, or for collaboration in joint projects. This yields our proposal for the
facilitation of such encounters and collaboration between university and indus-
try. The specification of reasons and ways to do this, as well as feedback from
industry and universities on this idea, are discussed later, in chapter 4.
We propose that cognitive processes in the interaction between theory and prac-
tice also provide the theoretical basis for the ‘cyclical innovation model’ of inter-
action between invention, trial and testing, innovation, and diffusion that has
replaced the old ‘linear model’ of the transfer of knowledge from research (Kline
and Rosenberg 1986).
Below, we analyse how exploration and exploitation may build on each other, in a
‘cycle of discovery’. There is a connection with the notion of “mode 1 and mode 2
science” (Gibbons et al. 1994). In mode 1, mono-disciplinary science and multi-
disciplinary application are separate domains, with their own methods and styles
of thought, but they are connected, generally in the ‘transfer’ of knowledge from
knowledge generation to application and in the programming of knowledge
generation from practical priorities. In mode 2 science, generation and application
of knowledge get integrated, in the joint, ‘transdisciplinary’ creation of knowl-
edge between scientists and ‘stakeholders’, defined as parties that undergo or
exert influence from the development and application of knowledge. Both sides
have legitimate claims of knowledge, of different kinds, which need to be inte-
grated. What our analysis here shares with that perspective is first of all the
underlying constructivist, interactivist epistemology. Second, we share the idea
that application contributes to knowledge creation. However, there is a differ-
ence. While we recognise that generation and application build on each other, we
still recognise different stages, in a cycle of development, with different require-
ments and conditions concerning institutions, organisation, styles of thought
and action, tolerance or appreciation of ambiguity, and uncertainty of goals,
means, and the causal connections between. From application there is an essen-
tial step of disembedding knowledge from its context, so that it may be re-
embedded elsewhere, in a novel application that yields new insights. In some
accounts of mode 2 science (rmno2007) any such distinction seems to disap-
pear, in a total merging of generation and application, in one single process,
which would suggest that there is no longer any division of labour between
universities and industry, and no distinction between invention, innovation, and
diffusion. We reject that.
3.4 cycle of discovery
With the idea that cognition is constructed from interactions of practices we
arrive at an innovation process as a cycle or spiral of invention/idea generation,
development, commercialisation, market penetration, diffusion, consolidation,
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how exploitation and exploration succeed each other and emerge from each
other. Insight into this is only nascent, and requires further development.
One proposal (Nooteboom 2000) of a ‘cycle of discovery’ was originally inspired
by the work of Piaget on the development of intelligence in children. Here it is
applied at the level of personnel and teams within firms, and to the level of firms,
products, and technologies within economies. How can such a shift of the level of
analysis be justified? The claim here is that the cycle goes beyond empirical
phenomena of child development. It represents a more general ‘logic’ of composi-
tion and break-up on the basis of experience, in an alternation of reducing variety
of content, in the move towards consolidation, an opening up of variety of
context, in generalisation, which leads on to a renewed opening of content, in
novel combinations. The reduction of variety in consolidation is analogous to the
evolutionary notion of niche creation; the escape to new contexts is analogous to
niche selection. We propose that this yields general principles of a ‘knowledge
ecology’. In fact, we propose that it also applies beyond markets and business, in
cycles of development and execution of government policy.
A basic idea of the cycle is that application of existing knowledge and competence
in novel contexts (e.g., new applications of theory and technology, new markets
for existing products, new jobs for people), called ‘generalisation’, leads to ‘differ-
entiation’ of existing practice, for the sake of adaptation to the new selection
environment.
The Dutch innovation of the ‘Senseo’ electric coffee machine, developed in an alliance between
Philips Electronics (for the machine) and coffee producer Douwe Egberts (for the coffee pads used
in the machine), has recently been differentiated with a bright red model, to appeal to emotions in
the perceptions of new customers in the Brazilian market, which is not sold elsewhere, and with
pads for making tea, in the same machine.
The new selection environment offers the room to deviate from the institutions
that have formed themselves in the ‘consolidation’ of a previous innovation, the
motivation for taking the trouble of adapting practice, to satisfy conditions of sur-
vival, and fresh insights from new conditions and demands, into new opportuni-
ties and into the limits of established practice. In the adaptation of a product or
practice to new conditions, one first taps into earlier experience about how things
might be done differently, going back to experiments, trials, and errors in an earlier
round of innovation. One may also utilise ideas from existing partners in collabo-
ration. If differentiation does not suffice in order to survive, or to profit from
newly emerging opportunities, a further step is to allow oneself to be inspired by
foreign practices encountered in the new environment, which appear successful or
promising where one’s own practice seems to fail. This leads to experiments of
combinations of known elements from existing practice and new elements from
unfamiliar, local practices, called ‘reciprocation’. This yields hybrid practices. The
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transition to radical innovation (Mokyr 1990). The significance of hybrids, in the
logic of discovery, is that they allow one to explore the potential of novel elements
without yet surrendering the basic logic, structure, design principles, or architec-
ture of established practice. The problem with hybrids is that they yield inefficien-
cies and inconsistencies in the system (‘spaghetti’), with overlaps, redundancies,
misfits, and ‘work-arounds’ to solve them. That then leads to more radical, archi-
tectural change, in Schumpeterian ‘novel combinations’. The period of hybridisa-
tion gives insight into the elements one would most like to preserve, given their
performance in the hybrid, and the directions in which one might think for novel
principles of logic or architecture. Here, at this stage, small changes in design prin-
ciples or basic logic can yield a saltation in the functioning of the whole. At the
same time, the inefficiencies and contradictions of hybrids also form a stumbling
block: they may be seen as evidence of failure and lack of perspective for the inno-
vation. Progress then depends on the perseverance of the entrepreneur or inven-
tor. Also, the inefficiencies of reciprocation and hybridisation are difficult to sus-
tain under the pressures of competition. This frequently leads to failure – because
problems do indeed prove to be insuperable or ongoing efforts and uncertainty
cannot be sustained – but occasionally this leads to a breakthrough. The cyclical
process of invention or discovery indicates how one can set out in exploration
along a path of exploitation. Crucial for the process, in the stages of generalisation
and reciprocation, is the opening to novel contexts (‘niche selection’), with new
challenges and opportunities, and openness in the form of curiosity and attention
to unfamiliar practices and perspectives, and the willingness and opportunity to
engage in experiments, and tolerance of the problems with hybrids. The cycle is
illustrated in figure 3.1. In chapter 9 of this volume, Anderson and Gasteiger
employ a cycle of convergent and divergent behaviour, where the first resembles
the movement towards consolidation, in exploitation, and the second resembles
the movement of exploration
Whereas previously multinationals used to internationalise for growth of sales,
as a way out from saturated markets, now they increasingly use internationalisa-
tion as a process of discovery and a path to innovation. They appear to have
caught on to the logic of the cycle. So far, the discussion of the cycle concerns the
bottom half, in the transition from exploitation to exploration, which is new in
the innovation literature. The top half is more in line with established innovation
theory. Along the top half, in the emergence of a new idea or practice, in a novel
combination, there is search for technical feasibility and commercial viability of a
new technology or product and its optimal configuration, in the emergence of
what in the innovation literature is called the ‘dominant design’. This leads to
what is labelled ‘consolidation’. In that process, if a breakthrough to an invention
succeeds, it faces the need to replace old practices, in Schumpeterian ‘creative
destruction’. Here, one runs into the problem that existing institutions, in the
form of standards and regulations (technical, safety, commercial, fiscal, legal,
administrative), market structures (distribution channels, installation, mainte-
nance, repair), schooling and training, and established commercial positions,
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other words, in order to break through, innovation requires institutional change,
and the analysis may contribute to the literature on institutional change. Our lack
of understanding of innovation and of institutional change are connected. As a
result, due to institutional barriers radical innovations can often break through
only later, and initially can only succeed where they can be fitted into the prevail-
ing order of existing institutions and market structures. They need to prove their
worth and their potential more extensively before obstacles can be cleared. It is a
well-known phenomenon that initially innovations do not find their application
where their potential is highest but where the obstacles are lowest.
Source: Nooteboom (2000)
Thus, the steam engine was first used for pumping water out of coal mines, because there they did
not have to replace any deeply rooted existing system. Only later [were steam engines] used in
trains and steamships, in competition with coaches and sailing ships .
Hence, openness of markets for new product entry, with a critical attitude
towards established interests and institutions is an issue for innovation policy. In
this volume, the issue of institutional and commercial obstacles to entry is elabo-
rated with four case studies, in chapter 6. One policy implication is that enabling
entrepreneurs goes beyond helping them to find their way through the density of
rules and regulations, and requires the gathering of insights as to how those may
have to be changed to accommodate the shifts of innovation.
In the movement towards consolidation, goals, means, and causal relationships
between them become clear. As also among potential users uncertainty decreases
and familiarity with the novelty increases, demand increases, novel producers
jump on the bandwagon of the emerging market, and price competition intensi-
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▲fies. Pressure on price yields pressures towards efficiency, on the basis of process
innovation. In pressures towards efficiency, standard economic analysis applies.
Market mechanisms are needed to ensure optimal allocation of scarce resources to
known goals and means. In the drive towards efficiency, opportunities are taken
to increase productive efficiency, by increase of scale, enabled by growing
demand, which leads to concentration and the ‘shake-out’ of less efficient
producers. Here, policy is oriented mainly toward removing barriers to entry, in
competition policy.
As noted in chapter 1, the fall of profits, in the transition from product innovation
to process innovation, in the development towards consolidation, yields an argu-
ment for trying to be a leader, in the early stage of innovation, because thereby
one captures the high profits of early partial monopoly, before imitation sets in.
As a follower, one enters at the stage of consolidation, where users profit from
lower prices, but high profits have eroded. Furthermore, as a leader one may
construct entry barriers to followers.
Ongoing progress along the cycle is by no means guaranteed. The cycle is not to
be seen as a logically necessary sequence but as a heuristic that may generally
work. In trying novel combinations one may get caught in ongoing uncertainty
and chaos (see figure 3.1), unable to settle the inconsistencies between new goals,
means, and connecting causalities. Prototypes may continually fail to become
viable, technically or commercially. Rival designs, prototypes, or technical stan-
dards may continue to compete for a long time, and for the duration potential
users are hesitant to commit themselves. After consolidation, one may get caught
in inertia (see figure 3.1), particularly if there are no opportunities or incentives to
escape to new contexts of application, or barriers to novel conditions being
imposed from outside. In consolidation, institutions have shifted to accommo-
date the innovation, and once that has happened there are often strong pressures
towards “isomorphism” (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), with strong pressures to
conform, by ‘coercion, mimesis (imitation) or normative pressures’. Existing
institutions are also protected by vested economic interests, in their efforts to
protect the installed base of both tangible and intangible investments, existing
competencies and efficiencies (accumulated in learning by doing), and market
positions. Therefore, innovation requires openness to novel contexts of applica-
tion, e.g., global markets, or new users or suppliers, as arenas for exploration and
sources of novel challenges. Stages of the cycle may be skipped, in a leap to novel
combinations without much intervening differentiation or reciprocation. The
process may not proceed beyond some stage. For example, differentiation, as a
step in exploitation, may not proceed to reciprocation and novel combinations. 
In the example of the Senseo coffee machine development may not proceed
beyond the addition of a red model for the Brazilian market and the use of filter
pads for tea in addition to those for coffee.
Note that progress along the cycle is full of stress and potential conflict. In gener-
alisation a stressful need arises to adapt existing practices, in order to survive in
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have their innovation accepted, and established practices encounter the stress of
creative destruction. In chapter 9, Anderson and Gasteiger report evidence that
during innovation within organisations these stresses indeed arise, as both a
motivator and a consequence of innovation.
Returning for a moment to the discussion of evolutionary theory, we note that
the cycle offers a specification of how invention can remain subject to trial and
error without being entirely blind, because it is rooted in a process of application
and adaptation that is to some extent based on inference and imagination. It
shows how exploration can emerge from exploitation, and how an apparent jump
(‘saltation’) in form or function can arise from a more gradual step-by-step
process leading up to it. Earlier in this chapter we noted that ecology (the func-
tioning of ‘niches’) is an aspect of evolutionary theory. In our present analysis,
aimed at taking discovery and learning into account, we propose that the cycle of
discovery provides the basis for what one might call a ‘knowledge ecology’. By
this we mean a system where the cycle of discovery operates, more or less
perfectly, depending on institutional conditions that inhibit or enhance the
component processes of generalisation (opening up to new contexts); differentia-
tion (deviation from established practice to survive in the new context); recipro-
cation (opening up to contributions from unfamiliar ideas or practices); experi-
mentation with hybrids and new principles, interpretive schemes or
architectures; convergence to a dominant design; and institutional change to
accommodate the novelty. The top loop of the cycle, in figure 3.1, corresponds
with niche construction and the lower loop arises from the selection of a new
niche. We can then characterise innovation policy as guiding and enabling the
knowledge ecology.
Crucial in the process is the opening to new contexts with new challenges and
opportunities, opening to collaboration for the exploration of novel combina-
tions, opening in the form of curiosity and attention to foreign practices, and the
preparedness to engage in experiments with elements from those and with
surprising hybrids. The Renaissance in Europe was accompanied by a lively inter-
est and use of many things that could be found elsewhere (Mokyr 1990). This
stands in contrast to China, for example, which from around 1400 lost its prior
advantage by closing itself off to foreign influences. Perhaps this helps to explain
why the first two industrial revolutions occurred in Europe.
Further application
Chapter 5 offers a systematic analysis of entrepreneurship, but here we briefly
indicate the connection with the cycle of discovery. It is customary to distinguish
between equilibrium breaking, Schumpeterian entrepreneurship that yields
‘creative destruction’, and ‘Kirznerian’ entrepreneurship, derived from Kirzner
(1973), which finds new market niches for existing or adapted products, in a
process of what economists call ‘arbitrage,’ and thereby tends towards equilib-
rium. We can recognise this in the cycle of discovery: the movement towards
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it as disequilibration. Instead of two kinds of entrepreneurship, we can identify a
larger range of different types, all along the cycle of discovery (Nooteboom
2000). Thus, there are entrepreneurs who make a new idea technically feasible,
commercially feasible, productively efficient, eliminate entry barriers, carry it
into new markets or applications, differentiate it, bring in new elements, in
hybrids, or bring together elements from different practices in new architectures
and thereby produce new ideas.
Note that in the step of generalisation the actor who takes an existing product or
practice into a new context is not necessarily an existing producer or practitioner.
It may be an outside entrepreneur or user stepping in, adopting the product or
practice with his own specific experience and perspective. This, however, may
already happen prior to consolidation, so that exploration may set in when
exploitation has not settled down yet. Entrepreneurs adopting the innovation
will inevitably, and not necessarily deliberately, colour their use of it according to
their perspective, and seeing that the product is on its way to widespread diffu-
sion and consolidation, with an erosion of profit, may already differentiate it
deliberately. What we are saying here is that disequilibration may take place even
during equilibration, which seems to make nonsense of the very notion of equili-
bration. Why would entrepreneurs move towards equilibrium if they know that
that will erode profits?
In this book, the main application of the cycle is to the emergence of new tech-
nologies, products and processes. However, the cycle also applies to experiential
learning by organisations and people. Indeed, its origins lie in the latter, as
mentioned earlier. There, new ideas are developed when existing ideas or prac-
tices are confronted with new challenges in novel contexts that are sought or
imposed from outside (generalisation). In individual learning, this typically
arises in discourse where one confronts one’s ideas with those of others who
think differently. In the processes of differentiation and reciprocation, existing
ideas, interpretations, and meanings shift, in the development, by way of hybrids
of old and new, the familiar and the unfamiliar, and via of new interpretive
schemes and terminology. In the literature on organisational learning, this is
called sense making (Weick 1995). Here, in exploration, discourse is based not
primarily on logical analysis, but on ‘storytelling’, in which narration from
specific experiences in specific contexts, shifts perspective and interpretation.
Stories are means for reciprocation. Attempts at mutual understanding and
reconciliation of differences yield the hybrids from which new shared perspec-
tives may arise. It is in this interaction, between people in organisations, with
shared goals, orientations, or practices, that individual and organisational learn-
ing connects. This interaction between people as a basis for learning is further
analysed in the next paragraph.
Perhaps the cycle can also be applied to government, as a cycle of policy learning,
in an elaboration of the notion of experimentalism or ‘direct-deliberative
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deliberative government as a source of policy learning, particularly for dealing
with complex, ‘untamed’ problems (wrr2006), where one does not yet have
clear insight into goals, priorities, means, the causality between means and goals,
and the resources needed. This includes uncertainty concerning possible
outcomes, what might happen under what conditions, and uncertainty concern-
ing the value or disutility of outcomes for different people. Here, one needs to tap
into the diversity of experience and insight of the population. When this results
in conclusions and policy, policy has to be implemented efficiently and transpar-
ently, which requires a clear distribution of tasks.
The link with the cycle of discovery may be as follows. To learn, existing policy
thinking must be subjected to new contexts and perspectives (generalisation),
which here entails that it is opened up to the variegated experience of citizens, in
consultative deliberation. New elements arising from that opening are incorpo-
rated in experimental hybrids (reciprocation), and this experimentation yields
further insight into what old and new elements to combine in what new architec-
tures or perspectives, in exploration. After experimentation has developed into a
‘dominant design’, it is implemented and consolidated, in exploitation, with
requisite changes in relevant institutions. This implementation requires and
allows for tighter central coordination, enforcement, transparency, and accounta-
bility. A central task of government is to enable the overall cycle, in “metagover-
nance” (Soh 2007). After consolidation, execution may perhaps be delegated to
markets or semi-public executive bodies. In sum, exploration occurs from
bottom-up and exploitation from top-down. A potential problem with the latter
is that the necessary connection between exploitation and exploration may be
broken. Experience with implementation is needed to inform exploration. There-
fore, people from executive bodies should also play a part in the process of citizen
consultative deliberation, in a subsequent round of exploration.
3.5 market failures (with a vengeance)
In the debate on innovation policy, the usual argument for public policy is that
especially in innovation there are market failures. These failures concern the
usual problems of externalities, public goods, merit goods, and entry barriers. For
public goods the market does not work due to non-excludability and the non-
rival nature of the goods. However, according to more recent insights the ‘trans-
fer’ or ‘spillover’ of knowledge requires the absorptive capacity to do so, which
arises from an accumulation of knowledge and experience. As a result, knowl-
edge can be excludable to a greater or lesser extent. A more recent insight into
obstacles to efficient markets arises from the notion of transaction costs; in the
judgement of quality; costs of search, mutual understanding, and adaptation for
producers and users; costs of coming to an agreement; obstacles to complete
contracting and monitoring, due to asymmetric information, consequent costs of
monitoring, haggling, re-negotiation, conflict, and litigation; and switching costs
if a relationship breaks. The uncertainties of innovation increase transaction
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chapters 7 and 8. The problem of entry barriers, and the need for public interven-
tion to avoid them or break them down, came up in the previous section.
In spite of such market failures, however, in the 1990s policy rhetoric has increas-
ingly shifted to the mobilisation of market forces, also in public goods and serv-
ices, such as transport and health care, by means of deregulation, privatisation,
the auction of franchises, and public-private arrangements with measures to deal
with market failures by public setting of tariffs or targets, and other regulatory
controls and openings for intervention. Currently market logic is moving into
universities, with incentives for university scientists to commercialise their
inventions by incentives of intellectual property, licensing, contract research, and
consultancy.
However, Lester and Piore (2004) revealed less recognised and perhaps more
fundamental failures of markets, which may not only fail to yield innovation but
can actually break down sources of innovation. Lester and Piore propose that
innovation consists of two distinct, different, and difficult to combine stages of
‘analysis’ and ‘interpretation’. There is a strong link, not identified by Lester and
Piore, between analysis and exploitation and between interpretation and explo-
ration, whereby their analysis fits snugly into our analysis of exploration and
exploitation. In analysis, ends, means, causal linkages between them, and requi-
site resources, are stable and clear, so that one can decompose a product or
process into elements (hence the term ‘analysis’) and rationally optimise the allo-
cation of scarce resources. Here, the allocative function of the market is central.
This corresponds closely with the situation that we indicated, in figure 3.1, of
‘consolidation’, as a basis for exploitation. In sum, in consolidation markets work.
By contrast, in interpretation, ends, means, causal relations, and requisite
resources are not clear, and one has to iterate between the interests, knowledge,
competencies, and resources of a variety of stakeholders (potential customers,
producers, suppliers, labour, regulators, citizens affected by externalities, etc.),
with a corresponding variety of perceptions, views, norms, and values. Here, we
are dealing with what have also been called “untamed problems” (wrr2006).
This requires what Lester and Piore call ‘conversation’, which requires openness,
acceptance, and utilisation of ambiguity, confusion, and ways to deal with fears
and suspicions and to build trust. This connects with the notion of sense-making
in the literature on organisational learning (Weick 1995). It requires the opportu-
nity, time, stamina, and patience to ‘sort things out’ and to build understanding
and trust. Pressures of price competition tend to disable all that. Under harsh,
pure price competition, there is fear of openness leading to loss of appropriability
of profit from investments (‘spillover’), pressure of price competition constrains
the give and take needed to build trust, pressures on cost, and pressures of time,
for short-term profits and for speed to market. Competition eliminates the ‘slack’
of resources and time needed to ‘conduct the conversation’, to accept and utilise
ambiguity, and to build understanding and trust. Price competition yields an
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of it is that it reduces price competition. Price competition also yields an incentive
to increase efficiency, which may be used to create the slack needed for explo-
ration, but that works only when the efficiency advantage with respect to
competitors is maintained, which entails limitation of competition.
Later, in chapter 7, we will argue that in exploration one needs to make relation-
specific investments in mutual understanding and trust, which require a certain
stability of the relationship. This leads to a plea for optimal, not maximum flexi-
bility, in labour and organisation. These arguments appear to connect with the
idea of “flexible rigidities” (Dore 1986): in early innovation a certain rigidity is
needed, in the sense of a limit on price competition and a certain stability of rela-
tionships. However, rigidity should be optimal and temporary: providing suffi-
cient stability but not so much as to obstruct the structural change and creative
destruction that is the outcome of radical innovation.
Lester and Piore (2004) propose that innovation policy in the us suffers from a
fundamental misinterpretation of what happened in the us in the 1990s. An
increasing focus on market mechanisms, under globalisation, deregulation, and
privatisation, has been beneficial in furthering efficiency and exploitation, and a
dynamic of entry and exit, but has also broken down the opportunities in indus-
try to conduct ‘conversations for interpretation’, or what we call exploration.
This has led to a break-up of institutes that existed in forms between university
and business, with participation of people from both, such as the famous Bell
Labs (for their role, see also Chesbrough 2006), that provided hotbeds for explo-
ration and spawned, among other things, the famous ‘Silicon Valley’. As a result,
industry now has to look more to universities to provide the ‘public space’ that
allows for exploration. The fact that in the 1990s there was both an upsurge of
innovative performance in the us, and a drive towards market mechanisms, has
led to the mistaken interpretation that the first was caused by the second. In fact,
that surge was built partly on the structures for exploration in industry that
existed previously but was broken down in the 1990s, thus breaking down the
wellsprings of future innovation. And now, the mistake is compounded by pres-
sures to carry market forces into the universities, thus jeopardising the remaining
sources of exploration. Europe, we may add, in its breathless admiration of us
innovative performance, has been preparing to imitate this mistake along with
factors of success.
For these and other reasons, we are wary of further commercialisation of univer-
sity research. However, we do see the need to stimulate the utilisation of oppor-
tunities to apply university research, a process which has been referred to as
‘valorisation’ in Dutch policy debates. On the basis of our analysis of exploration
and exploitation we add that the issue is not only that of moving university
research (exploration) into commercialisation in industry (exploitation), but also,
in the opposite direction, of generating inspiration for exploration from exploita-
tion. We need to find ways for university and industry to interact in order for
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chapter 4.
3.6 open innovation
The idea of ‘open innovation’ has gained widespread interest. It suggests that
firms should not innovate in isolation, but in collaboration with others. Such
collaboration would yield not only efficiency of scale or scope but, also of impor-
tance for innovation, a greater diversity and flexibility for Schumpeterian ‘novel
combinations’. Note that the key feature of the logic of the cycle of discovery was
that novel areas of application of existing practices (ideas, products, processes)
yield new pressures and insights for adjustments that start small, in differentia-
tion, and are then extended, in reciprocation and novel combinations. This, we
propose, yields the deeper significance of collaboration for innovation. In collab-
oration with suppliers, customers, firms in related markets, and sometimes even
competitors, one fits existing ideas and practice into their different but related
thinking and practice, whereby the dynamic of exploration by differentiation and
reciprocation may be set in motion. This ties in with pleas to involve suppliers
not only for efficient production, in ‘co-makership’, but also for development and
innovation, in co-development. It also ties in with pleas to make use of lead users
for development and innovation. See, in particular, Von Hippel’s (2005) plea for
the ‘democratising innovation’ by involvement of users.
This line of thought is further developed with the notion of “cognitive distance”
(Nooteboom 1999). Cognition here is a broad notion, including both rational and
moral dimensions, in both knowledge and value judgements. As noted earlier,
the constructivist view of cognition implies that people have different cognition
(perception, interpretation, evaluation) to the extent that they have developed
their mental structures along different life paths, in different countries, markets,
technologies, and forms of organisation. This yields greater or lesser cognitive
distance.
Cognitive distance yields both a problem and an opportunity. The problem is that
collaboration is more difficult under larger differences in cognition, because it is
more difficult to understand each other (less requisite absorptive capacity) and
because views on collaboration diverge. The opportunity lies in the fact that
difference yields an opportunity to learn something new. Innovation is furthered
by a balance between difference and agreement, at optimal cognitive distance:
large enough to tell each other something new but not too large for understand-
ing (Nooteboom 1999). Here we see the importance of diversity but also its limi-
tations. In other words, innovation is favoured by variety that is still somehow
related (see also ‘related variety’ as a driver of regional economic growth in chap-
ter 11). In chapter 9, Anderson and Gasteiger present evidence that diversity and
team heterogeneity have a positive effect on creativity within organisations, as
well as a positive effect on cohesiveness and longevity of teams.
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This is illustrated in figure 3.2. The downward sloping straight line2 models the
idea that it is more difficult to understand each other and to collaborate as cogni-
tive distance increases. The rising straight line models the idea that novelty value
increases with cognitive distance. If innovative performance equals the mathe-
matical product of novelty value and the ability to utilise it, an inverted U-
shaped curve (parabola) results, with a given level of optimal distance. When
something is new but cannot be used, it is as useless, for innovation, as when
something is easily used but not new.
An econometric corroboration of the model is given by Nooteboom et al. (2007),
in an analysis of 994 alliances involving 116 firms during a period of 10 years.
Patents were taken as a measure of innovative output, and the difference in 
technological profiles of firms, construed on the basis of patent data, were taken
as a proxy for cognitive distance. Li et al. (2007) found a corroboration in an
analysis of collaboration between suppliers and producers of 1,635 innovations
of 550 Canadian firms during a period of 35 years. Innovative performance was
measured as the number of radical innovations (new to the world) and cognitive
distance was measured as difference of position in the classification of indus-
tries.
In exploration, the value of novelty is higher than in exploitation, resulting in a
steeper slope of the line of novelty value. In exploitation the penalty of lack of
understanding and ability to fine tune collaboration is higher, resulting in a
steeper downward slope of the line for ability to collaborate. As a result, optimal
distance is higher for exploration than for exploitation. For empirical evidence,
see Nooteboom et al. (2007).
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▲It has been widely recognised that collaboration is needed for innovation, but
why is that, precisely? It is evident, especially from an evolutionary perspective,
that collaboration yields more variety and flexibility for novel combinations than
integration of activities in a single organisation, but why is it cognitively fruitful?
The cycle of discovery gives an answer to that question. Interaction forces people
to try and fit their ideas into the mental frames of the other person (generalisa-
tion), differences appear and yield a need for adjustment (differentiation), oppor-
tunities emerge to try and fit in elements of the other’s thought into one’s own
thinking, in hybrids of thought and practice (reciprocation), which stimulate a
novel integration of joint thinking and action. By the inventive use of metaphor
and illustrations one can help each other to cross cognitive distance and trigger
requisite shifts of thought.
The ability to communicate and collaborate with people who think differently is
not fixed. It grows with the accumulation of knowledge and experience in such
collaboration. This is illustrated in figure 3.2 by the dotted lines. If the line that
represents ability to collaborate shifts upwards, then optimal cognitive distance
shifts to the right, and corresponding performance shifts upwards. For empirical
evidence, see Nooteboom et al. (2007). This demonstrates the economic advan-
tage of the ability to collaborate with people who think differently: one can oper-
ate at a larger cognitive distance, achieving more innovation. A policy implication
for the Netherlands is that for innovation it is crucial to restore former Dutch
capabilities of appreciating and mobilising cultural diversity. The analysis also
suggests the positive side of cultural diversity in Europe. As a matter of eu
policy, we might aim for optimal variety: big enough for innovation but small
enough for collaboration.
If the analysis arises on the level of individual cognition, how does it apply on the
level of organisations? Organisations serve, among other things, for the sake of
efficient collaboration, by limiting cognitive distance, with a certain cognitive
‘focus’, on the basis of organisational culture, but with the maintenance of suffi-
cient distance for an internal source of innovation. In other words, firms have to
make a trade-off between exploitation and exploration. Organisational focus by
definition yields a form of myopia (‘group think’), that needs to be compensated
for with external contacts with actors (persons, organisations) with a different,
complementary cognitive focus (yielding “external economy of cognitive scope”,
Nooteboom 1992). Thus we again obtain figure 3.2, but now on the level of organ-
isations, where cognitive distance now applies to difference in the ‘cognitive
focus’ of organisations.3
When individuals or firms maintain long-lasting relations, and those relations
are also exclusive, i.e., are closed off from other, outside contacts, then after
awhile cognitive distance will decrease and in the long run it will decrease to
the point that the innovative potential of collaboration dwindles (see figure
3.2). For empirical evidence, see Wuyts et al. (2006). In their survey of studies
of creativity and innovation within firms, Anderson and Gasteiger (chapter 9)
micro-foundations for innovation policy
94also report inverted-U shaped effects of e.g., group cohesiveness and longevity.
In view of this, for innovation it is necessary, to continually refresh the field of
collaborators. Long-term relations do not necessarily have this effect. If actors
also maintain other, outside relations that do not overlap among each other, so
that they are continually refreshed with outside insights and impulses, even a
long-lasting relation can maintain its innovative momentum. This ties in with
what Burt (1992) called the bridging of ‘structural holes’ as a source of innova-
tion, in the connection of otherwise unconnected groups. This is illustrated in
figure 3.3.
In sum, open innovation requires not only collaboration with others, but also the
management of cognitive distance in collaboration, which requires openness for
the entry of novel actors or connections across groups of collaborators.
The notion of optimal cognitive distance also has implications for utilising the
cycle of discovery, in particular the step of generalisation. It is recommended to
look for a new context of application, e.g., a new market for a product, at optimal
cognitive distance (which includes cultural distance).
“A recent evaluation of the eu Framework programme for collaborative research (fp5 and fp6)
illustrates the role of absorptive capacity (eu 2007). A survey among fpparticipants shows that in
fpprojects the distance to the core activities of the firm is larger than in an average r&d project. An
analysis on the basis of the Community Innovation Survey (cis) shows that participants in the fp
programme do more r&d than non-participants. The survey shows that previous collaboration has
a positive effect on outcomes, but the presence of new participants has a greater positive effect. All
this can be interpreted from the perspective of the above analysis. In order to profit from the
opportunity for innovation offered by distance to the core, firms need adequate absorptive capac-
ity, which is formed by earlier r&d and experience in collaboration. However, previous collabora-
tion can have a negative effect of reducing cognitive distance too much, and then it is better to have
new participants to increase it again” (Polt et al. 2008).
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Figure 3.3 Bridging structural holes3.7 conclusions
An Austrian/evolutionary perspective in economics, together with a construc-
tivist, interactionist perspective of knowledge and learning, with its appreciation
of local specificity and diversity of cognition and meaning, as a source of learn-
ing, yields a perspective of ‘experimentalism’ that is also known in political
thought. This is the perspective that forms the basis for innovation policy that is
developed in this volume.
The evolutionary perspective suggests that especially the early stages of innova-
tion, in exploration, are subject to radical uncertainty, are hence unpredictable,
and an important task of innovation policy is to maintain sources of variety that
yield unexpected outcomes. Maintaining such variety requires a policy to stimu-
late entry of outsider entrepreneurs. It confirms the importance of eliminating
entry barriers to markets. The unpredictability of invention requires restraint of
instincts to plan and program innovation, and the acceptance of failure of entre-
preneurial ventures not as waste but as a necessary feature of innovation (see
chapter 5). As a result of the problem of unpredictability, in innovation policy
there is a paradox of accountability. For public funding one needs to account for
spending, but setting targets (‘deliverables’) is paradoxical and clear ex ante crite-
ria that are guaranteed to yield the desired results are not available. Yet, there is 
an inclination to fix verifiable targets, while in innovation one typically ends up
somewhere else.
An illustration is the development of the famous Philishave of Philips Electronics. The develop-
ment was initially aimed at a new dynamo for lighting on a bicycle, but what came out was a shav-
ing apparatus.
There are several perverse effects. First, by specifying deliverables one locks up
development in a possibly unfruitful direction. Second, one elicits strategic
conduct to distort facts, falsely pretending that the original goal has been
reached, in order to secure payment. It should be possible, in schemes to
subsidise r&d, to allow for flexibility in outcomes, and pay for what has been
achieved along the way and in the end, rather than for the achievement of
outcomes determined a priori. This is complicated in the case of research consor-
tia, as in the eu Framework Programme, where change along the way implies exit
and entry of members of the consortium, with complications concerning
contracts and shares in payment. However, the alternative is to continue with an
unfruitful development with the wrong partners. A third perverse effect of the
paradox of accountability is that to avoid the problem, one focuses subsidy
schemes not on the difficult to predict exploration, but on the more predictable
stage of exploitation. Thereby, innovation policy tends to confirm existing
strengths rather than developing new ones. This last problem is compounded by
an intellectual mistake, promoted by an uncritical adoption of the evolutionary
perspective, that since invention is unpredictable, it is blind and random, so that
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market mechanisms, is mostly preferable. Here, we have tried to show that while
invention is subject to much trial and error and remains unpredictable, it is not
blind, but is based on experiential learning that employs a certain type of infer-
ence from failures and indications for the potential of new directions. For this we
employed the idea of a cycle of discovery, where exploitation can lead to explo-
ration.
An issue of fundamental and ill-recognised importance is a novel market imper-
fection in the conditions needed for exploration. In exploration ends, means,
relations between them, and requisite resources are not yet clear. This requires
open communication, abilities to mobilise ambiguity, to deal with confusion, and
to spend resources and time in the iterations and trials needed to achieve clarity
of ends and means. This, in turn, requires trust, but trust has its limits, especially
under competition. This is taken up in chapter 7. Market forces may block such
processes, disallowing the openness, slack resources, time and trust needed for
exploration. However, competition is seldom extreme, pure price competition,
due to transaction costs, uncertainties, and switching costs. As a result, combina-
tions of exploration and exploitation, and of competition and collaboration, may
be feasible.However, the problem is not only that competitive pressure on price
may eliminate the resources and the slack needed for exploration in individual
firms. Also, competition policy, instituted to prevent cartels, may forbid ongoing
collaboration that excludes entry of new participants for the duration of the rela-
tionship. For exploration, relationships should have sufficient duration to evoke
relation-specific investments involved in the development of the mutual under-
standing and trust needed to profit from cognitive distance, in the creation of
Schumpeterian novel combinations.
Océ, a Dutch producer of photocopiers, was forbidden by the competition authorities to maintain
durable relations for product development with its suppliers, on the ground that it limited compe-
tition.
The analysis of the cycle of exploration and exploitation, in combination with the
notion of optimal cognitive distance, has many further implications for policy, in
both its main lines and its details. For example, it has implications for our take on
globalisation. Globalisation can form the basis for novel challenges and insights
that contribute to innovation. For this we should seek and employ optimal cogni-
tive distance, both within and beyond Europe. This requires an open-minded-
ness and appreciation for cultural diversity that is large enough for novelty but
not too large to block collaboration. Local collaboration should be supplemented
with linkages to communities elsewhere, preferably again at optimal distance.
The capability to cross cognitive distance is a key competitive advantage, and it
grows with experience, allowing one to deal with increasing cognitive distance,
with an increased potential for innovation.
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learning, discovery and collaborationThere are also implications for the mobility of labour, whereby application of
existing knowledge and competence in novel contexts can open up paths to
discovery. Thus, mobility is important not only for efficient allocation of compe-
tence, and for the diffusion of innovations, but also for discovery. The analysis
also confirms the need for inter-disciplinarity as a source of innovation. Oppor-
tunities and obstacles for inter-disciplinarity are further analyzed in chapter 12.
The cyclical interaction between exploitation and exploration has implications for the interaction
between university and industry. There should be paths leading from university exploration to
exploitation in industry, but also, in the opposite direction, paths by which experience from
exploitation in industry inspires exploration in universities. At the same time, we should recognise
that exploration requires conditions that may be thwarted by market competition. This issue is
taken up in chapter 4.
The problem of combining exploration and exploitation is arguably the most
important problem for innovation management in and between organisations, in
industry and government. What forms of organisation enable such combina-
tions? That will be taken up in chapter 8. What forms of collaboration between
firms, in alliances and networks, enable the combination of exploration and
exploration? That will be taken up in chapters 9 and 10. What are the implications
for ‘regional innovation systems’? That will be taken up in chapter 11.
In sum, innovation requires openness, in four dimensions. First, openness to
uncertainty in the innovation process, especially in exploration. Second, open-
ness for cooperation with other organisations at an optimal cognitive distance.
Third, openness for new innovative entrants. Fourth, openness to new areas of
application, in new countries, industries, markets, and organisations. This stands
in sharp contrast to much innovation policy, which in many cases creates obsta-
cles to innovation in pre-conceived targets, established players, national
programmes, key industries and technologies, isolated activities, and relation-
ships at arms length that lack collaboration and openness of communication.
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1B ateson (1972) also spoke of an ‘ecology of mind’.
2T he straight lines are not necessarily straight, but simply, as a principle of parsi-
mony, the simplest lines that decline or rise. When good theoretical or empirical
reasons arise for non-linearity, it will be built in.
3F or an empirical study, cognitive distance between firms was operationalized in
terms of differences in profiles of technological capabilities derived from the
patent portfolios of the firms involved. See Nooteboom et al. (2007).
99
notesreferences
awt (2003) Backing Winners, The Hague: awt.
awt (2007) Balanceren met beleid, The Hague: awt.
Bateson, G. (1972) Steps to an Ecology of Mind, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Baum, J.A.C. and J.V. Singh (1994) ‘Organizational Hierarchies and Evolutionary
Processes: Some Reflections on a Theory of Organizational Evolution’, in: J.A.C.
Baum and J.V. Singh (eds.) Evolutionary Dynamics of Organization, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 3-20.
Berger, P. and T. Luckmann (1967) The Social Construction of Reality, New York: Doubleday.
Borras, S. (2003) The Innovation Policy of the European Union: From Government to
Governance, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Burt, R.S. (1992) Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition, Cambridge, ma.:
Harvard University Press.
Campbell, D.T. (1974) ‘Evolutionary Epistemology’, in D.T. Campbell, Methodology and
Epistemology for Social Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 393-434
Chaminade, C. and C. Edquist (2006) ‘From Theory to Practice: The Use of the Systems of
Innovation Approach in Innovation Policy’, in J. Hage, Jerald and Marius Meeus
(eds.) Innovation, Science and Institutional Change, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Chesbrough, H. (2006) Open Innovation – The New Imperative for Creating and Profiting
from Technology, Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
Damasio, A.R. (1995) Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain, London:
Picador.
Damasio, A.R. (2003) Looking for Spinoza, Orlando, fl: Harcourt.
Dawkins, R. (1983) ‘Universal Darwinism’, in D.S. Bendall (ed.) Evolution from Molecules
to Man, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 403-425.
Dennet, D.C. (1995) Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life, New
York: Simon & Schuster.
Dimaggio, P.J. and W.W. Powell (1983) ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorph-
ism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields’, American Sociological
Review,48(2): 147-160.
Dore, R. (1986) Flexible Rigidities, Standord: Stanford University Press.
Edelman, G.M. (1987) Neural Darwinism: The Theory of Neuronal Group Selection, New
York: Basic Books.
Edelman, G.M. (1992) Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of Mind, London: Penguin.
Edquist, C. (ed.) (1997) Systems of Innovation: Technologies, Institutions and Organiza-
tions, London: Routledge.
Gerstenberg, O. and C.F. Sabel (2000) ‘Directly Deliberative Polyarchy: An Institutional
Ideal for Europe?’ in: C. Joerges and R. Dehousse, Good Governance in Europe’s
Integrated Market, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 289-341.
Gibbons, M., C. Limoges, H. Nowotny, S. Schwartzman, P. Scott and M. Trow (eds.)
(1994) The New Production of Knowledge: The Dynamics of Science and Research
in Contemporary Societies, London: Sage.
Hippel, E. von (2005) Democratizing Innovation, Cambridge, ma.: mit Press.
micro-foundations for innovation policy
100Hull, D.L. (1988) Science as Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual
Development of Science, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hurford, J.R. (2007) The Origins of Meaning: Language in the Light of Evolution, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Kirzner, I.M. (1973) Competition and Entrepreneurship, Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Kline, S.J. and N. Rosenberg (1986) ‘An Overview of Innovation’ in: R. Landau and 
N. Rosenberg (eds.) The Positive Sum Strategy: Harnessing Technology for
Economic Growth, Washington, dc: National Academic Press.
Lakoff, G. and M. Johnson (1999) Philosophy in the Flesh, New York: Basic Books.
Lester, R.K. and M.J. Piore (2004) Innovation – The Missing Dimension, Cambridge, ma:
Harvard University Press.
Li, Y., B. Nooteboom and W. van Haverbeke (2007) The Effects of Industrial and Country
Difference in Supplier Relationships on the Radicalness of Innovations, University
of Hasselt, Diepenbeek, België.
Lundvall, B.A. (1988) ‘Innovation as an Interactive Process: From User-Producer Inter-
action to the National System of Innovation’ in: G. Dosi, C. Freeman, R. Nelson,
G. Silverberg and L. Soete (eds.) Technical Change and Economic Theory, London:
Pinter, 349-369.
McKelvey, W. (1982) Organizational Systematics: Taxonomy, Evolution, Classification,
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Mokyr, J. (1990) The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nelson, R.R. and S. Winter (1982) An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nooteboom, B. (1992) ‘Towards a Dynamic Theory of Transactions’, Journal of Evolution-
ary Economics, 2: 281-99.
Nooteboom, B. (1999) Inter-firm Alliances: Analysis and Design, London: Routledge.
Nooteboom, B. (2000) Learning and Innovation in Organizations and Economies, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Nooteboom, B. (2001) ‘From Evolution to Learning and Language’ in J. Foster and 
J.S. Metcalfe (eds.) Frontiers in Evolutionary Economics, Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar, 41-69.
Nooteboom, B., W.P.M. van Haverbeke, G.M. Duijsters, V.A. Gilsing and A. Van der Oord
(2007) ‘Optimal Cognitive Distance and Absorptive Capacity’, Research Policy.
Piaget, J. (1972) Insights and Illusions in Philosophy, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Piaget, J. (1970) Psychologie et epistémologie, Paris: Denoël.
Piaget, J. (1974) Introduction a lépistémologie génétique, Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France.
Polt, W., N. Vonortas and R. Fisher (2008) Innovation impact study, Brussels: opoce,
forthcoming.
rmno(2007) Kenniscocreatie: samenspel tussen wetenschap en praktijk, The Hague:
rmno.
Soh, C. (2007) ‘Governance in Global and Regional Context: The Korean Case as a Study
of Metagovernance’, paper presented at the Korean-Dutch governance forum,
Leiden, August 30.
101
referencesVygotsky (1962) ‘Thought and Language’ in: E. Hanfmann and G. Varkar (eds.), Cam-
bridge, ma.: mit Press.
Weick K.F. (1995) Sensemaking in Organisations, Thousand Oaks, ca: Sage.
wrr(2006) Lerende overheid. Een pleidooi voor probleemgerichte politiek, Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press.
Wuyts, S., M. Colombo, S. Dutta and B. Nooteboom (2005) ‘Empirical Tests of Optimal
Cognitive Distance’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 58(2): 
277-302.
micro-foundations for innovation policy
1024r e s e a r c h ,   higher education, and
innovation
Gerrit Kronjee and Bart Nooteboom
4.1 introduction
In this chapter we discuss scientific research and higher education. New knowl-
edge in the fields of science and technology often has a positive effect on the
wealth of nations. Consider, for instance, the discovery of radar that after mili-
tary applications turned out to also facilitate transportation. However, new
knowledge may also have non-economic social consequences. When knowledge
promotes the attainment of goals like safety, public health, or a clean environ-
ment, that also is part of innovation. Many scientists are particularly motivated
by such societal goals.
In this chapter we consider if and how innovation policy for scientific research
and education for economic and other societal goals is possible. Such a policy
could be designed to stimulate:
–t h e  d e v e l o pment of new knowledge by scientific research;
–t h e   transfer of knowledge in education;
–t h e   social application of that knowledge.
We first discuss the relation between knowledge and innovation. This is
followed by an outline of conditions for the financing of research and of other
important characteristics of the context of research in higher education and in the
business community. Next we discuss more specific instruments for innovation
policy. The final section formulates a policy recommendation on the generation
and utilisation of knowledge in so-called ‘third spaces’.
Much could be discussed under the rather general section-headings that follow.
However, this chapter solely concentrates on (the implications for) innovation
policy and thus leaves aside other aspects of science and education. Policies for
science and education have many other dimensions that will not be discussed or
weighed against goals for innovation policies. The following observations on
innovation can therefore only be a limited (or partial) contribution to broader
discussions on the future of higher education and scientific research.
4.2 the relation between knowledge and innovation
4.2.1 effects of knowledge generation
In search of innovation, the relation between scientific knowledge and the devel-
opment of the economy gets much attention. This is both new and not new. Not
new is the belief in progress, the expectation that knowledge leads to more
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research, higher education, and innovationeconomic prosperity. What is new is the degree of specificity, i.e., the search for
specific scientific knowledge with economic utility, and the attempt to influence
the acquisition and transfer of knowledge to obtain optimal effects.
As discussed in chapter 1, not all innovations are based on new knowledge. The
economic significance of new technological knowledge is sometimes smaller than
that of existing technology. The significance of new technological inventions is of-
ten exaggerated and is, even when important societal changes result, sometimes
only experienced in the long run (see also Edgerton 2007). In addition, not all new
knowledge will result in innovations. It is therefore wrong to expect that invest-
ments in scientific research will always have societal benefits before long. Never-
theless, sometimes new knowledge is a necessary condition for innovation, al-
though it may take many years before such new insights lead to useful applications.
To be able to identify benefits, research on innovation in the longer term,
focussed on specific discoveries, is necessary. To get a grip on the societal impact
of more fundamental discoveries (such as e.g., fire, gunpowder, airplanes) we
need a more historical-sociological approach. For less fundamental discoveries an
economic-statistical approach may be adequate. In that way, it is possible for
example to find out with a limited historical analysis how much time it takes
before expenditures on research are followed by patents. According to an Italian
study, for example, this takes in general four to five years, but much less – up to
one year – in the ict sector (Schettino 2006).
The traditional view of r&dand innovation is a linear one: r&dyields knowledge,
which is applied to new products and processes. In reaction to this linear approach,
a non-linear system approach according to the Oslo Manual(Gault 2006) has
become fashionable, for example at Eurostat and in oecdresearch. In this innova-
tion system approach, research and development activities are seen as no more
than a segment in a range of innovative activities, and there are feedbacks between
activities in the system. In fact, r&drefers to invention, not its use in innovation.
As shown in chapter 1, many variables could be relevant as an indication of these
activities; the limits of variables that could be incorporated in the measuring
instrument have not yet been reached. For a survey of recent extensions of planned
innovation indicators, see the 3rd edition of the Oslo Manual(oecd2005).
However, the impact of public funding of r&d on innovation output is still diffi-
cult to prove by statistical/econometric means, for several reasons. One is that its
impact often takes a long time to materialise, in terms of new products and
processes that survive in markets. A second is that fundamental inventions have
wide repercussions that are not all easy to trace (oecd 2007: chapter 7). A third is
that while r&d yields new knowledge, its commercialisation requires many addi-
tional activities, in prototyping, testing, design, marketing, tooling, training, effi-
cient production, and distribution, with requisite organisation within and
between firms. A fourth is that it is often difficult to prove ‘additionality’, i.e.,
that the activities would not have taken place without the subsidy.
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adding variables for a variety of factors that affect outcomes, improved econo-
metric technique (e.g., to take into account selection bias), and longitudinal
research based, for example, on the accumulation of statistics in the eu Commu-
nity Innovation Survey (cis).
In a recent evaluation of the eu Framework Programme for collaborative research (Polt et al. 2008) ,
Kleinknecht managed to show, in a comparison between successive sets of cis observations
(conducted every two years) that for smaller firms there was additionality, in that participation
yielded an increase of r&d that exceeded the subsidy. However, in other research it was shown that
overall in the program the commercialisation of outcomes was limited. This does not disqualify the
programme, however, because its aim is pre-competitive r&d, and the generation of knowledge
that is later used for commercialisation is a valid goal. It is, nevertheless, hard to prove that, when
and how that happens.
However, the aim of this chapter is not to present an overview of the research
results in this field. Whenever appropriate, we will refer to relevant research.
Whatever insight is available will be used here to analyse directions for policy. As
noted in chapter 1, in spite of the rhetoric against focusing on r&d and against the
linear model of innovation, old practices still dominate the actual use of indica-
tors (Hawkins 2007). One reason for this is that r&d as input and patents as
output are more easily measured than many other, modern indicators. Second, in
policy r&d allows more a more tangible, identifiable target for government than
many other factors, such as collaboration, marketing, and organisation of firms.
The ongoing one-sided pre-occupation of policy with r&d is reflected in the
Lisbon and Barcelona agenda’s of the eu, and in the Dutch policy of setting up
‘technological top institutes’. In innovation research there is a bias to look only at
firms that do r&d, ignoring other sources of innovation (Arundel 2007). Incor-
poration of non-technological commercial, organisational, social. and strategic
factors requires a connection between the scientific literatures on innovation and
management/organisation that is difficult to achieve.
A fundamental problem with the tenacity of the linear view is that the link 
back from application (exploitation) to the generation of ideas (exploration) is
neglected. This has been discussed in chapter 3, with the proposal of a ‘cycle of
discovery’. The main implication of that cycle is that we should look not only 
at the application of science in practice, but also at its inspiration from practice.
That will lead us to the proposal of a ‘third space’ between university and indus-
try.
4.2.2 science in an innovation system
One outcome of the system view is the so-called ‘triple helix model’. After a brief
presentation of this ‘model’, we will discuss its drawbacks.
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the direction of knowledge exploration and about the kind of knowledge that is transferred in
education. That comes together in a ‘triple helix’ wherein science, government and business are
made to fit and are inseparably linked together. A motive for this model is the observation that
nearly all of scientific knowledge production could not be put in a simple dichotomy of fundamen-
tal and applied research. Most new knowledge is seen as being of a type ‘Mode 2’, where the bound-
aries between scientific disciplines dissolve. The role of traditional knowledge of ‘Mode 1’ is
believed to be finished: ‘The old paradigm of scientific discovery (Mode 1) – characterized by the
hegemony of theoretical or, at any rate, experimental science; by an internally-driven taxonomy of
disciplines; and by the autonomy of scientists and their host institutions, the universities – was
being superseded by a new paradigm of knowledge production (Mode 2), which was socially
distributed, application-oriented, trans-disciplinary, and subject to multiple accountabilities’”
(Nowotny, Scott and Gibbons 2003).
Three questions can be raised about this assumed paradigm shift:
– Is it correct that knowledge nowadays is produced in a totally different manner
than previously, i.e., that knowledge comes more directly out of exploitation
and is less of an outcome of fundamental research?
– Is it right to say that the Mode 1 approach is no longer valid, given the fact that
this approach is often the cornerstone of important innovations?
–T o  w h a t  e x t e n t  is such a factual observation – to the extent that it is true – also
a norm for future research and for investing in research; or: is it necessary to
throw the disciplinary approach overboard?
It will be argued that a variegated negative answer to these questions is appropri-
ate.
In the innovation system approach, knowledge is seen as part of an innovation
systemand subordinated to it. The next, perhaps initially unintended step, is
then to move from an analytical, descriptive proposition that this is how in fact
innovation works to a normative ambition for policy to stimulate innovations by
organising cooperation between science, government, and business. In chapter 1
it was argued that planning may have an adverse effect on the creation of ideas.
This becomes evident when we look at higher education and research in an
academic environment.
The risk of Mode 2 is that it leads to a neglect of activities that are related to
knowledge but that at first sight do not fit optimally in the innovation system.
Such knowledge activities can nevertheless have a relation with other important
societal functions apart from innovation. It is not advisable to organise education
for the new generation primarily for the purpose of transfer of knowledge for
innovation. Education has other functions too, like civil education. These other
functions could also be important for the cycle of discovery. Apart from the
cultural, social, and political value of education, the economic value of providing
well-educated people may be larger than the direct economic value of research. It
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tion of providing well-educated people is far more important, even for industry,
than the function of research.
The accumulation of knowledge through research partially takes place in an
academic environment that for good reasons has characteristics other than those
of a business environment. These include differences in recruitment and sociali-
sation, career patterns, values that are seen as important, and activities that
knowledge workers are paid for. These aspects are important for other functions
of research in higher education, such as stimulating social responsibilities and
educating citizens. Within the existing institutional differentiation researchers
are not (entirely) oriented to (economically) innovative exploitation of their new
knowledge. Related to the different functions of knowledge development and
transfer, academic scientific research and the business world have their own
different institutional contexts. The same is, by the way, the case with the arts –
also important for innovation, but not discussed in this chapter.
Innovation policy should not in an attempt to incorporate science, business, and
government into an innovation system, neglect other functions that require a
different context. To do so would place processes of exploration at risk processes
of exploration may be at risk, as argued in chapter 3. Serving the other functions
could even benefit exploration for innovation. For example, educating the new
generation produces inspiration for academic researchers in developing new
scientific theories. That is one reason why at universities we want to maintain
links between research and education.
According to Salter et al. (2000; Hawkins 2007), there are seven categories of
benefits from research, as follows:
–T r aining skilled graduates,
–I ncreasing the stock of useful knowledge.
–C r e a ting ‘social knowledge’ (i.e., knowledge about the socio-economic envi-
ronment),
–C r e a ting new scientific instruments and methodologies,
–I n c r e a sing capacity for scientific and technical problem solving,
–C reating new firms and licensing patents,
–F o r m i n g  networks and stimulating interaction.
The thinking behind Mode 2 is valid in its attempt to take into account the inter-
action between exploitation and exploration, in a learning ecology, that was
discussed in chapter 3. However, such interaction, in a knowledge ecology,
should not be interpreted as integration in a single process and organisation.
Exploitation and exploration require different conditions that should not be
neglected. When approached in a mode of exploitation, explorations is killed, and
so is the learning ecology. The challenge is to specify directions for policy that
take this into account. We will argue later that in innovation exploitation is a task
of industry, exploration is a task of the university, and that their interaction,
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take place in a ‘third space’ between them.
4.2.3 social relevance as a measure for acquisition and transfer
of knowledge
There are many possible options in the development of knowledge, and a key
question is whether knowledge development has the potential to result in inno-
vations. In chapter 3 it was proposed that in principle it is not possible to know
this in advance, but there may still be good reasons to try.
Among the outcomes that are difficult to predict, there are also negative
outcomes. Some knowledge could lead to difficult questions. For instance in the
medical field there is the question of how far we should go in using expensive
medical technology that only marginally improves a patient’s quality of life. The
accumulation of knowledge produces societal progress but can also raise ethical
problems, and the growth of certain knowledge can also lead to regrets.
As argued above, economic effects of research can be indirect, and there are other
motives than economic ones for doing research. Research also has intrinsic value,
just as the arts. It serves progress in science and contributes to the education of
new generations. However, the fact that research has more than just economic
functions should not be taken as an argument to stop paying attention to the
social significance of research. A relevant concept in debates and analyses about
innovation is the ‘valorisation’ of knowledge. In a knowledge society there is the
continuous need to collect and transfer knowledge, and the valorisation concept
points to this.
The social significance of research is not self-evident. As noted above, with
fundamental research we have to wait and see whether it will bring social bene-
fits. Nevertheless, there are social problems that have to be solved and that
cannot wait for science to spontaneously offer a helping hand. Therefore,
programming of at least a part of fundamental research is necessary. Such
programming calls for a difficult differentiation between ‘useful’ and ‘non-
useful’ knowledge for society. The usefulness of knowledge is derived from the
way it is used; it is not possible to know or decide whether knowledge itself is
micro-foundations for innovation policy
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As we know, there are known knowns.
There are things we know we know.
We also know there are known unknowns.
That is to say we know there are some things we do not know.
But there are also unknown unknowns.
The ones we don’t know we don’t know.
donald rumsfeld, 12 februari 2002useful or not. The problem is then how it is possible to make the right choices,
knowing that we don’t know what we don’t know. Inevitably, most expectations
will fail to be realised, and surprise is endemic. Yet, sometimes it is necessary 
to accept the gamble and make choices about aims and themes of research to 
help solve social problems, such as traffic safety, the effect of climate change, 
or the supply of energy. Even if only a small amount of research on such issues
contributes to solutions, that research may still be important enough to decide 
to invest in it. In other words, for problems with a public goods nature, which
industry does not take up out of its own interest, governments have to take the
initiative even if success is unpredictable. Lack of success then is not failure but 
a consequence of inevitable uncertainty.
A special case: Research in the social and behavioural sciences
In principle it is not necessary that knowledge leading to an economic or broader
social innovation has a basis in technology, or in the natural sciences. As also
argued by the Dutch Council for Science and Technology (awt 2007), research in
the humanities or in the social and behavioural sciences can also result in innova-
tions. Such research could result in changes in social relations, with the effect that
problems are solved and economic progress is obtained. Historically one can
think of research on the working conditions of the poor, which resulted in
changes in laws, followed by a general increase in prosperity. The social sciences
in particular investigate the social conditions in which the economy can make use
of technological progress. These social conditions are not an invention or discov-
ery, in the sense of discoveries in the natural sciences. After all, the repertoire for
social interaction is limited; it will not be easy to find something new. The same
kind of argument holds for the behavioural sciences, and possibly also for the
humanities. Chapter 8 gives a discussion of non-technological innovation in the
form of organisational innovation.
Often, social research is inherently scientifically relevant as well (Overlegcom-
missie Verkenningen 1996). There is no need to see a discrepancy here with
fundamental research. The history of the social sciences teaches us that social
research has often been an important force in the development of these sciences.
See for instance the wide scope of social-psychological research during World
War ii, which resulted in a series of publications under the common title ‘The
American Soldier’. Or think of the Leyden Talent Project, a Dutch research
program in the 1960s that tried to promote the upward mobility of children from
lower social-economic classes.
The importance of social relevance of research, in both technology and social
science, could be emphasised in research that is financed by the so-called ‘second
money flow’ (see the next section). Here, research should be sufficiently problem
oriented and geared toward the solution of social problems, such as e.g., ensuring
mobility or protection from flooding, without being so specific in advance, in
trying to determine the content, approach, and feasibility of research projects.
Finding a balance between specificity and feasibility on the one hand and the
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surprising results (serendipity), is essential. This connects with the recommen-
dation, in chapter 3, for openness in the sense of allowing for changes of direction
in innovation projects, and for letting ideas for research emerge from the bottom
up, from the diversity of experience and views in the research community.
4.3 sources of finance
Table 4.1 below presents an overview of money flows funding research in the
Netherlands. It turns out that government is a major funder of scientific research
in the higher education system, i.e., at the university level. Research institutes are
second in the reception of funding. However, the business community spends
more on research than government, mainly to fund research activities within
companies. This business research is not part of the public programming of
research. Figure 4.1 provides insight into the money flows of funding for scien-
tific research in the Netherlands].
Government funds are important for the financing of scientific research in the
Dutch higher education system. Academic research is financed and programmed
via three channels: fundamental research with the first and second money flow,
and applied research with the third money flow, which includes financing by
non-governmental institutions . The funding in the second money flow, admin-
istered by the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (nwo), is partly
allocated in thematic programmes established by nwo, partly to proposals based
on ideas generated by researchers, and partly to successful researchers (‘person-
directed funding’). There has been a tendency to increase the share of thematic
and person-directed funding.
Figure 4.1 shows that government departments, e.g., health, agriculture, trans-
port, and economic affairs, also fund research at universities and technical insti-
tutes. There is a certain tendency to concentrate research on a certain field (agri-
culture, environment, transport) at a certain university (e.g., the University of 
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Table 4.1 Funding for r&d in 2005 in the Netherlands (in billions of euros) 
Destination Total
Source Higher education Research institutes Business
Government 2.1 0.9 0.2 3.2
Business 0.2 0.2 4.0 4.4
Private, non- commercial 0.1 - - 0.1
Abroad 0.1 0.1 0.9 1.1
Total received 2.5 1.2 5.1 8.8
Source: Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap, Kerncijfers 2002-2006Wageningen for agriculture) or institute (e.g., for the environment), which is
then seen as part of the exclusive purview of that governmental department. In
our view, from the perspective of the importance of novel combinations and vari-
ety for innovation, argued in chapters 1 and 3, this is doubly wrong. For novel
combinations, there should be connections across fields of research between
disciplines, and connections across government departments in policy. For vari-
ety, areas of study should not be concentrated at a single university, and there
should be room for variety of approaches and perspectives in any given field. As
argued in chapter 1, there may be valid arguments of economy of scale, but these
should be traded off against diseconomies of scale and arguments of variety.
4.4 research in the higher education system and
innovation
4.4.1 financing university research
Research at universities is mainly financed with the first money flow. For the
government, criteria for the allocation of this money to individual universities
are the number of students with certificates and dissertations, as well as strategic
research priorities. Inevitably the history of earlier decisions and the size of the
universities play a role.. The pattern of existing academic disciplines and the
number of students in these disciplines will factor into the decisions made by
university boards on how to spend such research money., Thus, the number of
students will be an important condition for the financing of innovative academic
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Figure 4.2 Funding of universities









































(nwo)research. This is intentional, as the academic ideal implies there is a relation
between education and research at a university. However, an unintended conse-
quence could be that important scientific research disappears if the influx of new
students into different studies changes.
Universities profit from large numbers of students, and therefore will be inclined
to adapt available courses to the various interests of incoming students (see also
Investeren in Dynamiek 2006: 12). Existing disciplines that are not fashionable
and not successful in attracting students risk decreased funding for their courses
and related research or losing funding entirely. This could have consequences for
the quality of scientific research, including research that may be important for
innovation. One possible partial solution to this problem is to increase the
amount distributed through the second money flow, while keeping intact the
relation between research and education at universities.
We will turn to a comparison of merits and drawbacks between first- and second-
flow finance later. Here we note that there is a more general consequence of the
relation between financing research and the academic disciplinary landscape, in
both first and second stream funding. In both, existing disciplines and reputa-
tions tend to be reproduced. In the first stream, the financing of research has to
duplicate the existing landscape, otherwise universities or disciplines who feel
disadvantaged will complain. In the second stream, established schools of
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Figure 4.2 Funding of universities
Source: Ministry of Education, Culture and Science ocw (2007)









































(nwo)thought and scholars that dominate selection committees reproduce their lines of
research. Both could lead to an unintended continuation of financing unpromis-
ing research in existing discourse coalitions. This kind of coalition consists of
groups of scientist having the same theoretical views and criteria for promising
research. In the research they do they limit themselves to the theories they share
(Van den Boogaard 2002; Kronjee 2002). The continuation of research that was
being done in the past may result in unsurprising choices of subject matters and
scientific interpretations.
The amount of money in the first and second flow of funds is the result of politi-
cal decisions. The third flow of funds is dependent on the benefits expected by
the business community from research, but also on the responsibility this
community wishes to have for good fundamental research and higher education.
In section 4.4.4 we consider policy implications for the programming and fund-
ing of research.
4.4.2 effect of the structure of education
Choices in research are related to choices that are being made in education policy.
The Dutch higher education system is evolving towards an American education
system, including characteristics of the organisation of scientific research. Char-
acteristic of the American system is that research takes place only later in univer-
sity curricula, in the master’s stage or later. This occurs next to education in
professional schools (of law, business, etc.). This evolution is far from complete
in the Netherlands. An obstacle is that while previously research was part of
education in earlier stages (master’s or even bachelor’s), this is not in the interest
of students going for a professional career, which exerts pressure to take out
research, against the interest of careers in science. This problem is accentuated 
by the strong division between scientific (university) education and higher 
vocational education. This division follows the division in secondary education
between ‘vwo’ (pre-university education) and ‘havo’ (school of higher general
secondary education).
The process is as follows. In attempts to accentuate the difference between the
bachelor stage of university education and training in higher vocational education
(for which students also receive a bachelor’s diploma), many academic disciplines
begin the first phase of their education with a rather narrow, specialized training.
The risk of this is that many university students received specialised training that
they do not need and for which they may not even be motivated (e.g., because
they only want academic training to enable them to secure a job, which is mostly
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Dans les champs de l’observation,
le hasard ne favorise que les esprits préparés.
louis pasteur 1854not a scientific job). At the same time, those students who go for a scientific
career do not get the necessary general preparatory academic education, although
they need such a general education as the basis for acquiring the skills to be a
researcher in their own discipline (Van Oostrom 2007).
In addition, by accentuating the difference between university education and
higher vocational education the stimulus for universities to compete with other
universities in offering better education is weakened. Differences between
university education and vocational education might overshadow the differences
within these broad categories of education. In this way, the belief may prevail
within universities that the quality of university education is guaranteed as long
as it remains sufficiently different from higher vocational education.
The preparation of students for professional practice by doing practical research
during their education and by solving problems for the business community, may
be an important source of innovative ideas (awt2005a). This kind of education
could be seen as the task of higher vocational education institutions , and that is in
fact how these institutions see themselves, as universities for applied science. But
these institutions have limited financial and legal possibilities to function as such.
In principle they are not allowed to do original research and offer a full-fledged 
second phase master’s education. In trying to find a way out, they now cooperate
with foreign higher education institutes in offering master’s training. In addition
these institutions try to offer students participation in practical research that is 
necessary for their education. The institutions try to engage in research activities
through cooperation with universities, and by appointing so-called ‘lectors’ dedi-
cated to this task. Despite these efforts it remains difficult for higher vocational 
education institutions to participate in (applied) research. The road toward the
more comprehensive introduction of research to students in higher vocational edu-
cation during the second phase of their education is closed (see also Kahan 2002:
47). Attempts by the Ministry of Education to loosen the strict differentiation be-
tween universities and higher vocational education institutions are met by strong
opposition from universities and related institutions. For example, in a recent
memorandum that accompanied the new formulation of goals for higher educa-
tion, the Ministry of Education defined research at higher vocational institutions 
as follows: “Original investigation undertaken in order to acquire new knowledge.
It is, however, directed primarily towards a specific practical aim or objective”
(Memorie van Toelichting 2005). The Advisory Council for Science and Technolo-
gy Policy (awt) however responded that this should notbe the goal of research at
higher vocational education institutions. Vocational schools would then get the
opportunity to do research that may lead to substantial new insights, and the awt
holds that this should not be the task of these schools (awt2005b). It is remarkable
that maintenance of the existing educational structure is prioritised over the cre-
ation of opportunities to obtain new insight. The price of this position is that a pos-
sible research source that could lead to innovations is not being exploited. More-
over, as argued before, the training of researchers at universities may lack necessary
preparatory elements, which would improve the quality of such training.
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Related to the financing and programming of research are the chosen quality
standards.
An important quality measure for research at universities is nowadays the
success in publishing in foreign (usually American) journals, aimed at the devel-
opment of often rather specific expertise in a narrow or specialised field. While
we grant the merit of specialisation, when this regime is applied to everyone,
negative effects arise. This practice is not conducive to a wide accessibility of
research results, and also does not stimulate the practical, innovative use of
research results. Apart from this, in the social sciences the usefulness of a publi-
cation sometimes decreases when it is based on data sets that are gathered abroad
and not – such as in our case – in the Netherlands.
At the same time this way of measuring performance can direct investment deci-
sions for research by government in the wrong direction, as far as these funding
decisions are based on measurable criteria such as citation scores, previous
investments in research, or numbers of knowledge workers. This practice may
not be conducive to reaching innovation goals. It may therefore be more sensible
to make choices about research investment based on content, avoiding or reduc-
ing the influence of (unclear) quantitative measures. As indicated also in chapter
7, rather than only counting publications and citations, for proper evaluation one
should occasionally read publications to assess their value.
The use of a bibliometric analysis for evaluation and policy choices is elaborated in a report of the
Council for the Humanities and the Social Science Council of the knaw(Royal Netherlands Acad-
emy of Arts and Sciences). This report observes advantages of a bibliometric analysis for discover-
ing macro-developments in research (knaw2005). However, the report notes that these biblio-
metric indicators also have limitations, when they are used to evaluate research in the humanities
and social science and in research policy. It appears that the outcome may be that less attention is
given to the practical use of research results. Communication with the public is necessary to get a
grip on that, but this is not counted in the bibliometric statistics.
4.4.4 programming and funding research in higher education
In university research, an issue is to what extent this should be planned and
programmed according to societal needs. In line with our Hayekian perspective,
we are wary of bureaucrats in central offices, at ministries and national science
foundations, specifying programmes or projects for which scientists or busi-
nesses may then submit tenders. Why should they know better than the totality
of differentiated and dispersed knowledge? However, we do acknowledge the
legitimacy for central coordination to indicate broad public priority issues, such
as problems in the fields of energy, environment, water, health care, and aging,
short of actually specifying projects.
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Some money for new research is allocated to those who have an excellent research
record. They are awarded prizes or funding afterwards, to expand successful lines
of research. This is understandable in view of the difficulty to predict successful 
research beforehand (‘picking winners’), as discussed in chapter 3. Therefore, we
endorse such awards to researchers that have proved their ability, in terms of carry-
ing out research, intellectual leadership, and research management. Next to that,
however, funding on the basis of prior assessment of the merits of research propos-
als is also needed, to allow for newcomers and outsiders. That is more problematic,
in view of the difficulty to predict success and value of exploratory research. Next
to the usual ‘hard’ measures of a researcher’s past performance, in terms of publica-
tions in high ‘impact-score’ journals, and monographs at publishers of high repute,
this requires additional, rich, context- and person-dependent knowledge, to a large
extent tacit, which is best provided locally, in the research centre at the university.
Furthermore, also according to the principles of Hayekian variety and experimen-
talism, discussed in chapters 1 and 3, local assessment allows for greater variety of
judgement, based on variety of theoretical and methodological perspectives, com-
pared to committees of a science foundation that are dominated by one school of
thought or another. Thus, here we see a preference for first-flow funding. In the
policy debate, it has been claimed that in that stream there is lack of competition,
compared to second-flow funding. However, since the institution of research
schools at universities, and an intensification of research assessments by peer re-
view, competition has greatly increased also at the university level. Improvements
and adjustments in first-flow funding are of course possible. As argued earlier,
while a link between teaching and research should be maintained, first-flow fund-
ing might be coupled more to quality and novelty. In sum, we propose to maintain
a two-track approach for financing innovative research: investing in promising
new research on the one hand, and on the other hand at the same time backing con-
tinuation of successful research in the past, and to do so in both first- and second-
flow funding. We are wary of any further shift from first to second-flow funding.
Awards should be used first of all to expand successful research, rather than
increasing personal income of successful researchers. The effect of steering by
rewards in terms of personal income is limited when the purpose is to encourage
creative behaviour. Research shows (see also Schweizer 2004) that intrinsic
rewards, such as satisfaction of scientific curiosity, is often more important for
the stimulation of creative processes than economic rewards. The latter could
even produce an adverse stimulus.
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The winner takes it all
The loser standing small
Beside the victory
That’s her destiny
abba, 1980Research by universities and higher vocational education
The difference between exploitation and exploration may help us find new
opportunities for innovative research at universities and institutions in higher
vocational education. The academic world could be positioned in the sphere of
exploration, with a central interest for fundamental research. Higher vocational
institutions could have a role in doing research that is oriented to the exploitation
of knowledge, i.e., applied research. For universities there is then no need to
become too closely involved in applied research for the business world, and
exploration can be protected against undesirable influence from the market
system, discussed in chapter 3.
Interdisciplinarity
A further issue is the inter-disciplinarity of university research. Both radical
novelty and application often arise across the frontiers of disciplines. However,
universities are mostly oriented towards, and organised according to disciplines.
This is one of the complications in university-industry collaboration. Indeed, one
of the reasons for university-industry collaboration is to stimulate interdiscipli-
nary exploration. Nevertheless, there are good reasons for disciplinarity. Align-
ment according to discipline ensures depth of specialisation, and provides a focus
for teaching, scholarly societies, scientific journals, and conferences.
There may be a deeper, evolutionary argument. Perhaps disciplines may be seen in analogy to
species, and in biological evolution cross-species breeding is impossible for a good reason. Inter-
species breeding would yield lack of differentiation and hence lack of differential survival, by which
the evolutionary process would break down.
Yet, space needs to be made for interdisciplinary research. There are large obsta-
cles to this, from the viewpoint of the sociology of science, and over the past
years those obstacles have increased rather than decreased. Junior researchers
especially have to obtain scientific visibility to make an academic career. When a
researcher combines A and B, he says B things to people involved only in A and A
things to those involved only in B, and as a result is not fully recognisable or even
identifiable to either as a contender for recognition and careers. The typical
response is that one gets ignored. It is difficult for such partial outsiders to be
accepted for publication in the top journals, which are mostly single-disciplinary.
Conclusions
Two central issues in investment and planning of research are the link with
higher education, for diffusing scientific knowledge, and the potential contribu-
tion to scientific progress. This is to be determined within the academic world.
However, the demand for innovative research creates pressures on the allocation
of funds between the different flows. In that allocation one should balance differ-
ent goals, such as prosperity, the solution of social problems, scientific progress
and quality of education. One should also take into account relationships, for the
achievement of those goals, between the development and the application of
117
research, higher education, and innovationknowledge, between universities and industry and between academic institu-
tions and institutions of higher vocational training. Earlier, it was shown that the
cycle of discovery in innovation requires influences from outside the academic
world and a link to applied research. Fundamental and applied research are both
necessary for innovation in the cycle of discovery.
4.5 research in the business sector and innovation
4.5.1 fundamental research, the business community, and
innovation
Much research outside universities is multidisciplinary or transdisciplinary, and
aimed at application; fundamental research is done to a lesser extent (see also
table 4.1). It is argued that the image of a researcher who by chance encounters an
important and useful innovation while looking for fundamental insights, belongs
to the past (Rathenau Instituut 2006: 9). However, this observation requires a
comment.
If in reality much research is multi- or transdisciplinary and aimed at application,
this should not necessarily be a norm for the organisation of all research. One can
dispute whether important innovations are the result of research that aims at
innovation. There are good reasons for the shift of research from the business
world to universities and for the fundamental research that is being done there
(Weingart 1999). In the us, increasing competition in industry has eroded its
resources for exploration (Lester and Piore 2004). Yet exploitation of knowledge
needs preceding exploration, in the cycle of discovery. In his plea for free and fun-
damental scientific research in reaction to the coalition agreement of the current
Dutch cabinet, the president of the knawmakes a similar point (Van Oostrom
2007).
As can be seen from the money flows (table 4.1), a lot of research is done by
companies. A difficult question is related to the large amount of knowledge that
is obtained as a result of research carried out within large companies. In the
policy debate, there is much discussion of problems in the transfer of knowledge
from the scientific academic world to the broader economy and society, as in the
debate about the ‘valorisation’ of knowledge. But there are also obstacles to the
accessibility of results of scientific research that is carried out in commercial envi-
ronments. It would be very useful if knowledge generated there were accessible
for the outside world. There is not only a problem with the protection (and thus
accessibility for the rest of the world) of promising research that could lead to
patents, but also with the accessibility beyond companies of research that is not
successful. Unsuccessful research also contributes to the accumulation of knowl-
edge. However companies fear that publication of such negative results may give
clues to competitors about the direction in which the company is searching (see
also De Wijkerslooth 2007).
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‘spin-offs’. There, employees with innovative ideas that are generated but not
exploited in the large firm, because these ideas do not fit with existing thought,
competencies, or market strategy, or are considered too uncertain and risky,
follow their convictions and start a new firm to further develop and commer-
cialise the idea. This is further discussed in the chapter on entrepreneurship
(chapter 5).
In the theory of innovation, a classic condition for commercialisation of research
is the ability to protect profits by preventing or postponing imitation. An impor-
tant policy question is to what extent such protection of intellectual property (ip)
is still needed and desirable. No doubt, there is still a need in some cases, depend-
ing on the industry, but a trade-off needs to be made by firms between the possi-
ble loss of knowledge to competition and the gains from the free flow of informa-
tion. Taking into account that spillover requires absorptive capacity, skills,
complementary assets (including marketing assets), organisation, and the delay
involved in putting these things in place, spillover may often not be a real threat
(Nooteboom 1999). Several studies have shown that in fact patents and other
forms of protection of ip are the instrument least used to ensure ‘appropriability’
of profits, compared to other instruments such as: keeping one’s personnel from
leaving or being poached, secrecy, speed of development, complementary assets
or capabilities (needed to actually apply knowledge that spills over), and
complexity of technology (oecd 2005). Several of the alternative measures for
appropriability connect with the argument concerning absorptive capacity. The
Community Innovation Survey (cis) shows that only 10 percent of firms use
patents to ensure profits (eurostat 2007). This calls into question the use of
patenting as a measure of a country’s innovativeness, in ‘innovation score
boards’. Excessive protection of intellectual property has the traditional draw-
back of slowing down diffusion, thus reducing the welfare benefits of innovation.
A newer insight, offered by Von Hippel is that it also obstructs the openness of
innovation, with a variety of contributors, including users. This is discussed in
chapter 8. Also, patents are sometimes used not to ensure profitable exploitation
but for blocking access to new products by competitors.
A curious perverse effect of patents is the following. In collaborative r&d projects in the eu frame-
work programmes, legal divisions of especially large firms sometimes keep on sending back and
correcting draft agreements for projects, for improvement of ip protection of the firm. This slows
down the process so much that exasperated participants force an agreement through without any
regulation of ip protection, which later generates problems (private communication).
There have been increasing pressures on universities to commercialise the
knowledge they developed by selling it, or by contracting applied research. This
can be counterproductive. Firms complain that whereas in the past they could
pass by for a quick answer to a simple question, now universities offer to set up a
contract beforegiving such feedback. In view of the often substantial delay, in the
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decline the offer. The procedure is even unwise from a marketing perspective. A
free answer to a limited problem gives parties the opportunity to test the attrac-
tiveness and mutual ability to collaborate, and to cross the ‘cognitive distance’
involved, in terms of the analysis of chapter 3. In other words, a substantial scope
for free advice may be needed in order for contracting for more extensive research
to take place. And to account for such free spending of public funds, it should be
possible to measure university performance of such services, in the existing peri-
odic research assessments of faculties, on the basis of some logging (tracking of
time spent) of advisory projects and a sampling of the satisfaction of firms that
were served.
4.5.2 sources of knowledge work
It is claimed that there is a shortage of students in natural science or technology
specialisations at Dutch universities, and that there is an untapped potential of
positions for women, who until now are not sufficiently choosing those
specializations (Van Langen 2005). This potential could be tapped if premature
specialisation were avoided. However it is disputed whether or not there really is
a shortage of personnel in those specialisations, in the Netherlands (Noailly, De
Waagmeester, Jacobs, Rensman and Webbink 2005). If there was such a shortage
the business world has not addressed this need by offering attractive employment
conditions to such personnel. It is remarkable that companies specifically seek
students who have graduated from higher vocational institutions, whom, in the
Dutch setting, they can offer low wages, while it is not expected that they have
done any scientific research or been on the receiving end of any scientific knowl-
edge; indeed higher vocational institutions are prohibited from offering their
students participation in scientific research.
In the higher education system, universities included, attempts are being made to
prepare researchers for their future role in business. At Leiden University for
example, during the training of scientific researchers attention is given to organi-
zational and working conditions in companies (Birrer and Tobias 2003). Also
worth mentioning is the Casimir program that since 2004 provides for exchanges
of researchers between companies and public research institutions.
In order for research to result in innovation it must be creative, creativity is
required. Creativity is not an individual characteristic but specific behaviour that
results from different single personal characteristics and a specific environment.
It is true that performance in particular fields (music, science, arts) requires
specific skills or intelligence, but these are in themselves not sufficient to produce
good performance. Creative behaviour is the result of several specific qualities
and circumstances. Necessary individual qualities include a curious mind, perse-
verance, and inner directedness. For creativity in a social environment emotional
intelligence is necessary, too.
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gence and learning capacity, as measured by a person’s iq, is just one quality
amongst others that are sometimes, but not always, necessary for creative
performances. iq however does not determine on its own whether behaviour
will be creative. For that to happen domain specific talents and the correct envi-
ronment are also needed.
That attention should also be given to the environment is perhaps an unusual
idea for those who think creativity is a personal characteristic that is genetically
determined. But in psychology thinking in a dichotomy about the effect of
personal and environmental factors (nature and nurture) is nowadays passé.
Genetic make-up does not result unconditionally in specific behaviour. It is a
misconception to think that creative talent provided by chance or inheritance at
birth will determine whether one’s life will be creative. As Smitsman (2000)
argues: “(A) capability to perform a task, and a talent as the outstanding quality
by which one performs a task, are relational properties that rest on organism and
environment rather than on some hidden core inside the organism or the envi-
ronment.” Embodied in a person is no more than a potential. Fluctuations in
performance could occur, dependent on the context, after maturing (Renzulli
1999). In chapter 9 we explore in much more detail what the organisational
conditions for creativity might be.
4.6 specific innovative attempts in knowledge policy
4.6.1 european policy
Considering the number of scientists that will graduate in the future in large
countries with growing economies, such as India and China, it can be expected
that an increasingly smaller part of total research will be done in Europe. This is
one of the reasons for the increasing importance of international contacts for
Dutch researchers. Related to this are the efforts in the Netherlands and Europe
to fund research programs and leading technological institutes and to promote
international exchange of students and researchers. An important initiative of the
European Commission is the proposal to establish a European Institute of Tech-
nology (eit). If the European Parliament and the Council approve this proposal,
the institute can start in 2008 with a budget of at most 2.4 billion euros for the
period 2008-2013. According to an eu press release this institute “will be a flag-
ship for excellence in innovation, research and higher education in Europe. It will
be a reference model in the way it combines the worlds of academia, research and
business so as to enable Europe to face the challenges of a globalising, knowl-
edge-based world economy more effectively.”
If intuitions of the benefits of large scale form the basis for this plan, it is a dubi-
ous plan. As discussed in chapter 1, arguments of scale do not always apply,
certainly not for innovation. If there are indeed economies of scale, for example 
in specialised support in laboratories, or large instruments and installations,
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concentration of activities. There could be a drawback if this institute were to
dominate European scientific research and would take away a lot of research
money, given the difficulty to predict success of research, and the bureaucratisa-
tion that could accompany such concentration of research. As argued before,
fundamental and innovative research call for variety, at a certain cognitive
distance and free from interference by the business community and government.
Furthermore, when programming of research is partly decided at a European
level, political considerations could be included that are not in the interest of
science, such as considerations of prestige and power, and the use of subsidies for
research to promote the economic development of poor areas (Kahan et al. 2002:
49). There is a difference between promoting research that could lead to the solu-
tion of social-economic problems, which fits with the proposed formulation of
societal goals for research, and the use of research funds in an ineffective way as
an investment in a poor area, to stimulate regional development by the location of
highly paid knowledge workers living in that area.
There is a tendency towards bottom-up international cooperation in research.
The Atlas of Knowledge and Innovation shows that a large part of the knowledge
flows that may lead to economic-technological innovations are related to national
and international networks of companies and universities, and not primarily with
other knowledge institutes and companies in the same areas (Weterings, Raspe,
and Van Oort 2006). This self-organisation seeking its way in a knowledge ecol-
ogy is generally better than concentration. If the eit is set up to support rather
than replace this process, it may be a good idea.
4.6.2 creation of technologically leading institutes (ttis)
Probably, less rather than more policy making is necessary for innovation. Poli-
cies may have as an effect that they stimulate the development of an innovation
systemin the normative sense of designing and planning structures of education,
research, and business, with the drawbacks that were discussed above. There is
some doubt if existing policy initiatives are sufficiently appreciative of the danger
of fixing development in this way. This could be the case with policies for the so-
called strategic ‘key areas’ designated by the Dutch government and for techno-
logically leading institutes (ttis) in the Netherlands. At these institutes, partly
financed with government funds, cooperation between (big) business and
researchers takes place.
There are now eight ttis in the Netherlands. These institutes are doing long-
term strategic industrial research on a limited theme with international impor-
tance. An evaluation of the ttis indicated that it is not clear what the innovative
results of this approach are, although government maintains its confidence that
there will be positive results in the future (Tweede Kamer 2005-2006, 30300 xii;
Van der Veen, Arnold and Boekholt 2005). In our own interviews with some of
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demanding large fees for participation in research and the use of its outcomes.
Also, directors of ttis are sometimes former or present part-time employees of
large firms. Both conditions contribute to the exclusion of smaller firms and
entrepreneurs who may need access most, in view of their limited resources of
specialized expertise. In other words, there appears to be a threat of institutional
‘lock-in’. For the recent creation of a new ttion green genetics the Dutch govern-
ment has promised to address the necessary conditions for wider access, under
the supervision of a technological advisory committee. This committee is sched-
uled meet each six months and is supposed to stimulate the conversion of gath-
ered knowledge into product innovation (Tweede Kamer 2006-2007: 30919). 
It is too early to evaluate this initiative.
Overall, the policy of ttis appears to follow from the old view that innovation is
mostly to be seen as a matter of technology that calls for more scientific research.
However, as has been argued in various chapters in this book, innovation is not
only about solving technical questions but also, or even in the first and foremost,
about finding open spaces for debate, where participants discuss and deal with
ambiguities, and about the exploration of opportunities (Lester and Piore 2004;
Huston 2007). When exploration reaches exploitation, it requires additional,
non-technological innovation in organisation, collaboration, marketing, distribu-
tion channels, technical standards, education, and training.
4.6.3 stimulating the immigration of knowledge workers
Since 2004 it has become easier for foreigners who fit the definition of ‘knowledge
worker’ and are sponsored by an employer to get a residence permit to live and
work in the Netherlands. Now , with 4 percent foreign employees in the sector
‘science and technique’, the Netherlands is almost at the European average of 
4.1 percent (cpb2007). With the expectation that in the future there will be a
larger demand for these workers, proposals are now being formulated to complete
the demand-oriented migration with a supply-driven motivation. This means 
that foreign workers who meet certain criteria can migrate to the Netherlands and
find themselves a job also without the invitation/sponsorship of a company in 
the Netherland. A complication is that a policy discussion about this same issue 
is taking place at a European level at the same time, with uncertain outcomes.
In a recent recommendation, the Dutch Social Economic Council (ser) found the
simplification of the admission procedure to be insufficient (ser 2007). Accord-
ing to ser, the policy for knowledge workers should be less restrictive. In the ser
proposal, which immigrants can qualify for a residence permit under the knowl-
edge worker category would be determined via a point system based on level of
education, work experience, English and/or Dutch language abilities, and age
(preferably young). At the same time ser observes that there are limitations to
make working in the Netherlands attractive for foreign workers. Such attractive-
ness includes housing, schooling, recreation, and culture.
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There is a net-outflow of this category (see table 4.2 for figures from 2000; more
recent comparative data was not available). The question for the Netherlands is
whether a larger supply of knowledge workers will also create a larger demand for
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Table 4.2
Foreign-born persons with tertiary attainment
As a percentage of all residents with tertiary attainment, circa 2000
Australia 16,8 2,4 14,4 12,1 26,5
Austria 9,1 13,8 -4,7 5,2 0,5
Belgium 5,9 6,4 -0,5 4,2 3,7
Canada 10,3 5,4 4,9 15,5 20,4
Czech Republic 4,1 8,7 -4,5 2,2 -2,3
Denmark 4,4 7,3 -2,9 3,2 0,3
Finland 0,9 6,8 -5,9 1,3 -4,6
France 4,2 4,4 -0,2 8,2 8,0
Germany 2,8 7,3 -4,5 8,6 4,1
Greece 4,8 9,4 -4,6 7,3 2,7
Hungary 1,4 9,7 -8,3 4,5 -3,8
Ireland 14,0 26,1 -12,1 4,0 -8,1
Italy 2,8 7,3 -4,5 3,3 -1,2
Japan 0,2 1,1 -0,9 0,5 -0,4
Korea 0,2 1,4 -1,2 0,2 -1,0
Luxembourg 43,1 15,4 27,7 5,8 33,5
Mexico 0,8 6,9 -6,1 0,5 -5,6
Netherlands 3,3 8,9 -5,6 4,4 -1,2
New Zealand 14,6 24,4 -9,8 10,0 0,2
Norway 5,2 4,9 0,3 3,0 3,2
Poland 0,4 10,2 -9,8 2,3 -7,6
Portugal 4,1 11,2 -7,0 11,2 4,1
Slovak Republic 3,3 16,0 -12,8 0,9 -11,9
Spain 2,7 2,3 0,5 3,8 4,2
Sweden 6,9 5,4 1,5 7,3 8,8
Switzerland 20,0 10,8 9,1 7,3 16,4
Turkey 3,4 4,9 -1,5 2,7 1,2
United Kingdom 6,5 14,9 -8,4 9,4 1,0
United States 4,2 0,7 3,5 9,2 12,7
OECD average  6,9 8,8 -1,9 5,4 3,6




















(A-B+C)social security for these immigrants and their family members, who might face
difficulties in finding employment, either upon arrival or after they have finished
a job for which they originally came to the Netherlands. In supply-driven migra-
tion the costs of recruitment and integration are in fact paid by the Dutch taxpay-
ers and not by potential employers.
From the perspective of this book, in which innovation is primarily seen as
developing bottom-up, the migration of innovative knowledge workers should
be the result of an increasing demand from the business community and univer-
sities. Of course, obstacles that prevent migrant workers from satisfying that
demand should be reduced. It is difficult, if not impossible, however, to know in
advance which knowledge workers are attractive for an innovative economy. The
risk of supply-driven migration at the European level is that the Netherlands
might receive immigrants for whom this country is a second choice and in which
they are less interested in integrating and staying permanently. At this time most
of the highly educated immigrants into Europe go to Great Britain, France, and
Germany. These countries are expected to remain most attractive; Great Britain
and France especially have the advantage of being a country with a language in
which many knowledge workers already are fluent. And if they are not, investing
in learning English or French yields wider opportunities for moving to other
countries when the need or opportunity arises. The Netherlands could wait and
see what the accelerated procedures for immigration and a (hopefully) increasing
demand will produce. Also, ser’s advice (2007) could be followed to develop and
make use of existing potential talent within the Netherlands; in the Netherlands
there is still much unused talent among the ethnic minority and refugee popula-
tions.
4.7 a policy recommendation: promoting the generation
and utilisation of knowledge in ‘third spaces’
4.7.1 basic assumptions
Government should prevent investment in research from being fully dictated by
the market value of the results of that research. Government should leave earning
money to the business community that does substantially investments in
(applied) research. Government has a special responsibility to solve social prob-
lems. Guiding research efforts based on their social relevance can put right some
of the shortcomings of current research discussed before.
As suggested earlier, and discussed in more detail in chapter 3, exploitation and
exploration require different conditions, but they should build upon each other.
In the relationship between university and industry there is not only an issue of
applying science to practice but also of science taking inspiration from practice. In
some areas, such as engineering and medicine, close interaction between explo-
ration and exploitation is normal, within the university. However, even there
some research is more fundamental and ‘blue sky’, at a greater distance from
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research, higher education, and innovationexploitation. To allow for the need to combine exploitation and exploration, as
well as the fact that they may require different conditions, we propose the notion
of a ‘third space’, between university and industry. Within this space interaction
between university and industry would take place for the sake of carrying explo-
ration into exploitation as well as inspiring exploration from exploitation, while
keeping institutional differentiation intact. This third space could be virtual or
real, in the form of an actual location. By setting interaction apart, in a third
space, industry can escape from market pressures towards exploitation and
academia can protect the autonomy of its fundamental research, while being
connected to each other for their mutual benefit.
Third spaces enhance the full development of the cycle of exploration and
exploitation (see chapter 3). Third spaces should not be dominated by the market.
They should be open places with access for researchers to the practice of exploita-
tion, without asking these researchers to defer and limit themselves to the
demands of the market. Third spaces are spaces for interpretation (Lester and
Piore 2004, see also chapter 3). With these ideas in mind, we conducted a number
of interviews, with both academia and industry, which yield a number of recom-
mendations.
It appears that the industrial laboratories that formed the basis of the renowned ‘Silicon Valley’,
such as Bell Labs, performed this function of a third space. As told by Chesbrough (2003), these
arrangements have for some reason eroded. According to Lester & Piore (2004) this is due to
increased competition, during the nineties, which eliminated the slack needed for exploration.
4.7.2 a recommendation of ‘third spaces’
To test our idea of third spaces we conducted a series of interviews with universi-
ties (in Eindhoven, Groningen, and Delft), a higher vocational education school
in Rotterdam, three more or less recently instituted technological top institutes
connected with universities (The Centre for Food Sciences, the newly instituted
top institute for water management ‘Wetsus’ in Leeuwarden, and the Telematics
Institute), two medium-sized companies, and three large corporations (Unilever,
Shell, and Philips).
The main result is that among our respondents the problem of valorisation is not
perceived to be as large or urgent as it is among policymakers in the Dutch
government. Many forms of collaboration have already been developed.
However, as we indicated earlier, there is a tendency of technological top insti-
tutes (ttis) to focus on relations with large firms, and the openness to outside
entrepreneurs that we plead for does not always seem assured. Mostly, the
respondents from university and technical institutes claimed that they already
practise what we suggested, and that (something like) ‘third spaces’ were already
a reality. We acknowledge that, but not everyone seemed aware of all options,
and we believe that the people involved can still learn, mostly from each other.
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informants are elaborated below.
As indicated earlier, a key principle, in our view, is that the relation between
university and industry is not only a one-way issue of putting university research
to use, in exploitation, but a two-way issue of also providing inspiration from
practice for more fundamental university research, in exploration. Most respon-
dents acknowledged the validity of this principle. Another key principle, to
ensure exploration, is that meetings between people generate ideas and projects,
around a broad theme, rather than that projects are specified beforehand for
participants to subscribe to. This is related to the principle that innovation proj-
ects should be sufficiently open to allow for surprise and change of direction.
It proved useful also for other reasons to employ the distinction between
exploitation and exploration. Exploitation emerges in more or less straightfor-
ward contract research, in which industry can specify and contract for desired
outcomes. Exploration arises in collaboration between universities to literally
explore uncertain but possible developments, in new technologies, areas of appli-
cation or problems to be investigated. Here, we will focus on the latter. It was
recognised that one had to carefully select staff that are able to conduct the inter-
action for exploration. Not all practitioners are able and willing to exchange views
with academics, and not all academics are eager to obtain inspiration from indus-
trial experience. A problem also is that universities are generally oriented towards
disciplines, while exploitation is mostly interdisciplinary. For universities a side
benefit may be the development of contacts for future contract research, and an
increase of reputation for employment opportunities of graduates or Ph.Ds. For
industry, the benefit is not only the direct acquisition of knowledge or insights
into new developments, but also increased absorptive capacity to be brought back
into the firm, and to develop contacts for future collaboration in both further
exploration and exploitation. In the area of energy, examples are: storage of co2
(e.g., including the chemistry and geology of infusing co2 into different kinds of
soil) and energy from biomass (e.g., including what to do with residual material).
In line with our earlier analysis, in chapter 7, it was recognised that in such collab-
oration for exploration one should take enough time to get to know and under-
stand each other (‘speak the same language’) and build trust, since in such
settings contractual control, e.g., of property rights, is difficult, cumbersome,
unworkable, or even counter-productive. Concerning the issue of intellectual
property and ‘spillover’, respondents noted a growing awareness that a relaxation
was in order: to get knowledge one should offer and risk knowledge, in many
cases exploration was sufficiently ‘pre-competitive’ not to yield a direct threat,
contractual control would not work in early stages of exploration (there isn’t yet
anything well defined to appropriate), and people simply could not make
progress without each others’ knowledge. Among the technological top institutes
that we interviewed, in one case there is an explicit policy to leave ownership of
patents to firms.
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with different groups of partners on different occasions. The advantage of this is
flexibility. Others were aiming at more durable, ‘strategic’ relations, as a basis for
building understanding and trust. An element of such relations was also the
detachment or exchange of personnel, for the duration of a project. In some cases
there was also a desire for a certain continuity and a portfolio of activities, for the
sake of synergy, spreading risks, funding less mature projects from more mature
ones, and for satisfying conditions of matching for participation in eu
programmes. Some respondents expressed apprehension at too close and exten-
sive an involvement of firms in universities. That may interfere with the inde-
pendence of universities and their task, generally seen as legitimate and impor-
tant, to do independent fundamental research, and it may be seen by others (such
as politicians or the public) as appropriation of public institutes by business.
Recently, in the us there was an initiative for a third space between bp oil company and the Univer-
sity of California at Berkeley and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, in the form of an
Energy Biosciences Institute (ebi), with $500 million funding from bp, to conduct research into
biofuels and related technologies. This caused a debate on whether this would detract too much
from academic freedom and the public availability of results. What caused concern, in particular,
was that bp would also have its own researchers (about 50) at the institute, in a proprietary space,
who would be allowed to freely roam around in university spaces, while university staff could be
excluded from bp space (http://www.berkeleydaily, planet.com). Predictably, there were also
questions concerning property rights of outcomes.
A solution here may be a ‘third space’ in the form of an actual institute, with resi-
dential facilities, separate from both industry and university, financed jointly by
business and universities, dedicated to their interaction, with the explicit task to
enable and facilitate meetings and joint projects to utilise cognitive distance for
the sake of exploration. A second objective of a separate institute may be to shield
off and protect more fundamental research from appropriation by business inter-
ests. Participation in the activities of a third space should satisfy the principle of
optimal flexibility, discussed in chapter 3: long enough to develop requisite
mutual understanding and trust, but not so long as to reduce novelty and variety
of ideas.
A condition for such third spaces to work is that participation by academics is
seen as legitimate, and finds a place in the system of performance evaluation. On
the side of industry, a condition is that participation of staff is seen as a good
career move within the firm. A third space could perhaps also function as a plat-
form for entrepreneurial spin-offs. In that case the set-up may also involve
venture capitalists. However, in many cases of exploratory research exploitation
is still too far off.
These arrangements are appropriate for large firms, and for small firms with
adequate absorptive capacity, such as high-tech firms or spin-offs from universi-
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128ties or large firms. Openings should be maintained with respect to the latter, and
access should not be monopolized by one or a few large firms.
For most small- and medium-sized enterprises (sme) it is more fitting to their
absorptive capacity to seek collaboration with higher vocational education insti-
tutions, solely or in groups. In the Netherlands, this is done in the raak
(Regional Attention and Action for Knowledge circulation) programme, spon-
sored by the Ministry of Education and executed by the Stichting Innovatie
Alliantie (Innovation Alliance Foundation) (2007). To ensure diffusion of inno-
vation, and to further enhance the interaction between exploration and exploita-
tion, links should be forged between exploration at universities, the interaction
between exploration and exploitation at third spaces, and applied, exploitative
research at higher vocational institutes. As we found from one of the respon-
dents, one way of doing this is to make use of the recent institution of ‘lectors’ at
higher vocational institutes. Those might have part-time and/or temporary
assignments at third spaces.
4.8 conclusions
Doing excellent scientific research is one of the conditions for innovation. Other
important conditions are an adequate transfer of knowledge in education and an
optimal context for the applied exploitation of that knowledge in practice, in the
economy, and in society.
This chapter presents a discussion of the creation and application of knowledge,
in particular the role of universities and higher vocational education institutions,
science policy, and relations between higher education and industry. Fundamen-
tal research and education on the one side and the exploitation of knowledge by
business on the other side belong to two different institutionalised worlds. These
two worlds should interact but not merge in a knowledge and innovation system.
It is the permanent division between the two that has advantages, also because
innovation is not the sole goal for acquiring knowledge and higher education does
not only aim to transfer knowledge for innovation.
Among other things, an argument is made to limit the thematic programming of
university research to the stimulation of areas of societal priorities, in ‘second
stream finance’, and not to meddle in the autonomy of universities in specifying
projects and approaches. A question is to what extent ‘first stream finance’ should
remain coupled to the existing academic landscape of the universities.
In research, there is a division of labour between universities (more for explo-
ration) and higher vocational education institutions (more for exploitation); the
latter should obtain the finance to conduct corresponding applied research. For
the interaction between university and large firms and high-tech small firms,
ideas are proposed to further activities of exploration between them, in a ‘third
space’ of activities, to support industry in activities of exploration and for univer-
129
research, higher education, and innovationsities to test their ideas and to gain inspiration for fundamental research with
broad social applications. For the majority of small business (non-high tech)
higher vocational education institutions form a more natural ally.
There are good motives for promoting research based in part on the social rele-
vance of the research, without neglecting the other responsibilities of scientific
research and higher education. The business community can be involved in a set-
up of not only research that is in service of business, but also the other way
round: of a business community responsible for more general societal concerns.
Then the cycle of discovery will come full circle.
micro-foundations for innovation policy
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Erik Stam
5.1  entrepreneurship and innovation
Entrepreneurship has been recognised as a micro-driver of innovation and
economic growth (Wennekers and Thurik 1999; Audretsch and Thurik 2001b;
Acs 2006; Audretsch et al. 2006). What is meant by entrepreneurship, innova-
tion, and economic growth is often not clear or is very idiosyncratic. This chapter
starts with a discussion of the nature of entrepreneurship and its relation to inno-
vation. The second section provides an overview of theory and empirical research
on the relation between entrepreneurship, innovation, and economic growth.
The chapter continues with a study on entrepreneurship and innovation in the
Netherlands from an international and historical perspective. After these concep-
tual, theoretical, and empirical investigations, we turn to policy issues.
5.1.1 entrepreneurship defined
What is meant with entrepreneurship and how does this relate to innovation?
Entrepreneurship and innovation are fuzzy concepts that have been given multi-
ple meanings. Innovation and entrepreneurship are often regarded as overlapping
concepts. This can be traced back to probably the most well known definition of
entrepreneurship, by Schumpeter (1934: 74), who defines entrepreneurs as indi-
viduals that carry out new combinations (i.e., innovations). Schumpeter distin-
guishes four roles in the process of innovation: the inventor, who invents a new
idea; the entrepreneur who commercialises this new idea; the capitalist, who
provides the financial resources to the entrepreneur (and bears the risk of the
innovation project); the manager, who takes care of the routine day-to-day
corporate management. These roles are most often executed by different persons
(see for example Kenney 1986). The literature on entrepreneurship recognises a
variety of entrepreneurial roles in economic change, such as:
–t he person who bears uncertainty (Knight 1921);
– an innovator (Schumpeter 1934);
–a  decision maker (Casson 2003);
– an industrial leader (Schumpeter 1934);
– an organiser and coordinator of economic resources (Marshall 1890);
– an arbitrageur, alert to opportunities (Kirzner 1973; 1997);
– an allocator of resources among alternative uses (Schultz 1975).
These roles all implicitly carry with them an economically positive connotation.
However, if entrepreneurs are defined to be persons who are ingenious and 
creative in finding ways that add to their own wealth, power, and prestige (Baumol
1990), then it is to be expected that not all of their activities will deliver a produc-
tive contribution to society (cf. Murphy et al. 1991). For other reasons, many entre-
135
entrepreneurship and innovationpreneurs do not directly contribute to an increase in for example national income:
some entrepreneurship is more adequately characterised as a non-profit-seeking
activity (cf. Benz 2006). Greater independence and self-fulfilment are more often
mentioned as important motivations to become self-employed than increasing
earning power (eosGallup 2004). Empirical studies have even shown that 
(on average) entry into self-employment has a negative effect on the monetary
income of individuals (Hamilton 2000; Parker 2004). Being an entrepreneur may
be rewarding because it entails substantial non-monetary benefits, like greater
autonomy, broader skill utilisation, and the possibility to pursue one’s own ideas;
i.e., more freedom (cf. Sen 1999). These wide ranging effects of entrepreneurship
are reflected in entrepreneurship policy.1
There have been dozens of definitions of entrepreneurship (see for example
Hebert and Link 1989; Thurik and Van Dijk 1998). There is certainly not one
answer to the question of what the phenomenon entrepreneurship ‘truly’ is. 
Taking all entrepreneurship definitions together, they broadly reflect two 
relatively distinct social realities (Davidsson 2004). The first of those is the 
phenomenon that some people, rather than working for somebody else under 
an employment contract, strike out on their own and become self-employed.2
These economic entities involve some element of innovation at start-up, and 
some degree of innovativeness is needed to survive over time. However, 
innovation is not central to this phenomenon. It is to the second social reality. This
reality involves the development and renewal of any society, economy or organi-
sation, which is based on micro-level actors who have the initiative and persist-
ence to make change happen. In this reality, ‘entrepreneurship’ means the creation
of new economic activities and organisations (‘Schumpeterian entrepreneurship’)
as well as the transformation of existing ones (‘corporate entrepreneurship’).
In the context of this chapter we are especially interested in this second social
reality (‘entrepreneurship’) and less so in the first. In order to narrow down the
discussion we would like to propose a working definition of entrepreneurship as
“the introduction of new economic activity by an individual that leads to change
in the marketplace” (cf. Sarasvathy 2000; Davidsson 2004). This means that we
exclude some other interpretations of entrepreneurship (as non-innovative self-
employment) and parts of the innovation phenomenon (see figure 1). For exam-
ple, we exclude non-market activities such as not-for-profit endeavours, changes
in contract (e.g., from employee to self-employed) and internal, organisational
innovations. We also exclude mere contemplation over new ideas or introduction
of fatally flawed ones that do not change the market (directly or indirectly, via
learning mechanisms). We thus do not include novelty and creativity in any
domain of human behaviour in our concept of entrepreneurship (see also chapter
1). Inclusion of all this novelty and creativity would make the events of Septem-
ber 11, 2001, an entrepreneurship masterpiece: “To conceive of a fully fuelled
passenger jet as a missile and to combine the idea of hijacking with that of
kamikaze attacks is certainly innovative, and in terms of impact – economic and
otherwise – it has few parallels. However, regarding these attacks as driving
micro-foundations for innovation policy
136market processes is far-fetched” (Davidsson 2004: 7). This example also shows
that innovations can have devastating effects on society.
In line with our definition of entrepreneurship as the introduction of new
economic activity by an individual that leads to change in the marketplace, 
we can formulate several necessary conditions for entrepreneurship (cf. Shane
2004: 6):
–e xistence of entrepreneurial opportunities (environmental changes: techno-
logical, political/regulatory, social/demographic);
–d ifference between people (in their willingness and ability to act upon an
opportunity);
–r isk bearing; uncertainty until the entrepreneur pursues the opportunity (does
demand exist? can the entrepreneur compete with others? can the value chain
be created? etc.);
–o rganising (exploiting the opportunity); either creating a firm, or using the
market mechanism (for example, licensing);
– innovation: recombination of resources into a new form that is by implication
not a perfect imitation of what has been done before, and thus involves a
change in the marketplace.
These are necessary conditions for entrepreneurship. It is however contingent
upon whether the individuals discovering an opportunity are employees or 
independent individuals, and whether new firms or incumbent firms are used 
for the exploitation of the opportunity. See figure 5.2 for a typology of entrepre-
neurial efforts as a function of the locus of discovery and exploitation.
5.1.2 entrepreneurial opportunities
Because the range of options and the consequences of exploiting new things are
unknown, entrepreneurial decisions cannot be made through an optimisation
process in which mechanical calculations are made in response to a given set of 
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EntrepreneurshipFigure 5.2 Typology of entrepreneurial efforts 
alternatives (Baumol 1993). People must be able to identify new means-ends rela-
tionships that are generated by a given change in order to discover entrepreneur-
ial opportunities. Even if a person possesses the prior information necessary to
discover an opportunity, he or she may fail to do so because of an inability to see
new means-ends relationships. Unfortunately, visualising these relationships is
difficult. History is rife with examples in which inventors failed to see commer-
cial opportunities (new means-ends relationships) that resulted from the inven-
tion of important technologies – from the telegraph to the laser.
Every entrepreneur who starts a new business has ideas. The real challenge is to
discover an opportunity that is more than just a good idea. These opportunities
can have a radical nature (Schumpeterian) or be relatively incremental (Kirzner-
ian). Schumpeterian opportunities originate from changes in the environment
(Shane 2003). These can be technological, social /demographic, and
political/regulatory changes. First, technological change, often based on progress
in the research base of society, is a prime source of entrepreneurial opportunities
for new technology-based firms (for example in the ict and biotech industries).
See section 5.2 for the implications of this on economic growth. Second, social
and demographic changes can be quantitative changes like an ageing population
that offers new opportunities for entrepreneurs. It may also involve more qualita-
tive changes: changing preferences or wants, for example reflected in the increase
in the creative industries that satisfy new wants (e.g., Reality tvproduction
companies), or in the trend toward health and nutrition and the supply of diet
and organic food. In that sense people’s necessities are few but their wants are
endless. Third, deregulation, privatisation, and liberalisation have opened up
many opportunities for entrepreneurship.3 An example of deregulation is labour
market flexibility policy. Flexibilisation of the labour market has opened up
several opportunities for entrepreneurship. One the one hand many employees
have become self-employed, partly lured by the lower tax rates in comparison to
wage-labour. On the other hand, there have been high-growth start-ups that
have used this new trend of labour flexibility to specialise in temporary staffing.
Other examples of privatisation as sources of entrepreneurial opportunities are
the downsizing of municipal services and the privatisation of the care market,
which have provided opportunities for high-growth start-ups.




Independent individual Independent start-up Spin-off
Exploitation
Incumbent firm Acquisitions Corporate venturing
Source: Adapted from Shane and Eckhardt 2003: 186Some of the examples just given about deregulation as a source of opportunities
can also be characterised as Kirznerian. Related to that, the fourth – Kirznerian –
source of opportunities can be formulated, namely opportunities proven 
elsewhere that can be pursued in a new context (‘filling a gap in the market’). 
An example of such a Kirznerian opportunity is the imitation of the Italian coffee
bar by Starbucks: the founder of Starbucks was alert enough to see that the coffee
bar culture in Italy and its social role might translate to the us. These Kirznerian
opportunities most often do not involve straightforward replications, as the 
business idea has to be adapted to the new local context (see ‘differentiation’ in
chapter 3). Thus, although conceptually it is an imitation, the implementation
can be seen as an example of (innovative) entrepreneurship.
Finally, customers can themselves be a source of entrepreneurial opportunities,
involving so-called user-entrepreneurship (see also user-innovation in 
chapter 8).
“The mountain bike industry emerged out of a group of hippies that constructed mountain bikes
out of existing bike parts, in order to fulfil their want to ride the bike on off-the-road single track
downhills. Gary Fisher – one of those hippies – started to produce these mountain bikes in 1979,4
and stood at the cradle of what turned out to be a huge industry (Buenstorf 2001). Another example
of user-entrepreneurship is the online communication platform Hyves, started out of a personal
need to have a computer-mediated social network that connects people. Initially (in 2004) only
friends and acquaintances of the founders joined their website; in 2007 Hyves has millions of
members, has grown into an enterprise with 30 employees, and has an estimated market value of
50 million euros” (Intermediair 2007: 26).
5.1.3 entrepreneurship as an organisational product
Figure 5.2 showed that the discovery of an entrepreneurial opportunity can be
made by an employee (i.e., a paid organisation member) or an independent indi-
vidual. The latter situation is reflected in so-called user-entrepreneurship: i.e., a
personal need as a consumer is the source of the opportunity. Empirical research
has shown that the prior situation occurs much more often, as most founders
start a new business in an industry that is similar or related to their prior experi-
ence (Klepper 2001). ‘Producer-entrepreneurship’ is thus a much more wide-
spread phenomenon than user-entrepreneurship. In organisational terms the
most important question is whether this opportunity is pursued and exploited
within or outside the organisation of origin: i.e., in the form of a spin-off or of
(internal) corporate venturing. Spin-offs involve the exploitation of an opportu-
nity by an employee who leaves an organisation to start a firm of her own that is
independent of the parent organisation. Corporate venturing or corporate entre-
preneurship has been defined as “the process whereby an individual or a group of
individuals in association with an existing organisation, create a new organisa-
tion or instigate renewal or innovation within that organisation” (Sharma and
Chrisman 1999: 18). Two sub-types of corporate venturing are typically distin-
guished: ‘internal corporate venturing’ which focuses on opportunities identi-
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spin-off firm that commercialises this opportunity outside the mother firm); and
‘external corporate venturing’ or ‘corporate venture capital’ which focuses on
opportunities external to the company, in the form of investments in independ-
ent start-ups. Frequently, corporate venture units pursue some combination of
internal and external opportunities. Sometimes a third type – alliances – is also
included. Alliances offer the advantage of combining the assets of the larger
company (brand strength, market channels, investment capital, and other scale-
related advantages) with the more focused and flexible characteristics of the
smaller, younger partner.
Why would an opportunity be pursued outside the organisation in which it was
discovered? When the opportunity depends more on firm specific (e.g., physical
or intellectual) assets than on human capital, spin-offs are less common, because
entrepreneurs cannot move these proprietary assets with them when they exit a
firm. This explains the high number of spin-offs in business services, because the
most important asset in this industry is human capital. When innovations are
architectural and therefore reconfigure the way in which products are developed,
spin-offs will also be more common because established firms have a hard time
changing their organisation in order to exploit such innovations (Henderson and
Clark 1990). Spin-offs are also more likely when established firms are incapable of
responding to radical technological changes that upset the established ways of
organising their businesses, i.e., their business model (see Chesbrough and
Rosenbloom 2002). High-level managers may be incapable of evaluating the new
entrepreneurial opportunities or they choose to focus on their company’s core
line of business. Likewise, when a new good or service only serves a small market
niche, spin-offs are more common because an existing customer base will restrict
an incumbent firm from focusing attention on the new niche (Christensen 1997).
The risk averseness of the discovering person and the organisation in which she
is employed will be negatively and positively related to the likelihood of spin-off:
risk averse persons will not be eager to leave a secure job, while on the other hand
risk averse organisations will not be open to accommodate risky ventures.5
Taking this latter mechanism into account, an increase in the number of spin-offs
(and thus new firms in general) could also be an effect of the increased risk
averseness of incumbent organisations.6
5.2 entrepreneurship, innovation, and economic growth
How can we explain the relationship between entrepreneurship and economic
growth? Several mechanisms may be at work here, which explain why new and
small firms in combination with large organisations may drive innovation and
ultimately economic growth. These mechanisms are knowledge spillovers,
decentralisation, experimentation, and competition. We will first discuss these
mechanisms. Next, we will provide an overview of empirical studies that have
tested the effect of (different types of) entrepreneurship on (different types of)
economic growth.
micro-foundations for innovation policy
1405.2.1 knowledge spillovers
First, as has been mentioned before, new scientific and technological knowledge
is an important source of entrepreneurial opportunities. Organisations investing
in research or technology development often end up facilitating other agents’
innovation efforts, either unintentionally, as when inventions can be imitated, or
intentionally as where scientists report on their research. Economists have
termed this knowledge spillovers: ‘any original, valuable knowledge generated
somewhere that becomes accessible to external agents, whether it be knowledge
fully characterising an innovation or knowledge of a more intermediate sort. This
knowledge is absorbed by an individual or group other than the originator’ (Foray
2004: 91). There has been much empirical research showing that firms located
near knowledge sources introduce innovations at a faster rate than rival firms
located elsewhere (Audretsch et al. 2006). These can be incumbent firms, but
more likely involve firms that have been set-up by prior employees of the knowl-
edge producing organisations. They are the Schumpeterian entrepreneurs that
commercialise inventions. Many major inventions have been reshaped, speeded,
and expanded by (individuals and their) new firms with different objectives,
interests, and ideas from those of the original inventor (cf. Shane 2000) or origi-
nating organisation. These innovative new firms are started because their innova-
tions would have been turned down or severely delayed in the organisations in
which the initial idea was developed.
Several case studies throw some light on how potential entrepreneurs may recog-
nise opportunities that are not recognised as valuable by the knowledge-originat-
ing organisation. Well-known examples of companies developing resources that
they failed to exploit are Bell and Xerox, private companies that incubated
emerging technologies.
During the emergence of the semiconductor industry, the growth of knowledge developed at the
Bell Labs and the Bell System provided more opportunities for new semiconductor firms than the
Bells could exploit (Holbrooke et al. (2000: 1037); cf. Moore and Davis (2004) for a similar situation
at Fairchild Semiconductors). In the early semi-conductor industry, a diversity of new companies
were started, based on newly developed knowledge, which ensured that a wide opportunity space 
presented by the transistor’s invention was explored and exploited. The use of semiconductors was
appreciably accelerated and broadened as a result of the ready formation of firms (like the multiple
generations of spin-offs Shockley Laboratories, Fairchild, and Intel) with different development
criteria than Bell’s (cf. Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986; Holbrooke et al. 2000). It has also been claimed
that roughly half the population of Silicon Valley semiconductor manufacturers can be traced back
to the Bell Labs (Rogers and Larsen 1984: 43-45).
Another well-known source of entrepreneurial opportunities was Xerox Corporation. In the 1960s
and 1970s managers at Xerox who understood the potential of digital electronics and computing set
up Xerox parc near Stanford University. parc (its employees aided by Pentagon funding) created
many of the key technologies of the pc industry, but failed to take advantage of their opportunities 
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because its business model was based on developing copier systems in-house with proprietary
standards. parc employees were alert to business opportunities neglected by Xerox and chose to
leave to found new companies based on novel business models (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom
2002).
Large research organisations are often repositories of unused ideas: big firms have
natural diseconomies of scope that a cluster of start-ups does not have (Moore
and Davis 2004; cf. Nooteboom 2000), and public research organisations often
do not have incentives to commercialise ideas. One of the arguments behind the
so-called open innovation strategies of large firms like Philips Electronics is
exactly this: the intellectual property developed in these firms could be exploited
much more widely by firms outside its organisational boundaries than by divi-
sions from within. Technology transfer and ‘valorisation’ has also become an
important function of public research organisations. University based spin-offs
commercialising knowledge have become more common world wide (Shahid and
Kaora 2007). These companies explore applications of knowledge beyond the
academic remit which established firms find commercially uncertain or which
conflict with their current activities. The pioneer in Europe among centres of
high tech activity was the University of Cambridge. The first spin-out company
from the university was the Cambridge Scientific Instrument Company, founded
in 1881 by Horace Darwin, son of Charles Darwin. The current cluster of high-
tech activities resulted from multi-generational spin-out from the university
(Garnsey and Heffernan 2005).
Regions without larger research organisations (at the scientific or technological
frontier), will probably have fewer spin-off firms, both because a lack of techni-
cally trained people and a shortage of ideas (Moore and Davis 2004). A mix of
large and small knowledge-based organisations is thus a better starting point 
for the exploration and exploitation of new ideas than a concentration of small
entrepreneurial firms only (Baumol 2002; Moore and Davis 2004; Rothwell and
Dodgson 1994; Nooteboom 1994). The combination of high investments in 
new knowledge (exploration) and high levels of entrepreneurship exploiting this
knowledge is a key driver of growth in advanced capitalist economies (Acs et al.
2005; Audretsch et al. 2006). Large firms are not only important as sources of
entrepreneurial opportunities. They are also important for more downstream
functions. The most useful innovations are likely to produce one or more giant
firms, simply because useful often means ‘widely used’ and widely used may well
mean ‘mass-produced’ (Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986: 271). See for example the
dominance of a few large firms in chemistry, electronics, drugs, and automobiles.
Some of these large firms owe their size to an innovation that occurred while 
the firm was still small, while others had to shift their production and marketing
to a new field in order to become large corporations. Large and small firms 
have dynamic complementarities in technological development (cf. Nooteboom 
1994).
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technologically and commercially to filling the gap between the horseless carriage and the everyday
family car, and between the plane of Kitty Hawk and the commercial airliner” (Rosenberg and
Birdzell 1986: 288).
Diversity of enterprise is a necessary condition for economic growth and pros-
perity. History has shown that long-term economic growth and prosperity
depends on a mix of large and especially small enterprises (Rosenberg and
Birdzell 1986; Landes 1969). Many types and sizes of enterprise are useful under
the right conditions and circumstances, but what matters is the diversity of
economic organisation in economic systems – the variety of the system’s organi-
sational repertoire rather than the size of particular enterprises (Rosenberg and
Birdzell 1986: 270). The role of diversity of enterprise in economic growth and
prosperity has two key elements (Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986: 296-297): experi-
mentation and decentralisation.
5.2.2 experimentation
First, experimentation is almost always best conducted on the smallest scale nec-
essary to prove or disprove a point. Since experimentation is so important to eco-
nomic change, a great part of the activity in progressive economies will be con-
ducted on a small scale. Economic growth implies change and adaptation, and
much of this adaptation takes place through the formation of firms that are, at least
initially, small. New firms are useful devices for experimenting with innovation,
because they can be established at a small, experimental scale at relatively low cost
and therefore in large numbers, and their efforts can be intensively focused on a
single innovation. The experimental aspect of new firms is reflected in the facts
that they usually start small, their number is large, and as with other kinds of
experimentation, most of them fail. High rates of firm entry and exit (so-called
churning or turbulence) can even be regarded as a necessary price to pay in order 
to allow ‘exploration’ of new technological and market possibilities: failures at the
micro level may be consistent with social benefit at the aggregate level (see March
1991; Saxenian 1994; Dosi and Lovallo 1997). A high level of new variety is needed
to produce a few very successful new innovative industry leaders, like Microsoft,
Google, and Ebay. The experimental approach to the organisation of economic
activity is a key mechanism for economic progress. New firms often provide the
seedbed for the emergence of new industries.7They have been instrumental in the
introduction of electricity, the internal-combustion engine, automobiles, aircraft,
electronics, aluminium, petroleum, plastic materials, and many other advances
(Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986; Baumol 2002; Audretsch 1995).
5.2.3 decentralisation
Second, a fundamental characteristic of organisation in highly developed
economies is decentralisation – a diffusion of authority and responsibility and a
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costs and the complexities of controlling those costs are not limited to that part of
the pyramid that extends from a government board of planning and control down
to individual enterprises; they are reflected in the organisation of economic activ-
ity at all levels. The organising principle is that the costs and benefits of hierarchy
must be balanced out (including the static and dynamic transaction costs; see
Nooteboom 1992; Langlois and Robertson 1995).
“That the benefits [of hierarchy] outweigh the costs in comparatively few situations is a fact of
social life, as evidenced by the predominance of relatively small hierarchies in Western economies.
The strength of the tendency to decentralization in Western economies is chronically underesti-
mated, if one may judge from the many prophecies that capitalism would end in the centralization
of Western economies in the hands of a few capitalists – prophecies repeated by now for more than
a hundred years and still unfulfilled” (Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986: 297).
Although a large part of economic change is brought about by the expansion and
conversion of old firms, innovative change is to a large degree brought about by
new firms (see Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986; Acs and Audretsch 2003). That small
firms have played a large part in economic growth is not accidental; it can be
explained, at least in part, by their smaller agency costs (in addition to their
special suitability to the experimental stage of innovation). Innovation is more
likely to occur in a society that is open to the formation of new enterprises than
in a society that relies on its existing organisations for innovation (Rosenberg and
Birdzell 1986: 258).8 New, usually small, firms have an important role in bringing
about change – a role that may well depend on the degree of inertia accumulated
in older bureaucracies.
5.2.4 competition
Competition has been the principal source of diversity in enterprise organisation:
differentiation via the development of unique products, methods of production
and distribution, and forms of organisation is central to the strategy of competi-
tion. Diversity of enterprise is closely related, both as cause and consequence, to
diversity of products and services available to customers.9 See Porter (1980) on
the micro-economic, and Helpman (2004) on the macro-economic relevance10of
product differentiation (see also chapter 1).
New firms played a direct role in economic growth, with the introduction of new
products, but also an important indirect role in triggering old firms to improve or
restructure their activities (or to exit the market if they fail to do so). The easy
formation of new firms acts as a disciplinary device for existing firms (cf. Aghion
et al. 2006). New innovative firms circumvent bureaucratic rigidity and supply
older firms with an incentive – self-preservation – for taking internal measures to
avoid the habits and practices that eventually lead to rigidity. This is for example
reflected in the rise of corporate venturing, as a means for corporate renewal.
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Already at the start of the twentieth century the economist Schumpeter made a
plea for the entrepreneur as the person who brings new ideas to the market and in
that way causes economic renewal and progress. A necessary condition is that
these innovations have to offer more (or the same for a lower price) than the pre-
existing supply. If this condition is fulfilled there might even be creative destruc-
tion: innovations that make the ‘old economy’ superfluous. A recent example in
the Dutch economy is the success of the digital TomTom route planner that has
substituted a large part of the production of roadmaps. An indirect effect of the
introduction of these innovations by new firms is that incumbents are triggered
to upgrade their product offerings in order to remain competitive. How and to
what extent does entrepreneurship lead to innovation and economic growth?
Why should entrepreneurs start with an uncertain innovation process at all? A
recent study (cbs 2006: 153) shows that entrepreneurs innovate because they
want to improve the quality of goods and services (cf. Aghion and Howitt 1992),
to offer a broader range of goods and services (cf. Romer 1990), and in the end
they want to access new markets or a larger market share. A recent review of
empirical studies by Van Praag and Versloot (2007) shows mixed evidence on the
assumption of the relatively high innovativeness of small and new firms. They
conclude that ‘entrepreneurs and their counterparts [large incumbent firms]
contribute equally importantly to the innovativeness of societies. However, they
serve different goals in terms of quality, quantity and efficiency, as well as in
terms of producing (and adopting) more radical (and higher cost) innovations’
(Van Praag and Versloot 2007: 18). They show that new and small firms have rela-
tively high levels of innovative sales, and are relatively less likely to adopt high-
cost innovations.
A key question is whether and how entrepreneurship causes economic growth.
Before we can answer this question with empirical research, we have to choose
empirical indicators for entrepreneurship and economic growth. Traditionally,
economic growth has been referred to as the growth of employment or national
income, while recently productivity growth is seen as a more relevant indicator
(see chapter 2). The two dominant empirical definitions of entrepreneurship are
the creation of new organisations (a new legal entity; including both independent
start-ups and spin-offs) and self-employment (performing work for personal
profit rather than for wages paid by others). Some studies also take into account
people with a preference for entrepreneurship (‘latent entrepreneurship’), or
people who take steps to start a new business (‘nascent entrepreneurship’). The
latter two indicators can be seen as potential entrepreneurship. Corporate entre-
preneurship is not easily identified, and is unfortunately largely an invisible
aspect of entrepreneurship in empirical research. In addition to these operational
definitions of entrepreneurship, there are several measures of performance, like
survival, growth, profitability, and realising an initial public offering (ipo) of the
business. These performance measures are indicators of entrepreneurship to a
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long term but remain relatively small often become more conservative (i.e., less
innovative) while new firms that grow into substantial corporations often revo-
lutionise the economic structure (cf. Schumpeter 1942: 83). In addition, there are
habitual entrepreneurs that ‘specialise’ in setting up new firms and often leave
the newly created firms (either successfully, for example via an ipo, or less
successfully with a liquidation) to set up other ones.
Empirical research shows an ambiguous relationship between entrepreneurship
and employment growth: the relationship is often positive (Audretsch and
Thurik 2001a; Audretsch and Fritsch 2002; Bosma et al. 2006; Acs and Mueller
2008; Acs and Armington 2004; Carree and Thurik 2007; Van Stel and Suddle
2008; Thurik et al. 2008),11sometimes non-existent (Audretsch and Fritsch 2002;
Acs and Mueller 2008),12or even negative (Van Stel and Storey 2004; Mueller et
al. 2008). Growth in national income is unambiguously related to high levels of
new firm formation and high-growth start-ups (Stam et al. 2006; Wong et al.
2005). Research on the effects of entrepreneurship on productivity growth is less
abundant, and only shows an ambiguous positive effect of new firm formation
(Callejon and Segarra 1999; Audretsch and Keilbach 2004; 200513; Bosma et al.
2006) or no effect of changes in self-employment (Carree and Thurik 2007).
The review of recent research on entrepreneurship and economic growth reveals
that high levels of new, growing firms are strongly related to economic growth.
There is no consistently positive relationship between new firms in general or
the level of self-employment with economic growth (see table 1). The latter
outcome is not that remarkable: many new firms are a continuation of the activi-
ties that were previously done as by employees before – so these involve no new
economic activities (for example the construction worker who becomes an inde-
pendent handyman, and the graphic designer who is made redundant with a
round of restructurings, but still supplies the same services to her previous
employer). The decision to enter into self-employment is seldom driven by inno-
vation, and relatively often by lifestyle reasons, like the combination of labour
and care tasks and a focus on a particular craft (Dirks et al. 2003).14
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Table 5.1 Entrepreneurship and economic growth (in oecd countries)*
Employment Income Productivity
Self-employed + / 0 + 0
New firm formation + / 0 / - + + / 0
High-growth start-ups + / 0 + x
* + =  statistically significant positive relation; 0 = no statistically significant relation; 
-=   s t atistically significant negative relation; x = no empirical researchA critical interpretation of the overview of empirical research could be that entre-
preneurship as measured in these studies does not have much to do with innova-
tion at all: productivity growth is probably the best output indicator of innova-
tion, and the studies reviewed showed that entrepreneurship has hardly any
effect on this. The positive effects on income and employment do not have to be
explained with innovation: consider the situation in which increased labour
market participation via self-employment is registered both as an increase in new
firm formation and in self-employment, this is likely to lead to an increase in
employment and income, as members of society that were not involved in paid
labour, now contribute both to total employment and to total income. In this
situation both employment and income are growing, but innovation is not a
necessary ingredient in this.
In addition to economic growth, a more relevant indicator may be welfare (Layard
2005). Unfortunately, the relation between entrepreneurship and welfare has not
been researched to a large extent. However, there are several indications that
entrepreneurs are on average more satisfied with their occupation than employees
are (Blanchflower and Oswald 1998; Benz and Frey 2003; Frey and Benz 2003).
5.3 entrepreneurship in the netherlands
A record number of new firms was started in the Netherlands in 2007: 85,000. At
that time the number of new firms had almost tripled since the end of the 1980s.
On the basis of these numbers one would tend to conclude that the Netherlands
has become more entrepreneurial in the last decennia. If ones assumes that these
new firms also supply something that is sufficiently new and different from the
existing supply of goods and services, and even make a profit, than it is not such a
strange idea to regard new firms as the driving force of an innovative economy
(see Coalitieakkoord 2007, especially “pijler ii”).
In spite of this record number of new firms, there is still a common opinion that
entrepreneurship is in short supply in the Netherlands, especially in comparison
with Anglo-Saxon economies like the uk, Ireland, and the us. In order to under-
stand whether there is ‘sufficient’ entrepreneurship in a particular economy or 
innovation system, one should compare systems in time or over space. Only such a
comparison makes it possible to identify a ‘problem’. We will attempt to get a better
insight into the relative position of entrepreneurship in the Netherlands inter-
nationally (in comparison to other relevant ‘benchmark’ countries) and over time.
5.3.1 international comparison
We start with an international comparison of three key indicators of entrepre-
neurship: self-employment, new firms, and ambitious entrepreneurs. With
respect to the percentage of self-employed in the labour force – the most static
measure for entrepreneurship – the Netherlands leads all benchmark countries
(see figure 5.3). When we look at more dynamic measures of entrepreneurship,15
the picture looks a bit less rosy: the Netherlands is now behind almost all bench-
147
entrepreneurship and innovationmark countries, and is – just like all other European countries – miles behind the
us (see figure 5.4). Especially with regard to ambitious entrepreneurship – one of
the most important types of entrepreneurship for economic growth – the Nether-
lands is at the back of the pack (see also Hoffmann 2007).16
In spite of the record number of new firms in the Netherlands and the high
percentage of self-employed people,17the Netherlands can still not be seen as a
leading entrepreneurial economy. Especially with respect to ambitious entrepre-
neurship, the Netherlands is behind other relevant countries. This is confirmed
in international comparisons on the share of high-growth firms (see figure 5.5).
This form of entrepreneurship is very important for economic growth. The
Netherlands is thus a country with many self-employed people but with few
ambitious entrepreneurs and high-growth firms.
The European Trend Chart on Innovation (European Commission 2006a)
includes one set of indicators reflecting innovation and entrepreneurship (based
on the Community Innovation Survey and Eurostat data), which measure the
efforts towards innovation at firm level. The six indicators are ‘smes innovating
in-house (percentage of all smes)’, ‘innovative smes co-operating with others
(percentage of all smes)’, ‘innovation expenditures (percentage of total
turnover)’, ‘early-stage venture capital (percentage of gdp)’, ‘ict expenditures
(percentage of gdp)’, and ‘smes using organisational innovation (percentage of
all smes)’. The Netherlands performs particularly well with respect to ict expen-
ditures, but performs particularly badly with respect to innovation expenditures,
cooperating with others for innovation, and innovating in-house. Taken together,
the Netherlands performs less than average on the innovation and entrepreneur-
ship indicators in the European context (see figure 5.6).
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Belgium Denmark Sweden Germany Netherlands uk usWhat drives entrepreneurship? The literature on entrepreneurship has shown
that two of the necessary conditions of entrepreneurship are the (perceived)
skills and knowledge to start a business and the (perceived) opportunities to start
a business. With respect to entrepreneurial skills, the Netherlands adult popula-
tion is rather average within Europe (Bosma and Schutjens 2008), while with
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Figure 5.5 International comparisons of high-growth firms
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■ young high growth firms (1999-2001)          ■ high growth firms (1999-2002) respect to opportunities, the Netherlands seems to be relatively abundant
(Bosma and Schutjens 2008). Another aspect of national culture that is often
seen as a major constraint to entrepreneurship in Europe in comparison to the us,
is the so-called fear of failure. The Netherlands has the lowest percentage in the
eu of people who would not start a business because they have a fear of failure
(even lower than the us; see Bosma et al. 2008), and has a lower percentage of
people that regard the possibility of going bankrupt as an important risk attached
to start-ups than the eu average (eos Gallup Europe 2004). For high growth
(new) firms, the supply of venture capital is highly relevant. The overall supply 
of venture capital is very good in the Netherlands (see Porter et al. 2007).
However, the supply of informal investors and early-stage venture capital, which
is more relevant for successful entrepreneurship, lags behind considerably to
other benchmark countries (see figures 6 and 7).
We now have a ‘worrisome’ picture of the Netherlands, in comparison with 
other benchmark countries. How has the Netherlands ended up in this position,
i.e., has it been better in former times, or has it even been worse, and is the
Netherlands ‘catching up’?
5.3.2 entrepreneurship in the netherlands over time
How has entrepreneurship developed in the Netherlands in the last two decen-
nia? If we look at the annual number of new firms, there has been a huge increase,
with only a hesitation after the technology-bubble in the early 2000s (see 
figure 5.8). A similar, but more moderate, trend can be observed if we look at 
the number of self-employed over time (see figure 5.8).
micro-foundations for innovation policy
150
Figure 5.6 Innovation and entrepreneurship indicators, nl relative to the EU 2003












































innovationCan we trace back the increase in the number of new firms to particular sectors,
or have all sectors contributed evenly to the increase in new firm formation?
Figure 9 shows that the construction and (business and personal) service sectors
have grown disproportionately. These two sectors are certainly not a marginal
group as they also include more than half the population of new firms in 
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■ self-employed (x 10000)          ■ new firms  (x 1000)2006. Two increasingly important contributing groups of entrepreneurs are
female and foreign entrepreneurs. Female entrepreneurs are over-represented 
in personal services, and relatively often start part-time businesses, while 
– especially Eastern European – foreign entrepreneurs have provided a 
substantial impetus to the growth of new construction firms (Braaksma and
Meijaard 2007).
The number of subsidiaries has increased even stronger than the number of inde-
pendent start-ups. In the 1980s the number of firms and employment share of
subsidiaries was respectively about 15 percent and 30 percent of the total number
of new firms and employment, while in the 2000s the employment share of
subsidiaries has risen to about 40 percent of employment (and about 30 percent
of the number of new firms). These subsidiaries are started out of ‘offensive’ and
‘defensive’ motives. Offensive motives lead to distributing different business
activities in separate profit centres, and (thus) stimulating ‘intrapreneurship’. An
important defensive motive is reducing risk for corporations by creating finan-
cially independent subsidiaries.18
The number of technology start-ups, a relatively important category for techno-
logical innovation, has also increased over the last decade, however less strongly
so than for the general population of new firms (Braaksma and Meijaard 2007).
The share of start-ups with r&d has increased to a considerable degree from 10.4
percent in 1994 to 19.2 percent in 2003 (Braaksma and Meijaard 2007). This is in
contrast to the innovativeness of smes in general, which has decreased substan-
tially over the last eight years (see figures 10 and 11).19The latter trend resembles
micro-foundations for innovation policy
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Figure 5.9 New independent start-ups per sector, 1987-2006 (index 1987= 100)
































































































Figure 5.10 Innovation inputs of SMEs in the Netherlands, 1999-2007
Source: De Jong and Jansen 2007 
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Figure 5.11 Innovation outputs of SMEs in the Netherlands, 1999-2007
Source: De Jong and Jansen 2007
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▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲ ▲the general decline in the innovative output of the Dutch business population
(firms with more than 19 employees) over the last decade (cbs 2007).20
5.3.3 entrepreneurship and innovation in the netherlands: summary
If we summarise the findings on entrepreneurship and innovation in the Nether-
lands in an international perspective and over time there is ‘good’ and ‘bad’ news.
The good news is that the annual number of new firms has almost tripled over
the period 1987-2006. This spectacular increase is to a large extent traceable to
the increase in the number of subsidiaries that have been set up annually. This
can be done for offensive reasons, for example as corporate venturing, or for
defensive reasons, for example to allocate risky activities to separate legal entities.
The growth of technology start-ups has also been considerable, though less spec-
tacular than the growth of new firms in general. The share and number of new
firms with r&d activities has also increased in the last decade (1994-2003), indi-
cating an increasing number of innovative start-ups. In addition, young smes
seem to be more innovative than older smes, implying that an increase in start-
ups will probably lead to a more innovative business population.
However, there is also some bad news for innovation. First, many of the new
firms seem to actually be self-employed individuals who continue with the same
activities (mainly in the construction and services sectors) that they were previ-
ously engaged in as employees. This is not likely to improve the (product) innov-
ativeness of the economy at all. At most this means a more flexible economy, and
an improved allocation of resources (static efficiency), and in the end a higher
productivity.21Second, on average smes have become less and not more innova-
tive in the last decade (1999-2007), and the percentage of innovative smes is
much lower than the eu average. Most smes are not innovative at all (see also
Parker 2001). Third, the Netherlands is lagging behind internationally with
respect to ambitious entrepreneurship. This is not a recent phenomenon, but
seems to be consistent in the last decade, in spite of several policy measures that
have been taken to improve these numbers.
5.4 entrepreneurship and innovation policy
The objective of innovation policy is to encourage and facilitate the generation,
application, and diffusion of new ideas, in particular innovation systems. The sys-
temic nature of innovation means that we should not base our insights and recom-
mendations on a linear view of innovation. Chapter 3 has shown that entrepre-
neurship plays a role in different phases of the cycle of discovery. We know that
entrepreneurship fulfils an important function in the innovation system (cf.
Hekkert et al. 2007), but this does not mean that more entrepreneurship is always
better for the functioning of the innovation system. Two disclaimers apply: an
empirical and a systemic. The empirical disclaimer is that not all that is counted as
entrepreneurship necessarily involves innovation (not all new and small firms are
innovative) and not all entrepreneurship is counted (corporate entrepreneurship
micro-foundations for innovation policy
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small firms, or self-employed will thus not automatically imply an increase in
innovation. The systemic disclaimer has two aspects. First, the elements of an
innovation system should be aligned in some way in order to function properly:
the elements should be sufficiently present and well connected to the other ele-
ments. This means for example that if the number of innovative new firms
increases, but without sufficient venture capital supply or advanced customers,
this will not lead to higher levels of economic growth: the newly introduced prod-
ucts are not commercialised to a large extent due to a lack of investment means 
or a too small market base. Second, not every system needs the same level of entre-
preneurship. Mowery and Rosenberg (1993: 29) showed that new firms in the 
ushave played a significant role in the commercialisation of new technologies; a
role which the new small firm does not necessarily play in the innovation system
of other countries (e.g., Japan and Sweden).22Several configurations could explain
this. First, internal corporate venturing could act as a substitute of new firm 
formation. This means that if large firms in a country are relatively less inert and
bureaucratic (and risk averse) than in other countries – for example due to different
formal and informal institutions – there is less need for employees to start a new
firm in order to exploit a new idea. Second, organisational innovations, for 
example in the form of new forms of network organisations, could also enable the
recombination of resources without installing new legal entities. Third, certain 
– especially large-scale, and incremental (Winter 1984) – innovations are better
realised in large firms than in small firms.
Does all this mean that nothing remains to be said about entrepreneurship in
innovation policy? No, but first we should be careful not to start with sweeping
statements about the supposed backwardness of the Netherlands and to take the
us as the role model entrepreneurial economy. Entrepreneurship policy in the
Netherlands can take inspiration from top-performing countries in this respect,
but the initiatives have to be tailored to the Netherlands’ context. Second, we
should use indicators of entrepreneurship that are as close as possible to innova-
tion, including both exploration and exploitation. This means that for example
spin-offs and new technology based firms are probably better indicators of
exploitation of unused ideas than the general population of new firms. High-
growth start-ups are even stronger indicators of successful exploitation on a 
relatively large scale. However, we should not neglect exploration. Exploration
could be involved in many ‘experimental’ new firms that just try out new ideas,
and which might act as a source of learning for the firms in related activities, 
even if these start-ups fail in the short run.23 In this sense, it is important to ‘let 
a thousand flowers bloom’. An entrepreneurial climate – with little stigma for
failure – is likely to facilitate these experimental firms. With these remarks in
mind, the next subsections deal with how institutions might be changed in order
to stimulate new firm formation in general, and technology start-ups, spin-offs,
and corporate venturing, and finally high-growth start-ups in particular.
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The total supply of entrepreneurs varies among societies due to different prevail-
ing values and beliefs related to entrepreneurship, i.e., its entrepreneurial culture.
Economists generally share the opinion that it is not the role of government to
change the attitude of its people, perhaps even leading to “social engineering”
(Storey 2002), or that public policy cannot change the culture of a country in
order to stimulate the supply of entrepreneurship, on the short term (Baumol
1990). Some economists have argued that entrepreneurship is an omnipresent
aspect of human action, and that for economic development to take place, certain
institutions must be present in order for the entrepreneurial aspect of human
action to flourish (Boettke and Coyne 2003). This omnipresence also means
entrepreneurship cannot be the “cause” of economic development: it is caused by
proper institutions that channel entrepreneurship in a direction that spurs
economic growth (cf. Baumol 1990). Entrepreneurship policy in the Netherlands
also includes integrating entrepreneurship in the education system in order to
develop entrepreneurial skills and promote an entrepreneurship culture in the
long run. The latter aspect is a clear example of the convergence of entrepreneur-
ship and innovation policy, in that a strong entrepreneurial culture is an enabling
context for the emergence of innovations.
The other more direct role for public policy involves changing the formal institu-
tions in order to stimulate productive entrepreneurship. Examples of these
formal institutions relevant for entrepreneurship are taxation rules, bankruptcy
regulations, social security rules, and immigration laws. Enough has been said
and done about the first three of these. The latter is less straightforward.
Innovation systems are not closed systems: exploration taking place in one coun-
try, might lead to exploitation in another country, and the other way around. This
also means transnational entrepreneurs might function as important linksbetween
different national innovation systems. This legitimises accelerating changes in the
immigration system in order to attract (potential) entrepreneurs from elsewhere
(cf. Saxenian 2006) as part of – person-level – entrepreneurship policy and inno-
vation policy. This could also involve targeting ambitious expatriates to relocate
back to the Netherlands (or to become transnational; with firms registered in 
the Netherlands and elsewhere) and start an internationally oriented new firm.24
5.4.2 technology start-ups
Technology start-ups are a particular kind of new firm, which are very important
for the diffusion of new technologies, possibly in new applications. The stimula-
tion of new technology-based firms is an example of the convergence of innova-
tion and entrepreneurship policy, as this improves both the creation and diffu-
sion of new technologies and the levels of entrepreneurship (cf. Garnsey 2001).25
Indirectly, public r&d spending (as part of innovation policy) could increase
opportunities for new firms (part of entrepreneurship policy).
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suited to minimising the social risk of experimentation in developing applica-
tions of new technologies. They have every incentive to find such applications,
but at the same time the cost of the inevitable failed experiments is not multiplied
by the bureaucrat’s temptation to pour good money after bad rather than admit
failure (Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986: 312).
There has been much debate in economics as to whether r&d divisions of large
firms provide better incentives for innovation than entrepreneurial firms. A
study by Kortum and Lerner (2000) showed that the ratio of venture capital
(invested in young technology-based firms) to corporate r&d investments in
manufacturing is about 3 percent, while venture capital accounts for about 15
percent of industrial innovations (measured by patents). The apparently greater
efficiency of venture funding in spurring innovation raises questions about
whether industrial r&d spending has been optimally directed or exploited.
Jensen (1993) has argued that agency problems have hampered the effective
management of major corporate industrial research facilities. Indeed, it appears
that many major corporate research facilities are today in the process of being
restructured. One striking change is an emphasis by many large firms on adopt-
ing (open innovation) programs, such as joint ventures with smaller firms and
strategic investment programs, whose structures resemble that of venture capital
investment (for an overview, see Rosenbloom and Spencer 1996).
One of the key market failure arguments for innovation policy is that the private
return of developing and commercialising a new technology is below the social
rate of return (see chapter 1). This situation might be explained if (new technol-
ogy-based) firms are unable to fully appropriate the rents on their innovations. In
such a situation entrepreneurial activities could be lower than socially optimal.
Three key problems in this respect are:
–p r o b l e m s  o f  appropriating the rents of the innovation (spillovers);
– financial constraints to invest in the development of new technology (asym-
metric information between potential investors and the entrepreneur);
–u n c e r t ainty about demand for the new technology/product in the market
place.
Government interventions to tackle these problems are:26
–s ecuring intellectual property rights;
–s timulating seed capital and early stage capital (with subsidies, tax reductions,
or favourable interest rates);
–g overnment as leading customer (or setting standards/certifications).
Intellectual property right policy has become more of a European policy issue
(European Patent Office) than a strictly national one. Examples of the second
type of interventions are the Small Business Investment Company (sbic)
Program in the us (providing long-term funds with favourable interest rates to
private companies that invest in small firms), the Carbon Trust in the uk(co-
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the Netherlands.27The goal of Technopartner is to realise an increase in and
improvement of the quality of technology start-ups by mobilising the risk capital
market for technology start-ups through the Seed Facility (comparable to the
sbic Program in the us). This facility accommodates loans to private investment
funds. Technopartner also offers direct support and financial scope to new tech-
nology-based firms and stimulates knowledge institutions to professionalise
their patent policy through the Subsidy programme Knowledge Exploitations
(ske).
An example of the third type of intervention is the Small Business Innovation
Research (sbir) program in the us.
The us Congress enacted the sbir program in the early 1980s as a response to the loss of American
competitiveness in global markets, especially in the face of the ‘Japanese threat’. The us regulation
underpinning the sbir programme requires that 2.5% of all federal government agencies’ external
r&d budgets are distributed to innovative small firms. Each year the sbir program makes over
4,000 awards to us small firms, amounting to over $2 billion in value (Connell 2006). The sbir
consists of three phases. Phase i is oriented towards determining the scientific and technical merit
(technological creativity) along with the feasibility (economic creativity) of a proposed research
idea. A Phase i award (typically around $100 k) provides an opportunity for a small business to
establish the feasibility and technical merit of a proposed innovation. This is a venture capital
segment – seed capital – that is generally ignored by private venture capital. Phase ii awards are
more selectively aimed at developing new technologies and products, which involves about 50% of
the phase i award winners, and delivers up to $750 k. Phase iii awards are funded from mainstream
(i.e., non sbir budgets), and add probably again as much as Phase i and ii in total to overall r&d
expenditure on sbir projects (Connell 2006). These Phase iii projects also bring small firms the
opportunity to win valuable sole supplier contracts with federal agencies. Some of the most inno-
vative American companies, like Genzyme, Amgen, Genentech, and Qualcomm received early
stage sbir finance. Lerner (1999) showed that sbir funded firms enjoyed substantially greater
employment and sales growth than other similar firms. It is not just the size of the subsidy that is
important for the recipients: these awards also play an important certification function, increasing
the trustworthiness of the recipients.
Programs like the sbir are highly valuable in making governments lead
users/customers for innovative new and small firms in ‘public sectors’. There are
indications that the Netherlands is lagging behind with respect to this kind of
government procurement of advanced technological products (Porter et al. 2007).
5.4.3 spin-offs and corporate venturing
We discussed the conditions under which spin-offs are more likely than corporate
venturing as a means of exploitation. Both types of entrepreneurial effort involve
an entrepreneurial opportunity that is based on the existing knowledge base of the
parent firm. Spin-offs and corporate venturing are thus likely to be the vehicles of
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on existing capabilities (see chapter 11). In addition spin-offs provide new nodes 
in an inter-organisational network (see chapter 10). There has been much public
policy and media attention for university spin-offs, while corporate spin-offs and
corporate venturing have largely been neglected. Corporate spin-offs are both
more numerous and more likely to be successful (due to better capabilities and
market orientation: exploration based on exploitation), while corporate venturing
has a direct positive effect on the innovativeness of large firms, which is likely to
lead to an increase in macroeconomic growth. Should public policy pay more
attention to spin-offs and corporate venturing; if yes, how?28
There are several problematic issues in the practice of corporate venturing, which
explain why corporate venturing units often fail (Birkinshaw and Hill 2005). 
For example, it has been argued that mixing both corporate-trained people and
people from the venture capital world is one of the key factors behind corporate
venturing (Birkinshaw and Hill 2005; Ernst et al. 2005); however, many compa-
nies are not willing to have venture capitalists as ‘intruders’ in their business.
This might constrain the development of high-potential new businesses.
Another delicate issue is the appropriation of the rents from innovation: how are
these distributed over the top-management, corporate venturing unit staff, and
the employees that started the initiative? In addition, how and when will the new
venture be integrated into the incubating organisation? If the venture is inte-
grated too early, the innovation might die because of the parent’s bureaucracy,
while if it is integrated too late, the venture has developed an identity and
routines of its own, which constrain re-integration.
“Corporate venturing is never easy, but it is beginning to be recognised as something that far-
sighted companies cannot do without” (Birkinshaw et al 2002: 43).
Stimulating an entrepreneurial culture is not only a mission of the government:
large firms also play a role here, for example with their corporate venturing prac-
tices. Corporate venturing could lower the risk averseness in large firms, but this
should also include the alignment of incentives and the attitude towards failure.
Large firms’ corporate venturing practices will only create value in the long term
if the entire organisation has been made more ‘entrepreneurial’. In addition,
corporate venturing is a means to stimulate investment behaviour and in the end
the innovativeness of large firms. This should not be a one-off action, but should
be a structural element of corporate strategy (‘serial corporate ventures’, like Intel
(external vc) and 3M (internal vc)). Corporate venturing can also create a plat-
form where entrepreneurs, managers, and investors can find each other. Entre-
preneurs may acquire the (technical and commercial) expertise of large firms and
the financial means of (corporate or private) venture capitalists.
Stimulating entrepreneurship in existing firms (corporate entrepreneurship) is
probably the best policy to start with: stimulating entrepreneurial initiatives that
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some characteristics of large firms (inertia, incentive structures) make this an
unlikely success. That is why stimulating spin-offs might be a second-best policy
option. To some extent this is also easier to affect by government policy as it is
very much related to labour-market and competition regulation. One important
entry barrier especially for growth-oriented spin-offs is anti-competition clauses
(also called ‘non-compete agreements’). Government regulation might reduce
the use of these clauses. However, this might have negative effects on invest-
ments of firms in their employees and of venture capitalists in their portfolio
firms, as the (potential) entrepreneur can leave to join competitors or set up
another firm with knowledge from the proprietary organisation (cf. Gilson 1999;
Fallick et al. 2006).
Corporate venturing might be connected to universities in order to tap their
knowledge and look for commercial applications. A related trend can be identi-
fied in the ukwhere university incubators have become private organisations
(like isis Oxford, Imperial Innovations; see Library House 2007). This privatisa-
tion of university incubators both provides these organisations with more
competent staff and ‘purifies’ the university as producers of public knowledge (cf.
Lester and Piore 2004).
5.4.4 high growth start-ups29
High growth start-ups are the economic entities that are successful in commer-
cialising new ideas on a large scale in a short term. These firms are serious candi-
dates for the industrial leadership of tomorrow. However, the contradiction for
public policy is that policymakers grant themselves an important role in stimulat-
ing these (potentially) successful firms (Smallbone et al. 2002; Minez2006), but
that these firms themselves regard government intervention as a very marginal
influence on their success (see Fischer and Reuber 2003; Perren and Jennings
2005; Te Peele and Brummelkamp 2007).
This brings us back to the discussion of picking the winners or backing the chal-
lengers.30 Challengers are ambitious new firms that have already revealed some of
their potential to become leaders in their (sector or geographically unique)
niche.31Leadership in a sector unique niche involves the creation of a new tech-
nology or product that might be diffused globally (e.g., the development of new
erp software by baan, or digital route planners by TomTom), while leadership
in a geographically unique niche (i.e., the Netherlands as a whole or a specific
region initially) is likely to involve the application or adoption of technology or
product that has been developed in another country (e.g., the early leaders in the
Dutch Internet Service Providers industry: XS4All and Planet Internet). The
latter type of leadership is not based on pushing the technological frontier (tech-
nology push), but on advanced users that spur the development and diffusion of
new applications.
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lower the barriers to incorporation. Incorporation provides a means to safeguard
ambitious entrepreneurs from the high risks of growing a new business, by
making the incorporated firm and not the entrepreneur responsible for the even-
tual financial losses. Lowering the barriers to incorporation is likely to stimulate
firm growth (Storey 1997), but also leads to higher bankruptcy rates (Harhoff et
al. 1998). The net effect of these two outcomes – increase of the number of high-
growth start-ups and of the number of bankruptcies – on the societal level is still
unknown.
Research has shown that probably the best that entrepreneurship policy could do
for young high-growth firms is to stimulate communities of practice for entre-
preneurs leading (potentially) high-growth firms (Smallbone et al. 2002; Fischer
and Reuber 2003). Such peer networks have already been initiated in many ways,
and are also facilitated by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs (see Waasdorp
and Bakkenes 2006).
5.5 summary
This chapter has provided insights into the nature of entrepreneurship and its
role in innovation and economic growth. We have defined entrepreneurship as
the introduction of new economic activity by an individual that leads to change
in the marketplace. Innovation is a necessary condition of entrepreneurship, just
like the existence of entrepreneurial opportunities and heterogeneous risk-taking
individuals that organise the exploitation of these opportunities. Entrepreneurial
opportunities can emerge from major scientific breakthroughs, but also from
more mundane applications of existing solutions in new contexts. The particular
characteristics of the opportunities, the organisations in which they were discov-
ered and the persons that perceived them affect the trade-off between exploiting
these opportunities in the incumbent firm (corporate venturing) or in a spin-off
firm. What matters for macroeconomic growth is the performance of these entre-
preneurial efforts. Both new firm formation in general and high-growth start-ups
in particular play their role in economic growth. New firms are useful devices for
exploring the viability of innovations. They start small, with relatively low costs
and in large numbers. The provision of requisite variety comes at a cost, because
most of these new firms fail. However, without these large numbers of experi-
ments, breakthrough innovations and new industries and industry leaders are
less likely to emerge. Still, if this pool of experiments does not lead to a sufficient
number of high-growth start-ups, they are less likely to lead to economic growth.
They might have other indirect effects on economic growth by providing knowl-
edge about ‘failed experiments’ to incumbent firms, and acting as a potential
threat to incumbents that will spur corporate renewal. Investments in the knowl-
edge base of existing organisations also provide a source of entrepreneurial
opportunities, to be commercialised by knowledge-based new firms. In this
perspective new firms provide the missing link between investments in science
and technology and economic growth.
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preneurship in the Netherlands. Even though the annual number of new firms
has increased spectacularly (almost tripled) during the period 1987-2006, there
are more weaknesses than strengths with regards to entrepreneurship in the
Netherlands. First, a large part of the population of new firms seems to involve
self-employed individuals who continue with the same activities (mainly in the
construction and services sectors), which they had carried out as employees
before. This is not likely to improve the (product) innovativeness of the economy
at all. Second, on average smes have become less and not more innovative in the
last decade, and the percentage of innovative smes is much lower than the eu
average. Third, the Netherlands is lagging behind internationally with respect to
ambitious entrepreneurship. This is not a recent phenomenon, but seems to be
consistent in the last decade, in spite of several policy measures that have been
taken to improve these numbers. The Netherlands seems to have become a good
place for self-employed people with low ambitions, but this has not been accom-
panied by a rise in innovativeness and high-growth firms. Especially the low
number of ambitious entrepreneurship seems to be worrisome, as this is a strong
driver of national economic growth.
What is the role of entrepreneurship in innovation policy? We have stated two
important disclaimers concerning the measurement (not everything that is
counted as entrepreneurship concerns innovation) and systemic effects (more
entrepreneurship does not always mean more economic growth) of entrepre-
neurship. A small set of specific types of entrepreneurship – technology start-
ups, spin-offs, and corporate venturing, and high-growth start-ups – seems to be
more relevant for innovation than other types. The capital provision for technol-
ogy start-ups is already stimulated by a set of policy measures within the
Technopartner program in the Netherlands. Implementation of a sbir-like
program would probably lower the uncertainty about demand for new technolo-
gies and further stimulate the emergence and growth of new technology-based
firms. Corporate venturing is a highly important means to stimulate the innova-
tiveness of incumbent firms, but unfortunately corporate venturing strategies
seem to be less often successful than is needed for a dynamic innovation system.
A second best solution in this respect involves – university and especially corpo-
rate – spin-offs. The last but not least important type of entrepreneurship that is
discussed in the context of innovation policy is the high-growth start-up. These
firms probably need the least government support, but policy could play a role
here in facilitating communities of (high-growth) practice that stimulate peer-to-
peer learning of the entrepreneurs involved.
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1T h e  a i ms of entrepreneurship policy in the Netherlands are to increase employ-
ment, the flexibility and innovativeness of the economy, individual develop-
ment, emancipation, and integration (Rekenkamer 2002).
2 In a similar way, entrepreneurship is often equated with self-employment and
smes in other eu documents (eos Gallup Europe 2004; European Commission
2006b)
3S ee Phillips (1985) for evidence on the positive effects of deregulation on new
firm formation in the us and Berkowitz and Holland (2001) on the positive
effects of privatisation on new firm formation in Russia. 
4T his was the first mountain bike producing firm ever (called MountainBikes).
This firm dissolved in 1983, the year in which Fisher founded his better-known
company Fisher MountainBikes, which was acquired by Trek in 1993.
5 In addition, a risk averse firm is unlikely to offer return options for the entrepre-
neur if the new venture fails.
6T his is in line with a study by Wennekers et al. (2007) which shows that uncer-
tainty avoidance is positively correlated with the prevalence of business owner-
ship: a restrictive climate of large organizations in high uncertainty avoidance
countries pushes individuals striving for autonomy towards self-employment.
7A ccording to Pasinetti (1993) an economy that does not increase the variety of
industries over time will suffer from structural unemployment, and will ulti-
mately stagnate. In this view, the development of new industries in an economy
is required to absorb labour that has become redundant in pre-existing industries.
This labour has become redundant due to a combination of productivity increases
and demand saturation in pre-existing industries, characterising the product life-
cycle dynamics in each sector. 
8 In comparison to other small economies like Belgium, Denmark, and Ireland, the
Netherlands has a ‘water head’: relatively many large dominant firms (the
Netherlands had the most Fortune 500 firms per capita in 2006, after Luxem-
bourg and Switzerland), which have a more than proportional influence on public
policy, and have received a more than proportional part of government spending.
See Banning and Meeus (1998) for the role of Philips in the Netherlands. Studies
in the us have shown the negative effect of large firm power on small firm inno-
vation (Christopherson and Clark 2007) and on new firm formation (Choi and
Phan 2006). This overrepresentation of large dominant firms is likely to
constrain the experimental nature of the Dutch economy. More research is
needed to confirm (or reject) this hypothesis. 
9T he very limited variety of products that was available in communist economies
seems to confirm this generalisation. Wealth can even be defined as the range of
choice people have, not just the quantity of supply. 
10 Funke and Ruhwedel (2001) found that a greater degree of product variety is
highly correlated to per capita gdp levels and tfpgrowth in oecd countries.
11 Even when controlled for recent macroeconomic growth and time lags of the
effect on economic growth. Prior economic growth has positive and negative
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notesrelations with entrepreneurship rates: positive because of growth opportunities
(‘prosperity-pull’), and negative because unemployed workers are encouraged to
become self-employed because the opportunity costs of self-employment have
decreased (‘recession-push’) (see Thurik et al. 2008). 
12 In what they call ‘revolving door’ regimes: inefficient entrants, which exit soon
after entry because they cannot make a valuable contribution to the economy. 
13 The studies of Audretsch and Keilbach find no (2005), or only very weak (2004)
associations of new firm formation in general- and labour-productivity growth.
Only specific forms of entrepreneurship, like new firm formation in high-tech or
ict industries (i.e., technology start-ups) have strong positive associations with
labour productivity growth. 
14 The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor makes a distinction between ‘necessity
entrepreneurship’, which is having to become an entrepreneur (often ‘self-
employed’) because you have no better option, and ‘opportunity entrepreneur-
ship’, which is an active choice to start a new enterprise based on the perception
that an unexploited or underexploited business opportunity exists. Analyzing
data in 11 countries, Acs and Varga (2005) found that effects on economic growth
and development of necessity and opportunity entrepreneurship vary greatly:
necessity entrepreneurship has no effect on economic development while oppor-
tunity entrepreneurship has a positive and significant effect. They also found that
the ratio of opportunity to necessity entrepreneurship in a country is positively
related to gdp per capita. 
15 ‘tea’ reflects the percentage of the adult population that is actively involved in
setting up a business or owns a young (<42 months old) firm; ‘percentage ambi-
tious entrepreneurs’ reflects the percentage of the adult population that is
actively involved in or owns a young firm and have the ambition to expand to a
size of more than 20 employees (Autio 2007).
16 This might be less bad for the economy if this is caused by new forms of gover-
nance, like network organisations: entrepreneurs may have low ambitions for
employment growth, but high ambitions in sales growth and growth in value
added, realised as a self-employed individual in a network organisation.
However, it is far from clear that this phenomenon is over-represented in the
Netherlands, and that this causes the relatively low number of entrepreneurs
with employment growth ambitions in the Netherlands. 
17 The high percentage of self-employed individuals in the Netherlands can partly
be explained by the relatively high survival rates of new firms in the Netherlands,
in comparison with for example the us (Bartelsman et al. 2005). 
18 A low-performing subsidiary may eventually go bankrupt without dragging
along the corporation as a whole.
19 Unfortunately the data for 2001 was not available for figures 10 and 11. 
20 A business cycle explanation of these dynamics does not seem to match the data,
as there had already been a strong downward trend before the post-2000 reces-
sion started. In addition, research has shown that in general innovation behav-
iour is pro-cyclical, but that innovation behaviour of smes is countercyclical
(Heger 2004). This latter phenomenon is explained by the lack of access to quali-
fied labour for smes in boom periods. 
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16421 More research is needed to disentangle different types of self-employment and
their direct and indirect effects on innovation and economic growth. An interest-
ing question in the Dutch context is whether the institutions that have fostered
flexibility and modest wage increases have improved self-employment (static
efficiency) but not innovation (dynamic efficiency) (cf. Engelen 2002). 
22 This means that it is unlikely that there will be institution-free descriptions of
best practices in entrepreneurship and innovation policy (cf. Chesbrough 1999,
2003). Sweden, for example, is renowned for the economic dominance of large
firms and is often cited in comparative entrepreneurship studies as a country
whose institutional environment discourages entrepreneurship (see also figures 3
and 4 in this chapter), however, it is a leader with respect to innovative entrepre-
neurship indicators (European Commission 2006a; Parker 2006). 
23 In addition to this, empirical research has shown that entrepreneurs that have
started multiple firms (‘habitual entrepreneurs’) are more often innovative than
one-off entrepreneurs (Ucbasaran et al. 2008). 
24 More research is needed to gain insight into the effects of migration of highly
skilled labour – and the subsequent transnational entrepreneurship – on innova-
tion and economic growth. 
25 New technology-based firms are more likely to be innovative (due to the techno-
logically dynamic nature of the industries in which they are active), and are likely
to involve viable businesses due to the high-opportunity costs of the founders
(leaving behind secure well-paid jobs).
26 These are very general policy implications: they do not indicate how large the
subsidies should be or within which specific area one should intervene, and they
also do not say which policy instruments should be given priority. Unfortu-
nately, the systems of innovation approach does not do better than the market
failure theory in providing specific policy implications (see Edquist 2001).
27 See Boot and Schmeits (2004) for a useful review of imperfections in the capital
market for innovative firms, and public policy in the Netherlands. 
28 For example, the ukgovernment introduced tax relief for corporate venturing in
1999. However, one could doubt the effectiveness of such a measure, given its
low level of additionality: i.e., if corporate venturing is important to (especially
large) firms, they will do it anyway, and only the accountant will notice the
advantage of this tax relief. 
29 See Stam et al. (2007) for an overview of the literature on the economic impor-
tance of high-growth entrepreneurs and the rationales for public policy. 
30 The so-called uitdagerskrediet (challengers credit) partly covers this field. It is a
public credit facility for financing challenging innovation projects by smes, in
which new goods, processes, or services will be developed, which will lead to fast
and substantial growth of the firm.
31 Focus on post-entry policies minimises the risk of waste and the possible substi-
tution effect of government subsidies. A possible deadweight effect should be
avoided by the identification of those firms that are good enough to survive but
not strong enough to grow (i.e., that do not have the financial means to invest
substantially) (cf. Santarelli and Vivarelli 2007). 
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6.1 introduction
In all industrial countries governments embrace innovation as a source of future
wealth. The European Union sees innovation as a key factor in its aim to become
the most dynamic and competitive region in the world by 2010, as stated in its
‘Lisbon agenda’. In the Netherlands an ‘Innovation Platform’ has been established
by the government, under the direct guidance of Prime Minister Balkenende, in
2003 to promote innovation in Dutch society.
This is not surprising. Countless studies have led to the conclusion that innova-
tion is the main source of productivity rise and wealth creation, not only nowa-
days, but throughout the centuries (Baumol 2002). However, history also shows
that innovative developments often provoke strong economic and political resist-
ance. Acemoglu and Robinson describe how the political establishment in the
Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires tried to hold back the industrial revolu-
tion, because they perceived it as a threat to their political power (Acemoglu and
Robinson 2000). In Islamic lands, religious leaders forbade the printing press as a
source of blasphemy and heresy; according to Landes this is the main reason why
the Islamic world started to lag behind the West in economic development
(Landes 1998). And even today, access to the Internet is restricted in China and
other countries to secure political stability and protect those in power.
In modern Western economies too, technological change does not emerge with-
out provoking resistance. Innovation changes established economic and political
relations, so there are winners and losers. The mainstream view among econo-
mists is that the ‘losers’ oppose technological change in order to protect their
economic interests. For instance, a monopolist may try to stop the introduction
of a new, superior technology by a competitor, in order to protect his market
share. Societies that want technological and economic progress, must arm them-
selves against this, for instance with effective regulation of competition.
According to Acemoglu and Robinson, however, the ‘political-loser’ hypothesis
is not completely satisfactory and certainly not complete (Acemoglu and Robin-
son 2000). It fails to explain why the economic losers do not use their power to
capture the gains of innovation for themselves. This means that the power distri-
bution must be accounted for as well. Groups or individuals without political
power, disadvantaged by economic and technological change, cannot stop it.
Those with economic and political power can. Hence, we have to consider
economic and political institutions1 if we want to understand how innovation is
obstructed by important actors in society.
173
barriers to innovation6.1.1  economic and political losers
Economic analysis usually assumes that the market determines the level of 
technological development. Spurred by competitors, companies are developing
new technologies all the time, creating new attractive products or more 
efficient production methods. This is the simple Darwinistic model of compe-
tition.
However, there are nearly always other factors besides market forces, namely the
institutions constraining them. In the public sector, where the market fails, 
decisions on technological developments are obviously made within the political
process. On the other hand, political interference in the private sector is not
unusual. When public health and safety are at stake, there are good reasons to 
curtail the market for goods and services. Examples are new types of medicinal
drugs and cars. Inevitably a ‘political market’ emerges, where rent seeking and 
lobbying by interest groups can determine the outcome of the innovation process
or – even more effectively – where interest groups try to control the decision-
making process – the economic and political institutions (Buchanan et al. 1982)
There can be different reasons for individuals or groups in society to resist 
innovation (Mokyr 2000).
Loss of jobs
People may fear to lose their jobs. The best known examples were the Luddites in
Britain, who fought tooth and nail against the introduction of mechanised looms
during the Industrial Revolution. They did not have the power to stop progress
and some of them ended up hanging from a gallows. There is little historical
evidence that fear of job loss can halt technological progress, but it can slow it
down. To what extent this fear can slow down the innovation process, depends
on the institutionalised decision-making process. Think of the current discus-
sions about the influence of ‘private equity’ on corporate decisions.
Direct economic damage
New efficient production methods and technologiesa replace existing ones.
Established companies lose market share or go out of business. Valuable knowl-
edge and skills are lost. This is ‘creative destruction’ as defined by Schumpeter.
The owners of those companies, knowledge, and skills will try to slow down or
block the introduction of new technologies, especially if it is difficult or expen-
sive to switch to new technologies. Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007) noted the
asymmetrical nature of lobby activities for technological change: high sunk costs
and exit barriers ensure that losers lobby harder than winners. As a consequence,
government policy tends towards protection of vested interests.
Negative external effects
New technologies can also provoke resistance from groups without direct finan-
cial interests, because unfavourable external effects are feared. Nuclear energy,
genetically modified food, the bio-industry, prenatal screening, megastores, and
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potentially somehow damage the quality of the society. Again, the extent to
which resistance of external groups can block innovative developments depends
on economic and political institutions.
Information problems and uncertainty
Every innovation, especially a fundamentally new one, creates uncertainty about
the social consequences and who is to gain and who is to lose. That is why it will
always be a matter of dispute if the market is the appropriate mechanism to
decide whether an innovation is to be adopted. Precisely because the uncertainty
is high, political debate, political pressure, and propaganda are bound to influence
decisions on technology. A remarkable example is nuclear energy, which is fully
accepted in France, while there is widespread resistance against it in the Nether-
lands. Invoking technical experts is only a partial solution, since they usually
have opposing views and expectations on the social consequences of important
technological changes.
Distrust
Resistance against technological changes can also be the consequence of politi-
cally or culturally determined distrust. The introduction of quinine in England
was banned at the end of the seventeenth century because the Jesuits had 
brought it to Europe; it was called ‘Jesuit powder’ (Duran-Reynals 1946). 
There are many examples of major, established companies ignoring the major
inventions of small companies, assuming ‘if it was really any good, we would
have invented it ourselves – the “Not Invented Here” syndrome’.
6.1.2  market failures and coordination problems
Obstacles to innovation do not always come from individuals or groups. They
may also be the result of the nature of the market or the ‘system’.
Lacking markets
For some inventions there is little if any market. This applies, for instance, to
sustainable energy. As long as the costs to the natural environment and other
external effects are not accounted for in the energy prices, the development of
sources of sustainable energy is bound to remain slow and difficult. Nobody is
willing to invest in a product if there is no prospect of commercial application. In
theory it is the task of the public sector to correct this failure of the market.
However, this has to be done cautiously, since government intervention can
disturb the situation, creating new obstacles.
High costs of adaptation
Some innovations that are technologically superior, fail to break through because
a large number of potential users has already chosen inferior technology, making
the costs for adaptation too high. Economists call this ‘path dependence’ or
hysteresis. The classical example is the dvorak keyboard, which is considered
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keyboards in the world would have to be replaced and everybody would have to
learn to type again (David 1986)
System repercussions
More generally, the problems of the introduction and implementation of an inno-
vation grow larger as the number of different actors, activities, and technologies
grows larger, in other words: if the system repercussions are greater. A switch
from petrol to hydrogen or bio-ethanol car fuel does not only require different
engines, but also far-reaching and therefore costly changes in the production 
and distribution system (refineries, filling stations), quality and safety standards,
technical knowledge in garages, and fiscal arrangements (taxation of cars and
fuel). Many forms of innovation, especially in the public sphere, can have far-
reaching system repercussions.
Coordination problems
In some cases different actors are unable to agree on a common approach, bring-
ing the innovation process to a halt. Uncertainty about the outcome, distrust of
other parties or disagreement on the sharing of the costs and of the rewards can
stand in the way of cooperation. In that case a moderator can play a useful role.
This could be the government, but does not necessarily have to be.
6.1.3 counterproductive policy
All these factors can be reasons to reject the market mechanism for decision
making on the development and introduction of new products and technologies.
A ‘policy’ must be devised for the correction of failures of the market mechanism
and to promote and guide innovation. This policy can involve many things:
subsidies as an incentive to innovation; permits, procedures, and quality control
to assess the social impact of innovations; organisations to widen bottlenecks and
remove obstacles; and mediators and moderators to bring parties together and
promote cooperation. However, all this does not guarantee optimal results. Not
only can there be failure of the market, but also failure of policy. The government
is susceptible to lobbying and rent seeking. The government too has to cope with
uncertainty and incomplete information, and tends to avoid risks. A government
can be manipulated by parties whose cooperation is necessary but who are pursu-
ing their own interests. The need for transparency and accountability results in
detailed regulation and bureaucracy which discourage the innovators. The policy
can even create new obstacles to innovation.
6.1.4 case  studies
The following sections describe four cases of innovative developments meeting a
variety of obstacles. These four cases are:
–W i n d energy in the Netherlands;
–T he Whisper, low-noise bus;
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–E n e r g y  h o u s e s .
6.2  blowing in the wind
In the 1970s interest in the Netherlands for alternative sources of energy – one of
them being wind energy – grew, partly spurred by the 1973 oil crisis. Since then,
the Dutch government has tried to promote the development of wind turbines,
with considerable subsidies for research institutes and enterprises. While the
Netherlands initially had a leading position in wind energy, it has clearly fallen
back in the successive decades. Why has wind energy not been as successful as in
other countries?
6.2.1 netherlands must become front runner (kamp 2002)
The Dutch government’s 1974 ‘White Paper on Energy’ contained an outline of a
plan for the development of alternative sources of energy; with the government
subsidising and coordinating projects. Two new organisations were created: the
lseo, the Dutch acronym for a national coordinating committee for energy
research, and the neom, the Dutch energy development company. The lseowas
responsible for, among other things, the selection of projects qualifying for a
subsidy. The task of the neom was to promote projects and knowledge transfer
between research institutions and commercial enterprises.
Although the country had no experience with the construction of wind turbines
for energy production, the lseodid not foresee problems in this area, because of
a lengthy experience in the construction of classical windmills. This committee
even expected a leading role for the country in the development of wind turbines.
To this end, the government invested a large amount of money in r&d.
However, the construction of wind turbines appeared more difficult than
expected in the 1980s. Due to technical problems and high maintenance costs,
the necessary investments turned out to be much higher than expected. The
energy efficiency was disappointing. As a consequence, Dutch energy companies
and major turbine manufacturers, such as Fokker and Stork, withdrew from the
project. The government then changed its policy and concentrated on smaller
manufacturers. In the late 1970s they had started with the production of smaller
wind turbines and could not expect much in terms of government subsidies in
those days. However, this change in government policy has not led to success
either. Before 2000 most Dutch wind turbine manufacturers had gone out of
business or had been taken over by foreign competitors.
In contrast to the Netherlands, wind energy in Denmark has proven to be very
successful. Currently several Danish wind turbine companies have a strong posi-
tion on the world market (Kamp and Mulder 2005). Countries like Spain and
Germany also have relatively successful wind energy policies. Table 6.1 indicates
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Netherlands.
6.2.2  obstacles to wind energy
Lack of market demand
Although the price gap is narrowing, wind energy is still more expensive than
fossil fuel, partly because the costs to the natural environment and other external
effects are not included in the price of ‘grey’ electricity. Because the (artificially)
high price didn’t make wind energy very interesting for private investors, the
government had to create a market. It tried to do so by subsidising r&d, invest-
ments, and energy ‘resupply’ to the power grid.
At present, in 2007, wind energy is still not profitable in the Netherlands and the
market still depends on government subsidies. According to the Dutch Wind
Energy Association the installation of land-based wind turbines without subsi-
dies will not be possible before 2014; at sea it will not be possible before 2021.
Wind park subsidies until 2020 will amount to €2,400 million (€500 million on
land and €1,900 million at sea)2. Creating a wind energy market does not only
take much time (several decades), but also a large amount of public means
(several billion euros).
Lack of interest of energy companies
As a consequence of the lack of a real market for wind energy in the Netherlands,
private investors were initially hardly interested in small scale, sustainable
energy production from wind. It just did not fit into the business models of any
commercial enterprise. Energy companies were focused on large-scale energy
production from natural gas, coal, oil, or nuclear fuel. They were not involved in
the development of wind turbines. This attitude of Dutch energy companies
micro-foundations for innovation policy
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Table 6.1 Wind energy in nine countries in 2006
Capacity (mw)%   Wind energy /










Source: Wind Service Holland, 2007changed a little in the 1990s, when subsidies for owners of wind turbines became
available.3
No level playing field
Wind turbine owners produce wind energy for their own use, but supply their
surplus production to the power grid (i.e., the energy companies), for which they
receive financial compensation. The ‘resupply’ tariffs for this compensation have
been kept low by the energy companies for a long time, leaving the wind turbines
unprofitable in many cases. This unfair competition only came to an end in 1996
when the government started to subsidise these tariffs4. This sort of subsidy had
already existed in other countries for quite some time, for example in Denmark
since 1984. Table 6.2 indicates that the ‘buy-back’ tariffs in the Netherlands in
2003 were higher than in Denmark, Germany, and Spain, but the country had
lagged behind in the production of turbines so much, that it could not catch up
with these countries anymore.
Coordination problems 
Many parties (Kamp 2002) were involved in the development of turbines in the
1970s and 1980s: the government, research institutes, and major companies such
as Fokker and Stork. Although they did cooperate, they did not reach a successful
common approach to any sufficient degree. An important problem was the minor
role of the energy companies, who were the obvious potential market for wind
turbines; the ‘market’ was not involved in the development.
The minor manufacturers of wind turbines were also ignored when it came to
handing out subsidies. This only changed in the late 1980s, when the government
adjusted its policy, after the major companies (Stork, Fokker) had withdrawn.
Although small companies had sought cooperation with the research institute
ecn, this cooperation had its limitations, since the ecn operates on a far more
academic level than the more application-oriented manufacturers. Mutual coop-
eration between minor manufacturers was practically non-existent.
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Table 6.2 Buy-back tariffs in four countries in 2003
State subsidy since Buy-back tariff
(€ cent/kWh)
Denmark 1984 4.4
Germany 1991 6.2-9.1 *
Netherlands 1996 7.8-9.7 *
Spain 1994 6.3
* Depending on location
Source: Van Giesel and Van der Veen, 2004Because of these coordination problems, little if anything was learned, prevent-
ing technological innovation and the practical application of wind energy in the
Netherlands. In Denmark, in contrast, there has been close cooperation between
manufacturers of wind turbines, owners, and research institutes, as well as small
companies. Moreover, the energy companies played a major role in the develop-
ment of wind turbines; the Danish government created a production company for
wind turbines in cooperation with the energy companies. The good cooperation
between technological research and application resulted in important learning
effects. The success of the Danish wind energy policy is, according to Kamp
(2002), due to this learning process in particular.
6.2.3 political  windiness
Lacking a market for wind energy, the Dutch government had an important task
to do in creating one. In practice, the government has not been very successful in
doing this. This section focuses on the reasons for this lack of success.
r&d bias
As in many other countries, the development of wind turbines in the Netherlands
strongly focused on the stimulation of demand, partly through technological
research (technology-push). This stress on the supply side resulted in generous
subsidies for research institutes (ecn, Universities of Technology in Delft and
Eindhoven) and (major) companies (Stork, Fokker, Holec), who were active in the
development of turbines. During the first year of the National Development Pro-
gram for Wind Energy (now), 15 million guilders (1 Euro = 2.20 guilders) was
made available from March 1976 until March 1977. In the following years, projects
received many millions of guilders more in subsidies (Kamp 2002).
The government’s focus on technological research reduced the attention for the
demand side of the market. There were no subsidies for wind turbine manufac-
turers, making it unattractive to invest in their development. It was not until
1986 that the first investment subsidies for wind turbine production were intro-
duced, enabling a certain growth in the turbine market. However, this was not
enough to save the Dutch manufacturers; most of them went out of business in
the 1990s or were taken over by foreign enterprises (Kamp and Mulder 2005).
Denmark chose right from the start for a policy that included both a technology-
pushand attention to the demand side of the market. Investment subsidies for
buyers of wind turbines were established in the 1970s, enabling the creation of
many small wind turbine companies (Kamp 2002). Initially Germany was strongly
focused on research, like the Netherlands, but because of lack of success, attention
shifted to a more market-driven policy. In 2000 a bill was passed (Einspeisegesetz)
to stimulate the use of sustainable energy in general. The law compelled energy
companies to pay an acceptable price for ‘resupplied’ wind energy.
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A consistent long-term government policy is very important for the creation of a
successful wind energy market. However, in the Netherlands this is what has
been lacking only too often. In particular subsidies for wind energy was subject
to varying political criteria.5 Since the introduction of investment subsidies for
wind energy producers in the late 1980s, many arrangements have been abol-
ished and/or modified. For instance, subsidies were initially related to the
installed generator power in kilowatt hours (kWh), encouraging the installation
of relatively heavy generators. This had a negative effect on the quality of the
turbines, making them unsuitable for export. Later the subsidy was related to the
energy actually produced in kWh.
Until 2004 there was also a subsidy for the import of ‘green’ electricity from
abroad (Regulatory Energy Taxation, reb), that frustrated rather than stimulated
the domestic production of wind energy. Since Dutch enterprises were allowed
to invest in foreign wind parks with Dutch subsidies, they invested less in their
own country. The creation of the mep-subsidy (concerning the ecological quality
of the electricity production) had to remedy this (Mast et al. 2007). Although the
mep was very popular, it was ended in August 2006; the subsidy for off-shore
wind parks had already been scrapped the year before. This continual changing
and/or abolition of subsidy regulations made it very difficult for manufacturers
and energy producers to develop a long-term strategy.
Learning process for the government
The Dutch government has learned from some of its bad policy choices. When it
became apparent that focusing on technology had not brought about the desired
results, more attention was paid to the demand side of the wind energy market,
resulting in subsidies for ‘resupplying’ to the power grid and for investments.
Moreover, in the mid-1980s the government began to work with small manufac-
turers of wind turbines, who had previously been ignored.
6.2.4 conclusion
The ambitious plans in the 1970s for a leading Dutch role in wind energy have
had very little success. Thirty years later the Netherlands still lags behind. One of
the causes of the lack of success of wind energy is the poor cooperation between
different actors, who learned little from each other as a consequence. Investment
subsidies and subsidies on buy-back tariffs were introduced only at a late stage,
making investment in wind energy unattractive for commercial enterprises. The
government also has (unwittingly) created obstacles itself, by unduly stressing
technological research, while neglecting the demand side. Its policy on subsidies
was erratic. Certain regulations were actually counterproductive.
An important lesson is that the ‘market’ must be involved from the beginning.
Interactive learning is greatly improved by good cooperation between researchers,
manufacturers, and users. If the government wants to support innovative devel-
181
barriers to innovationopments, it is necessary to have a consistent long-term policy that partners in the
innovation process can rely upon. For the development of an effective policy thor-
ough market knowledge is necessary. The government must invest in this policy,
otherwise the government is pushed around instead of being a coordinating force.
6.3 waiting for the bus
A couple of years ago the company e-Traction in Apeldoorn developed a bus
called the Whisper; it is far more silent, environmentally friendly and cheaper
than normal buses. A first prototype was commissioned in Apeldoorn in 2005. In
spite of the advantages, plans to use the buses on a regular basis throughout the
Netherlands have not yet materialised. The question is why the Whisper is still
not being used all over the country.
6.3.1 advantages of the whisper
The Whisper has a conventional diesel engine and an electromotor. When it
brakes or moves downhill, the released energy is stored in batteries. This energy
can be used again for the electromotor driving the back wheels. The batteries can
be supported, if need be, by the diesel engine when moving uphill.
A study by tnoconcluded that the Whisper has a number of advantages. First,
its engine produces less noise than that of ordinary buses. Its typical noise level is
58 dB instead of 78 dB (Nederlands Dagblad 2005). Another great advantage of the
electromotor is that it saves a great deal of energy. A normal bus with a diesel
engine gets 2.2 kilometres to the litre, the Whisper gets 6.3 kilometres to the litre.
Thirdly, the Whisper is very environmentally friendly: its co2-emissions are 85
percent less than a regular bus (De Stentor 2004). Finally, the energy advantages
can help to keep the ticket price low.
Although the purchase price of the Whisper is higher than that of a normal bus,
the difference can be quickly earned back. The first five Whispers will each cost
about €280,000, while the price of a normal bus is about €200,000. If the
production of the Whisper goes up, scale advantage will reduce the price to
€220,000 (Nederlands Dagblad 2005). Because the Whisper saves about 20,000-
25,000 litre diesel oil per year with its electromotor, the price difference would
be earned back after a short period of time.
6.3.2 bus stop
In 2005 the prototype of the Whisper was used for the first time in the munici-
pality of Apeldoorn. Only test drives have been made ever since. E-Traction
currently depends on subsidies in order to continue the production of the Whis-
per. The costs of a test phase with five prototypes amount to €1.8 million. The
Netherlands Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (vrom)
is willing to pay a subsidy of €350,000 but the remaining costs are still too high
micro-foundations for innovation policy
182for e-Traction. The company is seeking subsidies from various provinces, munici-
palities, and/or public transport companies to enable them to develop the addi-
tional prototypes and start testing.
Three Dutch municipalities have shown interest in the Whisper so far: Apel-
doorn, Amersfoort, and Enschede. The province of Utrecht intended to grant a
subsidy for five Whispers in October 2005, to be used on the bus line from
Central Amersfoort to the Amersfoort district of Vathorst. In this way, the
province wanted to stimulate new development in public transport and reduce
inconvenience for the population. When the Whisper buses had lived up to
expectations, all buses in Amersfoort would be replaced by Whispers. Anno
2007 none of the three municipalities has made a start yet with such a Whisper
project, but in the meantime plans have been made in cooperation with the urban
region of Rotterdam to convert five normal buses to Whispers and use them in
regular service.
6.3.3  obstacles for the whisper
Catch 22: Everybody is waiting for everybody else
E-Traction is dependant upon several parties for the introduction of the Whisper:
municipalities, provinces, transport companies, and coach builders. In practice
none of them is willing to bear the initial costs. Every party has its reasons – often
understandable – to look to other parties to jump first. As a consequence, nothing
happens. The innovator (e-Traction) is caught between these different parties
and so far has not been able to convince any of them to make the first move.
Although a bus like the Whisper has widely acknowledged value for society,
there is no real market for it yet. None of the parties involved is willing to invest
in a product without proven technological quality and commercial value. Because
of uncertainty about the market potential of the Whisper, manufacturers hesitate
to join forces with e-Traction. It is too risky for them to invest a few million euros
in the development of five Whispers without certainty that the market is actually
willing to pay for it. Moreover, adaptation of their existing production lines is
costly.
Uncertainty is also an obstacle in getting transport companies to participate in
the project. Since they have a responsibility to their customers, they are unwill-
ing to experiment; they do not want to risk that the new Whisper technology
might break down.
The government: A silent partner
In the past the province of Gelderland has given subsidies to e-Traction for the
development of the prototype of the Whisper, but it is not willing to invest
more; the provincial authorities think that market partners must take responsi-
bility for introducing the Whisper to the market. The municipality of Apeldoorn,
the home town of e-Traction, is also not willing to invest more, because it does
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ities are understandable. They must be cautious with their market interventions,
because unfair competition can create new obstacles.
Moreover, a local authority can only intervene in the market in a limited way.
Municipalities hand out concessions to transport companies, for a temporary
transport monopoly. Once a concession has been given, a municipality cannot
easily change the conditions. That is why a municipality cannot compel local
transport companies to buy the Whisper, since the conditions of the concession
do not require that a specific type of vehicle be used.
The so-called innovation concession will probably allow municipalities to adapt
their concession policy from the end of 2007. This enables local authorities to
introduce innovative products because of their public interest. Transport compa-
nies that have a concession already can be compelled from then on to purchase
some buses based on ecological arguments. That would brighten the prospects for
the Whisper.
Quality control
An additional obstacle for e-Traction is that the Whisper has to be inspected by
several quality control institutions on safety aspects. An important example of a
certificate to be obtained is the ce benchmark, indicating that eu-safety guide-
lines have been observed. In order to obtain a certificate, a new product must
undergo several tests; the certification process can sometimes be lengthy and
costly. Although this certification is essential, it can be an obstacle for innovative
companies, especially small ones, without much time or money.
6.3.4 conclusion
The main problem of e-Traction with the introduction of the Whisper is that
none of the actors in the innovation process can break out of this ‘Catch 22’ situa-
tion; everybody is waiting for somebody else. A real market for the Whisper is
effectively non-existent, although its importance in saving fossil fuel is widely
acknowledged. It is understandable that potential subsidising authorities are
hesitant, since it is not their task to buy or use such vehicles. Existing bus safety
requirements require that vehicles be tested by several organisations, which is
another obstacle for the company in Apeldoorn.
The role of the authorities as ‘launching customer’ can be particularly important
to promote innovative developments. The innovation concession enables the
authorities to hand out concessions based on criteria other than price. To be sure,
we must be on our guard that this kind of concession does not evolve into a form
of subsidy from taxpayers.
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In 1997 the former Dutch health minister Borst announced that a start would be
made with the introduction of the Electronic Patient Dossier (epd), to facilitate
the exchange of medical records between health care workers. Ten years later
there is still no working countrywide information system for medical records.
Why is it taking so much longer than expected?
6.4.1 advantages of the epd
The epd is intended to facilitate the exchange of medical records between health
care workers. Authorised personnel must be able to query and view up-to-date
information on a patient anytime and anywhere in the country. Such a system
would be of great use for example to a doctor substituting for a general practi-
tioner (gp) or in a first aid centres. With the epd a doctor would be able to see a
patient’s medical history, including past illnesses, chronic diseases, allergies,
current medication they are taking and any counterindications. This would be a
helpful tool in preventing medical errors and enabling doctors to provide better
quality medical care.
Another advantage of the epd is that it would facilitate more effective medication
monitoring. Incorrect medication is the cause of approximately 90,000 hospitali-
sations per year in the Netherlands. The main reason is that different pharma-
cists, doctors, and hospitals do not know about each others prescriptions. The
direct costs of this amounts to about €300 million per year (Pharmaceutisch
Weekblad 2005). The total nationwide costs of incorrect medical information
transfer are even higher: over €1 billion annually, with an additional €1.6 billion
in incidental costs (tns nipo 2004).6 Although an epd would not rule out all
such errors, it could reduce them drastically.
The epd could also result in higher efficiency, because with such a system
medical records would not have to be gathered again and again by different health
care workers and institutions, and lab work would not have to be repeated.
Finally, the epd can contribute to demand-oriented care. When patients have
their own medical data at their disposal, they are better able to discuss decisions
on care and treatment with their doctors and other health care workers.7
6.4.2 delayed progress
After receiving the go-ahead of Health Minister Borst in 1997, the associations 
of hospitals, gps, and specialists signed a declaration of intent for the realisation
of a nation-wide electronic infrastructure for all health care services. In 2001
Minister Borst estimated that the epd would be operational by 2004; a few years
later this appeared not to be feasible. In 2003 the National ict Institute for Health
Services (nictiz), which is coordinating the development of the epd under the
guidance of the Ministry of Health, announced a delay of three years in making
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adjusted.
The initial plan was that the health services would take responsibility for the
implementation of the epd. When it appeared that this was slowing down the
whole process, late in 2005 Parliament forced the Ministry of Health to take over
this responsibility. The current target date to make two components of the epd ,
the Electronic Medication Dossier (emd) and the Dossier for stand-in gps
(wdh), operational nationwide is 2009.
The introduction of the emd and wdhhas several phases. The basic infrastruc-
ture (national switch point, lsp) is now ready. After a ‘proof-of-concept’ phase
and a ‘front-runner’ phase the nation-wide implementation will take place. The
front-runner phase is now in progress; the aim is to test the functionality in a
limited working environment with gps, group practices, hospitals, and pharma-
cists in terms of safety, reliability, and user-friendliness (Ministerie van Volksge-
zondheid, Welzijn en Sport 2007). In the eastern region of Twente a local wdh
will be made accessible via the lspand in Rotterdam and Amsterdam the already-
operational emd will be linked to the lsp.8 When all these field tests have been
completed and evaluated, the regional and the nation-wide implementation of
both systems can start. After that, other components of the epd can be added.
6.4.3 obstacles for the epd
Complexity of the operational environment
Many different health care services and people are involved in the implementa-
tion of the epd: gps, dentists, hospitals, home care organisations, pharmacists,
psychotherapists, physiotherapists, obstetricians, and nurses. The Ministry of
Health has to coordinate its policy with about 25 branch organisations. Since they
all have their own ideas and interests, it is not always easy to reach consensus.
This is one of the reasons why a rapid and simple implementation of the epd has
been difficult to achieve.
For example, the implementation of the epd in hospitals appears to be a laborious
process. All hospitals have their own board of governors whose consent is
required. Moreover, hospitals are complex organisations, since they often host no
less than twenty specialisms, which have their specific ways and methods of
record keeping. This adds greatly to the complexity and reduces the efficiency of
the epd. Negative experiences with automatisation in hospitals has bred a lot of
scepticism (Health Sciences Digest 2005). In general, Dutch hospitals have no
intention of connecting to the lspin the near future; in 2007 less than 30 percent
had allocated funds for this purpose, and 75 percent indicated it was not attractive
at the moment (Digitaal Bestuur 2007).
gps, pharmacists, hospitals, municipal health services, nursing homes, and home
care institutions all have their own strategies and automatisation policies; their
ict infrastructures are also different. This means that strategy, organisation,
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compatible. Figure 6.1 gives an overview.
Figure 6.1 The epd has to be standarddised at different levels*
S&P = Strategies and Policy; O = Organisation; I = Information; T = Technical infrastructure
Source: nictiz
Resistance of the actors
Most health care services already have a system to store medical records. Most gps
have already an electronic patient dossier containing consultation reports, inquiry
results, and medication. Communication between some of these existing systems
is possible already, for instance between the systems of gps and pharmacists.
Communication is usually limited to some health care services in the same region.
Health care services will have to hook up their existing systems to the new epd.
Health care workers and hospitals still without systems of their own will have to
introduce a completely new system. Many of them are not keen to do that, espe-
cially if they are content with their existing system. gps find the epd time
consuming, since they have to ‘translate’ their activities into diagnostic codes
(Automatisering Gids 2004). There is also substantial lack of trust in the function-
ality of the new system; the perception is that it will not meet the same require-
ments as the existing ones.
There are also financial objections to the introduction of the epd. Connecting the
existing information systems to the wdhwill cost a gp about €4,500; this could
be earned back in five years, according to calculations from Squarewise (an inno-
vation management bureau).9 Other health care workers also face similar initial





































Tnet costs over a period of a few years, the initial costs can create an extra hurdle
for new users.
The epd can also result in loss of income for some health care workers. Since it
contains information about earlier inquiries from a patient, those inquiries, like
taking X-rays and blood samples, do not need to be done again when a patient is
transferred to another medical practice.
The introduction of the epd implies that medical records stored by a doctor or
other health care workers will be accessible to others. This means loss of an infor-
mation monopoly and autonomy, enabling a doctor’s colleagues and patients to
get more detailed knowledge of their professional practice. The (compulsory)
sharing of patient information means loss of territory and power, for instance
within the organisation of a hospital. The introduction of market forces only adds
to the anxiety.
A survey of the Royal Dutch Medical Association (knmg) in 2004 shows that 80
percent of the respondent doctors are unwilling to give direct access to electronic
data to other health care workers or institutions for clinical purposes. About 76
percent say they have no need to query data from colleagues (Ministerie van
Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport 2005).
Uncertainty
A major issue related to the epd is the authorisation to access medical records.
Especially health care workers value the confidentiality of the medical records
they maintain; patients themselves are often less concerned about confidentiality
of their medical records. The law on the protection of personal information
(wbp) and the law on medical treatment agreement (wgbo) stipulate that a
health care worker can get access to medical records only if it is necessary for a
patient’s treatment and if the patient does not object. Health care workers who
are registered in the existing big system have a right to view medical records.
These are doctors, dentists, pharmacists, psychologists, psychotherapists, 
physiotherapists, obstetricians, and nurses. The wdh-component of epd is
accessible only for gps, their other doctors who temporarily stand in for them,
and their medical assistants. The emd component is, for the time being, acces-
sible only to gps, medical specialists, hospital and general pharmacists, and their
assistants.10
There are, to be sure, good reasons for all this attention to privacy. For example,
when a company doctor can view the medical record of a job applicant, he might
stop the hiring procedure if he finds a psychiatric record in the applicant’s file.
However, privacy rules that are too strict also have a downside: the obvious
advantages of the epd would be lost. The fear of privacy violation can also be
used as a pretext to thwart or delay the introduction of the epd.
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In spite of all the delays in the epd project, the Netherlands is still one of the three front runners
when it comes to exchange of medical data, the others being Britain and Canada. Most other coun-
tries run into similar difficulties, such as privacy protection and safeguarding and interoperability
with existing systems (Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport 2005).
The introduction of an epd in Britain was also delayed for several years. Phased introduction was
scheduled to begin in 2007. In contrast to the Netherlands, it will be introduced in a top-down
manner: health care workers will not be involved in the implementation of the new system. The
National Health Service has signed a contract with one ict supplier for each region in Britain for
the delivery of one integrated system for each hospital. Health care workers and patients have
strongly criticised this model, since they, the future users, have not been consulted. Privacy is also a
matter of concern, since the police and the secret services must also have access to combat crime.
Britain also has to cope with costs that have gone way over budget; the initial budget was about €3
billion, but it has already more than tripled (de Ziekenhuiskrant 2007). The costs of the Dutch epd
are ‘only’ a few dozen million euros.
The implementation of a nationwide epd in the us is still not forthcoming. A National Health
Coordinator appointed in 2004 has yet to realise such a system. It is expected to take about ten
years.11
Another concern about the epd is protecting the system against hackers. An inci-
dent in 2005, when hackers tested the Dutch system by breaking into the data of
1.2 million medical records of a Dutch hospital (de Volkskrant 2005), sparked a
heated debate on the protection of medical records. In order to prevent unautho-
rised access to medical records in the epd, national guidelines for protection have
been defined. Health care workers have to identify themselves with a special ‘uzi
pass’, and the computers of health care workers, hospitals, etc. and the lspmust
meet high standards of protection. A health care worker who does not meet the
requirements cannot connect to the lsp.12
The emphasis on protection of the epd illustrates a phenomenon that can be
observed in other innovation processes as well: the safety standards for new
systems are much higher than for the existing ones. However, absolute safety
does not exist, and striving for watertight guarantees can be an effective obstacle
to the introduction of innovations.
Lack of market demand
A major problem of the epd is that there is no effective demand for it. Patients,
who would ultimately benefit most from it, are not actors in the Dutch market
and cannot exert pressure to introduce the new system. This means that the
social benefits are much larger than the private benefits of the parties involved
directly. Moreover, the lack of competition in the medical sector ensures that
health care workers have little financial incentive to realise optimal safety for
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and market forces have little effect. As a result, the government had to take up the
role of initiator and play a guiding role in the development and implementation of
the epd. Because the government pays and controls the development of the
central facilities of the system almost completely, health care workers and ict
suppliers are not stimulated to think pro-actively about an epd that is as effective
and efficient. Since the government represents the supply side and controls the
demand side, it is susceptible to lobbying and rent seeking by market parties who
want to profit from the introduction of the epd or who want to prevent its intro-
duction.
Since many health care workers do not have expertise with ict, they are depen-
dant on the ict suppliers for the implementation of the epd. This gives these
suppliers strong leverage over their customers. Moreover, cooperation with a
chosen ict supplier has ‘lock-in’ effects: it is very difficult to switch to another
supplier. Since the data in a nationwide epd must be available anywhere anytime,
the system cannot be switched off during the search for another supplier.
6.4.4 conclusion
In spite of the obvious advantages of the epd, the innovation process is a labori-
ous one. There are several causes. The numerous parties involved in the develop-
ment and implementation of the epd are very diverse, and have different inter-
ests. There are also considerable initial costs for the customers in the introduction
phase, putting up barriers to many would-be customers. The epd also results in a
loss of autonomy for some, because medical records must be among health care
workers and can be viewed by the patients themselves. The lack of an ‘articulated
demand’ from patients has also slowed down the introduction of the epd. Finally,
protection of privacy against unauthorised users and hackers creates more delays.
A complex system innovation like the introduction of the epd can necessitate a
mediating role for the government. An absolute requirement for successful
implementation is that the objectives are clear and that a realistic and feasible
time schedule is projected, enabling market parties to adapt their strategies and
investments to it. Besides this, a carefully administered combination of ‘carrots’
and ‘sticks’ is necessary to ensure sufficient progress is made. The government as
a moderator must monitor the whole process and not get trapped in a quagmire of
contradictory demands and interests.
6.5 energy neutral houses
Sustainable energy plays an increasingly important role in our society. Fossil fuel
is bound to be exhausted some day, so there is growing attention for alternative
sources of energy, like wind and solar heat. The increasing dependency on major
energy companies and governments and the decreasing number of countries
exporting fossil fuels, are also reasons for this growing attention.
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energy neutral house, meeting its energy needs from alternative sources of
energy, including wind and solar heat. Several initiatives of this kind have been
developed in the Netherlands by companies and individuals since 1974. In spite of
public interest in the reduction of energy consumption, such initiatives run into
all sorts of obstacles.
6.5.1 from recycling house to energy neutral house
Energy neutral houses function partly or (in rare cases) completely separate from
the power grid and use alternative sources of energy, such as wind and solar heat.
In 1974 the Little Earth Foundation built an energy neutral house in the town
Boxtel, in the southern part of the country. This house had a windmill generating
the necessary electricity, a solar collector supplying heat, and a methane gas
installation for cooking. Drinking water was obtained from a well.
In the Netherlands and elsewhere, numerous initiatives of this kind have been
realised. A special type of energy neutral house is currently under development
by the otbGroup in Eindhoven. This ‘Energy House is, in principle, completely
independent from the power grid. The generated energy can be stored for later
use. Energy is stored in batteries or by producing hydrogen through electrolysis,
which can be used in a fuel cell for heat production. Currently, the development
is in the ‘proof-of-principle’ phase, in close cooperation with the Eindhoven
University of Technology and the Fontys Hogeschool (otbGroup 2007)
6.5.2 advantages of an energy neutral house
Energy neutral houses use sustainable energy only, so a major advantage is the
absence of co2-emission. Moreover, solar heat and wind energy are inexhaustible
sources of energy, a good alternative for fossil fuels that are bound to be
exhausted some day. The independence from dubious suppliers is another advan-
tage. Because energy is generated right where it is consumed, there are fewer
losses in transport and conversion; energy production in large power stations
makes transport of fuel and of generated electricity over long distances neces-
sary; more than 60 percent of the generated power (European Commission 2006)
is dissipated before it reaches the consumer. Of course there are no energy bills to
be paid, since sun and wind are free.
6.5.3 obstacles to energy neutral houses
Unfair competition
There is no fair competition between sustainable energy and fossil fuel, because
the costs to the natural environment and other external effects are not accounted
for. The generation of ‘green’ electricity is more expensive in the Netherlands
than that of ‘grey’ electricity. Taxation on fossil fuel with high co2-emission is
relatively low in the Netherlands. That is why there is currently no such thing as a
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competition, all market parties should carry their own financial burden, which
must include the damage done to the natural environment and by contributing to
global warming. Nowadays this is only partly the case.
Resistance of vested interests
Energy neutral houses are a potential threat to vested interests in the energy
market. Since some houses are not connected at all to the power grids, this means
loss of income for oil companies and energy suppliers. It is understandable that
they are trying to protect their interests. Although they do not overtly resist
alternative energy projects, their cooperation, if any, is half-hearted, especially if
their own market position is in peril. Political lobbying enables them to influence
political decisions in their favour. Suppliers of fossil energy do cooperate when
natural gas retains its importance and when energy is ‘resupplied’ to the grid. In
this way oil companies and energy suppliers remain in control.
Dutch construction companies are equally hesitant about integrating renewable
elements into new houses, as was experienced by the Little Earth Foundation.
One reason is the uncertainty among contractors and project developers, since
renewable materials and new building concepts remain to be proven in the
construction sector. Some municipalities in the province of Brabant have




Construction companies have to cope with a plethora of regulations and certifi-
cates. These are an obstacle to innovation. Some components used in energy-
neutral houses require special regulation. An example is the use of hydrogen in
the otbGroup’s Energy House, which is used for the storage of surplus energy.
Since hydrogen is a fuel with unique properties, its use necessitates special laws,
regulations, and permits. The often laborious administrative processes lead to
delays in the innovation process. Since most people are ignorant about the tech-
nicalities of the application of hydrogen, there is much uncertainty about the
safety aspects.
Erratic policies
The social and environmental advantages of sustainable energy are acknowledged
by the Dutch government. In practice, however, this results in erratic policies,
since different political parties have different ideas about sustainable energy.
Although the government wants to stimulate the use of sustainable energy, it has
abolished several ‘sustainable’ subsidies in recent years. In 2003 the Energy
Premium Regulation (epr)13a subsidy for energy-saving appliances such as solar
boilers and solar panels – was scrapped; the subsidy for off-shore wind parks was
scrapped two years later, and in 2006 the subsidy promoting the ecological qual-
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consistent government policy makes it very difficult for enterprises to devise a
long-term business plan. The abolition of the eprhas led to a collapse of the
Dutch market for solar boilers and solar panels. Some companies had invested for
many years in these products, but saw their home market shrink and had to turn
to foreign countries. Moreover, the buy-back tariffs of energy are low, discourag-
ing Dutch consumers from using solar panels, for instance. The Dutch tariff for
resupply is 6 cents per kWh; in Germany it is 46 cents.14
Research done by Simona Negro at the University of Utrecht confirms that
Dutch policy on sustainable energy is erratic and inconsistent, making it very
difficult to develop a reliable market. In 1998 the Netherlands started with gasifi-
cation of biomass in the Amer power station near Geertruidenberg. Initially,
everybody was enthusiastic because its efficiency was much higher than that of
the burning of biomass. But when some difficulties arose because the technology
appeared to need some further development, and obtaining biomass for an
affordable price became difficult, enthusiasm declined and the experiment was
ended. That led to the collapse of the entire innovation system for gasification
technology (Negro 2007).
Devising subsidy conditions
When companies request a government subsidy, they often run into practical
difficulties. The regulations are often very complex, or it is hard to meet all
requirements. Especially small companies – without specialised staff that can
concentrate on lobbying for subsidies – are the first to give up, leading to the end
of their innovative activities.
For the development of the Energy House the otbGroup had requested a
subsidy in the past; eventually this request was rejected. One of the reasons
given for the rejection was that no other relevant market parties – such as archi-
tects, constructors, and project developers – were involved. Another reason was
that the chance of success was slim, according to the subsidising agency Senter-
novem, since apparently no professional party with the required expertise was
involved in the project. Because the otbGroup Energy House is still in the
development phase, active involvement of such professionals is not yet possible;
they are only willing to commit themselves when the ‘proof-of-principle’ phase
is completed. After successful completion of the first phase of the Energy House,
the follow-up will be pursued by a separate enterprise, with a number of parties
as shareholders. These partners could bring in financial, building/developing,
and possibly technical/scientific expertise (otbGroup 2007). One more reason
for rejection was that the applicability and the environmental advantages of the
Energy House were perceived as meagre, because the technology is designed first
and foremost for newly built, free-standing, up-market privately owned houses.
However, the otbGroup had good reasons to test the technology first in a
limited environment; after proven success, the technology can be applied to
other segments of the housing market.
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The importance of a sustainable economy is acknowledged by an ever- increasing
number of people in the Netherlands. Although the building of energy-saving
houses in the Netherlands could make an important contribution to such an
economy, developers of the necessary technology have run into a number of
obstacles. There is no fair competition between suppliers of sustainable energy
and ‘traditional’ energy companies, since environmental pollution is not included
in the energy prices. Established energy companies and oil companies have no
financial interest in energy- saving houses and for that reason are not eager to
cooperate in their development. The government also creates obstacles, by failing
to devise reliable and consistent policy. Finally, the development of energy-
saving houses is delayed because of uncertainty about the application of sustain-
able components.
When a social issue acquires more prominence in political agendas, as is the case
with sustainable energy, political parties want to promote themselves with ‘new
policy’ to achieve various objectives. However, for market parties it is far more
important to have clear, consistent long-term objectives than having to repeat-
edly respond to policy changes and initiatives.
6.6 general conclusion
In spite of all the high-minded rhetoric, innovation is often a laborious process,
as evidenced by the experiences documented in this chapter.Supporting innova-
tions can be an uphill struggle against uncertainty, disbelief, and risk avoidance,
as well as a difficult fight against vested interests, arcane conventions and proce-
dures, and rigid institutions.
Innovation is no ‘manna from heaven’; it causes some to lose, some to gain,
economically or politically. Fear of losing market share or political influence are
major obstacles. When the development of sustainable sources of energy
appeared on the political agenda in the 1970s, the established energy companies
stayed focused (with few exceptions) on fossil fuel and nuclear energy. The use of
wind energy was considered unprofitable and was discouraged with very low
resupply tariffs. This may be rational from a corporate point of view, but it shows
once more that innovations often have to be initiated by economical and political
outsiders, who should not count on support from those with the most powers.
Uncertainty and distrust also frustrate innovation. The Whisper is, in spite of the
obvious advantages of reducing fuel consumption, co2-emission, and noise
pollution, still not in use because manufacturers of buses and transport compa-
nies are not sure about its technical reliability and commercial feasibility, and do
not want to take the economic risk. Authorities are – justifiably – not keen to
intervene directly in the market, which would upset the ‘level playing field’ for
transport and manufacturing companies. A ‘Catch 22’ situation prevents innova-
micro-foundations for innovation policy
194tion from materialising. It illustrates how the innovation process falters if the
corporate world and public authorities do not create space for experiments and do
not demonstrate the courage needed to force a breakthrough.
Moreover, market failures can hinder innovation. The failure of the Whisper and
the Energy House to succeed is partly due to the absence of positive external
effects in the calculations of market prices. The implementation of the Electronic
Patient Dossier, meanwhile, has been frustrated because the group who would
profit most from its implementation (patients) is absent from the market. The
authorities can adopt the role of regulator, market supervisor, ‘launching
customer’ or moderator, trying to create openings, but all the time it runs the risk
of stepping on economic and political land mines, ‘blowing up’ the project or at
best causing delays.
The more comprehensive the consequences of an innovation are for existing
methods and organisations, the more difficult and slower the introduction will
be. The epd is a case in point. It affects the policy, the organisation, and the finan-
cial interests of a large number of individuals and organisations. Without clear
guidance, based on clear objectives, and a consistent strategy for implementation,
a project like this can easily get bogged down in a lengthy and costly operation.
Last but not least, the government itself can become a part of the problem of
innovation. Conflicting policy objectives, lack of knowledge of the market,
limited policy horizon, risk avoiding behaviour in government bureaucracies,
and fear of loss of political prestige can lead to interventions that frustrate rather
than promote innovation.
As pointed out in this chapter, obstacles for innovation result partly from the
nature of our institutions. The organisation of the energy market, the transport
market, or health care services are not neutral entities, but reflect economic and
political interests and powers. The same applies to taxation on pollution of the
environment, investment subsidies, or rules for awarding contracts intended to
regulate the market. Innovation policy thus requires willingness to adapt the
structure of institutions if they obstruct innovation. Willingness to brave vested
interests, to give outsiders a chance, to make experiments possible, to reward risk
taking, to accept failure, to simplify procedures, to put reputations on the line,
and to pursue a consistent policy. To swim against the current, so to speak.
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1W e use the word ‘institutions’ here as defined by North (1991: 97-112): ‘Institu-
tions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and
social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos,
customs, traditions, and codes of conduct) and formal rules (constitutions, laws,
property rights).’
2S ee website Nederlandse Wind Energie Associatie: www.nwea.nl.
3I n t e r v i e w   with Linda Kamp, August 23, 2007.
4  In the province of Zeeland a subsidy on resupply to the main grid existed in the
late eighties already.
5I nterview with Gijs van Kuik, August 13, 2007.
6T h e s e   include societal costs of sick absence and disability.
7S ee website Ministerie van vws: www.minvws.nl.
8U ntil now this is restricted to personal data, medication history and applications
for electronic expenses claims. Treatment history and potential allergies are not
included yet.
9M inisterie van vws, 2007.
10 See www.minvws.nl.
11 Ministerie van vws, 2005.
12 See www.minvws.nl.
13 See website Senternovem: www.senternovem.nl.
14 Interview with Cees Collart, Augustus 6th 2007.
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The literature on ‘open innovation’ and the analysis in chapter 3 recommend
collaboration between organisations as a source of innovation. Dutch and eu
innovation policy, on all spatial levels (regional, national, supra-national), have
caught on to the trend of ‘open innovation’, in the stimulation and even organisa-
tion of collaboration, networks, and local ‘clusters’. However, collaboration is
often risky and difficult, and frequently fails. So, we need to consider the gover-
nance of collaborative relationships.
This, I propose, entails a shift in the notion of governance. Traditionally, concepts
of governance have been oriented towards control. The World Bank defined
governance as the way in which power is exercised, the undpdefined it as the
exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority, and the oecd
defined it as the use of political authority and exercise of control (Weiss 2000). In
a world of relationships and networks for collaboration, approaches of implicitly
or explicitly unilateral control, authority and power are no longer adequate,
because there is no central authority or controller. The economic perspective of
‘principal-agent’ relationships and the business perspective of ‘marketing
warfare’ have become counterproductive. In relationships of collaboration, play-
ers are each others’ agents as well as principals. Operation in markets is not
warfare but alliance management. Governance in networks must be multilateral,
in equilibration of power or dependence, somehow. If we can still talk of control,
it must be mutual control.
It is routinely recognised that collaboration requires trust. Especially in innova-
tion, uncertainty is too large to allow for complete contractual control. The
uncertainty of innovation makes it difficult to foresee what needs to be
contracted for (tasks, rights, duties, penalties, responsibilities, goals, competen-
cies), the novel opportunities that will require a change of direction, the pres-
sures that may tempt people to renege on commitments, and the avenues avail-
able to conduct such escape. Beyond technical uncertainty for contracting, there
is the more fundamental uncertainty in exploration, or in ‘interpretation’ as
Lester & Piore (2004) called it, that goals, means, and their causal connections
and resource requirements are not yet known, so that the actors involved must
take the time to deal with ambiguity, and to iterate between goals and means,
without knowing where they will wind up. Here, one must resist inclinations or
pressures to go for the quick fix of doing what is known, arguable, and measura-
ble. Acceptance and utilisation of such uncertainty in the form of ambiguity of
goals and means requires trust.
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collaboration, trust, and the structure of relationshipsHowever, while there is widespread recognition of the importance of trust for
innovation, it remains unclear what the meaning, conditions, and limits of trust
are. Trust is a complex notion that has caused much misunderstanding and
confusion. What do we mean by trust, what is the basis for it, and what are its
limits? What is the relationship between trust and incentives? The unravelling of
trust requires some space, in this book, since an understanding of trust is needed
for insight into collaboration within organisations, which forms the micro-level
structure of innovation systems (analysed in chapters 8 and 9), and in collabora-
tion between organisations, in networks and clusters, which forms the meso-
level structure of innovation systems (analysed in chapters 10 and 11). Conditions
for building trust depend on network structure.
The analysis in this chapter has implications for policy, in particular the issues of
whether and how government should pick economic activities and design or
facilitate their configuration. There are several different aspects to these issues,
which are not all taken up in this chapter. Here, we focus on the role of brokerage
in building trust between actors: is this a role for government?
7.2 trust in whom and what?
First, what is the object of trust: to what sorts of things does trust apply? We can
trust objects, but trust becomes more complex when we trust things that have
intentionality, such as people, organisations, institutions, and socio-economic
systems, in ‘behavioural trust’. In collaboration between organisations people
need to trust the people they are dealing with, as well as their organisations, and
relevant institutions, such as legal systems, that regulate ownership, contracts,
etc. If we trust our personal contacts, but they do not enjoy the support of their
superiors or associates, such trust is not very reliable. Vice versa, we can trust an
organisation, perhaps because of its reputation, but if its trusted policies are not
reliably executed by its personnel, such trust is also not very reliable. In the case
of small firms one may go a long way with trust in the owner-entrepreneur, but
in larger organisations we should be able to trust the people, the organisation,
and the relations between them. Those relations depend on the positions, roles,
and functions of people, organisational procedures, and organisational culture.
Commercial organisations may come under commercial pressures to renege on
commitments. Public organisations can be benevolent and have integrity, but
their conduct depends on politics, which can be volatile. Civil servants with high
personal integrity can be institutionally unreliable. In government there are
many horizontal, vertical, and lateral connections relevant for trust.
Within the chain of justice, distrust in one link can spill over to another. Distrust in the justice
department can affect trust in the police, and vice versa. Distrust in the police can spill over into
distrust in politics and in the rejection of the state’s monopoly on violence.
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have trust in competence, i.e., the ability to act according to agreements and
expectations. We can also have trust in intentions, i.e., the will to act ‘properly’,
with attention, commitment, and benevolence (no opportunism, no cheating, no
free riding). The distinction between competence and intentional trust is impor-
tant. When something goes wrong because of lack in competence, we react
differently from when something goes wrong because of opportunism, or
because of neglect or lack of care. In the first case we can invest in an improve-
ment of competence |(e.g., by training, advice, and help) while in the second case
we may tighten a contract. We can trust competence but not intentions, and vice
versa. If it concerns a partner in collaboration, we should be able to trust both
competence and intentions. If it is an adversary, and we do not trust his inten-
tions, we hope he is not very competent. Trust suffers from ‘causal ambiguity’: if
something goes wrong we often do not know the cause, or even what exactly
went wrong. It may be due to a mishap or accident, a shortfall of competence, lack
of attention or commitment, or opportunism. This causal ambiguity has serious
consequences for dealing with trust, and in particular for the openness needed for
trust.
When we trust the integrity of the police we would like to also trust their competence. Surveys in
the Netherlands indicate that the Dutch trust the integrity of the police, but not so much their
competence. That is better than the other way around.
7.3 trust and control
What is the difference between trust and control? Can we speak of trust when
reliable behaviour is enforced by contract or hierarchy? And if it is based on mate-
rial incentives such as profit? If we take trust broadly as the expectation that, for
whatever reason, ‘things will be all right’, despite risks of dependence, then
control is part of trust. Is this what we mean by trust, or can we speak of trust
only when control no longer applies? Are people trustworthy not because they
are forced or rewarded, but because they choose on the basis of the intrinsic moti-
vation of ethics or solidarity? Then trust is to be defined as the expectation that
‘things will be all right’ even if the partner has both the opportunity and an
incentive to cheat. Trust then entails that we do not assume that partner will
defect as soon as he sees a more profitable opportunity (‘exit’), but that he will
give us a chance to jointly improve the relationship (‘voice’).
To avoid confusion, I (Nooteboom 2002) proposed to speak of ‘trust’ and ‘trust-
worthiness’ only beyond control, and to employ the terms ‘reliance’ and ‘reliabil-
ity’ when there is also or is only control. In other words, reliance can be based on
trust, control, or a combination of the two.
Trust may be based on psychological mechanisms that move people to trust or
distrust others (causes of trust), and on a rational assessment of trustworthiness
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reasons to trust), there is never certainty concerning future conduct. This uncer-
tainty needs to be bridged by a ‘leap in the dark’ and willingness to extend the
benefit of the doubt. It is very fruitful to employ insights from social psychology
into the non- or partly rational motives and decision heuristics that lie behind
trust and trustworthiness (Nooteboom 2002), but in the following we focus on
the rational reasons why people may be reliable. A survey is given in table 7.1 In
the two columns of the table reasons for reliability are categorised on two levels:
within a relationship (micro) and in the institutional environment of the relation-
ship (macro). A distinction is made between control and trust.
One form of control is opportunity control. Here action space is constrained,
either by legal contracts (macro) or by hierarchy (micro). Another form of control
is incentive control, where actions are elicited by rewards. Within a relationship
this can be due to dependence: when a partner is more dependent he is more
inclined to take my interest to heart. This can be due to the unique value that I
offer to him, or due to his relation-specific investment in the relationship. The
latter notion, derived from transaction cost economics, suggests that the invest-
ment has (full) value only in the specific relationship, and when the relationship
breaks an investment has to be made anew in another relationship, which entails
switching costs. Also taken from transaction cost economics, the partner may
also be dependent because I own a hostage from him: something that he values
but that I do not, which I can destroy without hesitation when the partner
defects. This can take the form of a minority shareholding that may be sold in the
hostile takeover of the partner. Mostly, it concerns commercially sensitive infor-
mation that can be surrendered to a competitor of the partner. Another form of
incentive control is reputation. That also is a matter of self-interest: the partner
behaves well, because bad behaviour not only jeopardises the focal relationship,
but also the development of fruitful relationships with others.
Trust and trustworthiness need to begin where control ends, or control begins
where trust ends. Trustworthiness can be the result of established codes of
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Table 7.1 Sources of reliability
macro; institutional micro; relational
control
opportunity control contracts, law hierarchy, ‘fiat’ of management
incentive control reputation  dependence, incentives, hostages
trust values, social norms, empathy, identification,
moral imperative  routines, affect, friendship
Source: adapted from Nooteboom (2002)conduct, based on widely shared norms and values or habits. Within a relation-
ship trust can be based on values and routines or empathy developed in the
course of a relationship. Empathy is the ability to put oneself in the shoes of a
partner to gain insight into his needs, views, expectations, fears, and his strong
and weak points. This can lead on to identification, i.e., the experience of a shared
destiny and a merging of needs and goals. For fruitful collaboration, identification
is often not needed, and empathy may suffice. Trust and trustworthiness can also
emerge from sheer routinisation, where things are taken for granted because
nothing ever went seriously wrong. In identification and routinisation trust can
go too far, where flexibility disappears and opportunities for innovation are
missed.
Trust and control are both complements and substitutes. With more trust less
control is needed. But since both trust and control have their limits the one may
be needed where the other ends. Contracts should not be so strict, extensive, or
adversarial that the basis for trust is destroyed. Trust can both precede and follow
contracts (Klein Woolthuis et al. 2005). Excessive and strict contracting tends to
obstruct the development of trust, but limited contracting can set a relationship
going, and when trust grows contractual slack can increase. Without some prior
trust one may not want to take the trouble and risk of crafting a contract.
A certain balance of dependence is generally desirable. Unbalanced dependence is
not hopeless but it is more difficult to sustain. There is no need for balance in
every single determinant of reliability, and imbalance in one may be offset by
counterbalance elsewhere. If one partner is more dependent due to a greater share
in specific investments, balance may be achieved by redistributing their owner-
ship, or by offsetting the imbalance with another instrument, such as a hostage.
As discussed above, third parties or go-betweens can play important roles in the
management of collaboration. A policy question is who plays such roles: (local)
governments or private go-betweens in commercial business services? They can
offer arbitration or intermediation in conflicts, but there are more potential roles
to play. There is one aspect that merits special attention. As noted earlier, trust
suffers from causal ambiguity: when something goes wrong it is often not clear
what caused it. One can draw the wrong conclusion that the cause was oppor-
tunism, because that is what one fears most, while in fact there was merely an
accident. But how can one know? When detected, opportunism may be masked
as an error. A go-between may disambiguate the situation, explaining what really
happened, eliminating misunderstandings, and side-stepping emotions due to
fear and suspicion – which yield a vicious circle of mistrust that may escalate
beyond repair – and propose remedial actions. Go-betweens can also contribute
to an efficiënt and reliable reputation system by filtering just from unjust accusa-
tions of opportunism or incompetence and broadcasting the results. Go-
betweens may be found at banks, trade or professional organisations, knowledge
transfer agencies, or might be lawyers or private consultants.
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the room for trust depends on pressures of survival. When a manager is pres-
sured to catch any profit he can or else the firm will go down, his loyalty will
likely lie more with his firm than with external partners, and he may be forced to
renege on agreements with them.
In 1983, when due to a recession there was a strong pressure on price, in the highly competitive car
industry, car producers reneged on commitments to suppliers, which had arisen earlier in the then
fashionable rhetoric of co-makership and long-term supplier relationships. At that time I gave a
lecture to an organization of buyers and suppliers in that industry, proposing that there is both
trust and opportunism, limiting each other. I was told to be naive, talking about trust, since for
them, opportunism ruled all. A few days later I gave a similar lecture to the organization that
exploits natural gas. There, I was told I was cynical, talking about opportunism, since in their rela-
tionships with suppliers there was ample loyalty and give and take. Driving home I realized that
was easy to say, for a largely state-owned monopolist.
In chapter 3 we quoted the proposition from Lester and Piore (2004) that compe-
tition can eliminate the conditions and resources needed for the ‘interpretation’
that is part of exploration. Here we see a specific aspect of that: pressures of
competition can eliminate the trustworthiness needed for innovation.
7.4 conditions and the role of government
As indicated, there are various ways to manage relational risk for the sake of
innovation. None of them is universally the best way, and a proper mix should be
found to fit the circumstances. Table 7.1 offers a basis to find such a mix, where
one must take care that different instruments complement and do not operate
against each other. If appropriate external institutions (legal system, reputation
mechanisms, shared norms and values of conduct) are lacking, the basis must be
sought within relationships. If there is no basis for trust, one can only fall back on
control.
A classic case is Italy, where a paucity of reliable institutions and government necessitated, as a
substitute, the development of skills and traditions for networking of private relationships, for
which Italy became a proverbial success, which others then wanted to imitate even if they do not
suffer from comparable institutional weaknesses.
Contracts make no sense in countries where there is no adequate legal basis, or
where the police or judiciary are incompetent or corrupt. Contracts also make no
sense if one cannot reliably monitor contract compliance, as may be the case in
highly specialised professional work that does not yield a deliverable that can be
judged. Reputation mechanisms are not automatic, and reliable go-betweens may
not be available. If economic or political volatility is so high as to discourage a
longer-term perspective in the development of trust, or pressures of survival are
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friends, or the clan, limiting the perspective for prosperity by division of labour,
long-term investment and innovation from cognitive distance. There lies some of
the tragedy of underdeveloped countries.
Thus, a primary task for government is to maintain an adequate institutional
basis for trust and control (Nooteboom 2000). That is an important location
factor, particularly for innovation. With a weak institutional basis for ethics and
empathy, one will have to expend more on legal control and control by incen-
tives, with corresponding monitoring. That is costly and bad for innovation.
The Netherlands has a tradition of deliberation, in what has been called the ‘polder model’, as a
basis for building trust and consensus, notably between employers, employees and government, in
negotiating wages and conditions for labour, but also more widely, as part of organizational culture.
Here, the Netherlands may even be at an advantage over the us, with its more exit- and litigation-
oriented mode of operation. Deliberation for consensus can be carried to excess, in the inability to
make any move without consensus, but it does provide an advantage in the exercise of ‘voice’ for
the building of trust. Decision making may take a little longer, but execution may be faster and
more productive, also, and perhaps even especially, in innovation. There is all the more reason for
surprise that labour has not been represented in the ‘Innovation Platform’ to participate in the
deliberation on innovation policy.
While a certain amount of flexibility of relationships, in labour, ownership, and
inter-organisational relationships, is needed for innovation, present market rhet-
oric that pleads for maximum flexibility goes too far. Relationships require a
certain amount of investment in mutual understanding, intellectually and
morally, to cross the cognitive distance that is beneficial for innovation (see chap-
ter 3), and to invest in the building of trust. Such investments tend to be relation-
specific, and by the logic of transaction cost economics this entails that relation-
ships must be expected to last sufficiently long to recoup such investment. Hence
we should aim for optimal, not maximal flexibility: long enough to warrant
specific relational investment, but not so long as to produce rigidities.
Do governmental agencies have a task in the building or support of relationships
for innovation? In present Dutch policy concerning ‘key areas’ (sleutelgebieden)
the assumption is that such a role of government is indeed needed. Concerning
the policy of key areas, there is much more to be discussed, and we will turn to
these issues later, in chapter 12. Here we focus on the potential role for govern-
ment as a go-between in building trust. As indicated in chapter 1, in the discus-
sion of system failures in innovation, we can see reasons for that, and govern-
ment may then use table 7.1 for an analysis of the situation and a choice of
instruments. However, we also have reservations. In particular, governments
should ask themselves if they are the appropriate actors to play the role of go-
between. They should be aware of the dangers, which can also be seen from the
table. Governmental agencies are more vulnerable to loss of reputation than most
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chains of government, where distrust can spill over from one part to another (we
took the chain of justice for an example). Also, actions, pronouncements and
mistakes can be used as hostages, for blackmail, with the threat to publicise them
unless demands are met. Government itself is more constrained than private
actors in such naming and shaming. The government must be wary in building
trust on the basis of personalised empathy and identification, in view of the risk
of real or apparent corruption. In view of democratic accountability and trans-
parency, governments must exercise more openness, which they cannot reserve
only for preferred partners.
The possibilities are larger and the risks smaller for local/regional authorities
than for central ones. At the central government level, distrust spills over more
widely. Local government has better access to knowledge of local, historically
grown specificities and peculiarities, and is better embedded in local reputation
mechanisms. It can more easily offer a wider, integrated whole of subsidies,
permits, location, housing, and facilities of schooling and training. The down-
side, of course, is that precisely because of these conditions there is a larger risk of
clientism or even corruption. All the more reason for central government to stay
aloof and maintain supervision of decent local government.
Let us reconsider the case of Italy. The institutional shortcomings that left the need to fall back on
network relationships opened up the opportunity for the mafia to move in, and for public servants
and politicians to move in, in a mix of public and private relationships that easily evoke corruption.
Anthony Pagden (1988) gave an analysis of the breakdown of trust in the kingdom of Naples in the
17th and 18th century, when it belonged to the Habsburg empire of the Spanish king Carlos and
later Philips ii. The Spaniards opted for a cheap way to suppress the country from a distance, by
breaking down the social structure and the culture of trust. In the Netherlands they had learned
that sheer military suppression is costly and does not suffice, and that for control from a distance
the institutions of a society must be broken down, in a strategy of divide and rule. The nobility was
divided by creating a new, upstart nobility that owed its position to the Spanish masters. These
were given the task of collecting exorbitant taxes, of which they could keep a large share for them-
selves provided that it be spent on idle, economically useless and politically harmless activities such
as duelling and the defense of personal honour. This destroyed trust in the nobility as defenders
and personification of order and reliability. The critical role of the intelligentsia was destroyed by a
relaxation of academic standards. Universities were obliged to continue the teaching of Aristotelian
logic “because it never accounted for anything”. Excessive attention to religious ceremony was
required. Academic requirements for the legal degree were lowered, and the degree was also
awarded as a token of honour to the upper class, which contributed to the undermining of the legal
system. Arbitrary and unpredictable exceptions to legal rules were granted. Through the oversup-
ply of incompetent lawyers their price was lowered, yielding an excess of worthless and inconclu-
sive litigation. Social ties were replaced by mutual suspicion, and people were thrown back on
themselves or close family. Trade became a game of mutual cheating. Exchange was reduced to
immediate quid pro quo, without credit or investment. Gambetta (1988) showed how this break-
down of institutions as a basis for trust in the kingdom of Naples, which included Sicily, allowed 
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breakdown, and to fill the vacuum with their perverse order. Of course we are not suggesting that
Dutch policy for ‘key areas’ will inevitably lead to such dire conditions, but the Italian case does
yield a lesson.
In view of the difficult capability of competent support as a go-between, and the
risks for government, both local and central, it is recommended to stimulate the
emergence of commercial services of go-betweens, who may compete in the art
of the go-betweenit. Some existing ‘knowledge intensive business services’, such
as consultants in engineering, marketing, and finance are orienting themselves to
this emerging market, but there are opportunities for new services that are more
dedicated to the issues involved. The availability of reliable go-betweens
contributes to the attractiveness of a country or region.
7.5 transparency and trust
As discussed in chapter 3, in innovation one should not try to do everything
oneself, and one should utilise collaborative relationships with others, in ‘open
innovation’. That requires openness of communication, and many firms struggle
with that, from fear that others will hi-jack knowledge in order to compete. As a
result, in negotiation people are wary of openness. However, good negotiation is
looking for the solution of problems for the partner that mean much to him and
cost you little. If the partner acts in the same way, everyone benefits.
In teaching, health care, and other professional work there are increasing
complaints of an excess of control that eliminates motivation and the room for
action that are needed especially for innovation. Hence there is a call for less
control and more trust. At the same time, people demand transparency, to enable
trust, but what is the difference between transparency and control? If one
demands or imposes transparency that is proof of distrust. But can one trust
without transparency? Trust and transparency are both needed, and they both
require and enable each other, but neither can be imposed: they must be earned.
This requires ‘voice’ rather than ‘exit’ (Hirschman 1970). In voice one expresses
one’s weaknesses and fears, expecting others to react constructively, with the
commitment to jointly solve problems. Only when that fails persistently one falls
back on exit: one walks out, fires personnel, sells shares or a business, or forces a
cabinet crisis. There are several reasons for voluntary transparency, but a condi-
tion is that the partner responds constructively.
One must give room to a partner to contribute his creativity and competence.
One needs the partner because he knows or masters something that you do not.
Then is is odd to pretend that you can tell him what precisely he must do, and
that you can reliably monitor and assess his actions. Monitoring and control are
limited by cognitive distance, which, as argued in chapter 3, is needed for innova-
tion. That applies to firms as well as professional work in education and health
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terms of what concerns or worries them: what dangers or risks they see, if only
because otherwise the partners cannot know what they can do to help.
Within teams, in firms, or in inter-firm collaboration, openness requires
‘psychological safety’ (Edmonson 1999), i.e., the confidence that in reporting an
error one will not be made a fool of in public. Further conditions for innovation
in teams within organisations are discussed by Anderson and Gasteiger, in chap-
ter 9. For instance, they report that “leader-member-exchange (lmx)” in terms of
supervisor support, in relationships characterised by mutual trust and respect, is
positively related to creative and innovative behaviour (Harrison et al. 2006).
In collaboration between firms, a danger that is often seen is that in openness you
may surrender commercially sensitive information with which the partner can
become a competitor, or which via the partner can reach a competitor, so that one
cannot ‘appropriate’ the rewards for innovation. That danger may be real, but in
innovation is often smaller than people are inclined to think. The issue there is
not whether sensitive information reaches a competitor, but whether he can
absorb it, i.e., understand and implement it in his organisation, given his knowl-
edge, assets, and competencies, and whether he can achieve that so fast that
competition is still effective. If by that time the knowledge involved is already
superseded, there is no risk.
Nevertheless, in collaboration one is vulnerable to mishaps, mistakes, lack of
dedication, and opportunism. As indicated earlier, that yields causal ambiguity:
one does not know which is at work. And when something goes wrong people
may all too readily jump to the conclusion that opportunism is at play, especially
when the possible loss is large or when one has little self-confidence. In the
‘Calimero syndrome’ the weak or dependent are overly sensitive to risks and
threats, and see bad will wherever something goes wrong. Given all this, open-
ness is the best strategy. It is in one’s own interest, when something is seen to go
wrong, someone has not paid attention, or falls short in competence, to report
this to the partner and to help to preempt the problem or solve it in an early stage.
It is difficult to admit error, but in trying to hide one’s failures one jeopardises
one’s own interests. When you don’t report it, you are suspected of bad will
when later the problem appears anyway, as it usually does. If it was an error and
not bad will, why didn’t you report it when something could still be done about
it? Mistrust, once rooted, is difficult to eradicate. Trustworthiness must be
shown time and again; untrustworthiness can appear from a single action. Hence
the saying that ‘trust comes on foot and departs on horseback’. Also, by remain-
ing silent one robs oneself of the opportunity to learn, with the help of the part-
ner, and that is what counts in innovation. If one doesn’t like that, then one
should not start a partnership for innovation.
Openness cannot be imposed, and must be earned by a constructive response to
reports of error. Such reports are valuable, in order to repair the error and to
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error report is used to impose guilt and punishment, then transparency will
disappear, and we fall back on straightjackets of control that smother the move-
ment and motivation of innovation.
Trust and transparency require empathy: the ability to imagine oneself in the
position and perspective of the other, and to look at one’s own actions from
there: how would one interpret them, and how would one feel and respond?
Empathy increases the ability to collaborate, in crossing cognitive distance. It aids
insight into how to help the partner. It also reduces causal ambiguity: one can
better see what is at play when something goes wrong. One can better foresee
forced failures: how would one act if one were under the same pressures? Earlier
we noted that trust has its limits due to pressures of survival. One may be forced
to renege on commitments. However, one has the option to be open about that as
well, warning the partner in time, and explaining one’s predicament.
Earlier, we noted that the Netherlands has a tradition of deliberation, as part of
political and organisational culture. Hence, one might expect that the Dutch are
better at this game of openness, transparency, and trust. To some extent that may
be the case, but like everybody else the Dutch are caught in the momentum of
‘accountability’ on the basis of strict and measurable performance on ‘deliver-
ables’, in order to ensure control, which comes at the expense of risk taking, of
room for professional discretion and experimentation, and of openness, which
are all needed for innovation. This drive towards accountability by strict
performance measurement is accentuated by considerations of efficiency, in that
limited resources and time preclude the more time-consuming judgement of
less-easily measured forms of quality.
As scientific director of a ‘Ph.D. school/research institute’ of the faculties of economics, business
and spatial sciences at Groningen University, the present author was confronted, in the 1990s, with
the need to evaluate research performance, and pressure was high to do this simply by counting
journal publications ranked according to their impact score (average number of times a paper in that
journal is cited). One objection to this practice is that for any journal the variation of citations
around the mean is enormous. Why not count citations of specific publications, then? That also, of
course, has its problems. A more fundamental problem was that books and new journals were not
counted, while in some disciplines cases books are more important than journal articles. A mono-
graph can yield an opportunity to develop a new synthesis. The problem with books and some
journal articles was that to judge their quality one would have to have them actually read by some
competent readers, and for that there were no resources. We did it anyway, of course, but how
many institutes do?
In its subsidy programmes for innovation, in particular the ‘Framework
Programme’ (fp) for collaborative research between research organisations and
firms, the eu appears to be caught in an upward cycle of control that is becoming
tighter, in the sequence of the fifth to the sixth and now the seventh fp. Earlier
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projects. This allowed them to informally assess progress and problems, employ-
ing tacit knowledge, and to judge proposals for changes of direction as they
emerged. Increasingly, they are being pulled out, and control has become more
distant, and as a result more codified, explicit, and detailed, in the form of crite-
ria, rules, and regulations. This has the adverse effect of increasing transaction
costs, which is problematic especially for smaller firms, and reducing the flexibil-
ity needed to allow for the openness to surprises and unpredictable twists and
turns that are characteristic for innovation.1
7.6 trust and network structure
The structure of networks has effects on innovation in two ways: on the compe-
tence side (learning) and on the governance side (managing relational risk)
(Nooteboom 2004). On the competence side, the number, diversity, density,
centrality, and strength of ties have effects on the diversity and accessibility of
network nodes as sources of information, and on the flexibility of making and
breaking relationships between them. On the governance side, they affect condi-
tions for trust and control, such as monitoring, reputation mechanisms, bonding,
and coalition formation to constrain conduct.
On the competence side, Granovetter (1973) and Burt (1992, 2000) argued that
dense and strong ties are bad for innovation, and more distant, weak, and less-
dense ties generate the higher level of variety that is needed for innovation. This
is related to the notion of structural holes, discussed in chapter 3. Bridging a
structural hole taps into variety for innovation, but in dense networks there are
no promising holes left. Dense and strong ties keep players from moving out and
new players from moving in. Dense ties also yield redundancy: If you are
connected to A and to B who are also mutually connected, one of the ties is
redundant. If you only had a tie to A you could reach B through A. Since ties are
costly to set up and maintain, this is more efficient. From the analysis of cognitive
distance it follows that ties that are strong in the sense of durable and exclusive
will in due course reduce cognitive distance and the dynamic potential of the ties.
However, note that less exclusiveness yields greater density of ties. Gilsing and
Nooteboom (2005), argued that in exploration, where knowledge is embryonic,
density is needed for agents to complement their absorptive capacity (in the
collaboration with A you also use B to help you understand A), and in order to
‘hedge bets’ concerning the availability of partners. If in exploration there is
much volatility of entry and exit, you cannot count on partners yielding access to
other partners, since intermediary partners may soon drop out, so that one must
also have one’s own, direct access to other partners. This also increases density.
Furthermore, in exploration the cost of maintaining a relationship is often less,
and in any case in exploration cost matters less (than in exploitation), so that the
cost of redundant relations matters less. An environment of multifarious interac-
tions, in business and recreation, in ‘local buzz’, contributes to the utilisation of
diversity on the basis of planned and unplanned encounters (Bathelt et al. 2004).
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dense ties enhance control and bonding. Strong ties, in the sense of high
frequency and intensity, and long duration, yield shared experience, which
reduce cognitive distance, and enable the development of empathy and identifica-
tion.i Multifarious personal encounters, in sufficiently dense networks, can be
indispensable for building trust, particularly in the more personal foundations of
trust, such as empathy and identification. Business trustworthiness may be
assessed in part by how people treat a waiter during a business lunch. Second,
local ‘buzz’ may be needed for reputation mechanisms. Third, reliable, locally
embedded go-betweens may help to forge and manage collaboration – in the
bridging of cognitive distance and in the management of relational risks – and this
is supported in a milieu that is rich in diverse and frequent interaction. To gener-
ate and utilise local buzz, opportunities for collaboration, and reputation mecha-
nisms, networks in local clusters tend to be fairly dense, with many ties between
actors. Ties also tend to be fairly strong, with frequent interaction, and invest-
ments in mutual understanding and trust. As indicated earlier, the building of
mutual understanding and affinity, to cross cognitive distance and to build and
maintain trust, requires investments that are to some extent specific to the rela-
tionship. In local networks an investment in a relationship will sooner have value
in another local relationship, i.e., will be less specific, which encourages such
investments. In so far as the investment is still specific its utilisation requires
some continuity of the relationship or frequent interaction, which are both more
easily achieved at a small distance.
These arguments confirm the value of agglomerations with fairly dense and
strong ties between actors that offer related variety, at sufficient but not too large
cognitive distance. However, earlier (chapter 3), from the cycle of discovery, we
indicated the need for connections between local clusters and clusters elsewhere
in the world: an outside avenue is needed for the processes of differentiation and
reciprocation that yield exploration. Earlier, we also indicated that a lengthy and
exclusive relationship can yield too large a decrease of cognitive distance,
whereby its innovative potential dissipates. Then one needs either ‘channels’ out
of the agglomeration, a lively entry and exit of new players, or a combination of
the two, in order to replenish the variety of inspiration and insight, based on a
variety of experience, and thereby maintain cognitive distance.
In other words, agglomerations should be open, with outside connections,
domestically and internationally, to other agglomerations, and should promote
entry and exit of firms. Concerning entry and exit, Knoben (2006) showed that
for automation services the relocation of firms has a positive effect, especially in
the longer term, on the innovativeness of firms.
Concerning external linkages, similar arguments were given earlier by others
(Asheim and Isaksen 2002, Boschma and Lambooy 2002, Oinas and Malecki
2002). Here, we wonder whether perhaps universities can provide the connecting
nodes of small worlds, connecting regional innovation systems to similar
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sities are geared to access such internationally dispersed communities.
Combining the arguments for and against agglomerations with dense and strong
ties, we arrive at a theoretical argument for what is called ‘small worlds’, illus-
trated in figure 7.1. There, different local networks with high density and strength
of ties are mutually connected by less dense and weaker ties. The strong and
dense local ties enable the utilisation of opportunities for novel combinations in
related variety, flexible reconfigurations of ties, high joint absorptive capacity,
and support governance by reputation, go-betweens, and trust building. On the
other hand potential weakness due to lock-in, too much stability of ties, shrink-
ing cognitive distance, and reduced variety, are compensated by much entry and
exit of players and the weaker and less dense ties to other communities that
extend the scope of variety and maintain cognitive distance.
Gilsing and Nooteboom (2006) found this structure for Dutch biotechnology, with dense local
clusters with strong ties, around universities, supplemented with more sporadic and variable ties
with similar clusters elsewhere in the world. The importance of these external linkages is illus-
trated also by the finding that in biotechnology 70 percent of co-publications are with scholars
abroad (Ponds et al. 2006).2
In the development of small world structures we see a reflection of the phenome-
non that the economic significance of the national level declines and that of the
global and regional levels increases. That does not say that there is no role left for
the national level. Perhaps its crucial role is to see to it that the connections
between the regional and the global are indeed made.
Small world structure is also emerging in global networks of political governance (Soh 2007).
There, the locally dense clusters are national governments, but nodes should be added that 
intermediate in connections between governments, or independently connect with several or all 
of them. In the present context of business or regional networks, such nodes arise in the form of 
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Figure 7.1  Small worldsvarious intermediaries such as universities, professional service firms, and professional or trade
associations. Such intermediaries can help to create mutual understanding (crossing cognitive
distance), and can play the other roles of third parties in building and maintaining trust that were
discussed before.
As an agglomeration increases to a larger size and diversity of activities, it can
remain innovative longer without connections to outside agglomerations,
although one may expect that it may then break up into a set of smaller agglomer-
ations. In a small country, like the Netherlands, agglomerations will be smaller
than for example in the us or China, and therefore especially in a small country
the need for outside connections is great.
The analysis has implications for the dynamics of clusters or networks (Noote-
boom 2006). As discussed earlier, in the early stage of exploration one would
expect a relatively high need for local embedding, in strong and dense ties. Later,
one would expect a certain amount of disembedding, to utilise the potential of
emerging innovations in distant markets, and to achieve access to novel sources
of novelty to replenish local variety and restore cognitive distance. This raises
considerable complications for a policy for local clusters and regional innovation
systems. Are policymakers able to correctly identify the stage of development
that a local cluster is in, and are they able to implement policy on time, before
development has reached the next stage, where the policy may be counter-
productive? One may wind up furthering local embedding by the time that
disembedding is needed.
In sum, we see a trade-off between central and local/regional government in the
promotion of innovative clusters. Local/regional government is superior in its
local knowledge and governance of embeddedness and related issues of infra-
structure of various kinds – traffic, zoning, housing, education, and training –
that have an impact on knowledge ecologies. They can intervene faster to ensure
that intervention is in tune with the stages of development. However,
local/regional government may get too entangled in local embeddedness, which
may yield clientism or even corruption. There is a danger that an agglomeration
might become disconnected from other agglomerations, cutting off access to
sources of new knowledge, to complementary resources, and to distant markets.
Local or regional authorities may try to keep firms locked into their regions or
municipalities, thus obstructing healthy relocations. Central government has a
role to monitor developments and to ensure outside linkages and disembedding
where needed.
7.7 conclusions
For collaboration, trust is needed, especially in exploration, where high uncer-
tainty limits the scope for contracts and monitoring of contract compliance. To
eliminate misunderstandings concerning the notion of trust it is useful to distin-
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collaboration, trust, and the structure of relationshipsguish between reliance and trust. Reliance includes control, by contractual
enforcement or hierarchy, and by incentives of dependence, reputation, and
hostages. Trust goes beyond control, in norms and values of ethical conduct, and
in routinised conduct and personalised empathy and identification. However,
trust has its limits, which depend on pressures of survival. Intense price competi-
tion reduces the scope for trust, and hence is part of the overall obstacle that
competition may present to exploratory activities.
Trust, openness, and voluntary transparency based on trust that openness will be
met constructively, in a culture of ‘voice’, are needed to give professional work
the autonomy and room that it needs to exercise the discretion of professional
judgement, and the space needed for the experimentation of innovation. This
requires a transformation of the current drive towards accountability on the basis
of the strict measurement of ‘deliverables’ (even where the latter cannot be clearly
specified), which can be detrimental to more difficult to measure dimensions of
quality. This connects with earlier propositions, in chapter 3, concerning the
inherent unpredictability, variety, and risk of innovation (particularly of explo-
ration) that need to be accepted for innovation to take place. The connection
between innovation and organisation, including the issue of accountability and
performance measurement, particularly in the public sector, is further discussed
in chapter 8.
Concerning the structure of networks for innovation, there are arguments in
favour of dense and fairly strong ties, based upon considerations of both compe-
tence (learning) and governance (trust and control). However, such networks
carry the danger of getting locked into insufficient variety, cognitive distance that
is too short, and insufficient flexibility. To repair for that, and to complement
local dense and strong ties, weaker and sparser ties to other, outside networks are
needed, to yield a ‘small world’ structure. This yields a call for ‘open agglomera-
tion’, i.e., an agglomeration that is open to outside ties, and to the entry and exit
of players. This connects with our general call for an open innovation policy in
chapter 3. Perhaps universities can play a role in providing such connections to
outside sources of knowledge and expertise.
In current Dutch innovation policy, central government, having recognised the
importance of collaboration for innovation, in its policy for ‘key areas’ goes quite
far toward getting involved in crafting collaborative relationships between firms
and knowledge institutes. Arguments for local embedding of such collaborative
structures suggests that local authorities, with knowledge of local specificities
and attuned to local reputation mechanisms, seem to be in a better position to do
that. Also, local authorities are likely to be faster in identifying the stage of devel-
opment that a local cluster is in, and faster in implementing a policy of embed-
ding or disembedding that is appropriate to that stage of development. In view of
the complexities of collaboration and of the relational risks and complexities of
managing reliance and trust, the question is whether govermental agencies are
equipped for this task, and whether they might become too involved, with risks
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214of being taken hostage by private interests. Preferably, an increase in private
sector go-betweens will occur to fulfill the emerging demand for go-betweens in
the emerging network economy. If government does have to play the role, at least
temporarily, local government appears to be better equipped.
On the other hand, the close involvement of local/regional government in local
dense and strong ties carries a risk of clientism or even corruption. All the more
reason for central goverenment to step back and concentrate on preventing that.
Local/regional government may neglect or be unable to craft the outside linkages
needed for open agglomeration, and may be tempted to try and keep firms 
from moving out when that is best for innovation. Central government has a 
role to ensure openness and outside connections. The role of networks is further
analysed in chapter 10, and regional innovation systems are further analysed in
chapter 11.
On the national level, we might consider opportunities for the Netherlands to
develop into a ‘knowledge ecology’ for connecting exploration and exploitation
on a global scale. We refer to the notion of a knowledge ecology from chapter 3, as
a system where exploration and exploitation build upon each other, in a ‘cycle of
discovery’. The Netherlands has traditionally functioned as a place for trading,
combining, and distributing goods, as a ‘portal to Europe’, with the Rotterdam
harbor and the commercial and financial hub of Amsterdam. The question now is
whether in the future this may be extended to include more ‘trade’ in knowledge.
Other countries might find, in the Neterlands, not only logistical access but also
knowledge of knowledge and technology, and of supply and demand, for access
to Europe. The Netherlands might function as a place for meetings, of shorter or
longer duration, between explorers and exploiters of knowledge of many kinds:
scientists (keeing in mind the Netherlands’ international reputation in the fields
of agriculture, food, flowers, astronomy, and some fields of engineering, e.g.,
water management), producers and users of technology, designers and artists,
traders and businesspeople, politicians, diplomats, and lawyers (e.g., the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, located in the Hague), security (with Interpol, also in the
Hague), and certain areas of publishing. To support such a system, we would
need a variety of supporting services, in law, finance, transport, distribution,
conferencing, communications, translation, publishing, accommodation and
housing, with attractive spatial, recreational, and cultural environments, and,
hopefully, a renaissance of traditional openness to other cultures, as a ‘hub of
buzz’. Hopefully, the Netherlands might be a place where trust is built; a place
where identity matters little and processes of identification take place (wrr
2007). Perhaps the Dutch can again, even more extensively than in the past,
assume the many roles available for ‘go-betweens’ to help other people cross
their cognitive distances.
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collaboration, trust, and the structure of relationshipsnotes
1 McAllister 1995, Lewicki & Bunker 1996, Hansen 1999.
2 In figure 7.1, the thickness of a connecting line represents the strength of the tie,
with a number of dimensions: the scope or ‘multiplexity’ of the content of the tie,
the volume of business or communication involved, duration, frequency of inter-
action, specific investment in understanding and trust, and personal bonding.
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Bart Nooteboom and Robert Went
8.1 introduction
In this chapter we look at how to organise for innovation and how to innovate
organisation.
In a review of the existing literature on organisational innovation, Lam (2005)
notes that “(t)here is no single coherent conceptual framework for understanding
the phenomenon of ‘organisational innovation’. This is partly due to the great
conceptual ambiguity and confusion surrounding the term organisational inno-
vation.” To begin with, there is no consensus definition of the term organisa-
tional innovation. Lam holds that this conceptual indeterminacy may reflect the
fact that organisational innovation embraces a very wide range of phenomena.
She notes that “at present, research on organizational change and adaptation is
fragmented: the different levels of analysis are disconnected and often rooted in
different theoretical paradigms that use different research methods.” She finds
that “many innovation studies continue to be dominated by an economic
approach that allows little room for the analysis of creative change and innovation
within the organization itself”, and argues that “treating the organization as an
interpretation and learning system directs our attention to the important role of
internal organizational dynamics, actor cognition, and behaviour in shaping the
external environment and outcomes of organizational change.”
As discussed in chapter 3, a fundamental problem of innovation processes is the
combination and relation between exploration – i.e., the development of new
ways of doing things (also referred to as second order learning) – and exploita-
tion, i.e., improving on existing ways of doing things (also referred to as first
order learning). The first is necessary for companies in order to survive in the
short term, the second for their survival on a longer term. The challenge is to do
both. That is not simple, because they raise different and sometimes contradic-
tory demands. For exploitation, meanings have to be clear and stable norms, divi-
sions of labour, and know-how are all necessary. For exploration, it is necessary
to cut across existing denotations, norms, and divisions of tasks. This leads to
tensions between control and flexibility, with consequences for the motivation
and coordination of labour and the measurement of performance. The task to
nevertheless combine the two may well be the biggest challenge for companies
seeking to be innovative
In chapter 9, Anderson and Gasteiger report evidence that conscientiousness,
which is known to be the most consistent predictor of job performance was
shown to have a zero or even slightly negative relationship with creativity and
innovation (Harrison et al. 2006). The former is associated with exploitation and
the latter with exploration. Conversely, Miron et al. (2004) found that creativity
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innovation and organisationhad a significant negative effect on performance quality when the task required
accuracy and adherence to rules.
The key differences between exploitation and exploration have neatly been
summarised by Lester and Piore (2004) in table 8.1, using their own terms to
differentiate between ‘analysis’ (exploitation) and ‘interpretation’ (exploration).
More companies nowadays try to develop links downstream and upstream, with
suppliers and customers, to improve on existing products and help to develop
new applications or products (Von Hippel 2005). As discussed in chapter 7, this
requires organisational innovation in governance and in relations between
producers, users, and suppliers. A large literature has developed on collaboration
for innovation between organisations (Nooteboom 2004). Here, we focus on
organisation within firms, in relationships with users, and in collaboration
between users.
In this chapter we look at three aspects of the non-technical side of innovation.
First, we consider the deployment of people and the organisation of work, or
what is sometimes called ‘social innovation’ or ‘smarter work’. The following
section deals with the more fundamental problem of finding organisational
forms that can manage the relationship between exploitation and exploration, in
what are sometimes, rather modishly, called ‘ambidextrous organisations’. Next,




The focus is a project, with a well-defined beginning
and end
The thrust is to solve problems
Managers set goals
Managers convene meetings and negotiate to 
resolve different viewpoints and eliminate ambiguity
Communication is the precise exchange of chunks 
of information (bits and bytes)
Designers listen to the voice of customers
Means and ends are clearly distinguished, and linked
by a causal model
Source: Lester and Piore 2004, pp. 97-98
INTERPRETATION
The focus is a process, which is ongoing and 
open-ended
The thrust is to discover new meanings
Managers set directions
Managers invite conversations and translate to 
encourage different viewpoints and explore ambiguity
Communication is fluid, context-dependent, 
undetermined
Designers develop an instinct for what customers want
Means and ends cannot be clearly distinguishedwe turn to new forms of organisation that are facilitated by the use of ict and
Internet, such as user platforms, innovation by lead users, and open source
communities. Finally, given these new forms of organisation, we focus on oppor-
tunities for innovation in the organisation of government services.
8.2 deployment of people and the organisation of work
Adam Smith argued already 230 years ago that employees of companies can be a
major source of innovation.
“A great part of the machines made use of in those manufactures in which labour is most subdi-
vided, were originally the inventions of common workmen, who, being each of them employed in
some very simple operation, naturally turned their thoughts towards finding out easier and readier
methods of performing it. Whoever has been much accustomed to visit such manufactures must
frequently have been shown very pretty machines, which were the inventions of such workmen in
order to facilitate and quicken their particular part of the work” (Smith 1776).
For some years, Dutch ministries have widened attention from technology to
non-technological aspects of innovation. However, Volberda and van Den
Bosch (2005) argue that the Dutch innovation debate is still too concentrated on
technology-related macro-variables such as private investments in r&d and the
number of available scientists and engineers. Also, the Dutch Review Commit-
tee (‘Visitatie Commissie’) on Emancipation noted that the way in which 
‘social innovation’ was discussed in the Ministry of Economic Affairs was rather 
technological (Visitatiecommissie Emancipatie 2005). Until recently, not much
attention has been given to characteristics of management and organisational
features of successful organisations. This is reason for concern, because “it is
widely proven that the adaptation of concrete organizational concepts has a
paramount impact on the ability of a company to improve its performance”
(Armbruster et al. 2007). Volberda and Van den Bosch (2005) even claim that
the drop of the Netherlands in the World Economic Forum rankings of most
innovative and competitive countries , “can be mainly attributed to the present
lack” of managerial capabilities and novel organising principles in Dutch organi-
sations.
While the measurement of technical product innovations is based on commonly
agreed definitions and has methodologically been harmonised and standardised,
this cannot be said of the definition and measurement of social innovation.
Armbruster et al (2007) compare how organisational innovation has been meas-
ured in a number of surveys in Europe, and report that “different approaches lead
to significantly different results regarding the organizational innovativeness of
companies within one and the same sample.” They conclude that more research is
needed to bring “light into the black box of measuring organizational innovation
in large scale surveys”, and to develop a sound methodology for monitoring
systems of organisational innovation. Their research suggests that the following
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innovation and organisationfour elements have to be taken into account when measuring organisational
innovation:
– Complexity of social innovation: different organisational innovations have
different effects on performance indicators;
– Life-cycle of organisational innovation: because organisational innovations do
not age as quickly as product innovations, it is important to determine the
proportion of firms that has actually implemented an organisational innova-
tion (when you ask if such innovations have been implemented during the last
three years you only classify latecomers as innovative);
– Extent of use of organisational innovations: it is necessary to identify the
extent to which organisational innovations have been implemented into busi-
ness processes;
– Quality of organisational innovation: merely using labels when inquiring
about organisational innovations biases the diffusion of organisational innova-
tions across companies, thus it is crucial to know how terms like ‘team work’
or ‘total quality management’ are used in the respective company.
Notwithstanding methodological qualifications about the measurability of
organisational innovation, there are indications of a positive correlation between
organisational (or ‘social’) innovation and the success of innovation within Dutch
companies. Volberda et al. (2006) have surveyed directors and members of
management teams of 9,000 Dutch companies with more than 25 full-time
employees for their Erasmus Competition & Innovation Monitor 2005. They claim
that r&d and investment in ict accounts for 25 percent of the ultimate innova-
tion success of companies, while social innovation is three times as important 
(75 percent). ‘Social innovation’ is defined here as “the development of manage-
ment skills (dynamic management), the implementation of innovative principles
for organisation (flexible organisation forms) and the realisation of high-grade
forms of work (“smart work” and the development of talent) to improve capaci-
ties for competition and productivity” (Volberda et al. 2006). These authors argue
that a number of aspects and characteristics of flexible organisation forms,
dynamic management, and ‘smart work’ are positively correlated with the inno-
vation successes of Dutch organisations:
–F lexible organisation forms
•H igh internal speed of change
•S elf-organising by decentralised, well-built social networks
•B alancing innovation and efficiency in separate organisational units
– Dynamic management
•H i gh absorptive capacity of management
•E ntrepreneurship of visionary leadership
•C r o s s - f u n c t i o n al internal cooperation and integration
–‘ S m a r t work’
•D e v e l o pment of talent through a deep knowledge foundation
•V a r i e t y   in management expertise
•R emuneration on the basis of team performance
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social innovation are 27 percent more profitable than other companies, with 
19 percent higher growth of sales. It is not clear whether this correlation reflects
causality, and if so in which direction this causality goes.
In light of such evidence and other literature (Volberda and van Den Bosch 2005)
it is hard to understand why until recently the Dutch Innovation Platform rather
one-sidedly concentrated on technological innovation, while ignoring the non-
technological dimensions of innovation. Recently the Innovation Platform has
supported the institution of the Netherlands Centre for Social Innovation (ncsi).1
But the lack of attention to organisational aspects of innovation is still reflected
and reproduced in the composition of the Innovation Platform, which has no
trade union representatives s among its ranks. A possible motive for excluding
trade unions from the Innovation Platform is that they represent specific vested
interests, or may even be “natural enemies of process innovation” (de Nooij and
Poort 2005). But this argument apparently does not hold for other members of
the Platform, currently including representatives of the Dutch corporations
Philips, Corus, and dsm. More importantly, there are even indications that trade
unions at the central and local level may be a positive factor for the development
of new forms of work organisation and skills development in firms, and that
“European traditions of concertation between government, business, and labour
may prove to be a comparative advantage if there is a willingness on all sides to
take up these challenges” (Archibugi and Lundvall 2002). There are no indica-
tions that this does not hold for Dutch unions, which participate in the ncsi,
have collaborated in the Social and Economic Council of the Netherlands to
produce recommendations on social innovation (ser 2006), and are involved in
projects to stimulate and facilitate what they call ‘smarter work’ (fnv
Bondgenoten 2006).
“Smarter work is a long term investment. With that we deliberately take a risk. If smart work
becomes a success and in such a way labour productivity increases, there may be job losses unless
more products are sold. Still, we take this course … The trade union does however ask something
in return. In our view, a company is only healthy when it not only performs economically but also
socially” (fnvBondgenoten 2006).
‘Social innovation’ has gradually become more of an issue – or even a ‘hype’,
according to some observers (Biermans and Poort 2006) – in the Netherlands, as
evidenced by the attention given to it by employers organisations, trade unions,
and an increasing number of companies, as well as from the launch of the ncsi in
June 2006. However, without playing down the importance of this initiative, it
has to be noted that so far attention is predominantly given to the stimulation of
what is sometimes called ‘operational excellence’, i.e., improving on the way
exploitation is organised.
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innovation and organisation“fnvBondgenoten, the largest trade union in the Netherlands, has begun to stimulate the concept
‘draw up your own roster’ with among other things conferences, software packages and pilot proj-
ects. The basic idea is that employees draw up their own roster, within the precondition that
demands are being met for the number of employees needed to do the work. Employees thus can
get a better match between their working hours and private life and get more responsibilities, while
experience in Sweden shows that labour productivity will be increased” (fnvBondgenoten 2006).
Representatives from the biggest Dutch trade union in the market sector (fnv
Bondgenoten) and from one of the biggest Dutch employer’s organisations
(awvn) estimate that so far in just approximately 50 out of 800 collective agree-
ments in the market sector have taken up some element(s) of social innovation.
Employees and employers will have to cooperate and interact within the existing
structures to further social innovation and to foster the necessary good labour
relations, space for experiment, possibilities to learn and develop talents, and
diversity of teams. Resistance and obstacles to such changes may be vast, and can
come from layers of management, as a consequence of prevailing short-termism,
a fixation on measurable targets (‘spreadsheet management’), or a fear of loosen-
ing control mechanisms. Although they are of course not solely responsible for
organisational innovation, managers do have the main responsibility to initiate
the desired innovative processes and changes, to clear the way for experiments,
and to create a climate in which employees do not have to fear making mistakes.
But resistance to social innovation may also come from employees, out of (under-
standable) fears for insecurity and job losses when routines and traditions are
challenged. From an analysis of aggregate data the oecd (2002) concludes that
the cross-market interactions between innovative activity and labour market
policies and institutions are “complex”, and that “there seems to be a U-shaped
relationship between innovative activity and labour market regimes, defined by
different combinations of Employment Protection Legislation (epl) and coordi-
nation in industrial relations.”
The organisation of exploration for new applications and products is even more
challenging and demanding than aiming for ‘operational excellence’, and at least
as important in the longer term. As Volberda et al. (2006) have argued, both over-
exploitation of existing opportunities via reorganisations, cost cutting, and short-
term accomplishments (‘exploitation herd behaviour’) and over-exploration, by
exaggerating the importance of local changes and oversensitivity for hypes and
fashions, are dysfunctional for companies, leading to either competence or
modernisation traps. How exploitation and exploration can be combined in a
productive and sustainable way is therefore a challenge for every company.
“Lely Industries in Maassluis (250 employees) is a global market leader in milking robots and also
produces machines for working the soil for dairy farmers. The Lely Group has a separate company –
Lely Technologies – where ten to fifteen engineers permanently work to develop new innovative
products. Lely Technologies is strictly separated from the rest of the company, so that the creative 
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224and innovative processes do not interfere with the production phase, which demands much more
discipline.
Bronckhorst High-Tech in Ruurlo (250 employees) is a European market leader in flow meters. No
less than 45 of its employees work in the company’s r&d department, and 15 percent of annual
sales is invested in r&d and the development of new products. r&d employees at Bronckhorst
High-Tech are allowed to work one day per week on their own projects, the so-called ‘Friday after-
noon projects’” (Van der Geest and Heuts, 2006).
Although exploration is indispensable for the survival and continuous renewal of
companies and economies, it generally attracts much less attention than exploita-
tion. A great number of comparative and case studies have been made to try and
find the ‘Holy Grail’ for the correct balance between exploitation and explo-
ration, but as we will see in the next section there is no general answer or magic
solution to this problem.
8.3 ambidextrous organisation
In the past, whether companies were oriented towards exploitation or explo-
ration was dependent on the phase in the life cycle in which the company or
sector of industry was situated. That no longer holds true. Everywhere now
companies have to carry out exploitation to survive in the short term, plus explo-
rative activities for their survival in the longer term. Firms may use external
networks to externalise exploratory or exploitative innovations, thus outsourc-
ing potential problems associated with the tension between exploitation and
exploration (Nooteboom 2000; Jansen 2005). Combining exploitation and explo-
ration may well be the biggest challenge for companies (and organisations in
general), and is far from being a trivial exercise. The fashionable term for an
organisation combining the two is ‘ambidextrous organisation’. Note that this is
not a solution or formula, but a mere label of the problem.
Exploitation and exploration build on each other, and are dependent on highly
educated knowledge workers and the shop floor. Li et al. (2007) conclude from a
review of organisational learning and innovation studies from the last 15 years,
that exploitation and exploration are complementary rather than substitutes for
each other: extreme explorations (exploitations) score high (low) in all dimen-
sions of knowledge search and recombination, and both kinds of extreme situa-
tions are rare. Exploitation and exploration require different competences, organ-
isation, and mentalities. This has major implications for the organisation of
companies in general, and for human resource management, motivation, and the
coordination of work in particular. Research by Birkinshaw and Gibson (2007)
shows that “ambidextrous individuals” can be very useful for companies,
because they tend to “take the initiative and are aware of opportunities beyond
their own jobs; ambidextrous individuals co-operate, seeking opportunities to
combine their efforts with those of others; ambidextrous individuals are brokers
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taskers.” Table 8.2 schematically summarises a number of key differences
between exploratory and exploitative innovations.
Small firms have fewer resources for innovation, in the form of specialised
personnel, absorptive capacity, slack time, and resources for r&d and experimen-
tation. However, due to a smaller size, fewer hierarchical levels, less separation
between management, work, and customers, and greater informality they do
seem to have an advantage in becoming ‘ambidextrous’ by solving the problem of
combining exploitation and exploration. The following case gives an example.
“otb, short for ‘Only the Best’, run by owner-manager Ron Kok in Eindhoven, the Netherlands,
develops and produces a variety of new, mostly high-tech products. One entails the use of polymer
sheets as the substrate for solar cells, which increases their energy efficiency and flexibility, and
reduces their price. Second is a fully automated production ‘street’ to produce the cells, yielding a
low production price. At otb, developers and producers are sitting in the same large space, at tables
adjacent to each other. There are frequent hassles, heckles, and quibbles between them. When
those accumulate, Ron Kok takes both sides out into the country, in an informal setting, where
under his leadership they thrash out disagreements until solutions are found. Ron is a bit
concerned about what will happen when his firm grows in scale, with increased specialisation of
labour, and when separation of the two groups may be unavoidable” (Kok, author interview 2007).
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Table 8.2 Exploratory and Exploitative innovation








are radical innovations and are designed to
meet the needs of emerging customers or
markets
new designs, new markets, and new distribu-
tion channels
require new knowledge and departure from
existing knowledge




are incremental innovations and are
designed to meet the needs of existing
customers or markets
existing designs, current markets, and
existing distribution channels
build and broaden existing knowledge
and skills
refinement, production, efficiency, and
execution
short-term benefitsIn larger organisations, the problem of combining exploration and exploitation is
expected to be particularly difficult when exploitation forms the overriding
strategic task of the organisation, and the structure of exploitation is highly
systemic, i.e., there is a complex of many components that are densely and tightly
connected. This means that most component activities are constrained by narrow
tolerances on interfaces with other components. By definition, this yields little
room for the experimentation or trial and error that is needed for exploration.
When you are caught in many strong ties there is little room to move. Small devi-
ations from the established order reverberate in the system, yielding widespread
upheaval and inefficiency. This systemic feature is generally accompanied by a
corresponding culture of conformance to established roles, tasks, and correspon-
ding standards, and precision in the execution of work. Then, there is pressure to
separate exploration and exploitation, and allow for more looseness, variability,
and ambiguity in a separate unit for exploration. Then the problem arises of how
to connect the two, so that exploration is inspired by experience in exploitation,
yields results that are exploitable, and exploitation is willing and able to absorb
the results. Here we present an illustration of an attempt to solve the problem.
“The ‘Central Book House’, in the Netherlands, buys and supplies books for the book trade. It has
three core divisions, which need to be tightly integrated:
1. the assortment of books, which must offer a high degree of differentiation to customers, in
terms of composition and size of packages;
2. logistics for efficient and fast delivery;
3. information technology to enable 2 and to collect and provide strategically vital information as
to what books are read by whom where at what price, for 1 and for customers (both publishers
and shop keepers).
Clearly, efficient exploitation is crucial, and tends to predominate. But exploration also is impor-
tant, to keep up with developments in reading habits, technologies of information processing and
dissemination, changes in publishing. Due to the systemic coherence of the three divisions, inno-
vation must occur in step. To achieve this while maintaining efficient exploitation, the following
solution was found. A permanent r&d team was instituted, with ten people, recruited at different
moments (two new people every half year), from the three different departments, and moving out
after two years, but not necessarily to their own, previous division, not knowing to which division
they would go. Moving out from exploration, back into exploitation, they carry responsibility for
implementing innovations they helped to develop.
One can see the advantages. One is that exploration is based on experience in exploitation, and is
conducted with a view to the expected responsibility for implementation to be taken on later. The
different divisions each contribute both to exploration and its implementation, to protect systemic
coherence. There is turnover in the team to maintain variety and ongoing influx of experience from
exploitation. Since people may not return to their original division. Not knowing to which division
they will go, they have no incentive to protect the interests of their ‘own’ division, keeping things
easy for ‘their’ people. At any one moment there are recent and seasoned members of the develop-
ment team.
Are there problems? It seems that the assumption in the system is that the cycle of innovation is 
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ment in the division he joins, at least not an innovation to which he contributed. Is this an incentive 
or a disincentive to see to it that something new comes out within the two years? What if people are
valuable but do not want to move out of exploration and back into exploitation, and if their competen-
cies support that preference? What guarantees that one will always find people who have the skills
and interest in both exploitation and exploration? What guarantees are there that rivalries between
the divisions will not be carried into the development process? Is this prevented by the prospect 
of having to move into another division after the two years in exploration?” (Nooteboom 2000).
By contrast, when exploitation is already exploratory, with custom made prod-
ucts for a diversity of customers, with needs that are diverse and changing, and
the product is produced in highly autonomous teams, with limited or weak
connections to a back office or other production teams, then the problem may
disappear. This yields a strong proof of the problem: if even here there is a prob-
lem of combining exploration and exploitation, the problem is indeed pervasive.
A corresponding case is the following.
“The consultancy firm Arthur Andersen, when it still existed as an independent firm, was known
as a paradigm example of a flexible firm. Its consultants were highly autonomous, employing their
individual knowledge, skill and creativity to provide custom-made advice. Exploration was auto-
matic, and built into day to day practice. However, a problem appeared with regard to exploitation.
Consultants did not share their experience and new ideas, because there were no incentives to do
so, and consultants also saw each other to some extent as competitors within the firm for careers
and good customers. To remedy this, a computer-supported pool of ideas was instituted, to which
consultants were encouraged to contribute their ideas on the basis of an incentive system. At first,
part of their remuneration was related to the number of ideas contributed to the pool. Later, this
was shifted to a reward proportional to the number of times their ideas were picked up from the
pool by colleagues, not unlike the shift in the evaluation of scholars from their number of publica-
tions to their number of citations. This, however, caused a problem for exploration. The common
pool required a certain minimal amount of standardization of concepts and procedures in a
thesaurus. That fixity hampers exploration. The more radically new ideas would not fit established
meanings in the thesaurus, and would hence be neither used nor rewarded. To remedy this, a
committee was instituted to collect ideas that did not fit, and to periodically revise the thesaurus to
assimilate them. This still caused a delay in the reward for radical novelty that also had to be
compensated” (Nooteboom 2000).
While the solution at Arthur Andersen was formal and top-down, an alternative,
more informal and bottom-up way of dealing with the same problem was devel-
oped by another consultancy firm, Cap Gemini, as follows.
Here, it was recognised that it was in the self-interest of consultants, without the need for any extra
rewards, to share good ideas and experiences with colleagues, since the improved quality of advice
would itself yield better performance and more and better clients, and the rewards attached to 
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out to share ideas. Problems of free-ridership were avoided by social control, in the form of exclu-
sion of free riders from the group in case of lack of competence or commitment. However, a prob-
lem now arose for exploitation because groups saw each other as competing, which blocked
exchange of ideas and experience, but now not between individuals but between groups. To avoid
this, management had to intervene by periodically disbanding the groups to effect diffusion
between them.2
Another approach is to engage in ‘stage specialisation’. Here one focuses on one
stage of the innovation cycle, and seeks partners who engage in the other stages.
Thus we can have firms that specialise in generating novel innovations; in testing
them; in bringing them up to large scale and systemic, rationalised production,
and global distribution; or in differentiating them. This stage specialisation may
be more important and fundamental than specialisation in specific products or
markets. Differentiation and to a greater extent reciprocation, accommodation,
and early consolidation require disintegrated structures, and here industrial
districts have a comparative advantage over tightly integrated large corporations.
Different firms that are specialised in different stages can enter a relation of
symbiosis.
An example is the relation between small, diverse, specialised biotechnology firms and large phar-
maceutical firms. The first yield the novel combinations and the second yield the lengthy process of
regulatory approval of new drugs, the systemic, large scale production and marketing of novel
products, and the spread of risk across a portfolio of products.
However, it can be very difficult to separate exploration and exploitation
between firms, or even within an organisation.
Brusoni (2006) gave an example in the chemical engineering industry. He distinguishes between
‘division of labour’ and ‘division of knowledge’. While chemical plants are highly modular, and
hence decomposable, and hence partially outsourceable, there are different ways of doing decom-
position, with important differences in outcomes. The complexity lies in the coupling between
systems of reaction processes, separation processes, energy, and control and safety. To optimise
design requires a thorough understanding of systemic effects of alternative decompositions. Given
a choice of decomposition, the elements can be outsourced, but the capability to decompose and
synthesize elements in different ways cannot. As a result, some re-integration of capability and
activity took place after chemical producers had fully outsourced the production of chemical plants.
Pisano (2000) gave an example in biotechnological process technology compared to chemical
synthesis technology, in (1) ... theoretical understanding of the basic processes (2) ability to
precisely and fully characterize intermediates and final products, and (3) knowledge of the second
order effects of scaling up from experimental to operational production. As a result, “... biotechnol-
ogy process development relies … on trial and error and iteration of the process design after the 
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zations, the plant was viewed as an integral part of the development process and a critical venue for
experimentation. Others kept the plant relatively isolated from the development process; prefer-
ring instead to do most development in the laboratory and pilot plant” (op cit: 137).
One company had previously focused on product development, and had mostly outsourced
process development, and now started to integrate the entire development process. Then they ran
into the familiar problem, in connecting exploration and exploitation, of “... the huge gulf between
the interests of research scientists focused on finding novel products and the capabilities required
to get a process up and running in an actual plant” (op cit: 138). The company next instituted a
process development group, where a pilot plant is integrated with the commercial manufacturing
plant. This required the build-up and integration of a broad base of scientific capabilities in process
technology disciplines. For that, they could build on the knowledge accumulated by the initial
process development group. A second company resisted disruptions of ongoing manufacturing for
the sake of development, not to disturb the continuity of clinical testing to satisfy demands from
regulatory agencies, and face d the consequences of lack of integration between exploration and
exploitation. A third company went further in separating production and development, by
outsourcing, but ran into the problem of sticky knowledge, with the contractor lacking the
subtleties of process knowledge.
A similar problem was identified by Appleyard et al. (2000), in the semiconductor industry. 
There also, product innovation is highly intertwined with process innovation,“... requiring that 
the receiving fab (fabrication unit) have an equipment set that is identical to that on which a new
process is developed in the development facility. Even stringent requirements for equipment dupli-
cation... cannot eliminate all significant differences” (op cit: 189). A solution was attempted, here
also, in integrating development in a hybrid development/production facility where the pilot is
eventually implemented at a commercial scale, and was transferred only then to a operational high-
volume production facility, with substantial personnel rotation and equipment duplication (op cit:
198), and the process remains in parallel operation in the hybrid facility for at least 12 months after
the transfer, as a back-up for any unforeseen problems of transfer. However, a remaining problem 
of this arrangement lies in disincentives for experimentation in the manufacturing environment,
which may eventually impair its performance (op cit: 201).
These examples serve to illustrate how difficult it may be to separate exploration
and exploitation, within and between firms, and the need, in that case, to estab-
lish processes that connect them. This is typically supported by rotation of
personnel across the two to support mutual understanding and ability to collabo-
rate. Here we are back at the type of solution implemented by the Central Book
House.
A further, more radical way to deal with the problem is not to be entangled in
production at all, but to act as an orchestrator of the productive activities of
others. ict increasingly yields the opportunities for this. The orchestrator
conducts exploration by flexibly exploiting the productive competencies of
different companies, in shifting configurations, and thereby tries to escape the
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less fixed systems for efficient production is separated and hived off to other
players. But even here, the focal, orchestrating firm must be careful to both main-
tain and develop his core competence of orchestration.
Quinn (1992) gives the example of a company in custom-made asics(Application Specific Inte-
grated Circuits). They interface with clients directly by means of ict, to determine functional spec-
ifications. They then employ their own specialized software to convert this into photo masks,
which are sent by ict to a company in Japan for etching, next to a company in Korea for dicing and
mounting, next to Malaysia for assembly, from where the chip is flown directly to the customer. A
similar example in sports shoes is Nike. Another example in fashion clothing is Benetton: it also
performs the task of orchestration, by means of ict, of a decentralized network of individual
producers and retailers.
Concerning this case, the question is: If orchestration becomes easy, with accessi-
ble design software and coordination of producers by internet, couldn’t
customers take over? This is precisely what has been proposed by Von Hippel
(1999, 2005), and has meanwhile happened in the custom semiconductor indus-
try (Von Hippel 2005: 16). Here we see the mergence of platform organisations,
where producers offer modules for users to configure or develop products to their
individual preferences. This is further discussed in the next section.
8.4 platforms
Now we turn to novel forms of organisation, enabled, in particular, by ict and
Internet. In platform organisations, producers offer a platform of modules from
which users can configure their own goods or services or can route their ques-
tions or submit information or a platform for outsourcing, where potential
suppliers can scan and analyse requirements and submit their tenders. Platforms
are not necessarily restricted to the products of a single producer.
A company like e-Bay, for instance, hosts many different types of producers, some fully-fledged
businesses, some family firms, and others amateurs or enthusiasts.
In the cycle of discovery, the platform principle offers product differentiation by
users in the form of customised configuration. It does not include the reciproca-
tion stage of the cycle of discovery. As shown by Von Hippel (2005), some
producers go further and offer users ‘toolkits’ for exploration, which offer means
for product-design, prototyping, and design-testing. For example: software for
users to design their own chips. Here, users can reciprocate existing elements
offered by producers with elements added from their idiosyncratic context of use.
We can analyse organisation for innovation and innovation of organisation, also
for goals other than product innovation, for example increased efficiency. Here,
231
innovation and organisationwe will first focus on the latter, and later we will return to organisation for inno-
vation. Recall the analysis, in chapter 2, of total factor productivity. We reported
attempts to explain differences between the us and the eu as a result of the use of
ict. While the analysis was not entirely conclusive, there was an indication that
the us has achieved higher productivity growth on the basis of more advanced
use of ict. Perhaps this lies in the utilisation of ict for new forms of organisation
that increase productivity. And indeed, many organisations, not least in public
services, can be innovated to make large improvements, especially in the effi-
ciency, speed, responsiveness, and customisation of service delivery. A number
of examples are found in an investigation, sponsored by the ukNational Accoun-
tant’s Office (nao 2004), of innovations in the public sector.
The fundamental logic of platforms lies in the asymmetry of knowledge between
users and producers (Von Hippel 2005). Users have idiosyncratic and highly tacit
knowledge of their experiences and their needs, while producers have knowledge
and experience in providing solutions to needs. Transfer of need information
from users to producers, in market analysis, is costly, partial, reductive, slow, and
faulty. It is costly in transaction costs of selecting potential customers and
communicating with them. It is partial in that much of the knowledge is tacit and
for that reason difficult to identify and capture. It is reductive in that it tends to
yield averages that filter out the outliers in experience and ideas that may be the
most interesting and innovative. It is faulty because in interpretation information
is added and knowledge is transformed to fit the absorptive capacity of the
producer. The totality of these problems has been labeled as ‘stickiness’ of infor-
mation (Von Hippel 1999). As a result, in terms of communication and interpre-
tation it is much more efficient to leave information on needs where it originates,
and to supply modules from which users can configure their own custom-made
product. This presumes, of course, that the product modules yield the required
potential, and can indeed be consistently combined in unforeseen ways, and that
users know how to configure them. For the latter, one will need to supply
instructions, and they, in turn, may need to be customised for different users. For
this, one needs continual feedback on user experience, in the development of
modules and instructions. Some products can be more easily broken down into
modules than others.
The tipping point between traditional forms and the platform lies in the relative
complexity of user- and producer innovation. User production is more efficient
when user information is more complex, with greater variety of user needs, and
more sticky, than producer information on how to configure a product. The logic
applies not only for the initial configuration of a product, but also for its subse-
quent maintenance and repair. For that, producers would have to keep records of
what exactly it supplied to a given customer, including any special parts, while
users have direct access to that information (Von Hippel 2005: 49).
In service firms there is a familiar distinction between the front-office where the
contact with customers takes place, in researching, marketing, and delivering
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happen (for example, providing itand accounting systems, managing human
resources, and investing in production). Traditionally, for many services the
front-office is large and closely involves customers in interaction with the firm,
who in many cases have to be physically present, at a desk or treatment facility.
Now let us consider the switch from the traditional form to the platform princi-
ple, where firms no longer deliver fully specified products, but instead provide
access to internet-based facilities such as databases or admission to particular
networks. This is illustrated in figure 8.1. Customers can then use these data-
bases, websites, or other facilities in a wide range of different ways, which the
provider firm does not have to fully anticipate in the initial design of the service.
This kind of change builds on customer self-service and co-production of services,
allowing the firms involved to shrink down their front-office – because they are
no longer seeking to deliver fully-specified traditional services and interact less
with customers. In these kinds of firms the back office also grows relatively in
size, because the extended high-tech facilities involved, and the development and
improvement of modules for customers to configure, and requisite toolkits, need
close support and continuous technical innovation and development.
8.5 innovation by lead users
If it is true that exploration requires exploitation as a source of insight from expe-
rience with successes, failures, and new opportunities, as argued in chapter 3, and
that exploitation is largely conducted by users, including citizens that use
government services, then it follows that users and citizens are a source of inno-
vation, as has been argued by Von Hippel (2005). This is the case, in particular, if
a ‘lead user’ connects a familiar field of application with an unfamiliar but still
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officerelated one. Thus, for more radical innovation one has to look for lead users
beyond one’s present customers, in different but relevantly related areas or
‘analog fields’ as Von Hippel (2005: 134) calls them.
An example in the car industry is that of braking system for airplanes, which in their landing make
much more extreme demands on the brakes than cars. From this connection the car industry adop-
ted the abs system (antilock braking system).
In addition to sources of knowledge and experience, there are other arguments for
user-led innovation. Producers may be wary about making custom-made prod-
ucts with specialties or add-ons that they cannot easily guarantee, in terms of
reliability and safety, for fear of incurring legal risks of liability and affecting their
product’s image for reliability, while for users it is up to them to decide what
risks they will take (Von Hippel 2005: 50). A crucial condition for user-led inno-
vation is that it is freely offered to other users, either directly or through a
producer. If users had to separately develop each novelty, there would be a lot of
duplication and waste, with different users repeatedly developing the same inno-
vation.
While innovation of services is easiest, innovation of physical products is also
possible, though it has additional requirements. In particular, after innovation by
users, the product under development needs to pass to producers, for them to
bring in their solution-related knowledge, and to physically produce the product
or its components (Von Hippel 2005: 126). However, even for physical products
producers can go a long way in providing users with tools and help. Increasingly,
product prototypes can be designed and tested virtually, in computer simulation.
Producers can provide help in machine-tooling parts, or in physical prototyping
and testing, by opening up their facilities for users. In terms of figure 8.1, in plat-
form organisations the volume of activities of users further increases, and the
back-office of the firm shrinks.
But where does the profit come from and to whom does it go? Why would users
be willing to make development efforts without recouping them in profit? Why
would they freely yield the fruits of their labour to other users, or to producers?
Von Hippel (2005) specifies a variety of reasons. One is the intrinsic pleasure and
satisfaction of developing something new and seeing it work. A second is the
prestige that diffusion of their achievement yields. A third is that the end result
for them is still faster, cheaper, or better fitting to their needs than alternatives.
Users may still need producers for sticky solution knowledge not available in the
toolkits provided to users, and, as indicated, for physical production they still
need producers. A fourth is that by offering their contribution to a wider field of
users they benefit from economies of scale or scope (or network externalities), in
production and distribution. A fifth is that by offering their contribution to
others, those proceed to improve upon it, which, when others reciprocate in
openness, benefits them further.
micro-foundations for innovation policy
234Why would producers play this game? As indicated, they may benefit from
sticky and user information on needs, and on unexpected possibilities, which
arise, in particular, from connections between the product and idiosyncratic
needs or sources of knowledge and insight into possibilities from novel combina-
tions.
An example given by Von Hippel (2005) is a cross-country biker who also was an orthopedic
surgeon, and from that expertise developed a new shock-absorbing saddle to facilitate his particular
preference for bike-jumping.
Von Hippel (2005: 126) summarises options for producer strategies as follows:
–p r oduce user-developed innovations for general commercial sale;
–o f f e r   a custom manufacturing service to specific users;
–s e ll kits of product-design and/or ‘product platforms’ to ease innovation-
related tasks;
–s e ll products or services that are complementary to user-developed 
innovations (and are more difficult or less efficient for users to develop or
produce).
8.6 open source communities
In open source communities, a further step is taken: here there are no longer
separate producers, and users together take care of production. In terms of figure
8.1, both front and back offices of firms virtually disappear, apart from marginal
coordination activities, and only the space of user action remains. This arises
especially in the production of non-physical products, such as software (e.g.,
Linux, Apache, Sendmail) or information (e.g., Wikipedia), for two reasons.
First, one no longer needs producers with specialised hardware, and users
together have the solution knowledge needed in the system. Second, without
physical goods one can use the full potential of the Internet and does not need
anything beyond that. Users produce ongoing additions or improvements to an
existing system, enabled, when needed, by free access to the underlying source
code. The condition usually is that they attach their name to the contribution,
their contribution can be used and modified freely by other participants, and that
they may not incorporate the contributions from others in products they sell.
This is guarded by a ‘General Public License’ (gpl), supported by internet mailing
lists (iml) whereby infringements are tracked and communicated. Why would
users produce without payment? The reasons are mostly as indicated earlier:
intrinsic satisfaction, reputation and professional recognition, and collective
improvement of the system they use.
Lakhani & Wolf (2005; Von Hippel 2005: 60) studied individuals (n = 684, response rate 34
percent) who had contributed to open source software projects, asking for their main reasons, and
found that for 45 percent one of their top three reasons was intellectual stimulation, and that for
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that participation in the open source project was their most creative experience or as creative as
their most creative experience.
Why would people useproducts from such communities? Are they reliable?
“[Sixty-seven] percent of all active internet websites are supported by the open source programme
Apache, and 80 percent of all e-mail traffic is enabled by the open source product Sendmail.
Amazon, the New York Stock Exchange, ibm, the municipality of Munich and the Brazilian central
government use open source software” (Wendel de Joode 2005: 221).
The basic source of added value that cannot be obtained otherwise is this: A
system of user-producers that attracts contributors by self-selection opens up to
expertise and ideas that no central planner or controller would ever think about
and would not know where to find. In the Linux lore: “Many eyeballs make all
bugs shallow”. How can independent contributions come together in a consistent
whole? This requires modularity, with independent ‘patches’ attached to each
other, on the basis of standardised interfaces or connections developed by
specialised developers and distributors.
Why isn’t the system affected by misuse and bad quality from opportunistic or
incapable contributors? From his study of the Linux and Apache communities,
Wendel de Joode (2005) proposed the following logic. Particularly competent and
useful contributions get nominated to a ‘hall of fame’. Incompetent or low-qual-
ity contributions do not survive for long, and are quickly identified, reported, and
replaced. This yields a penalty, in loss of face or reputation. Blatantly bad behav-
iour may even be relegated to a ‘hall of blame’, and may get punished by getting
‘spammed to death’ by insulting e-mails. The user community forms an efficient
reputation system. Consequently, contributors make an assessment of their capa-
bilities, in a trade-off between aiming at a contribution with high impact, with
fundamental improvements, wide repercussions, and hence visibility, but higher
chance of failure, and low-impact, low-risk contributions. They select the most
difficult task they can still handle. Thus, the system yields an efficient allocation
of talent. This is not unlike scholars trading off high-prestige journals with low
chance of acceptance of a paper, and lower-level journals with a higher chance of
acceptance. Thus, with a variety of capability the system yields an automatic,
unplanned, emergent division of labour, with both incremental and radical
improvements, and limited failure.
In case of disagreement on content or quality, no time is spent on meetings or
committees to deliberate and make a judgment. People can freely develop parallel
approaches to existing ones, thus creating redundancy. The resulting complexity
and problem of search and selection among alternatives is tackled on the basis of
‘tags’ attached to alternative patches, which serve as a basis for selection. These
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which a patch is used. Also, distributors make selections among alternatives in
packages they offer. To get a contribution accepted and used in the community,
there is not only an incentive for substantive quality, but also for elegance and
ease of understanding. In sum, the issue is solved by competition: bad contribu-
tions fall into disuse by an increasing majority of the community. In other words,
this is an evolutionary system, running on wide variety generation, with room
for redundancy, plus survival in competition. Here we are back at chapter 3,
where we argued that an evolutionary system is a paradigmatic system for
combining exploitation and exploration.
There is also a phenomenon of ‘swarming’: in their contributions, participants
tend to latch on to high reputation areas and the activities of high-prestige
members, to ride on the tails of their success. Thus, prestige is self-reinforcing:
contributors with better reputations attract more followers and thus further
improve their reputations. This is called the Matthew effect, and appears also in
citations of scientific publications.3 This process will often cause the convergence
to an emergent dominant style and ethic that subsequent new entrants will have
to adopt. Could this convergence yield conservatism, in waves of fashion and
idolatry, yielding a reduction of cognitive distance, with an excess of exploitation
at the expense of exploration? The dynamics of the structure of open source
communities has been simulated in agent-based computational modeling by
Muller (2006). He confirmed such processes of convergence and cumulative
reputation. However, disagreements and radically new ideas that are incompati-
ble with the established scheme of things can lead to ‘forking’, where a commu-
nity splits up into different ‘schools’ that proceed to compete. That may be seen
as a waste, but also as an opening up to exploration. Such forking generally
requires a leader within the community who deviates from other leaders but has
enough of a reputation to take along a following in the forking process. Newcom-
ers that have not yet accumulated enough of a reputation will have to either latch
on and conform to existing leaders or face a long and lonely struggle out in the
deserts of dissent.
One difference between the Apache and the Linux communities is that the former had several lead-
ers while the latter had one central leader. The former is more likely to yield forking.
Here we can link back to the cycle of discovery from chapter 3. Deviations may be
triggered by shifts to new contexts of application, with new types of
users/contributors, generating new challenges, opportunities, and hints for
novel elements and directions. In evolutionary terms, new schools of thought
may then generate their own selection environments, with new communities to
generate and select contributions from a different perspective. In science, new
schools of thought may set up their own journals as a dedicated selection envi-
ronment for papers.
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measures concerning entry and exit, acceptance or rejection of contributions,
division and coordination of labour, and conflict resolution? Wendel de Joode
noted that sometimes (e.g., in the case of Linux) officially there are formal instru-
ments of governance, such as entry selection, voting systems, and project leader-
ship, but in fact they are not used because they turn out not to be needed (some-
what to the surprise of the community itself). The formal instruments that are in
operation are the General Public License, the internet mailing list, and the assign-
ment of names to contributions. Those appear to suffice for self-organisation. Is
this self-organisation really so simple, reliable, and generally valid? A counter-
example is the development of Wikipedia, which according to Mateos-Garcia and
Steinmueller (2006) was as follows.
Wikipedia was launched in 2001, and started as completely open, with only a small number of
essential rules: non-ownership of contributions, i.e., the right for others to create a modified
version, use of the Wiki software (for creation and editing pages, and interlinking between pages),
the requirement of a neutral, nonpartisan point of view, and several stylistic conventions. However,
publicity and success of Wikipedia generated an influx of participants that included a surge of
problematic users and abuses of the system, such as vandalism, spam, partisan points of view,
pursuit of a political agenda, self-promotion, commercial gain, and lack of respect for expertise.
This evoked interventions by the editor to selectively block entry, withhold ip, protection of pages
and article tracking. An arbitration committee was instituted to solve ongoing disputes between
members. However, these interventions were perceived as going against the anti-authoritarian,
egalitarian ideology of the beginning. Yet, the interventions were insufficient to quell complaints
about incorrect or libelous content in articles. This led to further but highly contested requirements
for users to register and login as a condition to editing articles, and the proposed creation of
‘stable/developmental’ branches of the project. A new problem appeared where people entered
under a false identity to make adjustments to entries that were giving negative information on
them. This has been repaired to some extent with a mechanism that can identify and expose such
actions by tracing the real identity of authors by their ip-address (with the complication that some-
times such an address is used by multiple users).
Now, there are significant substantive differences between an encyclopedia and
professional software. Software development requires a certain minimal
knowledge and reasonably circumscribed professionalism, with limited disper-
sion of knowledge and experience, which yields a self-selection that is more
stringent than for people who think they have something to tell an audience
that is unlimited in its variety. Software does not lend itself to misuses of parti-
san interests or politicking as much as articles do. Bugs in software are more
objectively identifiable than the ‘correctness’ of an encyclopedic article, what-
ever that would mean. Standards of ‘elegance’ that apply to software are not so
readily available for articles, and more subject to variety of style and taste.
Motives for contributing to open software may differ greatly from motives to
contribute to an encyclopedia. In sum, the lesson is that the extent of self-
organisation and openness that is viable depends on the content and the type,
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corresponding motives.
8.7 innovation in government services
We have sketched the development of new forms of organisation that involve
users in co-production of services. Could this become as important in the
government sector as in private services? We believe they can and will. In areas
like pensions planning or the administration of taxes and subsidies the scope for
co-production of government services is immense.
An example is the British ‘Directgov’ project. This is a portfolio of facilities and services (central
web portal, kiosk, digital tvchannel) intended to deliver online government services more effi-
ciently and effectively. It is designed to be a central point of reference for citizens to access core
government services online. Instead of being based on the way departments are organised, it is
intended that users access the services they need according to topics (such as motoring) or groups
(such as disabled people). According to the Cabinet Office, it is the largest e-transformation in the
uk(nao 2006).
The new organisational form of platforms yields considerable potential to
improve the efficiency and quality of government services. Here we make the
usual distinction between innovations that improve efficiency and those that
improve quality. A complication is what the meaning is of the concept of quality
in public services. Quality in such services not only includes features of user
quality such as relevance of content, ease of use, ease of access, and speed of
response. It also includes public quality in equity of use and access, due process,
and public accountability. In our analysis we employ the well-known distinction
between front and back office in service firms, already used in figure 8.1.
In figure 8.2 we illustrate where different kinds of innovation may come from. In
business, early innovations in services were mostly oriented towards efficiency,
based on technology, especially itand Web-based changes, and a strong push
from firms’ managements to cut costs and improve the impacts of given spend-
ing. Most efficiency innovations, in the upper row of figure 8.2, have been back-
office initiated, achieved by increasing the division of labour inside organisations,
pushing through new technologies, outsourcing inputs and exploiting new
synergies between activities. Later innovations of user quality, in the middle row
of figure 8.2, mostly came, as they should, from the pull of customer demand, the
need to introduce new services or provide a faster response in a better location,
and in a more differentiated and convenient manner for customers, with the front
office as the channel of information between firm and customers. Often there is
also a pressure for quality innovations from staff keen to try out new products or
new ways of doing things, or to exploit new capabilities. Here the back office
plays some role, indicated in the figure with a dotted arrow.
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increased, as can be seen from the emergence of ‘socially responsible manage-
ment’. While individual customers may be a factor , this dimension of quality is
mostly a corporate affair, in corporate communication with the public at large. In
figure 8.2 this is expressed with a dotted line from users, and an uninterrupted
line from the back office. While the importance of public quality is increasing in
business, it is still less prominent than in public services. While in business the
pressure for public accountability has increased, equity of access is much less of
an issue than in public services, due to the fact that political processes are absent.
When we turn to public services, we expect that the institutional logic of the
governmental sector, with a great emphasis on due process and accountability,
combined with a risk-averse hierarchy that has to avoid political incidents, will
sit in the way of initiatives to try out new approaches or make use of new possi-
bilities. Thinking about government services in terms of figure 8.2, one therefore
might predict that the bulk of innovations will be initiated by the back office and
will focus on efficiency rather than quality. A report on a British investigation of
125 innovations in central government services (nao 2006) offers many indica-
tions that this is indeed the case, pointing to processes that are very top down,
influenced by an over-emphasis on hierarchy and rank. This is difficult to recon-
cile with the fact that innovation of quality from customer pull requires room for
initiatives from the front office, which is lower in rank and hierarchy. The report
indeed shows that around two and a half times as many innovations in the data
set related to efficiency matters as opposed to quality improvements.
“Journalist Pieter Hilhorst argues that the public sector is also severely troubled by a “not invented
here syndrome”. Policymakers in one town rarely get “contaminated with good ideas from another
town”, the public sector has many laboratories but barely any production units that dole out
successes. The consequence is that many successful projects and useful experiences end up on the 
scrapheap. The biggest flaw of the public sector is thus not that it lacks creativity or good plans, but
that good ideas are hardly imitated. In the public sector intelligence is not contagious’” (de Volks-
krant, August 7, 2007).
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Figure 8.2 Sources of innovation
User Front office Back office
Efficiency
User quality
Public qualityFrom above in the political hierarchy processes are imposed through the back
office, to ensure political grasp, to safeguard political responsibility, and to
protect politicians from political discomfiture. Public accountability is also
imposed from the back office. Requirements are restrictive, requiring constant
measurement and control and raising challenges of whether we can de-bureaucra-
tize enough to allow front-line staff in government service more space for experi-
mentation and improvisation. The nao report highlights findings that civil
servants are over-cautious and that their influence on provision has in recent
years narrowed down to service delivery and internal organisational issues rather
than improvement of user quality. Departments and agencies often know of
opportunities to make improvements but they can be reluctant to act on these
opportunities until they are pushed. These barriers may take time and persist-
ence to counteract.
In chapter 7, we argued that monitoring and control can drive out innovation. In
the public sector, that applies with a vengeance. Since the 1980s, when countries
found themselves confronted with economic decline and increased international
competition, governments have begun to spend more time and money on
performance measurement and evaluation in the public sector, where result-
based management has become “the talk of the day at all levels” (van Thiel and
Leeuw 2002). Following the “New Public Management Hype” (Raad van
Economische Adviseurs, [rea] 2007), the Dutch government has copied
management-driven organisational practices from the private sector in its initia-
tive for a new budget system to increase accountability. A new system of
performance budgeting was thus introduced in the budgetary year 2002, which
was christened “From policy budget to policy account” (Van Beleidsbegroting tot
Beleidsverantwoording, vbtb). The purpose of this new system was to make it
easier for parliament to compare budget plans and annual reports and to there-
upon assess government policies. Over the years, vbtbhas also developed into
an instrument to advance a more efficient government (Tweede Kamer 2004; see
also van der Dussen 2006).
There is no denying that performance measurement can be of great value in the
public sector, and as the imf (2006) has noted, “vbtbcan, and in some instances
has already, had a positive impact on the transparency of budget and final account
documents. Importantly, it has improved policy accountability and has the
potential to improve allocative decision-making.” But it has also become clear
that despite all good intentions, the way performance measurement has been
implemented has had several unintended negative consequences. The Council of
Economic Advisers (rea 2007) argues that the public domain is so different from
the private sector that it is often counterproductive to transfer practices from one
domain to the other, and emphasises two ‘perversions’ this has given way to: the
autonomy of professionals has been corroded, and management has been
elevated and become dominant. We would add that this has been destructive in
business as well. Van Thiel and Leeuw (2002: 270) draw a number of more
specific conclusions from their review of relevant studies: “First of all, the prolif-
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organisations and the state. Second, within policy-implementing organisations,
the increased measure pressure can create dysfunctional effects such as ossifica-
tion, a lack of innovation, tunnel vision, and sub optimisation. These unintended
effects can jeopardize the effectiveness and efficiency of policy implementation.
Third, there is some evidence that monitoring has led to symbolic behaviour; that
is, monitoring appears to be in place but is in fact not. And finally, in some cases
it is unclear what is actually being measured (e.g., the definition of quality)” (see
also Aardema 2002).
“(B)ureaucratic performance measurement schemes can inhibit innovation, and lead to ossification:
organizational paralysis brought about by an excessively rigid system of performance evaluation.
The need to choose performance measures and set targets in advance means that new threats and
opportunities may be ignored by managers. Moreover,… a predictable system of performance eval-
uation may offer considerable scope for manipulation on the part of management.
The danger of ossification arises because of the inevitable delay in designing and putting in place a
performance evaluation scheme, and the effort required to change it subsequently. Yet… any
scheme is likely to be deficient to a greater or lesser extent, and so will need to be regularly
reviewed and updated” (Smith 1995: 299-300).
However, accountability by itself is not the only, and perhaps not the most
important problem. Related to it are the organisational and mental obstacles to
opening innovation up to initiatives from low-rank and low-status front-office
staff, as well as citizens via their access to the system through the front office.
8.8 conclusions
Although there are signs of a positive relation between organisational innovation
– or ‘social innovation’ – and the success of innovation within Dutch companies,
the innovation debate in the Netherlands has so far not paid much attention to
the management and organisational features of successful organisation. Some
researchers even argue that the decline of the Netherlands in some international
rankings on competitiveness and innovativeness can to a large extent be
explained by a concentration on technology-related macro-variables. However,
more recently social innovation has been put on the agenda others, including
trade unions, employers organisations, and the Innovation Platform, resulting in
the institution of the Netherlands Centre for Social Innovation (ncsi). Mirroring
day-to-day practice, however, social innovation has so far mainly been taken on
as ‘operational excellence’, i.e., improving exploitation. Thus, the development of
policy reflects the very problem that is at stake. As in organisations, here also
exploitation takes precedence over exploration because it yields improvements in
the short term, as opposed to improvements of exploration, and here as else-
where the short term mostly wins. Furthermore, we tend to focus on exploita-
tion because we understand it better and know better how to improve it. The
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social innovation towards the exploration of new products and applications.
There is an enormous potential for further innovation, not least in government
services.
It seems inevitable that exploitation and exploration are to some extent sepa-
rated, in time or space, because they require different organisational and cogni-
tive logics. At the same time, however, they need to be connected in ways that
allow them to build upon each other, in some form of ‘ambidextrous organisa-
tion’, within or between organisations. There are several ways to do this, but
tensions tend to remain, to a greater or lesser extent. In earlier chapters we noted
that while markets can serve exploitation well, intense price competition can
erode the resources and the basis for trust needed for exploration. In chapter 9,
Anderson and Gasteiger present evidence that time pressure forms a hindrance to
creativity in r&d (Amabile 1988). This has implications for policy, in view of
possible tensions between competition policy and innovation policy. As argued
by Von Hippel (2005) the dynamic of openness and disclosure of innovation
raises questions for policy concerning the protection of intellectual property
rights, which we will not discuss here.
Since exploration is inspired by novel experience, across a variety of use contexts,
and this variety derives from users, including citizens in the case of governmen-
tal services, users have an important role to play in innovation. The emergence of
ict and internet facilitates new forms of organisation, that allow much more
involvement of users and citizens, yielding a different logic of relations between
users and producers, in platform organisations, user-led innovation, and open
source communities. A key feature is that with the use of internet-based facilities
allowances can be made for asymmetry of information between users and
producers, and activities can be located where the source of the information is. In
open source communities, users are the producers, in systems that are highly
self-organised, as evolutionary systems.
Policy implications concerning the organisation of private firms first of all regard
industry rather than government. However, there still is a role for government in
putting social innovation on the agenda, and in stimulating and coordinating
activities of firms. Furthermore, there are implications also for the organisation of
government services: the new organisational form of platforms yields consider-




2E ncountered by author during a course given to consultants of Cap Gemini, in
2001.
3F or unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but
from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath (Matthew
xxv: 29, kjv).
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2489i nnovation and creativity in
organisations: individual and work team
research findings and implications for
government policy
Neil R. Anderson and Rosina M. Gasteiger
9.1 introductory comments
Facing rapid technological changes and being challenged, for example by emerging
markets, today’s organisations have to adapt quickly in order to maintain or, ide-
ally, to increase their effectiveness. Within this scope the development and adop-
tion of innovations have become a critical determinant of organisational produc-
tivity, competitiveness, and longevity. Hence, it is not surprising that a major
research effort has focused on variables that facilitate or hinder the development
and implementation of innovations (Howell and Higgins 1990). The aim and
scope of the present chapter is to present an overview of existing research findings
into innovation and creativity in the workplace as these relate to potential govern-
ment policies for innovation facilitation in the Netherlands. By necessity, as many
of the applied studies originate from the disciplines of organisational psychology
and management sciences, these disciplines constitute the predominant theoreti-
cal perspective adopted in this chapter. Given this disciplinary background, this
chapter considers in detail two particular ‘levels of analysis’ with regard to creativ-
ity and innovation in workplace settings: (1) Individual creativity and work role
innovation and (2) work group creativity and team-level innovation.
One of our main reasons for focusing upon these two levels of analysis was the
wrrsummary description of this whole project area itself. To quote from the
homepage related to the project on ‘Innovation: The Need for Renewal’:
“The fundamental unit of analysis is people in interaction with other people, within and between
businesses, with businesses, macro-conditions and institutions as ‘enabling constraints’. The
analysis at micro-level provides a basis for recommendations which are largely situated at the insti-
tutional level” (http://www.wrr.nl/english/content.jsp?objectid=3949&pid=3947).
Whilst other, more macro levels of analysis undoubtedly exist with regard to
organisational innovation (the organisational level of analysis), and the diffusion
of innovations across industrial sectors or organisations (the societal level of
analysis), the focus of this chapter is intentionally more micro- and meso-analyti-
cal in orientation. Creativity in individual work roles can build to transform
organisational performance overall. The implementation of new and improved
ways of doing things in organisations can, and does, occur primarily at the individ-
ual and work-team levels of analysis (Anderson, De Dreu and Nijstad 2004; West,
2002), and so these two primary levels of foci for this chapter are justifiable. In
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tions with an ongoing climate for work-group innovation may be argued to be a
major source of competitive advantage for Dutch organisations. Indeed, in rapidly
changing global markets where innovation and adoptive capacities are key deter-
minants of organisational success, it can be argued that creativity and innovation
are crucial factors for organisational survival and longer-term performance.
In this chapter we review important findings and empirical studies as they relate
to potential government policy for innovation facilitation in organisations.
Although we do not develop these research findings into specific recommenda-
tions for government policy, we hint at the need for these findings to be taken
into clear account and to be borne in mind with regard to the general formulation
of various policies and procedures that may impinge upon the innovativeness of
work organisations in the Netherlands.
remit
Building upon these opening comments, the agreed remit for this chapter as laid
out in our proposal was as follows:
As an integral component of this overall project, to review existing research findings into creativity
and innovation in the workplace. Particular attention will be given to studies into individual-level
work role creativity and to empirical research into work group-level innovation. Attention will also
be focused upon setting forth a general research context in summarising the major study findings
upon which potential government policy and procedures can in future be based.
9.2 defining innovation at work
An initial problem faced by all practitioners and researchers is to be able to accu-
rately define the terms ‘creativity’ and ‘innovation’ as they pertain to organisa-
tional practices. In fact, precise definitions of creativity and innovation have long
been a source of dispute and debate amongst academic researchers (West 2002).
Fortunately, although there remains no general consensus over precise defini-
tions, the most widely accepted definition of innovation was proposed by West
and Farr (1990). They define workplace innovation as:
… the intentional introduction and application within a role, group or organization of ideas,
processes, products or procedures, new to the relevant unit of adoption, designed to significantly
benefit the individual, the group, the organization or wider society’ (West and Farr 1990: 9).
By use of this definition the authors distinguish between creativity and innovation in the crucial
regard that the latter involves ‘intentional introduction and application’ of new and improved ways
of doing things, whereas creativity can simply refer to idea generation alone (see also King, 1992).
This distinction is essential: Creativity can refer simply to idea generation; unlike creativity the 
critical aspect of innovation is that this term refers alone to implemented ideas. That is, the 
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250application component is crucially important for the latter. For this reason, the innovation research
typically draws distinctions between the early phases of idea generation (so-called ‘ideation’), 
and latter-stage implementation to suggest that successful innovation attempts will require both
phases to be successfully navigated. Second, West and Farr (1990) point out that innovation must
confer intended benefits at one or more levels-of-analysis: the work role, group, or organisation.
Again, this is not necessarily the case for creativity where benefits can be impossible to quantify or
assign. In this case, however, it is often advisable to be somewhat flexible as to whether benefit was
truly intended before the innovation process was begun. For instance, the 3M product of Post-it
actually resulted from errors that were made by one technician in developing a glue for totally
another purpose, which in fact was a ‘failure’ for the purpose actually at hand. The glue was then
re-used as an unusual combination of being adhesive enough to stick down but only temporarily
on the reverse side of notelets, hence the development of this new product which only turned out
subsequently to be of considerable commercial benefit. Third, and finally, innovation implies rela-
tive novelty as opposed to absolute novelty (Zaltman, Duncan and Holbeck 1973). That is, any
change need only be new to the relevant unit of adoption, not absolutely new allowing for innova-
tions to be adopted and adapted from other organisations or work teams (West and Anderson
1996). This concept of ‘relative novelty’ is also important in that new and improved ways of doing
things need only be new to the section or department where they are implemented. That is, they
should be new in the perceptions of those involved with the innovation attempt, rather than being
absolutely new when compared with practices in all other organisations of a similar nature. This
distinction thus allows for innovations that are in common usage elsewhere to be adopted and
adapted within the new unit of adoption, thus still fitting within West and Farr’s overall definition
of innovation in the workplace. Few would argue that for a new idea or process to be regarded as an
innovation requires absolute novelty (Anderson et al. 2004), and so this forces practitioners and
researchers to regard innovation policies from the ‘eyes of the beholders’, that is from the perspec-
tive of employees and managers in organisations who are charged with innovation implementation
on a daily basis.
These debates over defining innovation are clearly not just matters of semantics
or rather ephemeral academic discussions. For any government policy aimed at
innovation stimulation and facilitation to be successful, it is crucial for innova-
tion to be viewed from the perspective of those affected by the suite of policies in
force at any particular time. Top-down policy that is imposed is unlikely to be
stimulative of response innovations by organisations, work teams, or individual
workers (Van de Ven, Angle, and Poole 1989). Rather, innovation policies need to
be aimed at establishing frameworks and climates that are supportive of creativity
and innovation. It is thus vitally important to consider the involvement, where
appropriate, of key workers and their representatives in early-stage policy formu-
lation. We return to each of these themes in subsequent sections of this chapter.
9.3 antecedents and facilitators of innovation
A substantial body of findings across the research literature has firmly estab-
lished which factors act as either facilitators or inhibitors of creativity and inno-
vation in the workplace. Such is the weight of evidence from the huge number of
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this body of empirical research. This stated, one of the most intriguing aspects of
these findings is that several factors have been found to be related in a curvilinear
manner to innovativeness, rather than in a direct, linear manner. Most common
have been research findings that, when combined, reveal an inverted U-shaped
curvilinear relation with subsequent innovativeness (e.g., rule independence and
general mental ability at the individual level-of-analysis; group cohesiveness at
the work team level-of-analysis). Caution is therefore warranted concerning the
interpretation of existing findings, but for cases where such curvilinear relations
have been found there is a readily understandable explanation. For instance, a
work group needs to be high on cohesiveness for innovation attempts to emerge,
but not so high that conformity to current methods and practices takes over as
the climate for maintenance (so-called ‘groupthink’, Janis, 1972). Thus, middling
levels of group cohesiveness have been found to be most facilitative of work
group innovativeness, with low cohesiveness and high cohesiveness being found
paradoxically to be related to significantly lower levels of innovation.
Some caution is also warranted in that, as is fairly typical in the social sciences,
studies sometimes report contradictory findings with regard to specific predic-
tors of work role or group innovativeness. In the present chapter we have sought
to overcome this by reporting the balance of weight of particular findings and by
giving priority to review papers published in the top-tier journals in the manage-
ment sciences where possible (e.g., Academy of Management Journal, Journal of
Applied Psychology, Academy of Management Review, Journal of Management,
Journal of Organization Behavior). Other studies, often published in second- or
even third-tier journals have been cited albeit briefly, and with the caveat that we
have given precedence of interpretation to the findings appearing in top-tier
journals where review and publication procedures are far more stringent and reli-
able. Of course, it could also be that such contradictory results have come about
because single studies have restricted sample sizes, or have calculated a single
linear correlation where as mentioned above curvilinear relations may exist, or
have been based in particular industries or at particular levels within the organi-
sation hierarchy. Here, we attempt to provide a balanced and reasoned summary
of the key research findings, and also to note studies and programs of research of
particular noteworthiness and scientific impact.
One final point needs to be made at this introductory stage. Most of the research
efforts by work psychologists referred to in the present chapter have focused
upon larger organisations, usually on the basis of attempting to maximize sample
size once access has been negotiated. Many of the studies cited in our chapter
concern individual and team level innovation in larger, often multinational
organisations. The generalisability of these findings to smaller organisations,
family businesses, and the like therefore can be open to question. Rather, the
bulk of the research referred to in this chapter concerns larger numbers of indi-
vidual employees (e.g., in engineering companies, public sector departments,
research and development teams, hospitals, and so forth) and teams working in
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out within the us, and so again, some caution is warranted in applying these find-
ings, although where generalisability across countries has been investigated the
findings have tended to hold up remarkably well across different countries (and
especially from the us to European organisations in general).
Table 9.1, summarises the key findings over factors found to be antecedents to
work role innovation and work group innovation in overview.
9.3.1 individual-level antecedent factors: individual and job
characteristics
As table 9.1 sets out, four key factors have been found to be predictive of work
role innovation at the individual level-of-analysis:
–P ersonality;
–M o t i v a t i o n ;
–C ognitive ability;
–M ood states.
In addition, job characteristics, for example the autonomy in ones work role, have
been shown to be important predictors for individual innovation at the workplace.
In early studies on creativity and innovation scholars thought that certain
personality characteristics constitute an individual’s potential to be creative and
to innovate (Barron and Harrington 1981). Correspondingly, it was attempted to
find measures to identify a ‘creative personality’ (Gough 1979). Contemporary
studies analyse the relationship between personality and innovation in more
detail. Within that scope the so-called ‘big five’1 or the ‘Five-Factor Model’ (ffm)
of human personality play an important role. In terms of individual personality
types found in the applied research to be likely to be more innovative, the profile
is not particularly surprising. Individuals with distinct self-confidence, tolerance
of ambiguity, unconventionality, and independence were shown to be more
likely to be innovative than individuals showing these attributes to a moderate
extent. Furthermore, individuals high on openness to experience as well as lack-
ing conscientiousness and agreeableness have been found to have a higher
propensity to innovate in their job roles (George and Zhou 2001a, 2001b; Patter-
son 1999). Openness to experience was shown to be the personality variable with
the most consistent relationship with creativity and innovation (Harrison et al.
2006). Given the conceptual similarity between openness and creativity, this
result is not astonishing. Individuals high on openness to experience are charac-
terised as being curious and interested in novelties in general; furthermore, they
are for example more likely to try out new products and to generate new ideas as
well (McCrae 1987). Looking at the relationship of the ‘big bive’ and creativity in
comparison to job performance ratings it becomes obvious that creativity may
not be comprised in global ratings of job performance. Conscientiousness, for
instance, which is known as the most consistent personality predictor of job
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Table 9.1 Innovation research findings in overview: Facilitators of innovation at two 
levels-of-analysis – individual and work group
Level-of-analysis Characteristic Dimension Key studies/ evidence 1
Individual Personality Tolerance of ambiguity Barron & Harrington, 1981; Patterson, 1999
and Job 1.2 Self-confidence Barron & Harrington, 1981
characteristics Openness to experience West 2001; Patterson, 1999; 
George & Zhou, 2001a; 2001b
Unconventionality West & Wallace, 1991
Originality West & Wallace,1991; Patterson, 1999
Rule governed 
(negative relation) Simonton, 1991
Authoritarianism 
(negative relation) Simonton, 1991
Independence West & Wallace, 1991; Patterson, 1999
Motivation Intrinsic (versus extrinsic) West, 2001
Determination to succeed Amabile, 1983
Personal initiative Frese & Zapf, 1994
Cognitive  Above average general  Barron & Harrington, 1981; 
ability (‘g’) intellect Patterson, 1999
Task-specific knowledge West & Wallace, 1991
Divergent thinking style Kirton, 1976; 1978
Ideational fluency Barron & Harrington, 1981
Mood States Negative moods George & Zhou, 2002
Job  Autonomy Axtell et al, 2000
characteristics Span of control Axtell et al, 2000
Support for innovation Axtell et all, 2000
Mentor guidance Simonton, 1991;
Van de Ven, et al., 1989
Appropriate training Van de Ven, et al., 1989; West, 2001, 
George & Zhou, 2001a; 2001b
Work group
Team structure Minority influence De Dreu, 2006
Cohesiveness 2 West & Anderson, 1996
Longevity 2 King, 1992; West & Anderson, 1996
Team climate Participation West & Anderson, 1996; De Dreu & West, 2001
Vision West & Anderson, 1996; De Dreu & West, 2001
Norms for innovation West & Anderson, 1996; De Dreu & West, 2001
Conflict De Dreu, 2006
Constructive controversy West, 2001; 2002
Team member  Heterogeneity of members Kirton, 1976; 1978
characteristics
Education level Sauer & Anderson, 1992
Team processes Reflexivity West, 2002
Minority dissent De Dreu & West, 2001
Integration skills Stevens & Campion, 1994
Decision making style King & Anderson, 2002
Leadership style  Democratic style West, 2001, Krause, 2004
Participative style West & Anderson, 1996; De Dreu & West, 2001
Openness to idea proposals West & Anderson, 1996
1) Source: Developed, modified and extended from Anderson, et al. (2004)
2) As noted earlier, for several characteristics at different levels-of-analysis curvilinear effects have been proposed, and in 
a few instances, found. Mostly inverted U-shaped curvilinear effects have been reported in a relatively small number of
more complex study designs.performance, was shown to hold nearly zero-relationships or even slightly nega-
tive relationships with creativity and innovation (Harrison et al. 2006). A poten-
tial explanation for these findings is that the ‘big five’ constructs are too broad
and heterogeneous for predicting important criteria like, for example, overall job
performance or innovation potential (Barron and Harrington 1981). Moreover,
these results suggest that personality traits might not be paramount drivers for
creativity and innovation on the individual level-of-analysis as it was hypothe-
sised in earlier research.
Research indicates that individuals need to possess a driving force in order to
cope with the challenges associated with creativity and innovation at work
(Tagger 2002; Harrison et al. 2006). Regarding the motivation underlying creative
and innovative behaviour non-material reasons, such as the aspiration to shape
one’s own professional environment, to ease work, and to search for remedies to
defects and risks as well as the possibility of cost-saving, have been proven to be
important (Maier et al. 2001). Intrinsic motivation, which refers to the inherent
human tendency to seek out novelty and challenges that represent a principal
source of enjoyment throughout life (Csikszentmihalyi and Rathunde 1993), is
one of the most important driving forces for creative and innovative behaviour
(Amabile 1988; West 1987; Frese et al. 1999). Furthermore, psychological empow-
erment, which refers to the set of cognitions essential for intrinsic motivation
(Spreitzer 1995), the determination to succeed (Amabile 1983; Howell and
Higgins 1990), an orientation towards learning, self-efficacy2 footnotes as in
previous chapters] and creative self-efficacy (Axtell et al. 2000; Tierney and
Farmer 2002), as well as personal initiative3 (Frese and Zapf 1994) and have been
shown to be important predictors for innovative behaviour at work. Additionally,
also extrinsic motivation has been shown to have a positive relationship with
creativity although on a smaller scope (Harrison et al. 2006).
Moreover, in addition to these personality-related attributes, other studies have
found that individuals who are of higher intellect (higher general intelligence,
abbreviated as ‘g’) are typically more innovative. This is simply due to the fact
that these individuals possess greater information processing and cognitive
capacities, and therefore, they are able to generate more ideas for ways to improve
existing ways of doing things at work. Of course, this then requires the personal-
ity, motivation, and determination to implement such ideas, which is where
other person-related attributes become more important. Following the ‘invest-
ment theory of creativity’ by Sternberg and Lubart (1991) creative individuals are
characterised by taking up ideas with high development potential at a time when
these ideas are still largely unknown, relatively unpopular or even disrespected
by others. They stick to their idea and make an effort to convince others of its
usefulness in order to put it into practice eventually. Hence, creative behaviour
requires not only specific personality traits and motivation but also intelligence,
knowledge, expertise, and specific thinking and working styles on part of the
ideator (Amabile 1988; Sternberg and Lubart 1996; Patterson 2002). Amabile’s
componential theory of creativity (1983) and creativity in the workplace (1996)
255
innovation and creativity in organisationssuggests that domain-relevant skills are a fundamental component of creativity.
Domain-relevant skills comprise knowledge and expertise within a certain
domain. According to Amabile (1983, 1996) domain-relevant skills are prone to
be affected by formal and informal education as well as an individual’s percep-
tual, cognitive, and motor abilities. Through education individuals are exposed to
a variety of experiences, viewpoints, and knowledge bases (Perkins 1986). Recent
meta-analytical findings by Harrison and colleagues (2006) suggest that general
cognitive ability and education have a moderately strong direct effect on creative
and innovative performance.
With regard to mood and creativity research findings are less clear. While some ar-
ticles come to the conclusion that positive moods are positively related to creativity
and innovation (Russ 2000) other research has shown that job dissatisfaction and
negative mood states can provoke creative and innovative outcomes. An intriguing
theme of recent research into rather more negatively connotated factors at the indi-
vidual and group levels and how these relate to subsequent innovation has been ex-
amined and published by Jennifer George and Jing Zhou (2001a, 2001b, 2002).
Whilst much previous innovation research has suffered from what has been
termed a ‘pro-innovation bias’ (that is, innovation being assumed to be positive per
se regardless of the context or outcomes), George and Zhou (2001a, 2001b) took a
contrary stance. They argued, and found empirical support for, the point that indi-
viduals will also attempt to change matters at work from the basis of a negative
mood state, dissatisfaction, or as an attempt to alleviate the stress experienced in an
underperforming situation. These negative mood states (such as dissatisfaction, ir-
ritation, and unhappiness with work role processes and outcomes) were found to
be far more positively predictive of innovation attempts than had previously been
thought. Further research is needed in order to shed light on the interplay of mood
states and creativity and innovation. In doing so it is crucial to be aware of the com-
plexity of affect. Affect can be studied either as a trait or as a state variable while the
latter can be further differentiated into ‘moods’ and ‘emotions’.
All predictors described above are directly related to the individual. In studying
creativity and innovation at work not only person-related but also situational
variables have been shown to play a decisive role. Within this connection job
characteristics have been widely studied as predictors of creativity and innova-
tion. Amabile (1988) found that challenging, non-routine jobs are conducive to
creative and innovative behaviour, presumably due to the fact that they include
diverse activities. In addition, research shows that individuals holding down a
complex job demonstrate more creative self-efficacy (Tierney and Farmer 2000).
Furthermore, autonomy in one’s work role, i.e., the freedom to decide how,
when, and with whom to work (West and Farr 1990), has been shown to be
predictive of creative and innovative behaviour (Krause 2004). In addition,
Amabile (1988) argues that time pressure is a frequently reported hindrance to
creative behaviour in the field of r&d on the grounds that time pressure results in
shallow, restricted thinking, instead of broad thinking. Unlike many other factors
that are likely to influence creativity and innovation at work, such as individual
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instance, supervisors and managers may be able to take action to protect time for
their employees that enables them to engage in creative thinking for example
within the scope of think tanks (Amabile et al. 2002).
In sum, the previously explained findings suggest that jobs can be (re)designed in
order to facilitate creative and innovative behaviour at work, for example by
increasing work autonomy and complexity as well as protecting time where
employees can give free rein to their ideas. For each of these areas of findings
there are concomitant implications for the design of jobs in work organisations,
human resource management (hrm) practices, employment legislation, and indi-
rectly, for policy formulation at the national level to support and facilitate inno-
vation. It therefore follows that governmental and industry-sector policies can
influence such initiatives, maybe not in a direct and immediate manner, but
certainly with regard to longer-term outcomes and in relation to establishing the
underlying conditions, regulatory structures, and societal conditions facilitative
of innovation in the workplace
9.3.2 work group level antecedent factors
At the level-of-analysis of the work group or team, a further five variables have
been found to be associated with generally higher levels of innovativeness. These
are:
–T e am structure;
–T e am climate;
–T e am member characteristics;
–T e am processes; and
–L e a d e r ship style.
Team variables were shown to be momentous for the promotion of creative and
innovative work behaviour (West 2002). With regard to the structure or compo-
sition of a work group diversity has been suggested to be conducive to creativity
whereas the management of diversity is seen to be the critical factor. Following
West (2002) the effective management of diversity comprises integrative group
processes, which in turn contain reflexivity, the development of intra-group
safety, participative decision-making processes and the way of dealing with
minority influence. Furthermore, the cohesiveness and the longevity of the
group (West and Anderson 1996) are crucial determinants for the creative and
innovative potential of a group.
With regard to the team climate for creativity and innovation the following four
dimensions can be distinguished: vision, participative safety, objectives and task
orientation, and support for innovation (West 1990; Anderson and West 1994).
Vision refers to the extent to which superior goals are perceived as motivating,
clear, coherent, and accomplishable. Participative safety relates to the degree to
which the participation in decision-making processes is felt to be unbiased, moti-
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the extent of the commitment to quality and high achievment by the employees. 
Finally, support for innovation refers to supporting social norms and expectations
that are for example beneficial for the introduction of new practices. These
dimensions influence the different phases of the innovation process.
With regard to team member characteristics the educational level of the team
members and their heterogenity (e.g., concerning age, gender, ethnic origin,
function) have been suggested to be crucial for creativity at work (Amabile 1988).
Furthermore, the way that groups work together has an impact on their innova-
tiveness. With regard to team processes a high degree of participation and auton-
omy in the work group (Axtell et al. 2000), reflexivity, a good communication
structure in terms of problem-oriented discussions and active support, a shared
vision (West 2002), and reciprocal feedback (Zhou and George 2001a) have a
positive impact on a group’s creative.
In addition, leadership has been shown to be an important factor throughout the
innovation process. Recent meta-analytical findings show that leader-member-
exchange (lmx) in terms of supervisor support, is positively related to creative
and innovative behaviour of followers (Harrison et al. 2006). In accordance with
the theory on lmx, the relationship between a leader and her or his subordinates
emerges from a formal interpersonal relationship to one characterised by mutual
trust and respect. Subordinates in high-quality lmx relationships are supposed
to have more autonomy in their work roles (Graen and Uhl-Bien 1995) and, thus,
are more likely to be creative and innovative in their jobs (Jaussi and Dionne
2003; Krause 2004). Furthermore, transformational leadership has been shown
to be positively related to creative and innovative behaviour of followers (Harri-
son et al. 2006). This may be due to the fact that transformational leaders have a
positive impact on followers’ motivation along with their support for ideas and
social support (Jaussi and Dionne 2003). Research conducted by Zhou and
George (2003) provide evidence for the important role of leaders throughout the
innovation process, i.e., from idea generation to implementation, in particular in
terms of the supervisor’s emotional intelligence. Different leadership styles will
lead to specific climates and cultures primarily, that are either conducive or detri-
mental to creativity and innovation at the workplace. Taken all together, the find-
ings described above underscore how important leadership is as the major lever
to gearing innovation (Zhou and George 2003).
9.4 the process of innovation
One of the most commonly misunderstood aspects relating to workplace innova-
tion is the process or stages through which any innovation progresses from its
earliest instigation to its routinisation of usage or ‘exnovation’ (the intentional
termination of a former innovation) by a work group or individual employee (Van
micro-foundations for innovation policy
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of poorly researched but strikingly popular management texts that almost
universally suggest that innovations proceed though neat, linear stages that can
be managed or directed by those at the top level in an organisational hierarchy.
Rather, several robustly conducted processual studies now firmly illustrate that
innovation attempts proceed through a rather messy, multi-phase ‘star-burst’
trajectory where processes are cyclical, iterative, and will often involve “two
steps forwards and then one step backwards” before an innovation progresses
from initiation to final implementation (King and Anderson 2002).
Further international evidence over the stages involved in different types of
innovations in organisations is provided by Van de Ven et al. (1989, 1999) in their
major programme of research in North America, usually referred to as the
Minnesota Innovation Research Program (mirp).
Building upon earlier work, figure 9.1 presents a summary of potential negative
antecedents, processes, and outcomes from innovation attempts. Counterposing
these three stages against the three levels of analysis of the individual, group, 
and organisation, this model thus generates a nine-cell representation of how
innovation attempts may be driven by, go through phases of, or result in, rather
less than positive elements within organisations. The following nine cells have
been derived.
259
innovation and creativity in organisations
Figure 9.1 Generic Model of Negative Innovation Attributes at Three Levels of Analysis



























































































nFigure 9.1 thus summarises much of the very recent research that suggests that
innovation attempts, processes, and outcomes commonly have negative as well
as positive attributes (Anderson and Gasteiger 2007). Considering each level of
analysis in turn, at the individual and job characteristics level, some studies have
already shown that, for instance, a negative rather than a positive mood state
induces greater innovativeness (Zhou and George 2001a, 2001b). As negative 
attitudes such as job dissatisfaction, lack of adherence to rule structures, and so
on, these attributes can be grouped under the heading of ‘rumination and
edeation’. Further studies strongly indicate that the process an individual worker
goes through to be innovative is also far from smooth sailing, with numerous
backward steps, reformulations of the original proposal, and notable resistance
from work colleagues or one’s immediate supervisor (Amabile 1988, 1996). Thus,
we coin the term ‘cognitive reformulation’ to refer to the way in which individual
employees will need to re-think and reformulate their original ideas in order to
move them toward implemented work role innovations. Finally, at the individual
level of analysis, some research hints at the range of adaptations the innovator
will need to go through once their new idea or proposal is accepted and imple-
mented toward routinised practice, even if just in their own job role (Bunce and
West 1996). Innovation attempts are likely to cause stress for the initiator, along
with other challenging feelings and imperatives to update one’s cognition toward
one’s working environment. We therefore term this third cell ‘individual adapta-
tion’ and it is meant to refer to any change the individual innovator experiences
directly as a result of their innovation efforts. A final point of caution is
warranted. Of course, not all attempts at being creative will result in a ‘successful’
innovation for employees. One of the potential negative outcomes can often be
that the innovation attempt failed to result in modified work role procedures or
outcomes. It is therefore wise to bear in mind that one outcome of innovation
may be feelings of being unsuccessful or even ineffective for employees involved
in attempted innovations that did not make it through to implementation for
whatever reason.
Several so-called ‘climatic drivers’ can be identified from the extant research as
antecedents carrying a negative connotation of work group innovation. The work
of de Dreu and his colleagues is particularly informative in this regard (de Dreu
2006). This research team, based at the University of Amsterdam, have found
positive relations between work group conflict, at least task-related conflict, and
subsequent innovativeness. Also categorisable within our cell titled ‘team
processes and reformulation’, it is sensible also to view the group process
involved in innovation attempts as being one that can be problematic for those
concerned. Some in a team may be resistant to innovation attempts (e.g., West,
2001), others may wish the idea to be pursued down a particular path only,
whereas groups extremely high upon maintenance needs may wish to avoid any
hint whatsoever of the disagreement or conflict inherent in innovation and try
simply to retain the status quo (Van de Ven et al. 1999). Not surprisingly, then,
innovation within work teams can result in several negatively connotated
outcomes alongside the innovation itself, including changes in the group
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patterns of ongoing working (West and Anderson 1996). This, we term ‘mutual
adaptation’ in our model presented in figure 9.1.
At the wider organisational level of analysis, the same three effects can be postu-
lated to occur during the antecedents, process, and outcomes of innovation. Less
empirical research is available to support these propositions than at the individ-
ual or group levels, however, so some caution needs to be emphasised with
regard to our model being applied to overall organisational innovation. This
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Figure 9.2 Summary of innovation typologies 
Source: Internat. Review of Industrial and Organisational Psychology, (1993) 8, 1-34, John Wiley &











































































































































boundariesstated, Damanpour (1987), for instance, in his meta-analysis of organisational
factors associated with company innovativeness reports some borderline nega-
tive factors such as loose structure and non-directive leadership styles as being
conducive to company innovativeness. Such ‘strategic drivers’ as we term these
variables will also include aspects such as the organisation’s structure (Daft 1978),
the number of levels in the hierarchy (Kanter 1983, 1988), organisational
resources and time devoted to support innovation attempts especially within
research and development (Kimberly 1981), and the industrial sector within
which the organisation needs to survive by being either more or less innovative
(Kanter 1988). Many such organisation-wide innovations will result in unavoid-
able changes to the old organisation structure, a facet we term ‘inter-sectional
reformulation’ in the table. Finally, the introduction of new products, services, or
working practices will often result in necessary ‘strategic adaptation’ for any
organisation. By definition, these more substantial forms of innovation will
require an organisation to restructure itself in some manner and to engage in a
period of reflection and review of its own strategic plans.
9.5 conclusions
In this chapter we have reviewed key findings into innovation primarily in job
roles and work teams. There is now sufficient mass of consistent findings to at
least offer firm bases upon which to formulate national policies and procedures
which will be supportive of creativity and innovation within organisations in the
Netherlands. Clearly, cultural and work practice differences will exist between
different organisations and between different industrial sectors, so it is unwise to
make too specific recommendations at such an early stage. However, this stated,
it is apparent that the growing body of research into creativity and innovation at
the level of analysis of the individual and the work team holds considerable sway
upon the rational formulation of policies and procedures designed to stimulate
innovative capacity in Dutch industry and service organisations. Although the
level of analysis of work psychologists has been more micro-analytical in nature,
the weight of empirical findings from research now published holds clear impli-
cations for the wider formulation of policy and procedure. Whether such policies
should be aimed at maximising innovative capacity is a moot point; indeed, we
have cautioned against this in this chapter. A more balanced approach is to recog-
nise the benefits of workplace creativity and innovation on the one hand, and on
the other to bear in mind the necessarily disruptive aspects of innovating as the
process emerges in individual work roles and teams in organisations. Truly, not
necessarily more innovation is unconditionally better, but strategically stimu-
lated innovation in key areas that is effectively managed can produce huge bene-
fits to competitiveness and productivity. It is this balance that is the dilemma
inherent in innovation management and one that is at the core of the complexity
of this process even at more micro-levels of analysis.
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Appendix I Key research findings at different levels of analysis (continued)
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1O p e n n e s s  t o  experience (referring to individual differences in the tendency to
pursue new experiences in life), conscientiousness (differences in diligence and
reliability in performing assigned tasks), extraversion (differences in assertive-
ness and dominance in social settings), agreeableness (differences in sensitivity in
interpersonal relationships) and neuroticism (referring to individual differences
in the tendency to experience distress and anxiety). These five dimensions are
held to be a complete description of human personality.
2P erceived self-efficacy is defined as people’s beliefs about their capabilities to
produce designated levels of performance that exercise influence over events that
affect their lives (Bandura, 1994).
3P e r s o n a l   initiative refers to an active approach characterised by a persons self-
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27210 inter-organisational networks and
innovation
Marius T.H. Meeus, Leon A.G. Oerlemans, and Patrick Kenis
10.1 introduction
In different scientific fields (e.g., organisation and business studies, economics),
and in policy practice, there is growing attention for the importance of inter-
organisational relationships (iors) and networks (ions). Central issues are the
functioning and performance of the business community in general, and the
relationship between iors and ions for the innovative behaviour of organisa-
tions in particular. It is believed that having iors and being part of ions is bene-
ficial to innovation. However, reviews that have been done so far, predomi-
nantly focus on the effects of so-called dyads on innovation (i.e., the iors
between two organisations) (Pittaway et al. 2004), whereas only Provan et al.
(2007) reviewed generic effects of complete networks on all kinds of organisa-
tional outcomes. Our main aim with this chapter is to identify features of so-
called egocentric and whole (or complete) networks and their impact on the
innovation of individual firms. Moreover, the findings on this relationship are
used to evaluate the extent to which current Dutch innovation policy portfolio
is geared towards ions.
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the relevance of
the topic to the Dutch economy by showing to what extent innovation and
collaboration are empirically associated. Section 3 introduces the research model
and the main arguments supporting it. Subsequently section 4 reports on a
review of the literature pertaining to the features of inter-organisational
networks and their potential impact on innovation The fifth section shows to
what extent current innovation policies impact on networks to achieve their
goals. In the final section we draw some conclusions.
10.2 the importance of cooperation for innovation:
Some empirical underpinnings
Each ion starts out with cooperation between two legally independent organisa-
tional entities, which eventually leads to additional relations. To set the stage for
this chapter it is relevant to know whether innovation and collaboration are
related. Table 1 displays a review of eight surveys covering a period of more than
ten years, on collaboration in the context of r&d, and the type of actors with
whom a focal firm has r&d relations.
It is the diversity of samples, their varying composition, and spatial range, which
helps us to identify patterns in r&d collaboration. Only the cbs (column 7) and
the Poot and Brouwer (column 8) samples covered the Dutch population of
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inter-organisational networks and innovationorganisations. All other surveys had a more or less biased sample, with an
emphasis on industry and low numbers of service companies.
Notwithstanding this sampling bias and temporal variation of data acquisition,
it is remarkable how consistent the findings are over time. The largest survey
– the Community Innovation Survey ii of 2002 – has some findings that deviate
in terms of the size of percentages of r&d with rivals and r&d with public r&d
organisations such as universities, although the ranking of the percentages of
types of r&d partners is the same as in the other surveys.
The main inferences from table 1 are: (a) r&d collaboration is a pervasive
phenomenon among innovative organisations in the Netherlands, (b) coopera-
tion is mainly positioned in the value chain; (c) r&d with rivals is rather infre-
quent; and (d) r&d collaboration with actors in the knowledge infrastructure is
even more unusual. These observations indicate that Dutch industrial companies
already in the early phases of the innovation process integrate inputs and require-
ments of buyers and suppliers. However, these findings also indicate that a larger
distance of partners from the day-to-day business seems to be associated with a
lower significance for r&d collaboration.
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Table 10.1 An overview of R&D partnering in surveys by Meeus and Oerlemans (1992/1993, 
1996, 1997, 1998), Meeus, Smits en Stuurman (1996), and Meeus, Faber, Moors
en Hekkert (2002), Dutch Bureau of Statistics (1998), Poot and Brouwer (2001): 
Source (Meeus, 2003)
Types of R&D cooperation 12345678
% yes % yes % yes % yes % yes % yes % yes % yes
r&d with suppliers 42.6 46.9 17.6 54.3 50.0 42.4 46.9 66.0
r&d with buyers 47.6 46.9 55.1 25.7 36.8 36.5 43.7 25.7
r&d with rivals 4.5 7.6 4.0 0 7.9 4.8 34.7 8.4
r&d engineering or consultancy firms 18.3 22.3 10.8 17.1 26.3 12.9 20.2 --
r&d with public R&D organisations:
university/academic Hospital 11.9 17.4 11.4 17.1 60.5 5.9 21.4* 10.7
technical university 30.9
large technologial inst. 39.5
polytechnics 14.4
1 mint 1992/1993, (n = 689), r&d in 420 companies (South-East Brabant, mainly industry)
2 cint 1996, (n = 363), r&d in 224 companies (The Netherlands, mainly industry)
3S tandardisation 1996 (n = 886), r&d in 535 companies (The Netherlands, only industry)
4 iop Image Processing 1997 (n = 65), r&d in 42 companies (The Netherlands, full sample of one specific
technological field)
5 iop Man Machine Interaction 1998 (n = 50), r&d in 38 companies (idem as in 5)
6 cisu 2002 (n = 144), r&d in 85 companies (Province of Utrecht, mainly industry)
7 cisii cbs 1998 (n = 17.193), r&d in 13.178 companies (representative sample of the Dutch population of
companies)
8K nowledge acquisition in partnerships. Poot & Brouwer 2001, (n = 2117) (idem as in 7)
*  average percentage of cooperation with polytechnic and universityFindings displayed in table 1 confirm that, given the prevalence of r&d collabora-
tion with a variety of partners, there must be an impact of collaboration on inno-
vation. The sheer fact that r&d collaboration is associated with innovation is
only an indication, not an empirical proof, of the causal effects of being engaged
in an ion on innovation.
In this chapter, two related issues concerning the causal effects of participation in
an ion on innovation are addressed. The first is: which aspects of the innovation
process are especially affected by or related to ions? The second issue focuses on
Dutch innovation policy measures. The questions asked are twofold: To what
extent does the current Dutch innovation policy portfolio consist of policy meas-
ures geared toward facilitating specific mechanisms that affect the network effect
on innovation?
10.3 a framework linking innovation policy to effects of
networks on innovation
The hybrid nature of this paper is due to its unusual combination of a literature
review study, a policy review, and a policy evaluation study. This requires an
explanation as to how these elements are linked to each other. The linkages are
specified below in 5 equations
Consider a generic model of a firm’s performance at time t:
(1)  fpt = f(fpt-1, at-1, ct-1, edt-1)
fpt = financial performance at time t
fpt-1 = firm performance in previous period
at-1 = activities performed at t-1
ct-1 = set of explorative and exploitative capabilities at t-1
edt-1 = environmental dynamics at t-1
The financial performance of a firm is considered a function of its financial
performance at t-1, its activities (At-1), and its capabilities and environmental
dynamics. The main part of A consists of producing its existing product portfolio
and the associated processes (aet-1). A part of A at t-1 consists of innovative activi-
ties (ia), which means a radical or incremental renewal of a firm’s products,
processes, or organisation.
(2)  At-1 = f(aet-1, iat-1)
In which:
aet-1 = production of existing product portfolio and related production processes
at t-1
iat-1 = innovative activities at t-1
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such as for example product differentiation processes of competitors that are
anticipated or reacted upon. Also the announcement of breakthrough technolo-
gies can induce innovation, as well as major regulatory changes (e.g., liberalisa-
tion of former monopolistic markets).
To be able to anticipate or react to environmental dynamics firms must develop
their capabilities, which is mostly done by innovative activities organised as
formal and informal (after office hours) research and development. Such innova-
tive activities are not without cost, quite the contrary, they require large and often
risky investments (It-1) with an unknown trade-off of costs and benefits.
(3)  iat-1 = f(It-1, rnt-1)
In which:
It-1 = investments in innovation at t-1
rnt-1 = knowledge flows through inter-organisational networks at t-1
Innovation related investments (It-1) are the addition of internal investments at t-1,
and another parameter of external money available for innovation activities of
companies (ef t-1). The financial resources that have to be invested in innovative
activities are the point where innovation policies become relevant because most
measures in the policy portfolio offer additional funding options to make the
investments less costly and risky, and therefore more attractive.
(4)  It-1 = f(iit-1, eft-1)
In which:
iit-1 = internal investment in innovation at t-1
eft-1 = external governmental funding of innovation at t-1
In order to clarify rnt-1(eq 3) we go back to table 1. Table 1 shows that knowledge
flows (only r&din table 1) are associated with inter-organisational relationships
and networks (rn), mainly in the value chain, and eventually in the broader inno-
vation system to actors such as universities, large technological institutes (ltis), or
consultancy firms, and brokers. The relationships with these partners have several
functions: to make these innovative activities aligned with user needs and capabil-
ities, as well as with supplier capabilities, to develop joint projects that enable risk
sharing and resource pooling (financial and knowledge). The deployment of these
functions relies on three levels of networks: the so-called node and relational fea-
tures (nvt-1). For instance one can have strong and weak partners in the network,
which have a distinct impact on the innovation activities. The characteristics of the
whole network at t-1, such as cohesiveness or centralisation of a network, deter-
mine knowledge flows in networks and also impinge upon the impact of networks
on innovation. Finally nvt-1, the structural configuration of a whole network dif-
ferentiates the network impact on innovation. Now we know that many innova-
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ation is a requirement. Since we do not know for now, we put a specific type policy
measure (efcct-1) in this equation that makes innovation funding conditional on
cooperation. This kind of measure will have its own effect on the prevalence of
innovative collaboration, for example as the Bay-Dohle Act did in the usin the
1980s. Whether this is a valid operation will become clear later in our evaluation of
current innovation policy measures.
(5)  rnt-1 = f(nv1t-1,, nv2t-1, nv3t-1, efcct-1)
In which:
nv1t-1 = network node and relational features at t-1
nv2t-1 = characteristics of the whole network at t-1
nv3t-1 = the structural configuration of ties in the whole network at t-1
efcct-1 = the external governmental funding of innovation conditional on coop-
eration available at t-1.
The first contribution of this chapter consists of trying to unravel whether there
is an empirically tractable impact of networks of relationships on innovation,
which means that we are analysing the impact of the whole set of direct relation-
ships of all network actors, and also the whole set of indirect relationships. In
other words, in our literature review we asked: is innovation (ia) indeed a func-
tion of whole networks (rn) (eq. 3)?
As was explained above, most research in the field focuses on the dyad level and
investigates the influence of iors, which can be defined as “the relatively endur-
ing transactions, flows, and linkages that occur among and between an organisa-
tion and an organisation in its environment” (Oliver 1990: 241), on innovation by
organisations. In this study, however, we focus predominantly on so-called
‘whole networks’. A whole network consists of multiple organisations linked
through multilateral ties (Provan et al. 2007: 482). Below, we will further elabo-
rate on this distinction.
The second contribution of this paper consists of answering the question regard-
ing the extent to which the funding and in-kind facilities provided for innovative
activities by Dutch innovation policy measures draw upon the effect of whole
networks on innovation (eq. 5). In fact it means that we want to know whether
Dutch innovation policies integrate the network effect in their policy design and
if so, how this affects the network effect?
For instance, policy measures can provide sheer financial inputs without any
further conditions as to the ways in which innovation projects are organized. In
contrast, policy design can condition the approval of certain grants on ways of
organizing e.g. in networks with specific partners. If the external funding is
simply adding to internal investment without any organizational conditions, this
would simply imply additional monetary inputs. If the external funding is condi-
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whole networks (consortia) as in the current Innovation Programmes, this would
imply that an additional set of mechanisms impact upon the relation between
policy inputs and their policy outcomes.
Of course this has a number of implications, for example that firms with strong
exploratory capabilities and existing networks are favoured above those with less
exploration capabilities and weakly developed networks. Eventually this might
induce exploratory networks with science myopia and a technology bias, who
prefer the production of state-of-the-art technology over commercial product
development.
The general reasoning is presented in figure 10.1, which will be explained system-
atically below.
The dependent variable
Innovation at firm level is the dependent variable in figure 10.1. Innovation
consists of all the behaviours that are directly related to performing innovation
and can be defined at the macro-level of the total population of firms in a nation
state; at the meso-level of sectors, networks of organisations, or product cate-
gories; and finally at the micro level of individual firms or business units within
companies. Innovation can be distinguished in the adoption and the generation of
new technology, products, services, and/or processes. Innovation – adoption and
generation – comprises r&d investments and a portfolio of r&d and implemen-
tation projects. Generation of innovation and technology means that a company
itself performs research and development. This can take the shape of either infor-
mal or formalised r&d organised in r&d departments, and specialised r&d
personnel, both technical and organisational. Adoption implies that a firm buys
new technologies of manufacturers, which are implemented in the buyer’s
company.
The independent variables
An interaction between two actors – the focal unit or ego (E), and alter/partner
(either between ego and a partner (P) or between two Ps) is defined here as a
voluntary and enduring arrangement between legally independent organisations
to have any type of relationship. Figure 10.1 lists a number of variables in the
centre area showing distinct levels of analysis of these interactions. Node features
such as size, sector of partners, or types of partners (nv1) can have strong impacts
on innovation of the focal firm E, but they are different from effects of the charac-
teristics from the whole network (nv2). It is important to note that not relations
or networks per se contribute to the innovation but certain attributes of the
structural patterns of interactions in which the organisation is embedded have
such an effect (nv3).
For the sake of completeness figure 10.1 also contains firm performance (fp) and
individual firm features (if), and collective efforts of network members (ce). Our
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empirical research available.
The primary effect of engaging in an ion implies that the partner’s partner, as
well as the indirect partner’s partner, is also considered to be part of E’s network.
Consequently it is in fact almost impossible to foresee what kind of network one
enters when a relationship starts. This effect determines the initial complexity of
engaging in relationships. It is mainly the attraction of P that determines the link-
age formation.
Another factor that complicates matters considerably is – and that is what we 
are focussing on in this chapter – if collaboration pursues innovation. Because
innovation always means either doing new things or doing existing things in 
a new way, innovation has multiple impacts. Innovation not only erodes market
positions of competitors, but it potentially destroys internal firm capabilities 
as well as the main capabilities of customers, suppliers, and knowledge produc-
ers. Consider the situation that customers, suppliers, knowledge brokers, and
producers of company X were involved in producing innovation at t-1 and
company X takes up an initiative to adopt or develop breakthrough technologies.
This decision will have a tremendous impact upon the capabilities of company
X’s direct partners, as well as on indirect links in the network. Despite the critical
role of company X’s partners in its innovation at t -1, this does not necessarily
imply that the innovation at t0 renders related effects for company X’s partners,
and the wider network. The main message being this: whereas at time t-1
company X depended upon its partners’ capabilities to innovate, this is not
necessarily the case at time t0. Former collaborative relationships clearly
contributing to a company’s competitive edge can eventually become detrimental
to this later on (Afuah 2000), and hence collective efforts in networks are not
constant over time. This simple consequence also raises the intricate strategic
issue of staying with or switching suppliers, customers, or other innovation part-
ners that cannot keep up with the pace of innovations. A lock-in situation is
always looming ahead when innovative companies do not dare considering leav-
ing old partners. So it is not trivial question whether the impact of complete
networks on innovation will be as positive as often claimed. A network is not just
an aggregate of the strengths of its members, but also of its weaknesses at certain
points in time. From a dynamic perspective both strengths and weaknesses are
re-constructed with each innovative step made by members of the network.
To avoid redundancy, illustrations of how attributes of the structural patterns of
interactions potentially impact on innovation are described and explained in the
literature review itself (for further details on nv1-3 see appendix A).
Innovation policy measures
On the left-hand side of figure 10.1 there is a set of innovation policy measures 1
to N that can either have targeted or untargeted impacts, direct or indirect effects
on network variables, or the collective effort invested in innovation networks.
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Most of the functions of ions for innovation have also been recognised by policy-
makers. From an innovation policy point of view, any form of collaboration with
regard to innovation is very often considered to be ‘easy money’, inducing a low-
cost multiplier effect. This applies because resources are pooled, knowledge defi-
ciencies turn into complementarities, and the networks offer the conduits that let
the life blood of innovation and knowledge flow, while the partnering provides
the prisms with which the value of knowledge is tested and improved in situ. Do
policy makers in their current set of instruments utilise the leverage that
networks potentially have for innovation (eq. 5) or not? And if so, does the design
of policy instruments and the policy portfolio draw upon network effects directly
or indirectly, targeted or untargeted?
10.4 the literature review
10.4.1 method of literature review
In an effort to identify recent empirical work on the relationship between (whole)
inter-organisational network characteristics and innovation, an extensive review
of the literature was undertaken. First, a search for journal articles utilising Web
of Science, ProQuest abi/Inform, and Google Scholar was conducted. Consistent
with the broad range of definitions of both networks and innovation in the litera-
ture, our search terms included: networks, inter-organisational networks,
centrality, small worlds, density, innovation, innovative performance, innova-
tion outcomes, as well as combinations of these search terms. The search was
limited to the 27-year period from 1980 to 2007 because most empirical work on
networks and innovation has been done in recent years. The results were then
analysed with respect to their relevance for organisation studies. Because many
network studies exist in a variety of fields, those articles falling outside of studies
of networks and organisations were discarded. For example, many articles in
computer science address computer networks, and many in the health field deal
with neural networks. After the initial analysis, the abstracts of the articles that
remained were investigated. Often, the abstracts provided ample information
micro-foundations for innovation policy
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Table 10.2 Effects of innovation policies on features of networks
Direct Indirect
Targeted  Cooperation required and evaluated  Cooperation promoted but not required
at funding application in funding application
Untargeted NWO* fundamental research asking  Measures that distribute R&D grants
for team composition and former  Measures that promote start-up founding
cooperation. about the methods and unit of analysis. Based on a reading of these abstracts,
many articles that focused on individuals and their social networks could be
eliminated. Once relevant articles and potentially relevant articles were identi-
fied, the complete articles were studied to make sure that each fit the require-
ments of this study.
Second, each article that fulfilled the requirement of focusing on the relationship
between inter-organisational network features and aspects of innovative behav-
iour of organisations was then indexed. A summary was produced for each arti-
cle, which listed the following topics:
1. Source: Reference to the empirical study reviewed;
2. Network measure: Description of the network measure(s) applied in the
study;
3. Type of tie: Description of the type of tie studied in the paper (e.g., informa-
tion sharing or joint product development);
4. Boundary specification: Description of the type of actors that are part of the
inter-organisational network;
5. Innovation outcome measure: Description of measure applied to indicate the
innovative performance of organisations;
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 6. Key findings: Description of the key empirical findings of a study as far as the
relationship between network characteristics and innovative behaviour of
organisations is concerned.
The article summaries provided us with easily identifiable markers for compar-
isons of the research being conducted in the field.
10.4.2 findings: networks of inter-organisational relations and
innovation
This section reports on a literature review of empirical studies using measures
indicating network characteristics on the one hand, and innovation on the organ-
isational level on the other. The results of this review are presented in table 3.
Innovation: multiple measures
The majority of the studies listed – ten out of 25 – used patent-related indicators
as innovation outcome measure: patent intensity, counts of patent applications,
number of granted patents, successful patenting, and received patent applica-
tions. In addition to this, there are a number of studies that used self-reports of
innovative performance (Oerlemans, Meeus, Boekema 1998; Ebadi and Utterback
1994; Ruef 2002; Zollo, Reuer and Singh 2002). Some studies focus on the
market introduction of innovations using the number of (new) products intro-
duced on the market (Zahra and Nielsen 2002; Fey and Birkinshaw 2005;
Capaldo, 2007) or innovative sales (Faems, Van Looy and Debackere 2005) as
performance indicators. Other studies apply rather unique innovation outcome
measures. Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr (1996) apply growth of the number of
employees, and subsequent r&d alliances, whereas Baum, Calabrese, and Silver-
man report on r&d spending and growth, and r&d employees growth. There is
only one study that uses creativity as innovation outcome measure (Uzzi and
Spiro 2005).
The observation of this diversity in innovation measures reveals that network
research: (a) focuses mainly on innovation generation, (b) is more oriented to the
early phases of the innovation process (exploration, r&d) than to the commer-
cialisation and exploitation stage.
Different types of centrality in inter-organisational networks and
innovation
Centrality is an important property of an individual actor within an organisa-
tional network, and is a structural measure of the importance of a given player in
the network (see appendix A for an explanation of commonly used centrality
measures). Centrality derives from being the object of relations from other
actors, which mostly1 as in earlier chapters] implies that the central actor is
‘attractive’ as a partner in the eyes of other actors.
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and innovation. In literature, three theoretical mechanisms are proposed to
substantiate this hypothesis. First, there is a resource-based argument: if central-
ity is taken as a proxy for the quantity and quality of critical resources available to
an actor, it can be argued that actors that are more central are more likely to have
‘slack’ resources that facilitate experimentation and innovation. Second, there is a
knowledge-based argument: Innovation is more likely to occur in a rich and
complex knowledge environment, as organisations are exposed to a wide variety
of cues that stimulate innovation. A more central actor is at the crossroads of a
larger number of knowledge and information sources, and it is therefore better
positioned to innovate. Furthermore, a more central actor is more likely to
receive earlier innovation-related information, knowledge and influence as
compared to less central organisations in the same network. Third, there is a
status-based argument: a more central actor is unlikely to imitate already wide-
spread practices, which are in use by ‘followers’. Rather, the former will either
innovate or imitate other highly central peers. Put differently: an imitator may
not be selected as an attractive partner as much as an innovator would be. Such an
argument is consistent with the proposition that first movers must continue to
innovate in order to maintain a central position.
Extensive empirical support confirms that centrality is positively related to inno-
vation. Most studies (see table 3) use a combination of various centrality meas-
ures (degree, betweenness, closeness) and patent-related performance measures.
All studies report that higher levels of centrality are positively related to innova-
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Figure 10.2 Degree, Closeness and Betweenness Centrality
Notes: j is the actor with the highest degree centrality
i is the actor with the highest betweenness centrality


















stive performance. Studies using other outcome measures (Powell et al. 1996)
arrive at a similar conclusion. Therefore, one can conclude that (a) the empirical
evidence about the relationship between centrality and innovative performance
of organisations is rather robust, and (b) that as far as the evidence applies both
innovation in the exploration and exploitation stage benefits from E’s centrality.
Range in inter-organisational networks and innovation
Network range is the second structural property of the inter-organisational
network of the focal actor that is assumed to influence innovative behaviour.
Network range implies that the organisations that are part of the network are
dissimilar in some way.
Two theoretical arguments can be found in the literature that ground the relation-
ship between network range and innovation. First, if a focal actor would rely on
inter-organisational relationships with actors of the same type (a so-called homo-
geneous set of ties; Ruef, 2002), there is a risk that there are no mechanisms for
iterative and diverse learning feedback with respect to an innovation. This
implies that innovators depending exclusively on these ties will tend to adapt
novelties to their own circumstances and needs without necessarily engaging in
further innovation. Focal actors related to a diverse set of actors may subject their
innovations to further modifications, as they receive diverse feedback from
multiple actors. In sum, in this argument network range or diversity functions as
a sounding board for the innovating focal actor.
Secondly, having inter-organisational relationships with a diverse set of actors
might imply access to complementary assets needed to turn inventions into
successful new or improved products on the market. Moreover, interacting with a
more diverse set of actors might encourage the transfer of knowledge and infor-
micro-foundations for innovation policy
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Figure 10.3 The Range of Networks
Note: Different shapes and colors of nodes indicate differences between the actors in the network
Network with a low range Network with a high rangemation, which, when combined with internally available knowledge resources,
could lead to the creation and development of processes and products that would
otherwise be difficult to mobilise and to develop. An organisation with higher
network range will, therefore, have access to a more diverse and unique set of
(knowledge and information) resources that could lead to competitive advan-
tages. Moreover, this could mean that an actor within such a diverse network has
a more efficient-effective network as it has access to resources that are not dupli-
cated or redundant.
The most commonly found hypothesis on the relationship between network
range and innovation is a positive one: higher levels of range are beneficial to
innovation.
In table 3, four studies report on the empirical relationship between range and
innovation (Powell et al. 1999; Baum et al. 2000; Ruef 2002; Faems et al. 2005).
Although these studies use different criterion variables, they all arrive at the
same finding: higher levels of network range (diversity of Ps) are positively
related to organisational innovative performance. Faems et. al. (2005) confirm
the effect of network range for the exploitation stage, whereas the other three
studies (Powell et al. 1999; Baum et al. 2000; Ruef 2002) do the same for the
exploration phase.
Type of actor and innovation
A number of scholars research the relationship between the type of actor(s) an
organisation interacts with on the one hand and innovative behaviour on the
other. It is assumed that a specific type of actor is a source of specific knowledge
and information. For example, universities or research labs are assumed to be
sources of basic research knowledge that enables the innovative performance of
the organisations that are on the receiving end of the transfer (Rothmaermel and
Deeds 2004). In most cases, it is hypothesized that partnering with a specific
type of partner has a positive impact on (parts of) the innovative process or
performance of an organisation. A notable exception is a tie with a rival or
competitor. We start our discussion with this type of actor.
Forming a relationship with a competitor can be beneficial to an organisation as
this competitor possesses complementary assets or can give access to new
markets, which could enhance organisational performance. However, for a
number of reasons allying with a competitor can be a “risky business” (Park and
Russo 1996):
–C ollaborations between competitors have a higher risk of uncontrolled infor-
mation disclosure;
–C o m p e titors have, due to comparable knowledge bases and competences, a
greater capability to appropriate disclosed knowledge and information (high
relational absorptive capacity).
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willingness to share knowledge, which in turn might lead to tie instability or
even failure (Park and Russo, 1996), or lower performance levels. In sum, the
literature assumes a negative impact of collaborating with rivals on innovative
performance. This hypothesis is confirmed in the empirical literature (Baum,
Calabrese and Silverman 2000; Mowery, Oxley and Silverman 1996).
In other studies other actor types, varying from universities with specific r&d
expertise (Fey and Birkinshaw 2005) to links with institutional partners and
providers of financial resources (Goes and Park 1997), are introduced as being
conducive for the innovative behavior and performance of organisations. It can be
derived from table 3, that in most cases (with the exception of administrative
links) a positive impact is empirically found irrespective of the way innovation
outcomes are measured.
Some scholars take a more configurational approach in which groups of types of
network actors are assumed to have similar (knowledge) resources, which have
effects on specific parts of the innovation process and its outcomes. A good
example of this can be found in the paper by Rothaermel and Deeds (2004), who
argue that so-called exploration alliances, in which it is the aim to jointly discover
something new, are of importance to product development in firms. These explo-
ration alliances refer to ties with organisations conducting basic research, drug
discovery or development. Exploitation alliances, that consist of collaborations
with actors competent on improvement and refinement of existing capabilities
(e.g., actors conducting clinical trials and are specialized in marketing and sales of
products), are thought to be conducive for the successful market introduction of
product innovation.
Both Rothmaermel and Deeds (2005) and Faems et al. (2005) empirically explore
the effects of exploration and exploitation on innovation outcomes of organisa-
micro-foundations for innovation policy
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Figure 10.5 The Density of Networks
Network with a low density (approximately 8%) Network with a high density (approximately 40%)tions in which a combination of type of partner and degree centrality are used as
independent variables. They conclude that exploitation ties are beneficial for the
development or sales of new products, whereas exploration ties tend to have a
positive impact on market introduction and sales of product innovations.
Network density and innovation
Theoretical literature suggests that network density will be positively related to
the innovation .
There are two main arguments for the proposed positive effect between the
density of a network and innovation:
– An information argument: high network density indicates higher levels of
communication in the network, which increases the probability that actors
will be exposed to novelties, information, and knowledge. These external
inputs stimulate innovation;
–A  socialisation argument: high density networks function as ‘cliques’ creating
strong behavioural pressures that facilitate the development of trust and
shared values and norms, and lower the chance of opportunistic behaviour and
its related negative reputation effects. As a result, high density networks have
favourable conditions for (especially tacit) knowledge transfer.
The empirical studies reporting on the relationship between network density
levels and innovative outcomes produce mixed findings. Ahuja (2000) shows, for
firms in the chemical sector, that a higher density impacts positively on innova-
tion outcomes. McEvily and Zaheer (1999), however, report an opposite effect:
lower density levels in advice networks are positively related to the adoption of
new organisational practices. Obviously, these different effects of network
density on innovation outcomes can be caused by sectoral differences and differ-
ent ways of measuring network density and innovation outcomes.
Gilsing and Nooteboom (2005) find indications that density levels perform
differently for different networks. In networks that are focused on exploration,
higher density levels are important because it is not clear yet which knowledge
will be important and consequently, having ties with many actors that produce
different types of new knowledge, keeps options open. Moreover, having redun-
dancy in ties can be beneficial due to the fact that network entry and exit is high.
Third, under the condition that the level of newness of knowledge is high in
exploration networks, one may need third parties to supplement one’s absorptive
capacity.
Tie strength and innovation
In the literature, there is an ongoing debate on the influence of the strength of
inter-organisational ties in networks on innovation in general and on innovation
outcomes in particular (Gilsing and Nooteboom 2005). One stream of research
argues that the stronger the tie with a partner, the higher the actor’s commitment
is to the collaboration, and the more likely the tie is a factor in its behaviour. Uzzi
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tion, the development of trust, and complex adaptation to environmental
changes. Moreover, strong ties are associated with strong behavioural pressures
to conform. These are the result of the desire to keep a relationship going and the
wish not to endanger it by behaving in an opportunistic way. Thus, the argument
is that strong ties favour the exchange of (often tacit) and more complex knowl-
edge in networks, which is beneficial to the innovative performance of organisa-
tions.
Another stream of research (Granovetter 1973; Burt 1992) has proposed that weak
ties are more beneficial to innovation. (Many) strong ties in networks are redun-
dant as they lead to actors that possess the same or similar knowledge. This is
even more the case in densely knit networks. As a result, this knowledge is avail-
able to many, and few innovative and competitive advantages can be derived
from it. Moreover, establishing and maintaining strong ties is costly and organisa-
tions with strong ties might become myopic and not open to new knowledge and
insights. Strong ties might also lead to routinisation of behaviour, which hampers
creativity and innovation. Therefore, from an innovation perspective it is more
effective to maintain weak ties.
Although the concept of tie strength is widely accepted in the field of network
studies, there is far less agreement on how the concept should be measured.
Operationalisations of tie strength vary from the frequency or intensity of
knowledge or information transfer to indicators of the level of commitment (e.g.,
dedicated investments or the level of reciprocity) in an inter-organisational rela-
tionship. By implication, it can be concluded that there is no consensus on the
measurement of this important concept.
Despite these measurement differences, a majority of the studies in our literature
sample reports a positive relationship between tie strength in networks and inno-
vation outcomes (Oerlemans, Meeus and Boekema 1998; Rindfleish and Moor-
man 2001; Zollo, Reuer and Singh 2002; Fey and Birkinshaw 2005; Capaldo
2007). Some studies, however, found the opposite effect (Ruef, 2002) or no
statistically confirmed relationship (McEvily and Zaheer 1999).
An interesting result is presented by Capaldo (2007) in his case study on the
innovative performance of three design-intensive furnishing manufacturers.
Although the strong tie argument is supported in this study, he also finds that so-
called dual networks, which are not dominated by weak nor by strong ties, are
most conducive to innovative performance. Put differently, in network struc-
tures dominated by strong ties innovative performance slows down as compared
to dual network structures.
Small world networks and innovation
Small world networks are network structures which are characterised by high
local clustering, while at the same time having short path length.
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also collaborators with one another, whereas short path length indicates that
there is a relatively low number of intermediaries between all pairs of actors in
the network. A small network influences behaviour through a structural and 
a relational mechanism. The more a network becomes ‘small worldly’, the 
more the links between network components/clusters increase in frequency,
which potentially enables the knowledge available within network components
to be distributed throughout the global network (structural mechanism). More-
over, the more a network becomes small worldly, the more the links between 
the network components/clusters are made up of repeated ties and third-party
ties, which potentially increased the level of cohesion in the global networks.
However, the theoretical literature proposes two hypotheses on how these
potential effects materialise in actual (innovation) performance of organisations:
a positive and a curvilinear relationship. As to the former, it is argued that as the
network’s connectedness and cohesiveness increases, the flow of creative ideas
and promising collaborations between network components are facilitated.
Moreover, the greater the level of repeated ties and third-party links, the greater
the risk-sharing and the development of trust. These lines of thought suggest 
that an increase in a network’s small world character can boost the performance
of the global network and its participants (depending, however, on their network
position) by making the exchange of conventions, as well as risk taking, more
likely.
The latter argument suggests that both low and high levels of connectivity and
cohesion in a network can be a liability for innovative performance. In case of 
low levels, there are few links between network components and links are not
disproportionately formed through credible third-party or repeated ties, which
isolates creative knowledge in separate clusters in the global network. As levels 
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Figure 10.6 The Smallworldiness of Networks
Network with a low Smallworldiness Network with a low Smallworldinessof connectivity and cohesion increase, separate network components become
more interlinked and linked by actors who know and trust each other. These
processes facilitate the flow of creative knowledge and help to build cohesive
network components that support more risky collaboration and innovative
behaviour. However, beyond a certain threshold, the same processes can create
liabilities for collaboration and its outcomes. Increased structural connectivity
reduces the innovative distinctiveness of network components, which leads to a
homogenisation of the pool of knowledge. At the same time, problems of exces-
sive cohesion (e.g., overlooking relevant information that is deviant from existing
views) can occur. Both processes produce lower performance levels.
In their empirical study on small worlds and innovation, Flemming, King, and
Juda (2004) find that decreasing path length and increased local clustering (the
two ingredients needed to determine the level of small worldliness) have a posi-
tive impact on innovation outcomes (measured as successful patent applications).
However, their small world measure turned out to be statistically insignificant in
all models investigated. Flemming et al. argue that this lack of results might be
due to a lack of diversity within a network component or a tendency that over
time pressures of conformity result in a culture of risk aversion.
Uzzi and Spiro (2005) studied networks of teams of creative artists producing
musicals. They hypothesize and find an inverted U-shape relationship between
small world network structures and levels of creativity of the production teams.
Actor characteristics and innovation
Under this heading, two partner characteristics and their relationship with the
innovative outcomes of organisations are discussed: alliance experience and part-
ner characteristics.
There is an emerging literature on alliance capabilities of organisations (Gulati
1999; Kale, Dyer and Singh 2002; Ireland, Hitt and Vaidyanath 2002; Rothaermel
and Deeds 2006). An important argument in this literature is that the relevance
of features of inter-organisational relationships and networks has been overem-
phasised, whereas the capabilities of organisations to manage these relationships
and networks often have been neglected. Amongst others, this literature
proposes that the more experienced an organisation is in collaboration, the
higher its alliance success will be. An important way of developing alliance capa-
bilities is through prior or repeated collaborative ties (prior ties with the same
partner). Prior and repeated ties do not only signal commitment and produce
trust between partners (cf. the tie strength argument), but also enable an organi-
sation to learn from its past experiences. Thus, the more prior ties an organisa-
tion has, the higher the probability that its collaboration will be successful (i.e.,
will generate higher innovation outcomes).
While reviewing this literature, an interesting pattern emerged: although the
number of prior ties seems to be beneficial for the success of collaboration in
micro-foundations for innovation policy
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organisations. Both in the Stuart (2000) paper and in the paper by Zollo, Reuer,
and Singh (2002), it was found that the number of prior ties (even in similar tech-
nological fields) did not impact on innovation outcomes. The number of prior ties
with the same partner (repeated ties) does, however, have an impact on innova-
tive performance, which also might be interpreted as the effects of the develop-
ment of a stronger tie over time.
The innovativeness of a direct or indirect partner is a partner characteristic that
influences the innovative outcomes of a focal organisation. Stuart (2000) shows
that more innovative direct partners are beneficial for the ego, whereas Ahuja
(2000) presents similar findings for indirect partners using weighted path length
as an indicator (i.e., path length to an indirect actor times the innovativeness of
this actor).
10.4.3 summary: main findings in the literature
Table 4 summarises the main findings of this literature review. The table depicts
the network characteristics applied, the hypothesized relationship between a
network measure and the innovative outcomes of an organisation, and the empir-
ical findings in relation to these hypotheses (confirmed, mixed findings,
rejected).
From the findings reported in table 4, it can be deducted that in a majority of
cases the hypothesized relationship between a network characteristic and the
innovative outcomes of organisations is confirmed. This seems to be true for
‘network centrality’, ‘network range’, ‘type of actor’, and ‘repeated ties’, often
irrespective of the way in which the network characteristic or innovative
performance actually is measured. For these cases one can conclude that despite
the relatively small number of papers, empirical findings tend to be rather robust
and consistent. In other cases (‘density’, ‘tie strength’, ‘small worldiness’, and
‘prior ties’), this cannot be concluded. Explanations for these latter results are the
use of differing measures for these network features and innovative performance,
sample differences, or the possible influence of diverse characteristics of innova-
tion (e.g., incremental versus radical) on empirical findings.
The large majority of the papers looked at the generation of innovation (22), two
had adoption as a topic. A real comparison with network effects on adoption
processes is not doable. As to the stages of innovation it turned out that most of
the papers were limited to the exploration stage (ten papers), six focused on the
exploitation stage, and six papers used criterion variables combining exploration
and exploitation stages. There were no systematic differences in effects of
distinct network measures on innovation in the exploration and exploitation
stages.
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Table 10.3 Inter-organisational relationship and network characteristics and their impact on the
innovative behaviour of organisations
Source Network Type of tie Boundary Innovation Main findings
measure specification outcome
measure
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Table 10.3 Inter-organisational relationship and network characteristics and their impact on the 
innovative behaviour of organisations  (Continued)
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Table 10.3 Inter-organisational relationship and network characteristics and their impact on the
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ported10.5 innovation policy and networks: the policy section
In this section we ask two questions:
1. To what extent is the current Dutch innovation policy portfolio geared toward
creating and facilitating ions?
2. To what extent does the current Dutch innovation policy portfolio (un-)
targeted, (in-) directly draw upon network mechanisms to foster innovation?
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Table 10.4 Overview of findings
Network characteristic Hypothesized relationship between  Main findings
network characteristic and innovative
outcomes
Centrality (different measures) Positive Confirmed
Network range Positive Confirmed
Type of actor: competitor Negative Confirmed
Type of actor: other actors Positive Confirmed
Network density Positive Mixed findings
Tie strength Positive Mixed findings
Negative Mixed findings
Small worldiness Positive Rejected
Inverted U-shaped Confirmed
Alliance experience:
Prior ties Positive Rejected
Repeated ties Positive ConfirmedDiagnosis and policy initiatives
In the ‘Annual Innovation Policy Trends and Appraisal Report’ (ec 2006: 26) 
an important element relates to this topic. The reviewers infer: “There is limited
interaction among the actors in the National Innovation System; inadequate
exploitation of research results”. This observation, which was characterised 
as the ‘knowledge paradox’, has been translated into a number of challenges 
for Dutch innovation policy, one of which is to promote collaboration among
companies in general, as well as more specifically the promotion of collaboration
between industry and the public knowledge infrastructure.
Box 10.1 The status of the Dutch National Innovation System (nis)
Based on the figures presented above, the following conclusions can be drawn concerning the
status of the Dutch nis:
–T h e   innovative performance of the Netherlands as measured by different indicators (input,
throughput, and output) can be regarded as good: the quality of scientific research output is
high, there is a high level of patenting, a high share of financing of public research by industry,
and there are high rates of usage of ict and access to ict applications.
–T h e   nis, however is also characterised by specific features and (structural) problems that
weaken the strong innovative performance of the Netherlands, while countries with less-
favourable innovation performance seem to be catching up (the Netherlands is ‘losing momen-
tum’ according to the European Innovation Scoreboard):
•T o t al financial efforts in r&d expenditure are stagnating, business expenditure on r&d
lags behind, compared to main competitors.
•I n c r e a sing shortage of highly educated people, especially in science and technology;
mismatch between outflow from education and demand by industry.
•L imited interaction between the actors of the nis; inadequate exploitation of research results.
•L imited innovation entrepreneurial activity.
•P r o b l e ms concerning financing of (early stages of) innovation.
The strengths and weaknesses of the Dutch innovation system are in line with those identified
within the framework of the analyses, which forms the basis for the ‘Innovation Letter’ of 2003.
This innovation policy document of the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs describes the inte-
grated (interdepartmental) approach towards industry-oriented innovation policy, and forms the
basis/framework for the current instruments and their changes in the last years (see section 2.1.3).
The main innovation indicators on human resources, expenditure, employment, and ipr, do not
yet indicate any changes compared to the year when the new policy was launched. This has to do
with the fact that the current policy mix is under review, based on the results of the Innovation
Letter. Most importantly, measures taken in the area of r&d and innovation show a delayed impact
on the innovation system in general, and on economic performance in particular. The Dutch econ-
omy itself, therefore, seems unchanged in the last years, with some indications of recovery in the
first quarter of 2006. This is partly caused by the budget restrictions imposed by the current cabi-
net, as well as by the further rationalisation of production by the industry in order to cut costs. A
more structural economic growth, based on increased labour productivity levels, is not predicted.
Source: Based on ec, 2006: 33
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In figure 3 one can see the number of recent initiatives that address this 
challenge.
Source: Annual Innovation Policy Trends and Appraisal Report, 2006: 37
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Figure 10.7 Innovation challenges and policy responses
Exhibit 11: Innovation challenges and plicy responses
Measures responding to the challenge
• (intensifying) wbso (nl_5 – a generic fiscal scheme to stimulate 
investments r&d by entrepreneurs
• Innovation Subsidy for Collaborative Projects (nl_45) – stimulates 
national and international technological collaboration between 
companies and the Ministry of Economic Affairs to invest more in 
innovation.
•D e l t a   Plan Science and Technology
•C asimir scheme (nl_48) – promoting public-private mobility of 
researchers
• Innovation omnibus (nl_52) – a legal framework for innovation 
programmes in selected key areas. Many current innovation measures will
be brought under the omnibus regulation as ‘modules’. 
A pilot innovation programme is currently developed in three sectors 
(Food & Flowers, Water, and Hightech Systems & Materials)
• iop-lti Module (nl_54) – uniting ‘old’ measures Leading Technological Insti-
tutes (nl_19) and Innovation oriented Research Programmes (nl_18)
•C hallengers module (nl_55)
•S mart-Mix (nl_53) – to stimulate public-private consortia performing excel-
lent and relevant research
•C asimir (nl_48) to stimulate public-private mobility
•T echnoPartner Knowledge Exploitation Subsidy Arrangement (nl_43)
•I nvestment Grants for Knowledge infrastructure (nl_29)
•P rogramme-basid funding of Large Technological Institutes and tno
•F u n d i n g  o f  e x cellent relevant scientific-technological university research via
the Technology Foundation stw
•V a lorisation grant (nl_49) – to promote the creation of spin-offs
• Innovation vouchers (nl_47) to stimulate interaction and exchange
between smes and the knowledge infrastructure
•R egional Attention and Action for Knowledge circulation (raak; nl_51)
– to improve interaction and exchange between smes and vocational higher
education institutes
TechnoPartner Action Programme (nl_43), including:
•S eed Facility – to improve and mobilize the Dutch venture capital market
• Pre-seed Facility – to help potential technostarters
•P atent Facility – to help knowledge institutes to professionalise patent 
policies
•T echnoPartner Label – to help techno-starters obtain a bank loan
Key challenge
1. Total financial efforts
in r&d expenditure are 
stagnating
2. Increasing shortage 
of hrst.
3. Limited interaction 
between the actors of 
the nis; inadequate 
exploitation of research
results
4. Problems concerning 
financing of (early stages 
of innovation.Besides the fact that the third key challenge – expanding collaboration – is
covered with the largest number of policy measures, it turns out that all other key
challenges (1, 2, and 4), are part of measures mentioned under key challenge
collaboration. This is the first strong indication that the Dutch innovation portfo-
lio is drawing upon generic network mechanisms. In order to understand how
these policy measures do utilise network mechanisms each policy measure is
briefly explained.
The measure Innovation Subsidy for Collaborative Projects (nl-45) stimulates, as
one of the exceptions, international technological collaboration between compa-
nies and/or public knowledge institutes. In terms of budget, the scheme is a
substantial measure (approximately 100 million euros per year). In 2007, this
measure became integrated into the new innovation omnibus legislation (nl 52),
with part of it being transformed into a credit facility rather than a grant (ec
2006: 45). In the Innovation Performance Contracts there is also the opportunity
to make part of the agreement with the Ministry of Economic Affairs a network
effort. The Casimir scheme is based on the assumption that there are exchange
relations that exist between organisations; otherwise exchange of personnel is an
empty proposition.
In the Innovation Oriented Research Programme and the Large Technological
Institutes module (iop-lti nl 54) the target is to align applied scientific research
to the needs of the business community, and to involve the industry in this type
of research. As one can see in table 1, there are large differences in the prevalence
of r&d collaboration between the two iops. In the Man-Machine Interaction iop
some 60 percent of the iop participants reported relations with the knowledge
infrastructure, whereas the Image Processing iop reports about 17 percent of r&d
cooperation with knowledge institutes.
In the Challenger module (nl 55) the aim is to create spin-offs from knowledge
institutes. Because this is very often associated with the maintenance of relations
with the parent institute it indeed contributes to the web of relations adding to
the valorisation frontiers of scientific knowledge. The start-up company usually
initiates its activity with a search for commercialisation options in the business
community, and there the linkage formation starts.
The Smart Mix module (nl 53) is the most prominent programme in this series of
measures. € 100 million euros are annually available to stimulate public-private
consortia on collaborative research of users, or buyers of scientific knowledge,
and knowledge producers like university and large public research institutes. It is
important that this programme requires that funding recepients organise a
network of ‘excellent’ partners out of the business and science community.
The Technopartner programme (nl 43) also focuses on the foundation of high-
tech start-ups. In terms of providing support for the creation of collaborative
networks, this programme follows the same rationale as the Challenger module.
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tion of scientific research findings. Of course this means that finding utilisation
partners is the priority of this measure. There are several ltis in the Netherlands
that actively collaborate with industry and government. For instance the Water-
loopkundig Laboratory has a strong interaction with the Rijkswaterstaat (author-
ity for infrastructure and water).
The innovation vouchers (nl 47) concentrate entirely on getting scientific knowl-
edge from university to industry. Organisations that are in urgent need of
specialist knowledge can apply for an innovation voucher in order to engage
university researchers on a consultancy basis on requested topics.
Finally the Regional Attention and Action for Knowledge circulation (raak; nl
51) has the explicit aim of stimulating the exchange of knowledge at the regional
level.
In addition there are many regional programmes that provide an impetus to
collaborate locally. Also there is stw (Foundation for technical sciences) which
organises collaborative research projects in the way it is done in the iops; appli-
cants for research funding have to organise a utilisers/buyers network, which has
to confirm their contribution to the project, either in time or with in-kind invest-
ments.
The Dutch innovation policy portfolio: An assessment from a network perspective
The remaining question is to what extent do these policy measures implicitly or
explicitly target the kind of network features that we found to have more or less
robust – but significant – effects upon innovative behaviour? It is clear that none
of the measures has an explicit target of affecting one specific network feature.
For that reason it is better to look at the portfolio of innovation measures and see
to what extent their impacts cumulate or counteract, and to what extent their
network impacts are more or less explicit. Subsequently, we will answer the
following questions:
–H o w   is network size affected?
–H ow is density affected?
–H ow is centrality affected?
–H o w   is tie strength affected?
–H o w   are structural holes, i.e., brokerage affected?
–H ow are small world effects affected ?
In table 3, network range turned out to be beneficial for innovation if the ties are
more diverse. There are at least two policy measures that explicitly have an
impact on this network feature: Technopartner and Challenger. The functions of
the Technopartner and additional measures such as Challenger are very impor-
tant because they foster the founding of start-ups, and these new entrants add
new and diverse nodes to the population rendering potential new relations:
Technopartner opts for backing innovative technology-driven start ups, though
related to the mainstream technologies. In Challenger start-ups, or programmes
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nological opportunity set. This latter category is in general considered to be one
of the ways in which the crowding out of r&d investments is prevented. Both
measures induce new r&d trajectories, which are signalled by start-ups founded
in the Challenger module.
Except for these main effects of creating new entrants in a sector, additional
nodes have several other effects. First, new entrants enlarge the partnering
opportunities, which is a continuous issue in sectoral vitality. Funding start-ups
has signalling value for technology opportunities, and simultaneously legitimises
partnering options. Of course one should take into account the relatively high
proportion of tie failures (Oerlemans, Gössling and Jansen 2007, for a review;
Powell et al. 2005: 1165, for figures in the life sciences industry; Van der Valk and
Faber 2007, for figures in Dutch dedicated life sciences firms). However, there is a
positive side to tie failure, because it most certainly adds to the partnering capa-
bilities. Given the positive impacts of networks on innovation, partnering capa-
bilities are a key part of the innovation process. The more competent partners are
selected out. A decisive criterion to continue or to stop a partnership is the
contributions of partners to the innovation project – and hence the innovative
performance of collaborators guides network expansion over time although in an
indirect way.
As we saw in table 3, there is a tendency that strong ties (Rindfleisch and Moor-
man 2001; Gilsing and Nooteboom 2005; Oerlemans, Meeus and Boekema 1998),
and weak ties (Ruef 2002), respectively configurations of strong and weak ties
(small world) contribute to creativity (Capaldo 2007; Uzzi and Sprio 2005). New
entrants and especially start-ups serve in inter-organisational perspective – not
from a social network perspective – as weak ties, they create non-redundancy in a
network. Weak ties are in general considered to have a bridging function, which
is often pivotal to solve problems in innovation projects, and even more to gener-
ate innovation and creativity, so there is a genuine need for weak ties. Start-ups
add to the number of weak ties, even despite their relatively low absorptive
capacity, and hence create additional options to achieve satisfactory innovative
performance.
Because start-ups are in general small and young, especially in case of university
spin-offs, but also with entrepreneurial company founding, they have to cope
with the liability of newness, and one way to do so is by means of partnering.
Because of the inclination to search locally, many start-ups initially prefer part-
nerships with their old departments, or the company they spun out from. This
leads to what is called a rewiring of the network, in fact existing relations are
repeated although now with another governance form. Former colleagues e.g., in
stw-collaborative projects become allies and this adds to the network size and its
diversity, and yields additional means to carry out r&d and innovation projects.
The point is that expanding the number of partnering oriented nodes – therefore
particularly small high-tech start-ups – also has an impact upon density of a
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organisations that is actually engaged in a relationship, this would mean that
density increases only if each node added initiates more than one partnership. In
high-tech sectors that is likely.
Enlarging the size of the network by adding nodes with a high likelihood of part-
nering can also be achieved by means of active business venturing of large compa-
nies such as dsm or Shell. Shell Livewireand dsm business venturing, or Rijk-
swaterstaat’s Future Centre, because all promote the founding of new companies
by (former) employees. It is very interesting to see that large numbers of start-ups
realised by dsm venturing are located in the us. Each player in the Dutch banking
sector has this kind of business venturing activities as well: Fortis, Rabo Bank,
ing, and abn amro.
As to the current portfolio of policy measures, there is none that explicitly draws
upon network centrality. Despite the positive effects of centrality measures on
innovative behaviour it is difficult to imagine how one can affect this directly
with policy measures. The only agent who can work on centrality is the focal
organisation (E) in the network. By means of partnering E can expand the number
of ties. However, it is pretty well known that for instance in the biotech sector, in
health research, or in food research there is a central role for universities and ltis,
and a very small number of mnos, with large r&d laboratories. Policy measures,
for example smart mix, stw, and iop, put those players in leading positions
because they have the absorptive capacity, the financial means, and the partner-
ing capabilities to compete for larger r&d projects that have to be prepared with
consortia of excellent partners.
For tie strength our assessment is similar to centrality: it is E in particular who
decides about the intensity and frequency of contacts. However, here the criteria
for funding developed in application protocols do define base-line tie strength. In
the stw, eet,2 iop, lti one can find specifications as to the kind of exchange, the
manner of resourcing a partnership (in kind, or additional funding), which in 
fact transforms relations into literally valued graphs. For instance in the smart
mix module one can see that per participant fundamental research is funded for
75 percent at maximum, applied research is funded at maximum for 50 percent,
whereas for pre-competitive research only 25 percent is funded. E is also asked to
indicate its own investment in the project. This implies that partners who cannot
deliver their negotiated share of the matching are dropped.
How can brokerage be affected? We think that the Innovation Relay Centres have
a strong brokerage effect in the Dutch innovation community. These intermedi-
aries have contacts in many different sectors, and can combine this into creative
solutions. Also E can organise brokerage more easily by the recruitment of people
who have experience across industrial/service sectors and in that sense can link
distinct knowledge and technological trajectories.
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strong ties, and globally weak ties, the aforementioned arguments with respect to
tie strength apply. Yet there is one relevant specification here, which is that global
dispersion of ties is facilitated more at the eu level in the framework programme
(which is left out of this story), than at the national level. On the contrary even,
in general there is a restrictive approach to the funding of international collabora-
tion. A conclusion could be that in the Dutch innovation policy portfolio there is
little room, and virtually no explicit attention to, the small world effect on inno-
vative performance. The international dimension needs further attention. For
instance in almost 25 years of stwresearch involving hundreds of projects there
have been less than a handful of international collaborations. Recently Peeks in
the Delta paid some attention to regional innovation policies and the need of the
northern regions to develop international collaboration with Eastern Europe.
Unfortunately those policy schemes are the exceptions, which emphasise even
more the sort of introversion of Dutch innovation policy as far as small worlds
are concerned.
Finally, it is important to emphasise that the wbsoscheme plays an important –
though generic – role in creating attractive partners. According to Ahuja (2000)
two distinct forces drive partnering: inducements and opportunities. Induce-
ments urge a company to collaborate, not being able to go it alone. But a company
can also be invited to collaborate because of its attractivity for another company.
Winning wbso-grants can easily be such an attractor, and many companies use
those grants in this way, because it proves that they are doing state-of-the-art
r&d. In that sense the wbsoscheme plays an essential role, because it improves
actor characteristics fostering inclusion in innovation networks.
10.6 some concluding remarks
The critical part of our innovation policy measures assessment derives from two
observations: (1) creation of too few start-ups, and (2) not targeting small world
effects. It is well known that the number of start-ups in the Netherlands is rela-
tively low, which implies that the Dutch knowledge economy could create more
diversity and new partnering opportunities if this policy would work better.
Another rather delicate issue is that although the world of science and innovation
is international and not national, there seems to be a strong inclination to spend
public money on national collaborative innovation activities. Of course one can
say that there is too little research to assess the small world effect on innovation –
which we fully agree with – yet the logic of local dense networks and strong ties,
and globally sparse networks and weak ties has a strong appeal within the science
and innovation community, however this has yet to be translated into appropri-
ate policy measures.
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Utilization in policy measures
Not directly, but  indirectly in
lti,iop, and stw module
Yes, indirect, by creating 
start-ups, by Technopartner, 
and Challenger module
No
Yes, getting the knowledge 
infrastructure more actively
linked to the industry: 
smart mix, iop_lti, Innovation
Vouchers
Indirectly through start-ups 
Indirectly because of thresholds
baseline r&d efforts created for
new entrants in stw, eet, iop_lti,
and Smart Mix. 
This implies that a very small
population of organisations 
rewires their network over time
No
Indirectly, see tie strengthmicro-foundations for innovation policy
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An overview of the network characteristics influencing the innovative
behaviour of organizations
There are such an abundance of network measures that we cannot pretend to
present a complete overview of existing network measures (for such overviews
see Wasserman and Faust, 1997; Brandes and Erlebach, 2005). For this reason
here we present those network features that have, according to the existing
academic literature, been shown to have an influence on the innovative behav-
iour of organisations (see part 4).
Consequently, we need to specify and define those network attributes or vari-
ables which have been proven to relate to the level of innovative behaviour of
organisations.
From the perspective of an individual network actor, the following attributes are
potentially relevant when it comes to explaining innovative behaviour of an
organisation, E:
1. The type of actors E interacts with or does not interact with;
2. The type of relationships or ties E has or does not have with other actors;
3. The position of E in the overall network;
4. Characteristics of the overall network E is a part of: centralisation, size,
density, cohesiveness, stability;
5. The structural configuration of ties in the overall network.
Attribute 1. The type of actors E does or does not interact with
Here the idea is that the innovative behaviour of E is related to the type of other
actors E has relationships with (denoted as Ps in what follows). The following
factors can play a role in this:
–T he resources the Ps possess (new knowledge, new experience, legitimating
power, financial resources, etc.).
–T he position the Ps have in the overall network (centrality, status, brokerage
position, access to network resources, etc.).
–W h e t h e r   E has previously interacted with P.
–W hether E interacts with rivals or not.
–T he level of innovativeness of the actor E interacts with.
Ad 2. The type of relationships or ties E does or does not have with other
actors.
Central to a relational or network approach is the type of relationship (also called
relations, lines, or edges) between different actors. These relationships are
defined by certain content. Substantive relationships can range from friendships
and social contacts to formal contracts, working relationships, giving and/or
receiving advice, interlocking directorates.. Although the type of actor and the
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appendix atype of relationship will often be related (e.g., a contact between a public agency
being existent because of the provision of financial resources) often this is not
straightforward. It turns out that especially the fact that different types of rela-
tionships (multiplexity) exist between two organisations or within a network in
which E is embedded makes the patterns of interactions particularly valuable.
The following factors can be at play here:
–T h e  t y p e  of the relationship:
•I n f o r m a l
•F o r m a l
•E x c h a n g e of expertise
•E x p l o i t a t i o n oriented





–H a ving had prior ties (with P, with actors similar to P, or in general).
–T he degree of multiplexity of relationships.
–T h e  a g e of the relationships.
–T h e  f r equency of interaction.
–T h e  s t r ength of the relationship. Network ties are said to be strong when they
are exercised frequently, have been in existence for some time, and when there
is an emotional component to the link. Tie frequency refers to the number of
times a contact is made with the other actor during a stated time period. Tie
duration represents the amount of time that has elapsed since the tie was first
established. Emotional intensity captures the closeness of the relationships
that exist between the E and other actors (e.g., a friendship tie would be closer
than a business-only relationship).
Ad 3. The position of E in the overall network
Given the fact that networks differ in their structures (comparable to structures
in organisations) it is relevant for an actor’s functioning where the actor is located
in that structure, in other words what its position is in the network. In what
follows we introduce a number of such positions which have been shown to be
relevant.
The actor centrality of E
The centrality of an actor is traditionally considered important since it conditions
the degree to which an actor E does or does not have access to resources through-
out the network.
The following different types of centrality are commonly distinguished:
– Degree centrality: the number of direct relationships an actor has in a network
(but also the number of relationships an actor does not have in a network). The
degree centrality measures the expansivity and the popularity of an actor. An
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knowledge spillover benefits.
– Closeness centrality: Those actors that have the shortest path to all other
members of the network (inverse distance to all other members of the
network).
– Betweenness centrality captures the role of ‘Brokers’ or ‘Bridges’; those that
have the most indirect ties and can connect and disconnect parts in the
network.
– Own-value centrality starts from the idea that it is important to have many
links to other network members. However, it also takes into account the
centrality of the actors to which links exists and hypothesizes that it is more
important to have links to other central actors.
The indirect ties of E
Indirect ties of E (count, distance weighted count, or distance and information
weighted count). The position of E in the inter-organisational network. E’s link-
ages provide it with access not just to the knowledge held by its partners (direct
linkages) but also to the knowledge held by its partner’s partners. The position
of E in the network of inter-firm linkages can serve as a node in a flow of infor-
mation, with each firm in network being both a recipient and a transmitter 
of information. Strategic positioning of E: is E a ‘boundary spanner’, ‘hub’, or
‘connector’?
Attribute 4. Characteristics of the overall network E is part of:
centralisation, size, density, cohesiveness, stability
Here a number of network level variables are introduced. The idea being that the
broader network context in which E operates has a direct influence on its innova-
tive behaviour. For example, whereas actor centrality is an attribute of E influenc-
ing its behaviour, network centralisation is an attribute of the (entire) network E
is a part of. Whether E is part of a highly centralised network or a network with a
low centrality will create different constraints and possibilities.
Centralisationis computed by taking the average sum of the individual actor’s cen-
trality. It shows the tendency of a single firm to be more central than all others.
The size of a network is the number of actors in the network. In order to deter-
mine the size of a network it is important to have a precise understanding of what
the boundaries of the network are. Network size is important as it represents the
potential of the actor to utilise connections to gather resources.
The range of a network refers to the diversity of the contacts represented in the
network. Although larger networks tend to have greater range, this is not always
the case. An actor may have a great number of ties to one type of actor but few ties
to other types of actors. Another actor may have relatively few ties, however,
they may be connected to a greater diversity of other actors. Range is important
because it reflects the actor’s potential access to alternative resources.
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appendix aDensity captures how tightly knit a group or subgroup is. It is a proportion that
indicates the number of actual ties present in the group relative to the number of
possible ties in the group (i.e., if everyone had a relationship with everyone else
in the group). When calculating the density of E we look at how closely
connected the Ps are to each other.
There are several measures of cohesion, including density. However, one
common measure is the average number of ties it takes for an actor in the network
to ‘reach’ another actor in the network. If E is connected to P1 who is connected to
P2, then E is at a distance of 2 from P2. The average path distance for the group
gives an indication of the group’s cohesion.
Stability of the overall network: the degree to which actors enter and exit a
network.
Attribute 5. The structural configuration of ties in the overall network
– Closed social networks: Members of closed networks are connected to each
other.
– Disconnections (or structural holes) between Ps: ties are redundant to the
degree that they lead to the same actors. Structural holes are gaps in informa-
tion flows between Ps linked to the same E but not linked to each other. A
structural hole indicates that the Ps on either side of the hole have access to
different flows of information. Networks rich in structural holes imply access
to mutually unconnected partners and, consequently, to many distinct infor-
mation flows. Thus, maximizing the structural holes spanned or minimising
redundancy between partners is an important aspect of constructing an effi-
cient, information-rich network (Burt, 1992).
–T h e   inter-subgroup cohesiveness in a network points to the interactions across
subgroups (e.g., projects).
– Small world’ properties of networks: Small world is a network structure that is
both highly locally clustered and has a short path length (short global separa-
tion and high local clustering). In a small world network, the clusters can be
linked by actors who are members of multiple clusters, making it possible for
even large networks that are made up of many separate clusters to be
connected and cohesive. The higher the small world degree of a network the
more separate clusters become more interlinked and linked by actors who
know each other. These processes distribute creative information among sub-
groups and help to build a cohesive social organisation within subgroups that
support risky collaboration around good ideas.
– Strong tie network, i.e., a network in which strong ties predominate.
– Dual network, i.e., a network architecture wherein a small core of strong ties is
integrated with a larger periphery of weak ties.
–A   structural autonomy network: Structural autonomy is putting brokerage (=
valuable but risky trust) and closure (= making it safe to trust) together. A
structurally autonomous group consists of actors strongly connected to one
another, with extensive bridge relations beyond the group.
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1T his particularly applies to degree centrality but not necessarily to other central-
ity measures. For example an E with two direct links in a large network – and for
that reason not attractive at all – can have a high betweenness centrality score.
2 eet stands for Ecology, Economy and Technology programme.
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11.1 introduction
Why some regions grow more than other regions is a key question in economic
geography. Up until the late 1980s, neo-classical economic approaches argued that
technology is a key determinant of regional growth. However, these approaches
treated technology as an exogenous factor, leaving the geography of innovation
unexplained. Inspired by Schumpeter, economic geographers took the lead in
criticising this view. Since the early 1980s, they have focused attention on the
explanation of the geography of innovation: some regions are more capable of
developing and implementing innovations, and region-specific characteristics
(including institutions) may be underlying forces. This led to the claim that
regions are drivers of innovation and growth. During the last decades, new
concepts like industrial districts (Becattini 1987), clusters (Porter 1990), innova-
tive milieux (Camagni 1991), regional innovation systems (Cooke 2001), and
learning regions (Asheim 1996) have been launched to incorporate this view.
Many of these concepts have drawn inspiration from evolutionary economics
(Nelson and Winter 1982; Dosi et al. 1988; Boschma et al. 2002). In a nutshell, an
evolutionary approach argues that “the explanation to why something exists inti-
mately rests on how it became what it is” (Dosi 1997: 1531). The objective of this
chapter is to outline how evolutionary economics may provide inputs for regional
innovation policy. This is not an easy task, since distinctive strands of thought in
evolutionary economics hold opposing views on policy. For example, the neo-
Schumpeterian approach (associated with Nelson and Winter, among others)
advocates an active role for policy makers, while the Austrian approach (such as
Hayek) does not (Wegner and Pelikan 2003). Complexity thinking in evolution-
ary economics takes a policy view that is again very different. Notwithstanding
these different views, we will outline some policy recommendations that incor-
porate recent thinking in evolutionary economic geography (Boschma and
Lambooy 1999).
This chapter is structured as follows. A brief and selective literature review is
given in section 2, providing a theoretical and empirical background for the
remaining part, which addresses policy implications. In section 3, we claim that
system failures should be taken as the point of departure to underpin regional
innovation policy. In section 4, we discuss how history should be taken seriously
in regional innovation policy. What is essential to recognise is that history deter-
mines not only the policy options that are at hand in regions, but also the proba-
ble outcomes of regional innovation policy. Building on these insights, in section
5 we sketch some policy options that may direct regional economies into new
directions while building on related variety. In particular, we direct attention to
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the regional level. Section 6 draws the main conclusions.
11.2 variety and regional development
Our starting point is a fundamental departure from how conventional neo-classi-
cal economics treats knowledge. Knowledge is not a public good that is charac-
terised by diminishing returns to scale. On the contrary, knowledge evolves: it is
not reduced when it is used, but it accumulates through processes of learning-by-
doing (Arrow 1962). This cumulative and irreversible nature of knowledge devel-
opment is embodied in individuals (skills) and in firms (competences): they
develop different cognitive capacities over time. Due to its tacit and cumulative
nature, knowledge is actor-specific and difficult, if not impossible, to copy or
imitate by other actors. As a result, variety in an economy is the rule, and knowl-
edge accumulation at the level of individuals and firms is its prime mover.
Variety in economic space
Consequently, an economy consists of numerous pieces of knowledge that are
formed as time goes by. To start with, an evolutionary approach to economic
geography focuses on the question of how these pieces of knowledge are spatially
distributed over time. If one observes the world, it is undeniable that knowledge,
knowledge creation, and innovation (i.e., the economic exploitation of new
knowledge, as embodied in new products, machines, and organisation tech-
niques) are unevenly distributed over space. This is shown in multiple ways.
To start with, one can observe a high degree of variety in the most urbanised
regions. Following Adam Smith, a huge market size enables firms to specialise in
activities they can do best, enhancing their productivity levels. As a result, the
economies of urbanised regions are characterised by a sharp division of labour
between specialised firms, which sustains urban growth (Pred 1966). Another
reason has been proposed by Jacobs (1969) who claimed that diversified urban
economies trigger new ideas and innovations. Co-location of many different
individuals, firms, and sectors enhances knowledge exchange and the recombina-
tion of different pieces of knowledge in novel ways, generating even more variety
in major cities.
In addition to such intra-regional variety, knowledge creation tends to concen-
trate in space, leading to interregional variety of knowledge. Research and devel-
opment is extremely spatially concentrated, favouring only a small set of regions
in the world, and empirical studies show this pattern is quite stable over time
(Feldman and Audretsch 1999). Studies have found strong relationships between
regional stocks of knowledge (as embodied in university research and private
r&d) and performance indicators, such as patent intensity and productivity
levels (Anselin, Varga and Acs 2000). However, it is not necessarily the case that
places of knowledge creation and places of innovation overlap. When there is
little overlap, one speaks of a knowledge paradox. The European paradox is a
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patenting activity in Europe are quite high), Europe is incapable of exploiting this
knowledge economically, turning it into innovations. In fact, the geography of
knowledge and innovation may be characterised by a strong spatial division of
labour, with some places specialising in knowledge creation, other places turning
this new knowledge into innovations (such as new products), and again other
places focusing on the manufacturing of the new products.
There are countless examples of regions and countries that specialise in a particu-
lar knowledge field, and which continue to do so for a long time. Industries often
tend to concentrate in space, as shown by the film industry in Hollywood, the
financial sector in the city of London, the American car industry in Detroit, and
the cut flower sector in the Dutch Westland region.1However, spatial variety also
occurs within one industry. We already mentioned the fact that the geography of
knowledge creation (r&d) does not necessarily overlap with the geography of
production of new products within the same industry. For instance, r&d in the
Dutch electronics industry is heavily concentrated in the Eindhoven region,
while the outputs of the r&d (i.e., new electronic products) are produced else-
where. In addition, firms operating in the same industry may look very different
in different places (Essletzbichler and Rigby 2005). For example, the French,
American, and Indian film industries are very different in terms of organisation,
state involvement, and market focus (Lorenzen 2007).
Spatial variety and geographical proximity
So, variety in space is paramount. These observations lend support to the fact that
knowledge tends to accumulate at the regional level. We stated previously that
knowledge tends to accumulate in individuals and firms. So why in regions? The
main reason is that knowledge will spill over to other firms now and then, despite
the fact that knowledge is actor-specific and difficult to copy. Knowledge is a non-
rival good: its use by one firm does not preclude its use by other firms. This means
that not only the firm itself, but other firms may benefit from the accumulation of
knowledge and human capital. This may result in increasing returns to scale that is
external to the firm (Shaw 1992). Empirical studies show that knowledge spillover
effects are often geographically localised. That is, they spill over to neighbouring
regions at the most, and spillover effects become weaker the higher the distance
from the source of knowledge (Audretsch and Feldman 1996).
This suggests that geographical proximity is a prerequisite for knowledge diffu-
sion and innovation. However, there is reason to believe that this position should
be reconsidered. In fact, it could be argued that geographical proximity is neither
a necessary nor a sufficient condition for interactive learning and innovation
(Boschma 2005a). This happens only when other barriers of knowledge diffusion
are overcome, such as cognitive, social, and institutional distance. These other
forms of proximity need to be secured between actors in order to make them
connected, and to enable effective knowledge transfer. Other forms of proximity
may act as a substitute for geographical proximity, because they can help to
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geographical proximity. For instance, social proximity may provide a vehicle to
connect agents and enable flows of knowledge over large distances, because these
agents share a past as former schoolmates or as former colleagues working for the
same organisation (Agarwal et al. 2006). However, having said that, effective
knowledge transfer may still often be geographically localised because geographi-
cal proximity indirectly impacts on the establishment of the other forms of prox-
imity. In fact, geographical proximity may encourage the creation of trust-based
relationships or other institutions that facilitate effective knowledge transfer
between local agents (Maskell 2001).
The cognitive dimension has attracted most attention in this respect. There is
ample evidence that local access to information (e.g., through the provision of ict
infrastructure) is not sufficient. Due to the tacit nature of knowledge, firms can
only understand, absorb, and implement external knowledge that is close to their
own knowledge base (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Effective transfer of knowledge
requires absorptive capacity of firms and cognitive proximity, that is, firms need
to share similar knowledge and expertise to enable effective communication
(Nooteboom 2000). In combination with geographical proximity, the need for
cognitive proximity may well explain the spatial concentration of tacit knowl-
edge.2 Once a region specialises in a particular knowledge and competence base,
this will act as an incentive, offering opportunities to local firms for further
improvements in familiar fields of knowledge on the one hand, and as a selection
mechanism, discouraging knowledge creation that does not fit into the regional
knowledge base on the other hand (Boschma 2004). As a result, the regional
accumulation of tacit knowledge provides an intangible asset for local firms that
is hard to grasp for non-local firms, because spatial distance forms an insur-
mountable barrier to the transfer of tacit knowledge (Gertler 2003).
Empirical studies demonstrate that the key mechanisms through which knowl-
edge between organisations is transferred encourages knowledge accumulation at
the regional level. One such mechanism is the spinoff process, through which
knowledge diffuses effectively between firms. A spinoff firm is a firm that has
been established by a founder that was a former employee of an incumbent firm
in the same or a related sector. Crucial is that these new entrants do not start from
scratch: these new entrepreneurs have acquired relevant knowledge and skills in a
incumbent firm which they can exploit further in their new company. Empirical
studies systematically show that this type of entrant performs best, that is, they
demonstrate the highest survival rates. Quite a number of sectors are charac-
terised by a high degree of spinoff dynamics during their years of formation, and
the most successful firms in those emerging industries tend to be spinoff compa-
nies (Klepper 2002). Because most spinoffs locate in the immediate vicinity of
their parent organisation, this knowledge transfer mechanism contributes to
geographically localised knowledge formation.
Another mechanism through which knowledge diffuses is labour mobility. Since
labour is the main carrier of knowledge, employees moving from one firm to the
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place largely at the local level, this implies this type of knowledge transfer
contributes to knowledge formation at the regional level. This is especially true
for labour markets that have similar or related economic activities: clusters are
characterised by local labour mobility that is higher than elsewhere in an econ-
omy (Lindgren and Eriksson 2007). In addition, labour mobility creates linkages
between firms through social ties between former colleagues. These social rela-
tionships facilitate knowledge flows between organisations (Breschi and Lissoni
2003). Since most of the job moves are intra-regional, these social networks are
formed locally, enhancing further knowledge accumulation at the regional level.
Thus, a network is a mechanism of knowledge transfer that favors localised learn-
ing between firms. Knowledge effectively circulates in networks, as happens in
technological alliances and epistemological communities to an increasing extent
(see chapters 7 and 10). Basically, networks are a-spatial constructs. Social
connectedness is often considered crucial to explain network configurations, as
the formation of inventors’ networks on the basis of co-patenting shows (Breschi
and Lissoni 2003). But because social proximity is enhanced by geographical
proximity, networks are often geographically localised, and so is the process of
knowledge creation and diffusion.
Networks may be especially beneficial for activities of exploitation, but they may
be less suited to exploration (Nooteboom et al. 2007). As chapter 10 showed,
network ties may become too close and inward looking, leading to a reduced
awareness of developments outside the network (Uzzi 1997). Firms that are
involved in embedded relationships may feel morally obligated to stay loyal to
their partners, and thus end up choosing less efficient ways of production. If
firms do not connect to new groups of firms now and then, and if their own
network is not accessible for new partners, it is difficult to break this situation of
cognitive lock-in . This over-embeddedness argument has a geographical conno-
tation. Grabher (1993) argues that firms that focus too much on local relation-
ships become less aware of technological and market-related developments
outside their region. The establishment of non-local relationships are considered
crucial, because they bring new variety into the region (Asheim and Isaksen
2002; Bathelt et al. 2004). However, non-local relations as such do not guarantee
effective knowledge transfer either: one needs a certain level of social and cogni-
tive proximity to make effective connections over large distances. So, firms with
relationships that are too tight or focus too much on their own region may find it
harder to adapt to external changes (Boschma 2005a).
Regional dynamics
There is, however, more in capitalist economies than just knowledge accumula-
tion taking place at the regional level, and consolidating spatial variety. An evolu-
tionary approach to economic geography focuses on the dynamics of urban and
spatial systems in the long run. It does so in terms of what Schumpeter (1942)
described as creative destruction. What drives a regional economy is the intro-
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and new sectors) in the economic system through entrepreneurial activity,
because it must offset the decline in other parts of the economy (Saviotti 1996).
So, regional growth is about qualitative change, not quantitative change.
This process of creative destruction does not keep the spatial system in balance.
On the contrary, regional dynamics is the rule. New basic variety challenges the
core-periphery structure of the spatial system (Boschma and Lambooy 1999).
New industries require new knowledge, new types of skills, new institutions,
among other things, and the existing spatial structure cannot provide these. This
makes it unpredictable where new industries emerge in space, although this may
differ from industry to industry. Newly emerging sectors do not necessarily
favour leading regions, and they provide opportunities to backward regions to a
considerable degree. Economic history bears witness to dramatic changes in the
spatial system both at the international and national level (Hall and Preston
1988). In the last two centuries, techno-industrial leadership has shifted from
Great Britain to the United States and Germany, and some countries in South-
East Asia have recently joined the ranks of leading industrial countries. Countries
are subject to similar dynamics: in Great Britain, Belgium, and Germany, the
leading industrial regions of the nineteenth century have almost been overrun by
a set of newly emerging regions in the south east of England, Flanders, and the
south of Germany.
As a consequence, the long-term development of regions depends on their ability
to create new variety through entrepreneurship and innovation, in order to
compensate for the loss of variety through exits and relocations in other parts of
their economy. In other words, it is essential for regions to transform and renew
their economic base (Pasinetti 1981; Saviotti and Pyka 2004). One reason for this
is that (tacit) knowledge not only accumulates in regions, but it may also become
standardised (i.e., explicit and codified) in the long run. Since this codification
process encourages knowledge diffusion between regions, the regional knowl-
edge base may lose its unique value to local firms (Maskell and Malmberg 1999).
Related variety as source for regional innovation
Regions may have several options to restructure their economies (Martin and
Sunley 2006). A key option is to diversify into new fields while building on exist-
ing regional assets. There is increasing awareness that the long-term develop-
ment of regions depends on their ability to diversify into new economic applica-
tions and new sectors while building on their current knowledge base. It means
that regional economies that branch into new directions may be more stable in
the long run than those that start from scratch.
One way to establish this is to develop major innovations that are triggered by
knowledge spillovers between different sectors in a region (Henderson et al.
1995). However, knowledge will only be exchanged effectively when the cogni-
tive distance between sectors is not too large. In other words, sectors need to be
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transfer. To be more precise, some degree of cognitive proximity is required to
ensure that effective communication and interactive learning take place, but not
too much cognitive proximity, to avoid cognitive lock-in (Nooteboom 2000). It is
neither regional diversity (which involves too large cognitive distance) nor
regional specialisation per se (resulting in too much cognitive proximity), but
regional specialisation in related variety that enhances real innovations. The idea
of innovations based on related variety comes close to the Schumpeterian defini-
tion of innovation as the recombination of pieces of knowledge in entirely new
ways (Levinthal 1998). So, major innovations are more likely to occur when
knowledge spills over between sectors, rather than within one sector, but only as
long as the sectors are related.
Related variety is linked to the concept of technology system that accounts for
strong technological interdependencies across industries (Carlsson and
Stankiewicz 1991). Economic history has repeatedly given evidence of a high
degree of exchange and feedback of technology across a particular set of industries
during a particular period (Boschma 1999). For instance, sectors may be techni-
cally connected because they originate from a common technology. The discov-
ery of the technological principles behind synthetic dyestuffs in the nineteenth
century is an example: this laid the foundations of a range of new chemical
sectors, such as synthetic colours, pharmaceutics, explosives, photography, plas-
tics, and synthetic fibres. Major innovations also depend on complementary
advances in technology in other industries before they can be fully exploited
(Rosenberg 1982). These examples give insights into how related variety
enhances knowledge spillovers and sparks of radical innovations, how new
growth sectors come into being, and how regional economies branch in new
directions.
Another example of how related variety contributes to economic renewal is the
post-war experience of the Emilia Romagna region in Italy. For many decades,
Emilia Romagna has been endowed with a diffuse knowledge base in engineer-
ing. After the Second World War, many new sectors, such as the packaging
industry, ceramic tiles, and robotics, emerged out of this pervasive and generic
knowledge base one after the other. These new economic applications made the
regional economy diversify into new directions. These new sectors not only built
and expanded on this extensive regional knowledge base, they also renewed and
extended it, further broadening the regional economy of Emilia Romagna.
The economic significance of related variety is also shown through the emer-
gence of new sectors that grow out of old sectors, such as the television industry,
which branched out of the radio sector (Klepper and Simons 2000). Because this
branching process concerns old sectors giving birth to new sectors, it increases
the probability of survival of the new industry. Klepper (2002) demonstrated
empirically that prior experience in related industries (like coach and cycle
making) increased the life chances of new entrants in the new us automobile
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powerful mechanism that effectively transfers knowledge from one firm to the
other. Boschma and Wenting (2007) found evidence that new automobile firms
in the ukhad a higher survival rate during the first stage of the life cycle of the
new industry when the entrepreneur had a background in these related sectors,
and when the firm had been founded in a region that was well endowed with
these related sectors. So, when diversifying into the new automobile sector, these
types of entrants could exploit and benefit from related competences and skills,
which improved their life chances significantly, as compared to start-ups lacking
those related competences/skills.
Frenken et al. (2007) have more quantitatively assessed the impact of related vari-
ety on regional growth in the Netherlands. Making use of the standard sectoral
classification, sectors at the five-digit level were defined as related when they
shared the same category at a lower level. An outcome was that regions with a
high degree of related variety showed the highest employment growth rates in
the Netherlands in the period 1996-2002, suggesting the importance of knowl-
edge spillovers across related sectors at the regional level. At the same time, a
broad range of unrelated sectors in a region may also be beneficial for regional
growth, because unrelated variety spreads risks. When a sector-specific shock
occurs, it is unlikely to harm other industries and disturb the regional economy
when sectors are unrelated. So, unrelated variety may stabilise regional
economies (Essletzbichler 2005).
Before, we pointed out that non-local relationships may be crucial because new
variety may be brought into the region through linkages with other regions
(Boschma 2004). However, a study on regional growth in Italy, making use of
trade data, demonstrated that the inflow of variety of knowledge per se does not
affect economic growth in regions: it is not sufficient to attract large flows of
extra-regional knowledge (Boschma and Iammarino 2007). The same is true
when the extra-regional knowledge is similar to the knowledge base of the
region: there is not much to be learned from inflow of knowledge that the region
is already familiar with: it does not add to the existing knowledge base of the
region, and therefore, does not lead to real innovations and regional growth.
However, a crucial finding of this study was that the more related the knowledge
base of the region and its import profile was, the more it contributed to growth in
the region. This finding suggests that related variety in extra-regional connec-
tions ensures that external knowledge sparks of learning and innovation in situ.
Thus, a region benefits especially from extra-regional knowledge when it origi-
nates from sectors that are related or close, but not quite similar to the sectors
present in the region. In those circumstances, cognitive proximity between the
extra-regional knowledge and the knowledge base of the region is not too small
(avoiding the learning process of being more of the same), but also not too large
(enabling the absorption of the extra-regional knowledge).
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However, inter-firm knowledge transfers based on proximity and related variety
alone will not lead to innovations. Since the 1990s, the innovation system litera-
ture claims that the innovation process should be seen as the outcome of interac-
tion between actors within firms, between firms, and between firms and other
organisations such as universities, educational facilities, financing organisations,
and government agencies (Freeman 1987). So, being innovative is not just a
matter of having access to related variety or to local or non-local knowledge, but
whether interaction takes place at all these levels.
According to this literature, a number of organisations (such as research institutes,
educational facilities, and financial organisations) provides complementary inputs
essential to the innovation process (Edquist 1997). In addition to absorptive capac-
ity, a firm can exploit its innovation only when it is for example able to get access to
(venture) capital, when it is able to hire workers with the required new skills, or
when it can find a new market. In other words, firms need the presence of a critical
mass of organisations that can provide these needs. In many peripheral regions,
this critical mass is missing, resulting in low innovative performance.
Besides a critical mass, it is crucial that these organisations are connected and
form a system. The innovation process requires organisations to connect in order
to enable flows of knowledge, capital, and labour. The key issue is that this is far
from self-evident in practice, even quite exceptional (Boschma 2004). Capital
suppliers are almost by definition reluctant to invest in innovative projects: (radi-
cal and more complex) innovations are a risky business with uncertain outcomes,
and financial organisations have built up routines in established markets and
technologies. Although the number of inter-firm technology alliances is on the
increase (Nooteboom et al. 2007), firms tend to be reluctant to share their core
competences with others, because there is a serious risk that knowledge will leak
to competitors. Public research institutes such as universities often have difficul-
ties in meeting the demands of innovative firms, because of differences in culture
and incentive mechanisms (Metcalfe 1994).3 And when innovations require
labour with new skills, it may take a long time before the educational system is
restructured and new appropriate courses are offered.
In addition to the fact that it is not self-evident that interactions occur between
organisations, it is also unlikely that organisations are sufficiently flexible to
implement innovations. In reality, almost by nature, organisations are not flexi-
ble and responsive, due to routines and path dependency (Nelson and Winter
1982). Thus, regions will reap the benefits from entrepreneurial activities of firms
only when the actions of these key organisations are coordinated and form a
system of innovation, and when regions have local organisations that respond
quickly and smoothly to new developments. This is crucial for the long-term
competitiveness of regions: some regions are more capable of making these
connections and have more responsive organisations than other regions. This is a
key systemic asset of a region that is almost impossible to copy by other regions.
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institutions like democracy and markets that support entrepreneurship and inno-
vation, institutions also regulate and coordinate actions between organisations
(Hodgson 1996). This task is fulfilled by formal institutions (such as laws) and
informal institutions (like norms and habits) (Edquist and Johnson 1997). An
example of a formal institution is a patent law system that protects inventors for
some time while making information public. An example of an informal institu-
tion is a culture of shared trust, which is a local capability that supports inter-
firm learning (Maskell 1999). Countries and regions accumulate different institu-
tions over time, which is quite similar to the way the regional knowledge base
accumulates. They are the outcome of a long history in a specific regional context
that cannot easily be copied by public policy in other regions. Like the innovation
process itself, institutions have a systemic dimension: they form systems that are
territory-specific (Hall and Soskice 2001). At the international level, there are
‘exit-based’ and ‘voice-based’ institutional models (Ergas 1984), at the regional
level, there are many more. Consequently, regions follow different institutional
paths that yield comparable levels of economic development: there is more than
one way regions can accomplish economic development.
Because institutions tend to be durable and resistant to change, they not only
support but may also constrain new developments. When new institutions are
formed and created alongside new economic activities, they fulfill a specific need
(Murmann 2003), but once they are established, they may obstruct new develop-
ments. Powerful special-interest organisations may take over an economy, slow-
ing down the capacity of regions to adopt new technologies and to reallocate
resources to new activities (Olson 1982). What matters thus is whether institu-
tions are flexible and responsive to change, in order to avoid regional lock-in
(Freeman and Perez 1988): regions need a capacity to upgrade and transform
institutions required for the development of new activities. This dynamic capa-
bility of organisations and institutions impacts on the long-term competitiveness
of regions (Boschma 2004).
Conclusion
In a knowledge economy, regions depend on their ability to develop and apply
new knowledge in their economies. Since knowledge tends to accumulate, new
knowledge will not diffuse widely between firms and between regions. It
requires absorptive capacity and institutions that bring agents together. Both of
these intangible assets provide incentives and constraints within which the inno-
vation process takes place. If region-specific, interregional variety may be a
persistent feature of economies. Knowledge will spill over more intensively
when regions are endowed with related industries that share a common knowl-
edge base. Due to the systemic nature of innovation processes, regions also
require a critical mass of organisations that meet the following conditions: (1)
they have to be well connected, enabling flows of knowledge, capital, and labour;
(2) however these ties should not be too strong, and not too focused on the
region, avoiding problems of lock-in; and (3) local organisations and institutions
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tendencies due to habits, routines, and path dependency (Boschma and Lambooy
1999).
11.3 system failures as basis for regional innovation
policy
In this section, we sketch out some policy implications. While it is common to
refer to market imperfections as basic underpinnings for public intervention, we
will claim that system failures should be taken as the basic rationale for regional
innovation policy.
A conventional market failure argument is that knowledge is a semi-public good.
Because of the problem of non-appropriability, government should take action to
overcome underinvestment in new knowledge through the provision of r&d
subsidies or the establishment of property rights. Another standard argument is
that knowledge is characterised by increasing returns to scale. For that reason,
investments in public r&d, technology transfer and education are expected to
foster economic growth (Hall 1994). As such, the government aims to encourage
the dissemination of knowledge, through the public provision of infrastructure
such as broadband Internet. This is especially relevant for lagging regions and
small- and medium-sized firms that lack resources to invest in r&d.
By and large, the market failure argument suffers from two shortcomings. First of
all, evolutionary economists argue that market imperfections are not necessarily a
problem that needs to be corrected by public intervention. For instance, due to
cognitive constraints, knowledge can be excluded from other firms to a greater or
lesser extent. Market imperfections, such as knowledge spillovers, knowledge
asymmetries, and monopolies can even be considered the real drivers of innova-
tion and economic growth (Bryant 2001). Because knowledge asymmetries limit
knowledge transfer, they provide a strong incentive to invest in knowledge
creation. What is more, variety acts as a major source for exploration and
economic renewal (see chapter 3). Therefore, variety is a key regional asset that
needs to be cherished.4 Consequently, public intervention aimed at tackling
market imperfections could damage rather than benefit an economy. Secondly,
the market failure argument is based too much on a linear model of innovation
policy that focuses on r&d infrastructure and technology transfer, as if these
automatically lead to innovation in regions. For instance, science and technology
policy in the European Union is focused on enhancing r&d, and there is a strong
belief that r&d policy will bring benefits to many regions. In reality, r&d-based
policy favours only a few regions in Europe, that is, the ones that are already
specialised in r&d (Morgan 1997; Simmie 2003). In addition, much of the newly
created knowledge is not exploited economically in Europe but leaks away to
countries like the us. This means European r&d policy is subsidising the
exploitation of knowledge elsewhere. In other words, this linear model of inno-
vation policy based on market failure will lead to poor results, if such policy does
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tive capacity and institutions for knowledge diffusion.
Therefore, we claim that system failures, rather than market failures, should be
the starting point for policy intervention (Metcalfe 2003; Asheim et al. 2006).
This is not to deny the relevance of market failures for underpinning regional
innovation policy in some cases. On the contrary, poor access to information, for
instance, should be tackled by policy intervention, but it requires additional
policy actions to be effective. So, at best, policy based on market failures needs
additional actions to be effective, at worst, it may seriously damage the driving
forces of innovation in an economy.
There are three types of system failures that may result in poor innovative
performance of firms in regions (Edquist 1997; Bryant 2001; Todtling and Trippl
2005). The first type is more quantitative in nature, instead of relational: there
may be crucial parts of the innovation system that are underdeveloped. This so-
called ‘organisational thinness’ refers to the fact that key organisations in innova-
tion systems, such as research institutes, educational facilities, venture capital-
ists, and specialised suppliers, but also key regulations, are weakly developed.
Such a situation of ‘organisational thinness’ is often found in peripheral regions,
due to a lack of critical mass of local demand (Camagni 1995).
The second type of system failure is a purely relational one, of a more qualitative
nature. As mentioned in section 2, relationships between organisations in inno-
vation systems are not self-evident, but have to be constructed. As explained in
chapter 7, inter-organisational collaboration, for instance, is often risky and
frequently fails. When missing or badly managed, knowledge will not be
exchanged, inter-firm learning will come to a halt, and investment opportunities
will not be realized due to shortages of capital and skilled labour.
The third type of system failure is associated with processes of lock-in. A lack of
flexibility in organisations and their relationships may lead to inertia, which
undermine the ability of regions to adapt and to renew their economic base. As
noticed before, local organisations may be too strongly oriented towards old
routines and old specialisations, as the experience of mature industrial regions
illustrates (Grabher 1993). Moreover, local organisations may have developed
too strongly tied networks, which limit their access to new sources of informa-
tion, and which makes it difficult to implement changes. It is crucial to under-
line that public organisations may be part of such a regional deadlock: public
agents may contribute to the formation of closed and inward-looking systems
through their policy programs and their direct participation in such networks
(Hassink 2005).
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When building regional innovation policy on system failures, a number of issues
call out for clarification. Should policy select and target particular sectors and
regions? Should one adopt a ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy approach? Can policymak-
ers make regional economies develop in new directions, and if so, how? And to
what extent should innovation policy be regionally-based? These issues are
addressed below.
Targeting sectors and regions?
There is often a tendency in policy to select particular sectors and regions 
a priori as targets at the national level. Policymakers are inclined to support 
relatively new sectors such as biotech, nanotechnology, or gaming, because
these sectors are expected to create jobs in the near future. In a similar way, some
regions are identified as innovation hotspots or ‘brain ports’, because these are
considered the drivers of national economic growth in the near future. However,
one can question the usefulness and relevance of such a ‘picking-the-winner’
policy.
First of all, such policy overlooks the fact that it is impossible to predict which
will be the new growth regions and sectors of the future. A ‘picking-the-winners’
policy at the national level is risky, as history shows, because one runs the risk of
selecting the wrong regions and sectors. There is little understanding of how
regions move into new directions or start up new growth paths (Iammarino and
McCann 2006; Martin and Sunley 2006). What has been observed is that new
industries are often the result of spontaneous processes, rather than the outcome
of orchestrated policy interventions (Lambooy and Boschma 2001; Pack and Saggi
2006). This is not to deny, however, that governments often play a key role, as in
Silicon Valley, where huge defensive expenditures by the us government gave
the region an enormous boost.
Secondly, ‘picking-the-winner’ policy often results in picking the same winners
by many countries and regions. When all regions are targeting the same sectors
(like biotech), it is meanwhile likely that most of these sectors will cluster in only
a small number of regions in the world;one can predict that the overwhelming
majority of regions will fail to develop these industries, with huge losses of
public resources (Boschma 2005b). An exception might be the public support of
general purpose technologies (like the Internet): there is no doubt these will have
long-term impacts, but it remains uncertain which parts of the economy will be
most strongly affected in the next decades, and how.
Thirdly, ‘picking-the-winner’ policy at the national level denies the fact that, in
principle, almost every region has growth potential in the knowledge economy.
Growth or innovation potentials of regions can be measured in different ways.
Indicators like r&d, creative workers, high-tech industries, and knowledge-
intensive services identify different dimensions of the knowledge economy. Each
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the Netherlands shows (Raspe et al. 2004). For example, r&d is located more
often in the more peripheral parts of the Netherlands, while creative workers are
concentrated in the central, urbanized part of the country. If all the maps of each
indicator would be put on top of each other, it would be almost impossible to
identify regions that lack innovation potential. That is, most of the Dutch regions
participate in the knowledge economy in one way or another. Therefore, it would
be wrong to exclude many regions from policy intervention from the very start,
because it would leave regional potential untouched and unexploited.
Consequently, one should be cautious of focusing innovation policy too narrowly
on r&d. As explained before, r&d is only one indicator to measure innovation
potential, and it is grounded in a traditional linear model of innovation that
simply equates innovation with r&d. In addition, innovation policy based on
r&d potential has strong geographical implications. Since r&d activities are
concentrated in a small number of affluent regions, r&d-based policy will benefit
these leading regions even more (Oughton et al. 2002).
Regional innovation policy based on related variety will avoid the dangers of
‘picking-the-winner’ policy, because its objective is to broaden and diversify the
regional economic base while building on region-specific resources and extra-
regional connections. No particular regions need to be targeted. Each region can
be made part of such a policy approach, no matter whether these regions are
specialised or diversified, or whether these have a high or low degree of related
variety. Nor do specific sectors (low or high tech, creative or not) have to be
excluded from such a policy approach. As it aims to bring together activities with
possible complementary pieces of knowledge, such policy leaves behind a narrow
sectoral perspective. Having said that, there is no doubt that regional policy based
on related variety needs focus to be effective: it needs to identify and target
region-specific assets and extra-regional linkages that have obtained some critical
mass in a region. However, the objective is not to make strong sectors even
stronger, but the objective is to enhance interaction and exchange between differ-
ent activities, in order to support new variety in the region.
No ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy?
To say that almost each region has innovation potential is not to say that all
regions are equal. On the contrary, there is a strong need to account for a variety
of innovation potentials between regions, because regions differ in terms of loca-
tion, human capital, knowledge base, and institutional structure. Italy is a prime
example: the north of Italy is strong in science-based organisations with a high
r&d intensity, the Third Italy is characterised by industrial districts which
consist of small- and medium-sized organisations that have formal and loosely
structured relationships, and the south of Italy is characterised by a weak indige-
nous learning capability and weak networks of organisations due to poor institu-
tional arrangements (Iammarino 2005). Because of such spatial variety, it would
be wrong to apply a ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy, such as copying neo-liberal policies
micro-foundations for innovation policy
328or a best practice like Silicon Valley, which is often the case in regional policy
development (Todtling and Trippl 2005).
It would also be wrong to create regional policies from scratch. Effective policy
making requires localised action embedded in, and attuned to available resources
in regions. To a large extent, it is the regional history that determines available
options and probable outcomes of policy (Lambooy and Boschma 2001). It means
one should take the knowledge and institutional base in a region as starting point
when broadening the region’s sector base by stimulating new fields of application
that give birth to new sectors. Accordingly, there is a need for differentiated,
tailor-made policy strategies that are geared towards specific potentials, and that
will focus on tackling specific bottlenecks in regions. In sum, regional policy
needs to capitalise on region-specific assets, extending and renewing the
economic base, rather than selecting from a portfolio of specific policy models
and recipes that owe their success to different environments (Asheim et al.
2006).
‘One-size-fits-all’ regional policy models do not work in a highly fragmented
economy (Cooke and Morgan, 1998). This implies that copying of best practices,
as identified by benchmarking studies, are bound to fail, as regional policies
aimed at imitating success stories such as those of Silicon Valley have demon-
strated (Boschma 2004). Howells (2005) points out that ‘best practice policies’
are hard to adapt to local situations and difficult to understand and implement.
Moreover, copying of success stories in practice often focuses on the success
factors, rather than on the basis of a sound analysis of how public policy
contributed to the success of that particular region. This is not to say that regions
cannot learn from each other (Hassink and Lagendijk 2001). There may be advan-
tages to best practice policies: they have proven their success elsewhere, they are
more or less ready to use, and they may break down closed local networks that
serve vested interests (Howells 2005). In other words, there may be disadvan-
tages attached to region-specific policies: these are often unique, so it is not clear
whether they will work, and local vested interests may dominate the design of
new policy, excluding outsiders and newcomers (Fritsch and Stephan 2005).5
This implies that region-specific policies should be designed in such a way that
these potential problems are tackled. This means, for instance, that it might be a
good thing to encourage public support of academic spinoffs everywhere, but for
this to work it requires different public strategies that are adapted to regional
circumstances (Degroof and Roberts 2004).
Policymakers are adapters
The rejection of ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy is in line with the view that policymak-
ers are not fully informed and omnipotent. Therefore, policymakers have few
degrees of freedom (Lambooy and Boschma 2001). As stated before, the trajecto-
ries that regions followed in the past, as accumulated in a particular knowledge
base and a set of institutions, determine to a large extent the available options and
probable outcomes of policy. Regional policy is likely to fail when local strategies
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the surrounding environment, the larger the potential impact of policy. When
adaptation to change is constrained by the spatial system, policy based on related
variety may increase the probability of policy success, because it builds on exist-
ing structures, while its objective is to broaden or diversify the regional economy
in new directions.
Such a policy approach takes a more contextualised view of how policy should
intervene in a regional economy. It implies that the degree and nature of policy
intervention should be different in different regions because their histories differ.
As a consequence, the question of whether governments should intervene in a
regional economy should be based on the institutional history of a region and on
the type of intervention that better fits a region’s situation, rather than being
based on theoretical or ideological accounts (Fromhold-Eisebith and Eisebith
2005). In addition, there is general awareness that the state is only one of the
actors in a region, although a key player (Kohler-Koch 1998). When taking a
systemic innovation policy approach, we claim that governments do not only
directly intervene (e.g., through regulations, public research, and education), but
also take a role as broker and intermediary to an increasing extent, bringing
together actors at the regional level (Cooke and Morgan 1998).
We should account for the fact that policymakers, just as firms, do not optimise,
but they adapt (Metcalfe 1994). They operate in a world of uncertainty. In these
circumstances, policy failures will occur, just as it is a rule that firms will eventu-
ally fail in markets (Ormerod 2005). Because policymakers cannot rely on ‘one-
size-fits-all’ policies, regional innovation policy is necessarily based on trial-and-
error, in which policymakers learn and adapt, based on experience (Schwerin and
Werker 2003). To stimulate learning, the policy system should be open to
newcomers and new ideas, leave room for policy experiments, and a system of
constant policy evaluation should be put in place (Wegner 1997).
Regional dimension of regional innovation policy
Policymakers in many countries have embraced the view that innovation
processes have a regional dimension, and have responded by adding a regional
dimension to their innovation policy (Van Geenhuizen and Nijkamp 2006).6 We
stated earlier that diversity in regional innovation policy is something that
should be encouraged. While it is essential to take the knowledge and institu-
tional base of regions as a starting point, one should be cautious, however, not to
overestimate the role of the region as a driver of innovation. This has implications
for regional innovation policy.
First of all, knowledge relationships often cross regional boundaries. As noted in
section 2, non-local linkages are often found to be crucial for learning and inno-
vation, in order to avoid cognitive lock-in. Amin and Cohendet (1999) claim that
non-local networks are crucial for path-breaking innovations, while local learn-
ing results in more incremental innovations. For firms, being connected may be
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2005). This means that policy intervention should not focus on the region alone,
as if geographical proximity is sufficient for innovation (Boschma 2005a). On the
contrary, it should encourage geographical exposure by means of cross-regional
knowledge collaboration and inflows of human capital, in order to avoid regional
lock-in.
Secondly, policy should take in consideration that knowledge transfer between
local firms is not just accomplished by bringing them together. Knowledge does
not spill over automatically between firms, even when they are located in the
same region. Network analysis demonstrates that the position of firms in knowl-
edge networks depends on their absorptive capacity (Giuliani and Bell 2005). The
higher a firm’s absorptive capacity, the more it is connected locally, the more
central its position in the knowledge network, and the higher its innovative
performance. Firms with a high absorptive capacity are also more connected to
the world. They may even act as gatekeepers that bring new variety into the
region. Whether this external knowledge will diffuse in the region depends on
the absorptive capacity of all other firms in the region. This can be stimulated by
policy, by enhancing the absorptive capacity of local firms through public
research, and by education schemes.
Conclusion
There are good reasons to avoid a ‘picking-the-winner’ policy that targets only a
few sectors or regions. The idea that it is possible to design ‘one-size-fits-all’
regional policies is no longer valid. The copying of best practices is almost impos-
sible when it comes to intangible regional assets that are the result of long histo-
ries. Regions provide opportunities but also set limits to effective growth poli-
cies. When policy solutions are built on regional indigenous capacity, the
probability of effective policy is likely to increase. To avoid regional lock-in, it is
crucial that policy is open to newcomers, to new ideas, and to experimentation.
11.5 policy options
Now, how can regional innovation policy tackle system failures? There are many
policy options one could think of, too many to be mentioned here. Due to a lack
of space, only selected policy options will be listed and discussed below.
The objective of regional innovation policy is to encourage and facilitate new
ideas and innovation through the creation, diffusion, and exploitation (or
commercialisation) of new knowledge. The government might directly inter-
vene, through the supply of r&d, education, and capital that match the need of
local firms, and which increase the absorptive capacity and innovative capability
of firms. Public policy can also stimulate the effective transfer of knowledge
through various mechanisms, such as spinoff dynamics, labour mobility, and
collaborative networks.7 Below, we briefly direct attention to these three 
mechanisms of knowledge transfer, because they tend to take place at the regional
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variety.
Recent studies have shed light on the importance of spinoff dynamics for knowl-
edge diffusion, entrepreneurship, and regional development (Helfat and Lieber-
man 2002). As noted before, spinoffs are new firms that are founded by entrepre-
neurs that have acquired relevant experience as far as market and/or technical
knowledge is concerned. Empirical studies tend to show that spinoff companies
often perform better than other types of entrants because they can build on rele-
vant knowledge and experience acquired in parent organisations in the same or
related industries (Klepper 2002). Since spinoffs tend to locate near their parents
almost as a rule, they may provide a basis for regional innovation policy. Because
the spinoff process has played a crucial role in the emergence of many new
sectors, it may be seen as a mechanism that makes regional economics diversify
into new sectors, while building on knowledge and competences available in
existing sectors (Boschma and Wenting 2007). A policy option is to target poten-
tial entrepreneurs (not just supporting any new firm), by taking into considera-
tion what kind of knowledge the founder brings into the new firm. Another
policy option is to encourage spinoff policies at universities that may contribute
to the growth potential of spinoff ventures (Lockett et al. 2005).
Regional innovation policy could also play a role in encouraging labour mobility,
because it is a crucial mechanism through which skills and experience are trans-
ferred from one local company to the other (Camagni 1991). Since most labour
mobility takes place at the regional level, policy promoting labour mobility may
enhance knowledge transfer and innovation at the regional level. Since labour
mobility may take away the incentive of firms to invest in their personnel, public
policy should invest heavily in education and life-long learning at the same time.
Aghion et al. (2006) argue that labour markets need to be more flexible in order to
smooth the process of creative destruction and lower the costs of such adjust-
ments. This again needs to be complemented by a policy of life-long-learning,
because it increases the capability of individuals to confront changes and to move
from one job to the other.
Another crucial policy measure is to encourage the immigration of skilled labour
because it may bring new ideas and knowledge into the region. One way to achieve
this is through international exchange programmes for students. Incoming stu-
dents bring in new talents and skills from abroad, and combine these with new
skills that are acquired in higher education institutes in the host country. If the
host country is capable of maintaining this group of high-skilled students after
graduation (policy can most certainly play a role here), they will contribute to the
economy as skilled employees or as founders of new firms. Outgoing students will
acquire new skills in research and education institutes abroad, and may return to
their home region after a while, where they will exploit their newly acquired skills
in an environment they are familiar with (Saxenian 2006). Policy could target
those outgoing groups and provide incentives to return to their home region.
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which knowledge circulates and interactive learning takes place. As stated before,
policymakers may act as intermediaries or knowledge brokers, or establish policy
platforms that facilitate knowledge to spill over and diffuse from sectors to
related ones. In doing so, policy should avoid that vested interests of established
firms take over and dominate these networks, and deny access to small firms and
newcomers. Some have conceived these vested interests as one of the weaknesses
of the Innovation Platform, an initiative of the Dutch national government. In a
similar vein, competition policy could aim at stimulating the establishment of
network alliances between firms in related industries as a way of diversifying
regional economies into new but complementary fields of activity.
This type of network policy should acknowledge that knowledge networks
frequently cross regional boundaries (Gertler and Levitte 2005; Giuliani 2005). It
is crucial that regional innovation policy stimulates extra-regional networks,
because it brings new knowledge into the region. Besides new infrastructure
development and international exchange programs, a way to accomplish this is to
encourage foreign investments. In a study of small European countries, Dachs et
al. (2007) found that foreign-owned companies in some European countries tend
to show a higher innovation output and higher labour productivity, as compared
to domestically-owned companies. What is more, affiliates of foreign multina-
tionals were quite strongly embedded in the national innovation system, may of
them even showing a higher propensity to cooperate with domestic partners, as
compared to domestically-owned companies.
Universities may also play a crucial role in exploiting inter-regional linkages,
because they are extremely well connected to international networks. After their
graduation, students will exploit and diffuse this knowledge in the regional econ-
omy. Academic spinoff policy and other policy measures may be implemented to
ensure that the knowledge of universities will be further exploited economically
at the regional level (Feldman and Desrochers 2003). What would be risky
though is that public policy specifies in detail which knowledge fields will be
targeted (e.g., through the allocation of r&d subsidies). As outlined before, this
would mean a ‘picking-the-winners’ policy that denies the crucial role of variety
as a source of novelty.
11.6 conclusions
We have built upon insights drawn from evolutionary economic geography to
present some recommendations for effective regional innovation policy. Since
knowledge tends to accumulate mainly at the firm level, variety is the rule, and
the more diversified a regional economy is, the higher regional growth. However,
knowledge may also diffuse between firms, having an additional impact on
regional development. If knowledge externalities are geographically bounded,
knowledge will also accumulate at the regional level, and the regional economy
will benefit as a whole. In addition, knowledge will spill over more intensively
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edge base. This makes regional economies diversify into new directions and start
up new growth paths, which are crucial for long-term regional development.
However, knowledge creation and knowledge spillovers alone will not lead to
innovation. Regions require a critical mass of organisations that provide neces-
sary inputs to the innovation process, such as knowledge, skills, and capital.
Besides a critical mass, these organisations need to connect and interact, to enable
flows of knowledge, capital, and labour. In addition, organisations and institu-
tions need to be flexible and responsive in order to implement change. In reality,
almost by nature, organisations and institutions are not, because they suffer from
lock-in, due to routines, sunk costs and path dependency.
We have used these insights as key inputs and underpinnings for effective
regional innovation policy. Following system failure arguments, public policy has
the task of establishing key organisations of innovation systems in regions where
these are found to be missing, or public policy has to ensure that these missing
inputs to the innovation process will flow into the region. Once available, public
intervention should encourage key organisations to connect. For example, firms
need to be linked with research institutes and capital suppliers. In addition,
public policy can make organisations more flexible and innovative, for instance,
by upgrading their routines through the supply of new knowledge and skills.
Finally, regional innovation policy can stimulate the effective transfer of knowl-
edge at the regional level by means of spinoff activity, labour mobility, and
networks. Since these mechanisms of knowledge transfer are basically taking
place at the regional level, and because they make regions move into new growth
paths while building on existing assets, these policy actions put in practice the
idea that related variety may contribute to long-term regional development.
To increase the probability of policy success, regional innovation policy needs to
account for the region-specific context because it provides opportunities but also
sets limits to what can be achieved by public policy. In doing so, it should neither
apply ‘one-size-fits-all’ policies nor adopt ‘picking-the-winner’ policies. Instead
of copying best practice models or selecting winners, policy should take the
history of each region as a basic starting point and identify regional potentials and
bottlenecks accordingly. To avoid regional lock-in, it is crucial that public policy is
open to newcomers and new policy experiments.
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1 In the late nineteenth century, Marshall (1890) attributed the spatial clustering of
industries to specialised labour markets, local access to specialised suppliers and
large markets, and the presence of local knowledge spillovers.
2T h e  r e l e v a n c e of geographical proximity for knowledge exchange is associated
with tacit, as opposed to codified knowledge (Brown and Duguid, 2000). Codi-
fied knowledge consists of information that can be written down and, conse-
quently, can be exchanged over long distances. Tacit knowledge is more difficult
to express in an explicit form. Tacit knowledge is acquired through experience,
demonstration, and practice which require personal interactions. Therefore,
geographical proximity is seen as facilitating the transfer of tacit knowledge
(Johnson et al. 2002). There is increasing awareness, however, that the need for
face-to-face contacts to exchange tacit knowledge does not automatically mean
that individuals have to be located close to one another (Rallet and Torre, 2000).
In many cases, face-to-face contacts can be arranged on a temporary basis, for
example through business travels, conferences, or fairs (Gallaud and Torre, 2005).
3B ecause collaboration between different types of organisations (e.g., between
firms and universities) is not self-evident, it tends to take place at a lower spatial
scale, as compared to collaborations between similar organisations (e.g., between
firms) (Ponds et al. 2007). This suggests that geographical proximity may be help-
ful in overcoming cultural and other barriers between different types of organi-
sations.
4 In a study on the Swedish economy, Neffke et al. (2007) found evidence that
young industries (in contrast to mature industries) tend to benefit from Jacobs’
externalities, that is, they perform best in regions with a high degree of sectoral
variety. An additional finding was that the effect of Jacobs’ externalities was
especially strong and positive when the industry was in the exploration stage, in
contrast to the exploitation phase.
5T here is real danger that the ideal circumstances for regional policy (a specialised
region with a few strong players) cause a situation of institutional lock-in, with
adverse impacts on regional development in the long run (Cheshire and Gordon,
1996).
6 It is important to realise that this regionalisation of innovation policy consists of
many dimensions: it incorporates objectives, instruments and administration
issues of policy, among other things (Fritsch and Stephan, 2005). We view
regionalisation of innovation policy in a broad way, covering any policy action
that accounts for region-specific features. So, it is not only about cluster promo-
tion, which is now a popular policy objective, but which has also been subject to
severe criticism (see Martin and Sunley, 2003).
7B y contrast, Dosi et al. (2006) claim that the European Union should shift its
policy approach from a networking type (emphasis on interactions with local
environment) to an actor type of approach (strengthening high quality basic
research and the innovative capacity of corporate actors).
335
notesreferences
Aghion, P., P.A. David and D. Foray (2006) ‘Linking Policy Research and Practice in “stig
Systems”: Many Obstacles, But Some Ways Forward’, paper presented at spru
conference, September 11-13, 2006.
Agarwal, A., I. Cockburn and J. McHale (2006) ‘Gone but Not Forgotten: Knowledge
Flows, Labor Mobility, and Enduring Social Relationships’, Journal of Economic
Geography,6: 571-591.
Amin, A. and P. Cohendet (1999) ‘Learning and Adaptation in Decentralised Business
Networks’, Environment and Planning D Society and Space, 17(1): 87-104.
Anselin, L., A. Varga and Z. Acs (2000) ‘Geographic and Sectoral Characteristics of Acad-
emic Knowledge Externalities’, Papers in Regional Science, 79: 435-443.
Arrow, K.J. (1962) ‘The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing’, Review of Economic
Studies, 29: 155-173.
Asheim, B.T. (1996) ‘Industrial Districts as ‘Learning Regions’: A Condition for Prosper-
ity’, European Planning Studies, 4(4): 379-400.
Asheim B.T. and A. Isaksen (2002) ‘Regional Innovation Systems: The Integration of
Local ‘Sticky’ and Global ‘Ubiquitous’ Knowledge’, Journal of Technology Trans-
fer, 27: 77-86.
Asheim B. et al. (2006) Constructing Regional Advantage: Principles, Perspectives,
Policies, final report, dg Research, Brussels: European Commission.
Audretsch, D.B. and M. Feldman (1996) ‘Spillovers and the Geography of Innovation and
Production’, American Economic Review, 86: 630-40.
Bathelt, H., A. Malmberg and P. Maskell (2004) ‘Clusters and Knowledge: Local Buzz,
Global Pipelines and the Process of Knowledge Creation’, Progress in Human
Geography,28: 31-56.
Becattini, G. (ed.) (1987) Mercato e forze locali. Il distretto industriale, Bologna: 
Il Mulino.
Boschma, R.A. (1999) ‘The Rise of Clusters of Innovative Industries in Belgium During
the Industrial Epoch’, Research Policy, 28: 853-871.
Boschma, R.A. (2004) ‘Competitiveness of Regions From an Evolutionary Perspective’,
Regional Studies, 38(9): 1001-1014.
Boschma, R.A. (2005a) ‘Proximity and Innovation: A Critical Assessment’, Regional
Studies, 39(1): 61-74.
Boschma, R.A. (2005b) ‘Rethinking Regional Innovation Policy: The Making and Break-
ing of Regional History’, in: G. Fuchs and P. Shapira (eds.) Rethinking Regional
Innovation and Change: Path Dependency or Regional Breakthrough?, Dordrecht:
Springer Verlag, 249-271.
Boschma, R., K. Frenken and J.G. Lambooy (2002) Evolutionaire economie, een inleiding,
Bussum: Coutinho.
Boschma, R.A. and S. Iammarino (2007) ‘Related Variety and Regional Growth in Italy’,
working paper series on Evolutionary Economic Geography, Utrecht: Utrecht
University.
Boschma, R.A. and J.G. Lambooy (1999) ‘Evolutionary Economics and Economic Geogra-
phy’, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 9: 411-429.
micro-foundations for innovation policy
336Boschma, R.A. and R. Wenting (2007) ‘The Spatial Evolution of the British Automobile
Industry’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 16(2): 213-238.
Breschi, S. and F. Lissoni (2003) ‘Mobility and Social Networks: Localised Knowledge
Spillovers Revisited’, cespri Working Paper 142, available at
http://www.cespri.unibocconi.it/.
Brown, J.S. and P. Duguid (2000) ‘Mysteries of the Region: Knowledge Dynamics in Sili-
con Valley’, in: C.M. Lee (ed.) The Silicon Valley Edge: A Habitat for Innovation
and Entrepreneurship, Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 16-39.
Bryant, K. (2001) ‘Promoting Innovation: An Overview of the Application of Evolution-
ary Economics and Systems Approaches to Policy Issues’, in: J. Foster and S.
Metcalfe (eds.) Frontiers of Evolutionary Economics: Competition, Self-organiza-
tion and Innovation Policy, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 361-383.
Camagni, R. (ed.) (1991) Innovation Networks: Spatial Perspectives, London/New York:
Bellhaven Press.
Camagni, R. (1995) ‘The Concept of Innovative Milieu and its Relevance of Public Policies
in European Lagging Regions’, Papers in Regional Science, 74(4): 317-340.
Carlsson, B. and R. Stankiewicz (1991) ‘On the Nature, Function and Composition of
Technological Systems’, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 1: 93-118.
Cheshire, P.C. and I.R. Gordon (1996) ‘Territorial Competition and the Predictability of
Collective (In)action’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 20:
383-399.
Cohen, W.M. and D.A. Levinthal (1990) ‘Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on
Learning and Innovation’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 35: 128-153.
Cooke, P. (2001) ‘Regional Innovation Systems, Clusters, and the Knowledge Economy’,
Industrial and Corporate Change, 10(4): 945-74.
Cooke P and K. Morgan (1998) The Associational Economy: Firms, Regions, and
Innovation, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dachs, B., B. Ebersberger and H. Loof (2007) ‘The Innovative Performance of Foreign-
owned Enterprises in Small Open Economies’, cesis working paper 87.
Degroof, J. and E.B. Roberts (2004) ‘Overcoming Weak Entrepreneurial Infrastructures
for Academic Spin-off Ventures’, Journal of Technology Transfer, 29: 327-352.
Dosi, G. (1997) ‘Opportunities, Incentives and the Collective Patterns of Technological
Change’, The Economic Journal, 107(44): 1530-1547.
Dosi, G, C. Freeman, R. Nelson, G. Silverberg and L. Soete (eds.) (1988) Technical Change
and Economic Theory, London: Pinter Publishers.
Dosi, G., P. Llerena and M. Sylos Labini (2006) ‘The Relationships Between Science,
Technologies and their Industrial Exploitation: An Illustration Through the
Myths and Realities of the So-called “European paradox’’’, Research Policy,
35(10): 1450-1464
Edquist, C. (1997) ‘Systems of Innovation Approaches: Their Emergence and Characteris-
tics’, in: Edquist (ed.) Systems of Innovation: Technologies, Institutions and Orga-
nizations, London/Washington: Pinter, 1-35.
Edquist, C. and B. Johnson (1997) ‘Institutions and Organizations in Systems of Innova-
tion’, in: C. Edquist (ed.) Systems of Innovation: Technologies, Institutions and
Organizations, London/Washington: Pinter, 41-63.
Ergas, H. (1984) Why Do Some Countries Innovate More than Others?, Brussels: cep.
337
referencesEssletzbichler, J. (2005) ‘Diversity, Stability and Regional Growth in the U.S. (1975-
2002)’, Papers in Evolutionary Economic Geography, 5(13), Utrecht: Utrecht
University.
Essletzbichler, J. and D.L. Rigby (2005) ‘Competition, Variety and the Geography of Tech-
nology Evolution’, Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie,96(1): 48-62.
Feldman, M.P. and D.B. Audretsch (1999) ‘Innovation in Cities: Science-based Diversity,
Specialization and Localized Competition’, European Economic Review, 43: 409-
429.
Feldman, M.P. and P. Desrochers (2003) ‘The Evolving Role of Research Universities in
Technology Transfer: Lessons from the History of John Hopkins University’,
Industry and Innovation, 10: 5-24.
Freeman, C. (1987) Technology Policy and Economic Performance: Lessons from Japan,
London: Pinter.
Freeman, C. and C. Perez (1988) ‘Structural Crisis of Adjustment, Business Cycles and
Investment Behaviour’, in: G. Dosi, C. Freeman, R. Nelson, G. Silverberg and 
L. Soete (eds.) Technical Change and Economic Theory, London: Pinter, 38-66.
Frenken, K., F.G. van Oort and T. Verburg (2007) ‘Related Variety, Unrelated Variety and
Regional Economic Growth’, Regional Studies, 41(5): 685-697.
Fritsch, M. and A. Stephan (2005) ‘Regionalization of Innovation Policy: Introduction to
the Special Issue’, Research Policy, 34(8): 1123-1127.
Fromhold-Eisebith, M. and G. Eisebith (2005) ‘How to Institutionalize Innovative Clus-
ters? Comparing Explicit Top-down and Implicit Bottom-up Approaches’,
Research Policy, 34(8): 1250-1268.
Gallaud, D. and A. Torre (2005) ‘Geographical Proximity and the Diffusion of Knowl-
edge’, in: G. Fuchs, P. Shapira and A. Koch (eds.) Rethinking Regional Innovation
and Change: Path Dependency or Regional Breakthrough?, Dordrecht: Springer
Verlag, 127-146.
Geenhuizen, M. van and P. Nijkamp (2006) ‘Learning Regions in an Evolutionary
Context: Policymaking for High Technology Firms’, International Journal of
Entrepreneurship and Innovation Management, 6( 3): 265-282.
Gertler, M.S. (2003) ‘Tacit Knowledge and the Economic Geography of Context or the
Undefinable Tacitness of Being (There)’, Journal of Economic Geography, 3: 75-
99.
Gertler, M., and Y. Levitte (2005) ‘Local Nodes in Global Networks: The Geography of
Knowledge Flows in Biotechnology Innovation’, Industry and Innovation, 13:
487-507.
Giuliani, E. (2005) ‘The Structure of Cluster Knowledge Networks: Uneven and Selective,
Not Pervasive and Collective’, druid Working Paper 2005, 11.
Giuliani, E. and M. Bell (2005) ‘The Micro-determinants of Meso-level Learning and
Innovation: Evidence from a Chilean Wine Cluster’, Research Policy, 34: 47-68.
Glückler, J. (2007) ‘Economic Geography and the Evolution of Networks’, Journal of
Economic Geography, 7(5), forthcoming. 
Grabher, G. (1993) ‘The Weakness of Strong Ties: The Lock-in of Regional Development
in the Ruhr Area’, in: G. Grabher (ed.) The Embedded Firm, London: Routledge,
255-277.
Hall, P. (1994) Innovation, Economics and Evolution: Theoretical Perspectives on Changing
micro-foundations for innovation policy
338Technology in Economic Systems, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Hall, P.G. and P. Preston (1988) The Carrier Wave: New Information Technology and the
Geography of Innovation 1846-2003, London: Unwin Hyman.
Hall, P.A. and D. Soskice (2001) ‘An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism’, in: P.A. Hall
and D. Soskice (eds.) Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of
Comparative Ddvantage, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-68.
Hassink, R. (2005) ‘How to Unlock Regional Economies from Path Dependency? From
Learning Region to Learning Cluster’, European Planning Studies, 13(4): 521-535.
Hassink, R. and A. Lagendijk (2001) ‘The Dilemmas for Interregional Institutional Learn-
ing’, Environment and Planning C. Government and Policy, 19(1): 65-84.
Helfat, C.E. and M.B. Lieberman (2002) ‘The Birth of Capabilities: Market Entry and the
Importance of Pre-history’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 11(4): 725-760.
Henderson, J.V., A. Kuncoro and M. Turner (1995) ‘Industrial Development in Cities’,
Journal of Political Economy, 103: 1067-1085.
Hodgson, G. (1996) ‘An Evolutionary Theory of Long-term Economic Growth’, Interna-
tional Studies Quarterly, 40: 391-410.
Howells, J. (2005) ‘Innovation and Regional Economic Development: A Matter of Per-
spective?’, Research Policy, 34: 1220-1234.
Iammarino, S. (2005) ‘An Evolutionary Integrated View of Regional Systems of Innova-
tion: Concepts, Measures and Historical Perspectives’, European Planning Stud-
ies, 13(4): 497-519.
Iammarino, S. and P. McCann (2006) ‘The Structure and Evolution of Industrial Clusters:
Transactions, Technology and Knowledge Spillovers’, Research Policy, 35(7):
1018-1036.
Jacobs, J. (1969) The Economy of Cities, New York: Vintage Books.
Johnson B, E. Lorenz and B.A. Lundvall (2002) ‘Why All This Fuss about Codified and
Tacit Knowledge?’ Industrial and Corporate Change, 11(2): 245-262.
Klepper, S. (2002) ‘The Evolution of the us Automobile Industry and Detroit as its Capi-
tal’, paper presented at 9th Congress of the International Schumpeter Society,
Gainesville, Florida, March 27-30.
Klepper, S. and K.L. Simons (2000) ‘Dominance by Birthright: Entry of Prior Radio
Producers and Competitive Ramifications in the us Television Receiver Indus-
try’, Strategic Management Journal, 21: 997-1016.
Kohler-Koch, B. (1998) ‘Europe and the Regions: The Issue of Multi-level Governance and
Sovereignty’, paper presented at conference on Democracy in Europe, Enschede:
Twente University.
Lambooy, J.G. and R.A. Boschma (2001) ‘Evolutionary Economics and Regional Policy’,
Annals of Regional Science, 35(1): 113-133.
Levinthal, D.A. (1998) ‘The Slow Pace of Rapid Technological Change: Gradualism and
Punctuation in Technological Change’, Industrial and Corporate Change, 7(2):
217-247.
Lindgren, U. and R. Eriksson (2007) Cluster Mobility: Impacts of Inter-firm Labour Mobil-
ity on Firm Performance, Umea: Umea University.
Lockett, A., D. Siegel, M. Wright and M.D. Ensley (2005) ‘The Creation of Spin-off Firms
at Public Research Institutions: Managerial and Policy Implications’, Research
Policy, 34: 981-993.
339
referencesLorenzen, M. (2007) ‘Internationalization vs. Globalization of the Film Industry’, Indus-
try and Innovation, 14(4): 349-357.
Marshall, A. (1890) Principles of Economics, London: MacMillan.
Martin, R. andP. Sunley (2003) ‘Deconstructing Clusters: Chaotic Concept or Policy
Panacea?’, Journal of Economic Geography, 3(1): 5-35.
Martin, R. and P. Sunley (2006) ‘Path Dependence and Regional Economic Evolution’,
Journal of Economic Geography, 6(4): 395-437.
Maskell, P. (1999) ‘Social Capital, Innovation and Competitiveness’, in: S. Baron, J. Field
and T. Schuller (eds.) Social Capital Collection, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1-17.
Maskell, P. (2001) ‘Towards a Knowledge-based Theory of the Geographical Cluster’,
Industrial and Corporate Change, 10(4): 919-941.
Maskell, P. and A. Malmberg (1999) ‘Localised Learning and Industrial Competitiveness’,
Cambridge Journal of Economics, 23(2): 167-186.
Metcalfe, S. (1994) ‘The Economic Foundations of Technology Policy: Equilibrium and
Evolutionary Perspectives’, in: M. Dodgson and R. Rothwell (eds.) The Handbook
of Industrial Innovation, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 409-512.
Metcalfe, J.S. (2003) ‘Equilibrium and Evolutionary Foundations of Competition and
Technology Policy: New Perspectives on the Division of Labour and the Innova-
tion Process’, in: P. Pelikan and G. Wegner (eds.) The Evolutionary Analysis of
Economic Policy, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 162-190
Morgan, K. (1997) ‘The Learning Region: Institutions, Innovation and Regional Renewal’,
Regional Studies, 31(5): 491-503.
Murmann, J.P. (2003) Knowledge and Competitive Advantage: The Co-evolution of Firms,
Technology, and National Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Neffke, F., M. Svensson Henning, R. Boschma, K. Lundquist and O. Olander (2007)
‘Evolution of Agglomeration Externalities: How Industry Life Cycles and Innova-
tion Stages Help Explain Variations in Agglomeration Externalities’, Papers in
Evolutionary Economic Geography, Utrecht: University of Utrecht.
Nelson, R.R. (1995) ‘Co-evolution of Industry Structure, Technology and Supporting
Institutions, and the Making of Comparative Advantage’, International Journal of
the Economics of Business, 2(2): 171-184.
Nelson, R.R. and S.G. Winter (1982) An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Cam-
bridge, ma/London: The Belknap Press.
Nooteboom, B. (2000) Learning and Innovation in Organizations and Economies, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Nooteboom, B., W. van Haverbeke, G. Duysters, V. Gilsing and A. van den Oord (2007)
‘Optimal Cognitive Distance and Absorptive Capacity’, Research Policy, 36: 1016-
1034.
Olson, M. (1982) The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social
Rigidities, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Ormerod, P. (2005) Why Most Things Fail: Evolution, Extinction and Economics, New
York: Pantheon Books.
Oughton, C., M. Landabaso and K. Morgan (2002) ‘The Regional Innovation Paradox:
Innovation Policy and Industrial Policy’, Journal of Technology Transfer, 27: 97-
110.
micro-foundations for innovation policy
340Pack, H. and K. Saggi (2006) ‘The Case for Industrial Policy: A Critical Survey’, World
Bank Policy Research 3839, February: 51.
Pasinetti, L.L. (1981) Structural Change and Economic Growth, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Ponds, R., F.G. van Oort and K. Frenken (2007) ‘Internationalization and Regional
Embedding of Scientific Research in the Netherlands’, in: A. Varga (ed.) Universi-
ties and Regional Development, Cheltenham/Northampton, ma.: Edward Elgar
Press.
Porter, M. (1990) The Competitive Advantage of Nations, New York: Free Press.
Pred, A.R. (1966) The Spatial Dynamics of Urban-industrial Growth 1800-1914: Interpre-
tative and Theoretical Essays, Cambridge, ma: mit Press.
Rallet, A. and A. Torre (2000) ‘Is Geographical Proximity Necessary in Innovation
Networks in the Era of Global Economy?’ GeoJournal, 49: 373-380.
Raspe, O., F.G. van Oort and P. de Bruijn (2004) Spatial Patttern in the Dutch Knowledge
Economy (in Dutch), Rotterdam: Nai Publishers.
Rosenberg, N. (1982) Inside the Black Box: Technology and Economics, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Saviotti, P.P. (1996) Technological Evolution, Variety and the Economy, Cheltenham:
Edwrad Elgar.
Saviotti, P.P. and A. Pyka (2004) ‘Economic Development by the Creation of New
Sectors’, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 14: 1-35.
Saxenian, A.L. (2006) The New Argonauts: Regional Advantage in a Global Economy,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Schumpeter, J.A. (1942) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, New York: Harper and
Row.
Schwerin, J. and C. Werker (2003) ‘Learning Innovation Policy Based on Historical Expe-
rience’, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, 14: 385-404.
Shaw, G.K. (1992) ‘Policy Implications of Endogenous Growth Theory’, The Economic
Journal, 102: 611-621.
Simmie, J. (2003) ‘Innovation and Urban Regions as National and International Nodes for
the Transfer and Sharing of Knowledge’, Regional Studies, 37(6-7): 607-620.
Todtling, F. and M. Trippl (2005) ‘One Size Fits All? Towards a Differentiated Regional
Innovation Policy Approach’, Research Policy, 34: 1203-1219.
Uzzi, B. (1997) ‘Social Structure and Competition in Interfirm Networks: the Paradox of
Embeddedness’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 42: 35-67.
Wegner, G. (1997) ‘Economic Policy from an Evolutionary Perspective: A New Approach’,
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 153: 463-509.
Wegner, G. and P. Pelikan (2003) ‘Introduction: Evolutionary Thinking on Economic
Policy’, in: P. Pelikan and G. Wegner (eds.) The Evolutionary Analysis of Economic
Policy, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1-14.
341
referencesmicro-foundations for innovation policy
34212 conclusions for innovation policy:
opening in fours
Bart Nooteboom and Erik Stam
12.1 introduction
Innovation is needed to sustain economic growth, but the position of the Nether-
lands in terms of innovation is not a very good one. It was shown in chapter 2
that in recent years the eu has lagged behind the us in productivity growth, 
and within the eu the Netherlands takes up a middle position. The Netherlands
performs below the eu average in six out of eight indicators of innovativeness. 
It was shown in chapter 5 that although in recent years the number of new firms
has risen rather spectacularly, this can largely be attributed to employees contin-
uing their activities in self-employment for fiscal and ‘lifestyle’ reasons. On 
average, small- and medium-sized enterprises (smes) in the Netherlands have
become less rather than more innovative in the last decade, and the percentage of
innovative smes is much lower than the eu average. Therefore, there is an urgent
policy issue: how can innovation be increased?
We have argued that innovation is a system phenomenon, with multiple types of
individual and collective agents, including firms, entrepreneurs, institutes for
education and research, policymakers, regulatory agencies, and many types of
services and intermediaries, interacting in a variety of ways. Actions and interac-
tions are enabled by institutions and forms of organisation (of firms and between
firms), and in turn affect those institutions. In this innovation system institu-
tional logics and dynamics arise that are difficult to manage, and yield unex-
pected and often adverse effects.
As argued in chapters 1 and 2, for an adequate innovation policy we need an
adequate understanding of the micro-level actions and interactions of agents, in
competition and collaboration, in idea generation, implementation, and diffusion
of innovations. Little is known of the micro-foundations and institutional condi-
tions of innovation policy, and the purpose of this book is to contribute to the
further development of that insight and corresponding policy.
In this book we have discussed theories of cognition, learning, and trust 
(chapters 3 and 7), and we have analysed the following elements of the 
innovation system: the generation and utilisation of ideas (chapter 4), 
entrepreneurship (chapter 5 and 6), and the internal (chapters 8 and 9), and 
the external organisation of innovation (chapters 10 and 11). In this final chapter 
we summarise the main lines of analysis and we present our conclusions. 
We begin with a summary of the conceptual and theoretical perspectives that 
we have used. We proceed with a critical discussion of targeted industrial 
policies, and a discussion of market, system, and government failures. 
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conclusions for innovation policy: opening in foursThis is followed by policy implications regarding different parts of the innovation
system: knowledge, entrepreneurship, organisation, networks, and regions.
12.2 perspectives
As discussed in chapter 3, in this volume we take a perspective informed by an
Austrian, in particular Hayekian, and an evolutionary view of markets, where
diversity, local specificity, and idiosyncrasy of knowledge form sources of inno-
vation, in an experimentalist society. This yields a plea to afford autonomy and to
create conditions for lower-level actors to experiment with solutions of their own
devising within broadly defined areas of public policy. For this, entrepreneurship
is crucial, as discussed in chapter 5. We also take an institutionalist view of
markets, in which markets and institutions co-evolve in the innovation system.
Markets require institutions but also create institutions that may obstruct the
emergence of new markets.
An evolutionary perspective yields an appreciation of radical uncertainty and the
role of variety, for exploration, and the corresponding role of trial and error, the
need for a selection environment of markets and institutions to select among
them, and the transmission of success. We add a Hayekian awareness of the
distributed nature of knowledge. Together, the two perspectives suggest
modesty concerning the ability of governments, especially central government,
to ‘pick winners’, choose the right parties for ‘backing winners’, and to design
innovation trajectories. Yet, it does not leave policy empty-handed. In addition to
the traditional market failure arguments for policy interventions in (innovations
in) public sectors, one can identify ‘system failures’ in the processes of idea
generation, innovation, and diffusion that governments should address, to
enable and facilitate evolutionary processes, without claiming to be able to
outguess innovation in the prediction of the outcomes of those processes. The
unpredictability of innovation lead to the requirement of openness in the course
of innovation processes and their outcomes, to allow for surprises and changes of
direction along the way.
However, the evolutionary perspective is in danger of neglecting creativity and
invention. The creation of variety, in new ideas, is not as blind as it is in biological
evolution, and we need a theory for it. A central issue, analysed in chapter 3, but
returning in several if not all other chapters, is how to combine exploration and
exploitation, within and between organisations. In learning and innovation, on
all levels, of people, teams within organisations, firms, and public policy, there is
a tension as well as a mutual dependence between exploitation, or first-order
learning, in the application and improvement of new ideas, principles, designs, or
logics, and exploration, or second-order learning, in which they are generated. On
the one hand the two build upon each other, or emerge from each other, but on
the other hand they have different requirements, in terms of mentality, approach,
modes of governance, and organisational conditions, and are difficult to combine
at the same time and place. We find this tension in firms ( between research and
micro-foundations for innovation policy
344development on the one hand and operations and production on the other hand),
in the tension between entrepreneurship and management (in the relation
between university (exploration) and industry (exploitation)), and in the tension
between the design and implementation of policy.
In economic policy, there has been a focus on exploitation to the neglect of explo-
ration, which requires a dynamic perspective.
We see this tension also in privatization. An example is the concession of regional bus transport to
private providers. Static efficiency requires a short concession period, as an incentive for efficiency
in the short term, to qualify for the next concession period, but innovation requires a longer hori-
zon. Efficiency of scale in the provision of transport, and efficiency of connections in travel require
a large concession area, with a large volume of transport, but this excludes small contenders and
limits variety for experimentation. Low cost is usually safeguarded in tight ex ante specifications of
performance, but this excludes the room for experimentation needed for innovation.
The fundamental duality and tension between exploitation and exploration has
to be faced in innovation policy, and its consequences have to be developed and
translated into policy measures, in most if not all parts of the innovation system.
In chapter 3, we analysed a ‘cycle of discovery’, as a model for a ‘knowledge ecol-
ogy’. According to this model, exploration is stimulated by submitting estab-
lished practice to new challenges, in new contexts of application, to gain fresh
insight into its limits, to build motivation to change, and to find inspiration of
possible elements and directions of change, as an avenue of discovery. The cycli-
cal nature of learning, with exploration and exploitation building upon each
other, yields the requirement of openness of entry for new players, outside entre-
preneurs, and inventors. It also requires openness to the world, allowing for
connections with outside communities, and for avenues of discovery. In policy
making it requires openness to ideas, goals, and experiences of citizens.
As discussed in chapter 3, the Hayekian view of diverse and dispersed knowledge
can be connected, going beyond Hayek, with an ‘embodied’ view of cognition,
including perception, interpretation, and evaluation, as based on mental cate-
gories that constitute absorptive capacity and are constructed in interaction
between people. Here, cognition is both individual and social: an individual
construction based on interaction. This yields ‘cognitive distance’ between
people to the extent that they have developed their cognition along different life
paths. This yields both a problem, of imperfect understanding, and an opportu-
nity, of new insights. Information needs to be absorbed to become knowledge.
Knowledge is transmitted only imperfectly and with greater or lesser effort. This
applies not only to ‘tacit knowledge’, as widely recognised, but also to codified
knowledge, since that can also only be absorbed to the extent that it fits into
absorptive capacity. Knowledge absorption, or assimilation into cognitive frame-
works, entails transformation, to a greater or lesser extent. Thus learning in the
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edge. That, by the way, is also why it is difficult to completely separate the
creation from the adoption of innovation (in diffusion), since adoption always
entails transformation and in that sense is innovative. Absorptive capacity is
subject to development: more knowledge enables the absorption of further
knowledge. In other words, knowledge is cumulative. For innovation, diversity
and cognitive distance are indispensable. The policy implications of this are that
formal and informal institutions should be aimed not at eliminating that distance
but at the ability to cross it. The benefits of cognitive distance yield an argument
that for innovation actors (people, firms) should profit from outside collabora-
tion with others, at optimal cognitive distance. On a fundamental level, that is
what lies behind the currently fashionable notion of ‘open innovation’.
On the governance side, a crucial theme is that of trust, discussed in chapter 7. As
argued above, collaboration is especially necessary for innovation. We need
collaboration to profit from cognitive distance, but especially in innovation
governance of relationships by contractual and incentive control is problematic,
due to the uncertainty of innovation and the novelty of emerging knowledge and
competence, which limit contracting, monitoring and the evaluation of compe-
tence and performance. Especially in the earlier stages of innovation, i.e., explo-
ration, one does not yet know what the goals, means, causalities between them,
and requisite resources will be. In other words: problems are ‘untamed’. As a
result, relevant stakeholders have to iterate in their collaboration, in the hope of
converging on a basis for exploitation. This is difficult to govern by means of
contracts, monitoring, and control. But what is trust, how does it work, and what
are its limits? Crucial for trust is openness of communication (‘voice’), in which
one voices concerns, reports one’s weaknesses and mistakes, and responds
constructively to such openness of partners. To further innovation, but more
generally to provide scope for professionalism, we should get away from current
tendencies towards excessive control and monitoring of work, and master the 
art of voice in the building of trust. chapter 7 provided indications on how to do
that.
Our key message is that innovation policy should create and maintain openness,
in four dimensions: openness to uncertainty in the innovation process; openness
for collaboration with others at a fruitful ‘cognitive distance’; openness for new
entrants; and openness to the world outside. This fourfold openness for innova-
tion stands in contrast to much theory, policy, and practice of innovation, which
in many cases locks up innovation in pre-conceived targets, established players,
national programmes, isolated activities, and relationships at arms length that
lack collaboration and openness of communication. The different chapters of this
book serve to make these dimensions of openness more concrete, and to specify
ways to achieve them. Those are summarised in the following sections. First, we
proceed with a critical discussion of targeted industrial policies.
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In chapter 1 we noted that one should expect radical, path-breaking, paradigm-
switching innovations to be rare, particularly in a small country like the Nether-
lands. Most innovation will be exploitative, incremental, or imitative. There, in a
wide range of application across the economy, invention achieves its greatest
economic impact. Clearly, then, a priority for policy is to enable and stimulate
entrepreneurship to conduct this wide range of exploitative innovation. That is
why, in a later section, we indicate how entrepreneurship may be enhanced,
based on the analysis in chapter 5.
The question next is in what areas ‘we’, as a nation, should choose to be leaders,
accepting that we are mostly followers. Here, a temptation arises for policymak-
ers to make a choice in targeted industrial policies, on the basis of expected
unique strengths in the future (‘picking winners’), or to enhance strengths that
have been proven in the market (‘backing winners’). The former approach was
taken, in the Netherlands, in the 1980s, with a choice of ‘arrowhead’ sectors, and
the latter policy is being pursued now, with the choice of ‘key areas’. Picking
winners is now recognised as going against the unpredictability of future success.
One cannot outguess the evolutionary process, and as much as possible one
should leave the errors of choice up to private business, in a wide range of experi-
mentation in diverse directions that occasionally, somewhere will yield unpre-
dictable success. The argument for backing winners is that in proven success
errors and misfits have been weeded out. Another argument that is used for back-
ing winners is in fact an old argument of comparative advantage, now applied to
areas of knowledge or competence. If we are successful in certain areas this
reveals comparative advantage, upon which we should capitalise. However, who
says that present success guarantees future success? Again, we cannot outguess
evolution. Also, success is often the result of strength developed from challenge
and struggle, and may be weakened rather than further strengthened by support.
Innovation when cuddled may only survive in an artificial way.
An argument that has also been used for backing winners is an argument of
concentration: we cannot afford to spread money and attention around every-
where. For the sake of efficiency we have to concentrate it where it is best spent,
and that is where quality is highest. In chapter 1 we acknowledged that economies
of scale do occur, sometimes, for example in transaction costs, but there are also
diseconomies of scale, and moreover any advantages of scale have to be traded off
against loss of variety. Spreading experimentation over a variety of many small-
scale trials increases the chance of breakthroughs while limiting the losses that
arise from failure, compared to fewer bets on larger projects.
Furthermore, the question with backing winners is why they should be backed if
they are winners? If they have been proven in the market, they are generating
profits for their expansion. Such policy carries the risk of confirming what exists,
in established ideas, technologies, and players, rather than stimulating the emer-
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raise obstacles to entry for new challengers. In our view, the priority should lie in
keeping the system open to outsiders. This entails prioritising space and incen-
tives for entrepreneurship.
Upon closer inspection and debate it turns out that what is in fact intended by the
Dutch policy of backing winners, is better labelled as ‘mobilising unrealized
potential’, i.e., eliminating obstacles for the full utilisation of proven strengths.
Of course, government certainly has a task in seeing that potential is realised, for
example by breaking down barriers to innovations. Barriers may arise from the
lack of appropriate infrastructure, skills, education, technical standards, vested
interests, problems of high costs due to initial small scale and lack of learning by
doing, and systemic complexities. There may be market or system failures, and
then there is an argument, in principle, for government intervention, but those
barriers then have to be specified. We consider such barriers in a subsequent
section on failures of governments, markets, and systems.
On what basis would government make choices? Part of the problem is that in
the design of programmes, networks, clusters, and subsidies, one needs insights
from industry, and these tend to be offered and taken from established large busi-
ness (small firms hardly have the staff to spare, for example to participate in such
committees). Naturally, their suggestions are coloured by their experience and
interests – hen they slide into positions where they can protect their interests, it
would be naive to assume that they would not. In particular, in innovation large
incumbent firms are tempted to engage in ‘pre-emptive participation’. Here, they
do invest in the r&d needed for innovation, if only to have a basis for appropriat-
ing innovation if it does break through, but hold back on implementation and
breakthrough as long as the innovation would cannibalise existing, sunk invest-
ments, when those innovations are incompatible with it. This is not a matter of
‘evil plots’ but of institutional logic. In the Netherlands, this phenomenon is
intensified by the country’s peculiar industrial structure, with a hydrocephalus
(‘waterhead’) of a relatively large number of very large firms, in combination with
a small number of medium-sized firms, whereby the large firms are likely to
exercise a disproportionately large influence on public policy.
Can one expect the established oil and chemical industry to play along with degradable bio-plastics
that do not fit into the existing assets geared to petrochemicals, or with hydrogen fuel that does not
fit into the assets geared to gasoline (refineries, pipelines, gas stations)? And is government able to
resist these forces of conservatism? On the other hand, one should allow corporations to conduct
early research in new technologies or fields of activity, and to pull out when they conclude that 
it does not fit their strategic portfolio of activities. So, how do we know when they are engaging in
pre-emptive participation and when in reasonable pull-out? In the latter case, one might expect
them to be liberal in licensing the results of their research to others who do see a worthwhile
opportunity in it. This may also take the form of supporting spin-offs from the company into such
ventures.
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technology in innovation policy, everyone in that area wants to take part, and on
what basis would government refuse them? It is not only a matter of whom to
admit but also of whom to exclude. On what basis would government determine
that exclusion is justified or unjustified? Moreover, other areas worth their salt
would lobby to also be recognised as a key area, or at least a potential one. Which
area would not consider itself a potential key area? In this way backing winners
might lead to picking winners (or: winners picking governments) again.
This is what we observed in the Netherlands of the 1980s, when government, upon the advice of
the ‘Wagner committee’, instituted a similar policy of ‘arrowhead’ sectors. It started out with
seven, increased to 14 and ended up with 21. Similarly, while in present policy there are now four
key areas (flowers and food, high-tech systems and materials, water, and creative industry), four
more sectors have been recognised as potential new ones (chemistry, life sciences and health, logis-
tics, and durable energy), and two more have laid a claim (the finance sector, and the Hague as ‘resi-
dence of peace and justice’).
Finally, there are obstacles of bureaucracy, in government failures. We will
discuss those in more detail later, but here the point is that participation of the
government in the funding, facilitation, and monitoring of consortia for innova-
tion entails bureaucratic entanglement, with consequent delays, irritations, and
frustrations among business partners. It is naïve to see this as a simple matter of
lack of competence, will, or commitment on the part of civil service. It is due,
again, to an institutional logic that follows from the need for public spending to
be publicly justifiable and accountable, with a division of competencies and
authority across different sections and levels of a government department, and in
innovation often also across departments, to accommodate novel combinations.
Clearly also, there are sectors of activity where, for classic arguments concerning
public goods and externalities, government needs to take the lead, such as health,
education, infrastructure, mobility, energy, environment, security, and, increas-
ingly, the provision and control of water. In matters of societal interest with a
public goods nature, government should not just back winners but also pick
them, even in spite of the inevitable errors in trying to outguess evolution,
because private firms do not take the lead. If private firms cannot be tempted to
make choices that are liable to mistake, then government must make them.
Next, there is the issue of openness to the world. In particular, do targeted indus-
trial policies satisfy our condition of openness to the world? Or are they in
danger of locking innovation up in a country while the priority may lie precisely
in linking national activities into globally fragmented value chains, as argued in
chapter 1? The latter danger is not unrealistic: in a survey of measures of Dutch
innovation policy, in chapter 10, it was shown that of 21 measures only one was
explicitly directed at international collaboration (the Innovation Subsidy for
Collaborative Projects). It is true that implementation of policies for chosen key
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Typically, this occurs ex post. However, in the basic choice and design of key areas
there is the simple point of institutional logic that an eu nation is not inclined to
involve organisations from other eu countries in its national innovation policy,
so that the basic design is necessarily nationally oriented, while the choice and
design should be taken in an international perspective from the very beginning.
In other words, the choice, ex ante, of what to do, and of whom to involve, should
be internationally oriented, and not only the choice of how to implement
national choices. An example of how national boundaries constrain innovation
projects is given below.
“The University of Hasselt, in Belgium, cooperated with the University of Maastricht, in the
Netherlands, in the development of an instrument to measure a plant’s vitality by the state of its
chlorophyll, and they needed a development subsidy. Dutch authorities did not want to subsidize
cross-border collaboration, and, likewise, Belgian authorities required subsidies to be spent only on
Belgian firms and institutes” (Financieele Dagblad 2007).
Also, if we want to be leaders rather than followers in some areas, then in those
areas we should not take a parochial view of excellence and be satisfied with the
best that we have at home, but instead we should take a global view, where we
build what is best in the world. Innovation policy should beware of policy meas-
ures that are nationally oriented and may have the adverse effect of locking inno-
vation up in a country when instead innovation policy should enable interna-
tional connections.
In sum, utmost caution should be taken in any policy of backing winners. The
emphasis should lie on enabling challengers. There may be arguments for lower-
ing obstacles in the realisation of proven innovative potential, but these obstacles
should be made explicit as a basis for policy and its design. But what, then, is our
answer to the question of where to be leaders and where to be followers in inno-
vation? We maintain that one should exercise restraint in backing winners,
except in cases of market or system failures, since in principle winners in markets
should reap their own funds for expansion.
12.4 failures of governments, markets, and systems
12.4.1 government failures
Before undertaking any government policy for innovation, the customary ques-
tion, which is still valid, is why government should or should not act? Why do
markets fail, in respect of innovation, what other failures may there be in the
innovation system, and what are potential government failures? Usually, the
analysis starts with market failures and ends with government failures. Let us do
it the other way around.
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not have an adequate grasp of the varied – to a greater or lesser extent idiosyn-
cratic and context-specific – local knowledge and insights that are distributed
across society. In view of diverse and distributed knowledge, government should
be modest about its grasp of what can be done, and should tap into local knowl-
edge rather than impose its own.
Government is vulnerable to being taken hostage by established interests. It
needs the knowledge and support of industry in the design of subsidies and other
schemes, but design and implementation then inevitably carry the imprint of
their interests, as we discussed above. Also, in the discussion of the foundations
and limits of trust, in chapter 7, we noted that government is more vulnerable to
loss of reputation, and has to be more careful with commitments and openness of
information than industrial firms. Since government is more vulnerable to
opportunism than business, it should beware of confirming established interests
by getting involved in close relationships with industry.
Earlier, we noted that bureaucratic entanglement is inevitable when government
becomes involved in programmes or projects for innovation, as a result of the
imperative of public accountability. The question is how this can be fulfilled
without generating the delays, irritations, and frustrations that result for busi-
ness partners. Here, the principle comes to mind of an ‘account manager’, which
is already familiar in business: there should be a single point of contact. This
account manager carries the responsibility, and is given the authority, of coordi-
nating across departments and across segments and levels within departments.
We see this as a basis not only for resolving coordination problems, but also for
policy learning. The need for an account manager to coordinate across depart-
ments or segments within departments exerts a pressure to take cognisance of
inconsistencies or incoherence between regulations, rules, or processes, as a basis
for simplifying or revising them. This pressure is greater than when it is left to
the outside partners to deal with the problems of bureaucratic entanglement. In
this way, the public internalisation of transaction costs may best stimulate their
reduction by streamlining and integration. The problem of bureaucratic entangle-
ment is exacerbated by the condition, argued in chapter 3, that in innovation,
particularly when exploration plays a large role, there should be openness
concerning the course of a project, to allow for the surprises and changes of direc-
tion that are inherent in innovation. This is at odds with any ex ante specification
of ‘deliverables’ that must be achieved for payment of the subsidy. An alternative
then is to attach an official to the process, to monitor progress, discuss and autho-
rise changes of direction, and to assess the value of outcomes that deviate from
expectations. This entails a fundamental switch from the authorisation of deliv-
erables that need to be specified up front, to the authorisation of the process as it
unfolds, and/or the value of outcomes, ex post. Thus, a public account manager
has the task not only of coordinating public contacts, but also of authorising
progress and legitimating outcomes.
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when playing an inside role in collaborative programmes or projects. Now the
additional problem is that of temptations of favoritism or outright corruption.
Can this problem be resolved? We suggest a solution. Public account manage-
ment and process authorisation should be accompanied by safeguards of account-
ability. This probably requires a supervisory board, to specify boundary condi-
tions and for accountability ex post. Account managers submit verifiable reports
according to standards specified by the board, which are scrutinised, integrally or
by sampling, ex post. This entails correction of the conduct of account managers,
and a basis for learning, in an adjustment of rules and procedures. This increases
transaction costs, but it is not clear a priori that total transaction costs, for
government and business, increase. They may well decrease, even substantially.
That is an issue for further investigation. Crucial here is that the arrangements
allow for more openness of innovation.
12.4.2 market  failures
Knowledge does not suffer as much from the market failure of non-excludability
as has been assumed in earlier economic theory, since it cannot always spill over
easily, due to cognitive distance and limited absorptive capacity. As discussed in
chapter 4, a policy question is to what extent protection of intellectual property
(ip) is still needed. We suggest that the degree of ip protection should be weak-
ened – by shortening the period of protection, by raising the originality bar, and
by making compulsory licensing and parallel imports easier (Chang 2007: 143).
Where patent protection is still needed, for small, independent innovators there
are transaction costs with effects of scale in the acquisition, monitoring, and
protection of intellectual property rights. Acquiring a patent is costly, especially
for smaller firms and especially the first time when the procedure is unfamiliar,
as is the cost of determining if a certain patent already exists, and also the moni-
toring and fighting of patent infringement. The procedure is also too slow, espe-
cially for small firms, who often have to move fast and lack the resources to wait
long. There should be a single eu patent, not complicated by language issues,
available through a faster process, and a lower price for searching, filing, and
renewing a patent, as well as support for small firms in the identification and
redress of infringement. This is on the agenda of present innovation policy, but
its urgency should again be highlighted.
As indicated above, market failure in the appropriation of rewards from knowl-
edge is not as strong as previously thought, due to cognitive distance and limita-
tions in absorptive capacity. However, the reverse side of that coin is that there
are serious market failures in diffusion of innovation. Knowledge ‘transfer’ is a
highly misleading term. Firms with limited absorptive capacity cannot easily
capture innovative opportunities. Often this creates a problem particularly for
smaller and more traditional firms, who for reasons of scale lack specialised
expertise. Also, particularly in more traditional smaller firms knowledge is often
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knowledge is harder to assess by outsiders than codified knowledge, and tends to
be self-evident to the bearer of the knowledge, which makes criticism of existing
knowledge and practice, and hence adoption of innovations, more problematic.
Lack of absorptive capacity and a high degree of tacit knowledge yield what one
might call ‘cognitive’ transaction costs, and these are relatively high for many
small firms (Nooteboom 1993). Therefore, there is a good rationale for a
subsidised knowledge transfer service to small firms, as offered by the Dutch
‘Syntens’ organisation.
Consider the recent policy measure in the Netherlands of ‘innovation vouchers’, aimed at trigger-
ing the ‘market’ for knowledge ‘transfer’, with which small firms can obtain free advice from
universities, polytechnics and technical institutes. There is a potential problem here. Knowledge
intensive firms will mostly find their own way to knowledge institutes, and hardly require a
subsidy. The more traditional, less knowledge intensive firms that form the main target group
often do not have the absorptive capacity to deal with especially universities, to whom cognitive
distance is often large. There is a risk that more time will be needed than expected to build mutual
understanding and trust, and to properly frame the research question, before knowledge can be
shared. This may far exceed the worth of the voucher, and in the end the result may even be
counter-productive, with the small firm feeling that with the voucher it was lured into a waste of
time and effort. A recent evaluation of the scheme showed that firms that applied for the voucher
were indeed larger and more experienced in innovation than average firms (see cpb 2007).
As argued in chapter 3, exploration requires time and slack resources to deal with
uncertainties of goals, means, causal relations between them, and resources
needed, in iterations with relevant stakeholders, and this slack is likely to be
eliminated by extreme price competition. This constitutes a newly recognised
market failure for innovation. Here, the failure is not that the market does not
work, but that it works too well, in the sense that price competition is so intense
as to squeeze out resources for exploration. We suspect that this is one of the
reasons why industry has cut down, or even abolished, its more fundamental
‘blue sky’ research, and is now falling back on universities for such research.
For collaboration for innovation we argued that, as elaborated in chapter 7, a
minimal duration of relationships is needed to make and recoup relation-specific
investments in mutual understanding and trust, and that we should strive for
optimum, not maximum, flexibility of relationships. This has implications for
competition policy. Competition policy should allow for dedicated collaborative
relationships, with specific investments needed to utilise cognitive distance, to
have an adequate duration, even if this means temporary exclusivity and hence
limitation of competition.
Mobility of labour helps innovation, in both the diffusion of new practice and
exploration. In particular, innovation is stimulated by movement between
exploitation and exploration. However, for labour also the logic applies that a
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understanding and trust that is needed to cross the cognitive distance that is
conducive to innovation. The argument extends to the ownership of firms, in
issues of corporate governance. There also, ownership should not be so volatile as
to discourage specific investment needed to build networks, mutual understand-
ing, commitment, and corresponding trust. This means that in relations of work
and ownership of firms, we need a corrective to the present discourse of maxi-
mum flexibility, aiming for optimal, not maximum flexibility.
12.4.3 system failures
System failures arise from mismatches between elements of the innovation
system. These are many. In the previous section we discussed the institutional
logic of ‘pre-emptive participation’. Some system failures go beyond the scope of
this book. One of those is lack of adequate education and training to match new
ideas or practices. Other system failures have been discussed in various chapters
in this book, and conclusions will be presented below. One of those is an appar-
ent lack of connection between the generation of new knowledge, at universities,
and its application, in industry, as discussed in chapter 4. A second is lack of
finance for entrepreneurship, discussed in chapter 5. A third is lack of adequate
management and organisation to deal with the need to combine exploration and
exploitation, discussed in chapter 8, and to provide conditions for the function-
ing of creative teams, discussed in chapter 9. These failures, and implications for
policy, are discussed in subsequent sections. Another system failure is lack of
trust and ability to collaborate, in alliances for innovation, discussed in chapter 7.
Another system failure is the reverse, in a sense: lock-in into established interests
and positions, discussed partly in chapter 7 and partly in chapter 11.
In our critical discussion of the policy of ‘backing winners’ we granted that there
may be problems of coordination in the collaboration needed to utilize opportu-
nities of novelty, and that this might yield an argument for government interven-
tion. Here we will focus on that issue. Regularly, stakeholders get stuck in stale-
mates of manoeuvring for position, in choosing which option to take, which
standard to establish, and how to divide influence, costs, risks, and revenues.
In chapter 6 we gave several examples. One was the development of the ‘whisper’ bus , reducing
noise, pollution, and energy consumption. This was stalled due to lack of coordination between the
municipality of the city of Apeldoorn that wanted to promote this bus, the Ministry of the Envi-
ronment that was prepared to subsidise the scheme, the public transport companies that would
need to introduce the busses, and the bus manufacturers who would produce them. There was no
alignment of interests and everybody was waiting for everybody to take the first step. Another
example was the development of an electronic patient dossier, which stalled due to lack of align-
ment between a wide variety of physicians and medical specialists, psychotherapists, physiothera-
pists, nurses, hospitals, home care providers, pharmacies, and the ministry of health.
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(‘prisoner’s dilemmas’). Often, players need each other but are also rivals. Exam-
ples are technical standards or market structuring. Some solutions are closer to
established practice and knowledge of a given player than others. It may be diffi-
cult to bring manoeuvring for position to an end. Once equilibrium is found it
may be very difficult to find new equilibrium when conditions change. An
outside party, like the government, may be required to take steps to solve the
dilemma. We have heard this argument for government intervention several
times, also from industry. We are sceptical about this. There are conditions where
intervention is indeed needed to unlock such lock-ins. This may be a task for
government, but there may be alternative intermediaries. And if, for want of
adequate intermediaries, there is indeed a need for government to intervene, it
may have to be only a short-term ‘nudge’, after which government can retire,
rather than maintain ongoing involvement. As indicated earlier, government can
be taken hostage in tugs of influence.
The real issue, it seems to us, is that rather than running to government for help
as soon as deadlocks arise, industry should face up to the challenge of developing
the capabilities needed for collaboration and network formation, in the new
networked knowledge economy. Also, as argued in chapter 7, there are interesting
entrepreneurial opportunities in a new branch of business services to provide the
roles of go-betweens to facilitate collaboration for innovation. There is consider-
able knowledge concerning the issues involved and ways to deal with them,
which can be exploited commercially (Nooteboom 2004).
Chapter 6 showed how specific the problems can be, in unique configurations of
positions and interests of different stakeholders that are difficult to translate into
general regulations. Solutions then need to be case-specific, to be effective and to
forestall further accumulation of regulations. There may be a role for a ‘deblock-
ing brigade’1 that is expert in managing complex relationships and has the author-
ity to cut across different areas of departmental and jurisdictional authority, and
can be called in when unyielding systemic failures occur. We propose this
deblocking brigade partly as an alternative to the targeted industrial policies that
we criticised earlier.2 In sum, government should exercise utmost restraint in
participating in the configuration, design, planning, and progress of collaboration
between private actors. It should stimulate private actors to take their own
responsibilities, and to develop their own capabilities in collaboration, and it
might stimulate the development of business services that facilitate collabora-
tion. Government should intervene only when obstacles arise that are inveterate
to the point that they cannot otherwise be resolved.
Earlier, we discussed government failures, and the de-blocking brigade should be
consistent with that analysis. First, clearly officials at the brigade should be
masters in the management of collaborative relationships and networks for inno-
vation. Second, the process requires an ‘account manager’ with sufficient author-
ity. This ‘account manager’ should provide a single point for integrated and
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hand involves a prolonged process of innovation, this official should have the
authority to authorise changes of direction in order to maintain openness to
innovation. The official should be able, or have the resources, to establish a valid
judgement about the quality of the outcome of the process, when it does deviate
from expectations. Fourth, to cover the risk of favouritism or even corruption
that such a position of power and trust could elicit, the brigade should be subject
to a supervisory board that establishes boundary conditions, and to which project
managers report for possible correction, ex post. This board would be accountable
to parliament, through a minister that has this in her portfolio. The reporting
procedure should provide a basis for policy learning.
12.5 generation and utilisation of knowledge
12.5.1 valorisation
In chapter 4, we considered the system failure of the supposed ‘knowledge para-
dox’, according to which in the eu in general and the Netherlands in particular
scientific performance is fine, but fails to be adequately carried forward into
innovation. Presently, in the Netherlands, this problem of utilisation, or ‘valori-
sation’ as it is called, carries high priority in innovation policy.
In chapter 4 we noted a perverse effect of forcing universities to ask for a fee for
any knowledge they supply to industry. Pricing this knowledge provision is not
efficient in view of the transaction costs involved. Furthermore, even from a
commercial perspective it is better to allow for an ample threshold of free advice
that forms the basis for judging the merits and feasibility of a contract for a more
substantial research project.
In the preparation of this book we developed some ideas on how the interaction
between university and industry in exploration could possibly be improved, and
we tested those ideas in a series of interviews with four universities, a polytech-
nic, two technical institutes allied with universities, two medium-sized firms
(motek and otb), and three large corporations (Unilever, Shell, and Philips).
The main result is that among our respondents the problem of valorisation is not
perceived to be quite as large or urgent as it is among policymakers in ‘Dutch
government. Many forms of collaboration have already been developed. Lessons
can be learned from this, improvements can be made, and it may be useful to
collect and diffuse the resulting principles, summarised below. The principles
that emerged from our own analysis, in chapter 3, plus feedback from the inform-
ants, are as follows.
A key principle, in our view, is that the relation between university and industry
is not only a one-way process of putting university research to use, in exploita-
tion, but a two-way process in which inspiration is also provided from practice
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follows from the analysis of the ‘cycle of discovery’, in chapter 3, in which
exploitation and exploration build upon each other. Most respondents acknowl-
edged the validity of this principle.
Another key principle, to ensure exploration, is that meetings between people
generate ideas and projects, around a broad theme, rather than that projects are
specified beforehand for participants to subscribe to. This is related to the
Hayekian principle that innovation projects should tap into the diversity of
knowledge and ideas spread around different communities, and the principle that
projects should be sufficiently open to allow for surprise and change of direction.
It proved useful also for other reasons to employ the distinction between
exploitation and exploration. Exploitation emerges in more or less straightfor-
ward contract research, in which industry can specify and contract for desired
outcomes. Exploration arises in collaboration between universities and industry
to literally explore uncertain but possible developments, in new technologies,
areas of application or problems to be investigated. In line with our earlier analy-
sis, in chapter 7, which yielded a recommendation for optimal rather than maxi-
mum flexibility, it was recognised that in such collaboration for exploration each
actor should take enough time to get to know and understand each other (‘speak
the same language’) and build trust, since in such settings contractual control, for
example of property rights, is difficult, cumbersome, unworkable, or even
counter-productive. On the other hand, there should be enough turnover of
people to maintain variety of ideas and sufficient cognitive distance.
Concerning the issue of intellectual property and ‘spillover’, respondents noted a
growing awareness that a relaxation was in order: to get knowledge one should
offer and risk knowledge, in many cases exploration was sufficiently ‘pre-compet-
itive’ not to yield a direct threat, contractual control would not work in early stages
of exploration (there isn’t yet anything well defined to appropriate), and people
simply could not make progress without each others’ knowledge. This does not
mean that issues of intellectual property have disappeared, but that in early explo-
ration they are less urgent or even do not arise. As one respondent said: patents
from early exploration are likely to have elapsed before exploitation is reached.
For some respondents it was fine to conduct exploration more or less ad hoc,
with different groups of partners on different occasions. The advantage of this is
flexibility. Others were aiming at more durable, ‘strategic’ relations, as a basis for
building understanding and trust. An element of such relations was also the
provision of temporary staff and exchange of personnel, for the duration of a
project. Some respondents expressed apprehension at too close and extensive an
involvement of firms in universities. That may interfere with the independence
of universities and their task, generally seen as legitimate and important, to do
independent fundamental research, and it may be seen by others (for example,
politicians and the public) as appropriation of public institutes by business.
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industry, in the form of an actual institute, with residential facilities, dedicated to
their interaction, financed jointly by business and the government, with the
express task of enabling and facilitating meetings and joint projects to utilise
cognitive distance for the sake of exploration. Such separation from both univer-
sity and industry may serve to protect the integrity of the university and ensure
that the work does not fall back into exploitation induced by commercial pres-
sures. A condition for this to work is that participation by academics is seen as
legitimate, and is given a place in the system of performance evaluation. For
industry, a condition for this to work is that their staff views participation as a
good career move within the firm. A third space could perhaps also function as a
platform for entrepreneurial spin-offs. In that case the set-up may also involve
venture capitalists. Mostly, the respondents from university and technical insti-
tutes claimed that they practised what we suggested, and that something like
‘third spaces’ already were a reality. We acknowledge that, but not all potential
participants seem to be aware of all relevant options, and we believe that the
people involved can still learn, mainly from each other.
Valorisation may be less of a problem than is perceived by policymakers. The
actors involved, in industry and academia, have developed forms of interaction
for both exploitation and exploration, oriented at both application and inspira-
tion of university research. However, options and forms can still be further
developed and improved. Government has only a limited role here – to ensure
that adequate incentives are in place for university staff to participate in interac-
tion with industry and to disseminate experience in modes of collaboration.
These arrangements are appropriate for large firms and for small firms with
adequate absorptive capacity, such as high-tech firms or spin-offs from universi-
ties or large firms. However, the limited absorptive capacity of most smes makes
Dutch institutes of higher vocational education a more suitable collaboration
partner for them than universities. To play this role, institutes of higher voca-
tional education should be given the resources to conduct applied research.
12.5.2 funding university research
An issue in relation to university research, is to what extent such research should
be programmed and rewarded according to societal needs. We do acknowledge
the legitimacy to indicate broad areas of public priorities, such as energy, envi-
ronment, water, health care, and aging. However, in line with our Hayekian
perspective, we are wary of bureaucrats in central offices, at ministries, and
national science foundations, specifying programmes or projects for which scien-
tists or businesses may then submit tenders. Why should they know better than
the totality of differentiated and dispersed knowledge? There is a danger also of
fashionable ‘hypes’ directing research. Ideas should be allowed to arise from
below, from the wellsprings of variety. This would also mean that within univer-
sities ideas for Ph.D. projects should come more often from Ph.D. candidates
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Netherlands only at some universities. It must be possible to allow for this and
still achieve sufficient coherence and connection between projects.
On the basis of a traditional logic of public goods, we propose to back winners in
scientific achievement, with awards that yield funds for expansion to proven
researchers and research leaders. The merit of such a policy is that it avoids the
problem of trying to predict successful new ideas, and provides the means for
success to expand where it cannot generate its own profits to do so. As discussed
in chapter 4, in the Netherlands we have such awards, notably the ‘Spinoza
prize’. Note that the award does not yield a higher income to the researcher, but
funds to expand his patently excellent line of research. What successful firms get
out of profits researchers should get out of awards. The logic of this principle is
that in order to avoid the paradox of outguessing evolution, and as a means of
extending the scope of success, one gives a reward afterwards for proven success
if the research cannot get such a reward from a market. We applaud awards for
proven personal excellence, allocated in second-stream funding. In addition to
that, however, funding on the basis of prior assessment of the merits of a research
proposal is also needed, to allow for newcomers and outsiders, but this is more
problematic, in view of the difficulty to predict the value of exploratory research.
As argued in chapter 4, here we have a preference for the first stream, in view of
the greater variety and richness of local knowledge and perspectives for generat-
ing and evaluating proposals.
A further issue is inter-disciplinarity of university research, as discussed in chap-
ter 4. While there are good reasons for disciplinarity, both radical novelty and
application often arise across the frontiers of disciplines. However, universities
are mostly oriented towards, and organised according to, disciplines. This was
noted above as one of the complications in university-industry collaboration.
Indeed, one of the reasons for university-industry collaboration, possibly in third
spaces, is to stimulate interdisciplinary exploration. In this respect, measures are
needed to facilitate inter-disciplinary research, for example with special
programmes at the Science Foundation, and measures to recognise and reward
interdisciplinary research at universities, in formal assessment systems and Ph.D.
programmes.
12.6 entrepreneurship
In view of our evolutionary argument for variety generation, and our plea for
openness to surprise and to challengers of the status quo, entrepreneurship is of
central importance for innovation. In chapter 5, we distinguished between
Schumpeterian entrepreneurship, in breakthrough innovations, and Kirznerian
entrepreneurship, in more incremental innovation and ‘arbitrage’ in filling gaps
between supply and demand. The former are needed to produce innovations and
the latter to diffuse and fully profit from them. While the second type does not
and should not form the focus of innovation policy, it is important for economic
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society and to profit fully from innovation in economic growth. Self-employ-
ment may also yield an escape from unemployment. Beyond economics, self-
employment has an important societal value as a stabilising political factor, for
example as an avenue for emancipation, an escape from discrimination in labour
markets, and for social acceptance.
The majority of self-employed people are of the second, Kirznerian type, if inno-
vative at all. That is not surprising: as argued in chapter 1, one should expect only
few breakthrough innovations relative to incremental innovation and diffusion.
For innovation policy we focus on the more dynamic, Schumpeterian entrepre-
neurs. Research tries to identify these in new technology-based firms, corporate
venturing, spin-offs, and high-growth start-ups.
On the basis of recent research it was shown in chapter 5 that notwithstanding a
recent increase in the number of self-employed people in the Netherlands, on
average small- and medium-sized enterprises (smes) have become less and not
more innovative in the last decade (1999-2007), and the percentage of innovative
smes is much lower than the eu average. The Netherlands is lagging behind
internationally with respect to entrepreneurial activities in general and ambitious
entrepreneurship in particular. In view of the importance we attach to entrepre-
neurship for an open system of innovation this is a serious matter.
Another striking finding is that, counter to received wisdom, there is a relatively
low ‘fear of failure’ in the Netherlands. Since this does not explain lack of innova-
tive entrepreneurship, then what does? It may be lack of ambition. If it is, such a
cultural feature is hard to change, certainly in the short term. So, we turn to
markets and institutions. In particular, while venture capital has developed in the
Netherlands, there is still a perennial problem in the Netherlands, as elsewhere,
in the provision of early stage finance (‘seed capital’). Here we make a link to the
need for major efforts for innovation in public sector activities such as those
related to energy, the environment, climate change and water management,
ageing and health care, and congestion in transport. Since government will have
to make a major investment in research and development in these areas, this
might also be used to stimulate and mobilise entrepreneurship. In view of insti-
tutional logic that tends to favour larger firms, it would be a good idea to system-
atically channel public funds for r&d to smaller firms, in imitation of the sbir
programme in the us.
Corporate spin-offs are a much more important phenomenon than university
spin-offs, both in number and in impact. In chapter 5 we discussed the condi-
tions for corporate spin-offs. The advantage of such spin-offs, from the perspec-
tive of combining exploration and exploitation, is that they carry relevant experi-
ence from business into new ventures (See chapter 3). Chapter 11 also offered
evidence of the importance of spin-offs for innovation. Corporate spin-offs
might be stimulated by lowering barriers such as anti-competition clauses. Inno-
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venturing to a larger extent, for example by showcasing best practices.
In our analysis of interactions between university and industry, in chapters 3 and
4, we noted the danger of too many market pressures within universities. That
provided a basis for considering ‘third spaces’ between university and industry.
This notion of a ‘third space’ also has implications for the development of ‘busi-
ness incubators’ at universities. Facilitating the growth of promising university
spin-offs by privatised incubators both provides these incubators with more com-
petent staff, and protects the university in its role as producer of public knowl-
edge.
The fragmentation of present innovation policy in the Netherlands, and of
schemes and regulations more widely, yields high transaction costs, which weigh
more heavily for small firms due to effects of scale in transaction costs (Noote-
boom 1993). Often, these costs are in the nature of a fixed effort of search, contract-
ing and monitoring compliance, which weigh more heavily on small volumes of
business than on large ones. In addition to such familiar types of transaction costs,
we noted cognitive transaction costs, related to absorptive capacity and tacit
knowledge, which also exhibit an effect of scale. The case studies in chapter 6 illus-
trated barriers to innovation, in established interests, standards, procedures, coor-
dination failures, and perverse institutional logics, which can obstruct innovation
generally but are especially difficult to overcome for small firms.
12.7 organisation
An important part of organisation for innovation lies in the collaboration
between firms and other organisations, in open innovation. This has been
discussed above, and it reappears in the discussion of networks. Here the focus is
more on internal organisation. Public policy has at best an indirect role to play
here, for example in the diffusion of best practices in organising innovation, and
hence this section is modest in scope. In chapters 8 and 9 we analysed organisa-
tional conditions for innovation, and perspectives for organisational innovation,
concluding that there are enormous as yet unexploited opportunities. Perhaps
this is the cause of the Netherland’s apparent lag in total factor productivity rela-
tive to the us, which appears to be ahead in this regard.
There are many opportunities to improve the efficiency of exploitation, but the
big challenge is how to combine, within an organisation, or to connect, between
organisations, exploration and exploitation, in ‘ambidextrous organisation’. In
chapter 8 we found ways to do this. In chapter 9 we identified conditions for the
functioning of creative teams within organisations. The problem, however, is
that the more short-term oriented and familiar conditions of exploitation tend to
prevail and to squeeze out exploration, which is also more vulnerable to pres-
sures of price competition. This appears to lead to a conservatism in management
and organisation that the Netherlands can ill afford.
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teams are consistent with dimensions of the quality of labour: intrinsic 
motivation, autonomy, openness, psychological safety, and inspirational leader-
ship. There appears to be an opportunity here for a new alliance between
management and labour, to both stimulate innovation and improve the quality 
of labour.
Related to the combination of exploration and exploitation, but going beyond
that, profiting from new opportunities of ict, there are several new forms of
platform organisations, in which users can to a greater or lesser extent configure
their product, and even contribute to its innovation, and open source communi-
ties, where users are the producers. Particularly for government services there are
obstacles in present authority relations and in rules of accountability, there are
opportunities to make mistakes, and there is low status for ‘front-office’ workers.
There are opportunities to improve innovation, in both quality and speed, not
least in government services, by employing the concept of platform organisa-
tions, and even, perhaps, of open source communities. For government services,
this will require a change of perspective concerning the role and the authority of
the ‘front office’, in suggesting and leading innovation. We have only touched
lightly upon the wide issue of innovation in government. The further exploration
of opportunities and their exploitation in the innovation of organisation in
government services by itself merits further study.
12.8 networks and regions
We also see conservatism and insufficient learning in the limited ability of public
and private organisations to collaborate with other organisations, in open innova-
tion. Too often, organisations engage in the power play of mergers and acquisi-
tions, to maintain hierarchical authority, rather than engage in the more difficult
game of collaboration in mutual dependence, where that would be better for inno-
vation. Inter-organisational collaboration yields more flexibility of (re)configuring
activities and greater variety and cognitive distance, conducive to innovation.
Also, as argued in chapter 7, formal hierarchical authority and control are less
appropriate especially for exploration. There is increasing insight into how to
manage such relationships, in mastering the art of trust, as discussed in an earlier
section.
As discussed in chapter 5, there is complementarity between small and large
firms, which should also be taken into account in regional policy. Small firms
provide the variety of trial and error needed for experimentalism, and large firms
provide a platform for spin-offs of new entrepreneurial firms, a basis for large-
scale exploitation (production, distribution) of innovations, and a home for deep
specialisation of labour (with a corresponding advanced demand for labour).
Also, as argued earlier, large firms are often more interesting partners for univer-
sities than small firms, because they generally offer higher levels of knowledge
and specialisation, lower transaction costs, and deeper pockets, to engage in
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technics are more natural partners, in view of a smaller cognitive distance.
In chapter 10, a survey was given of features of networks of collaboration for
innovation, their effects on innovative performance, and opportunities to gear
policy to favourable network variables, such as variety of potential participants,
centrality, density, and small world structure, which was also discussed in chap-
ter 7. For example, policies to further entrepreneurship contribute to the number
and variety of potential participants in networks. As noted in chapter 7, govern-
ments have a task in maintaining institutions that support reliability and trust-
worthiness of actors.
As discussed in chapters 7 and 10, structure and strength of ties in networks have
effects on both competence and governance in networks for innovation. On the
one hand, dense and strong ties are needed, especially in exploration, to ensure
accessibility to contacts under the volatility of networks, to pool absorptive
capacity for understanding sources of knowledge, triangulation for accuracy, and
reputation mechanisms, coalition formation and trust building as an alternative
to contractual control. On the other hand, strong and dense ties can limit variety
and cognitive distance, and can yield cognitive and relational lock-in, thus reduc-
ing the variety and flexibility of configuration needed for innovation. A solution
to this dilemma lies in ‘small world’ structures, where local communities with
dense and strong ties are complemented with less dense and weaker outside ties
to other, similarly structured communities.
The cycle of discovery, discussed in chapter 3, provided the foundations for a call
for openness to new contexts, including foreign countries. In chapter 7 we noted
that an alternative to external weak and sparse ties is frequent entry and exit of
players, to maintain related variety and cognitive distance.
As discussed in chapter 11, in geography there is a notion of ‘related variety’,
concerning activities that on the one hand differ but on the other hand are still
similar. The claim is that such related variety contributes most to regional
employment. Both more variety and more specialisation yield less growth. Note
the correspondence between the notions of cognitive distance and related vari-
ety, where both plea for difference that is enough for potential novelty but not
too much to utilise that potential. However, while related variety contributes to
innovation, unrelated variety contributes to the spread of risk.
Regionally embedded, diverse, but also related, activities, that are upgraded with
processes of localised learning, are less footloose, and do not dissipate as easily to
emerging economies (such as China and India) as isolated activities or technolo-
gies do. However, there is a danger of locking activities into regional or local ‘clus-
ters’ that are ‘over-embedded’, with too high strength and density of ties. The
concept of small worlds suggests that there must also be ‘channels’ that connect
an agglomeration with comparable, competing, and complementary agglomera-
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whether perhaps universities can provide the connecting nodes of small worlds,
connecting regional innovation systems to similar systems elsewhere in the
world (cf. Benneworth et al. 2006, Kitagawa 2005). Universities are geared to
such access to internationally dispersed communities.
This potential role for universities is to be connected with the idea of ‘third
spaces’ between universities and industry, discussed above. Here, third spaces
connect universities with industry, in regional innovation systems, while the
universities provide the necessary channels to the world. Local collaboration is
probably more geared to exploiting the potential of novel combinations, on the
basis of experience and experiments from local related variety, with an interdisci-
plinary structure and orientation, while the outside, global connections of
universities, organised along disciplinary lines, provide a deepening and renova-
tion in specialised areas (Ponds and Van Oort 2006). Universities as connecting
nodes, via a third space that connects them to local industry, may also help firms
to gain access to new markets of inputs and outputs. That role of providing
outside connections is also played by large firms.
The situation in the Dutch region of Twente appears to confirm the danger of too much local
embedding without sufficient outside connections in the world. In spite of an exceptional involve-
ment of the University of Twente in local business, development of the region has been disappoint-
ing (Benneworth et al. 2006). Perhaps here local involvement has become too strong relative to
international linkages. Or is the local ‘buzz’ in Twente too limited?
In present policy there is an inclination to identify ‘best practice’ in regional
systems, in the form of the configuration of activities and their organisation and
governance (the renowned Silicon Valley and Italian industrial districts), and
transplant them to one’s own environment. This is illusory. As argued in chapter
11, local and regional systems are the historical outcome of the confluence of
locally specific and highly path-dependent conditions. The context specificities
of these systems are essential for structure and performance and cannot be
universalised. Their success must be unraveled in underlying logics, such as those
we are trying to set out here. As argued in chapter 11, there is spatial division of
labour, with some regions being strong in research, others in innovation, and yet
others in production. Different industries tend to concentrate in different regions
and within an industry firms may look different in different places. As a result,
different regions have potential in different types of activity. It is myopic to focus
policy on regions that are strong in r&d, for example, while neglecting potential
in application and production. Different indicators, such as r&d, creative work-
ers, and high-tech industries reveal different strengths in different regions, and
in the Netherlands it is hardly possible to find a region that is not strong on one or
more of these indicators (Raspe et al. 2004).
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to account the dynamics of clusters. As discussed in chapter 7, in the early stage of
exploration one would expect a relatively high need for local embedding, in strong
and dense ties. Later, one would expect a certain amount of disembedding, to
utilise the potential of emerging innovations in distant markets, and to achieve 
access to novel sources of novelty to replenish local variety and restore cognitive
distance. This raises considerable complications for a policy for regional clusters
and innovation systems. Are policymakers able to correctly identify the stage of 
development that a local cluster is in, and are they able to implement policy in time,
before development has reached the next stage, where the policy may be counter-
productive? One may wind up furthering local embedding by the time that
disembedding is needed. Regional government seems better informed and better
able to act quickly than national government. However, regional/local govern-
ment may not be able to break up local structures if they become counterproduc-
tive under the creative destruction of radical innovation, illustrated in chapter 11.
In view of local specificity of knowledge, conditions, successes and failures, and
the need to choose and implement policies in time to fit the needs of different
stages of development, central government should be modest in its ambitions to
design regional development, and leave it as much as possible to ‘bottom-up’
regional initiatives, in the locally specific configuration of relevant variables.
Such variables are: related variety, complementarity between large and small
firms, collaboration between universities and large firms, and between polytech-
nics and small firms, spin-off formation, features of network structure, education
and training, labour mobility, linkages outside the region (‘small worlds’), and
inward and outward mobility of firms and people.
National government could then focus on the linkages between regional clusters
and other clusters, at home and abroad, the possible role of universities in estab-
lishing and maintaining linkages abroad, entry and exit of organisations, estab-
lishing safeguards against local or regional clientism and possible corruption, and
providing pressure and support to break up regional structures when they
become counter-productive under the creative destruction of radical innovation.
There should be a division of labour between central and regional government.
This we connect with the notion of experimentalist governance or directly-delib-
erative polyarchy, discussed in chapter 3, where:
“… lower level actors … experiment with solutions of their own devising within broadly defined
areas of public policy. In return they furnish central or higher-level units with their rich informa-
tion regarding their goals as well as the progress they are making..., and agree to respect in their
actions framework rights of democratic procedure and substance… With periodic pooling of
results... (that) reveals the defects of parochial solutions, and allows the elaboration of standards for
comparing local achievements, exposing poor performers to criticism from within and without,
and making of good ones (temporary) models for emulation” (Gerstenberg & Sabel 2002).
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the Netherlands as a ‘hub of buzz’; an open knowledge economy or ecology,
where as an extension of its traditional function as a portal to Europe, as a hub of
streams of goods, it could also function as a hub for meetings of explorers and
exploiters of a variety of knowledge. As discussed in chapter 7, this would entail
meetings between scientists, producers and users of technology, traders and
businesspeople, designers and artists, politicians, diplomats, lawyers, security
and police officials, publishers, marketers, and distributors. To support such a
hub, we would need a variety of supporting services, in law, finance, transport
and distribution, conferencing, education, communication, languages and
publishing, accommodation and housing, with attractive spatial, recreational and
cultural environments. For all this, we would need a renaissance of traditional
openness to other cultures. Hopefully, the Netherlands might be a place where
people meet at a fruitful cognitive distance and where trust is built. A place
where identity matters little and processes of identification take place (wrr
2007). Perhaps the Dutch can again, and even more widely than in the past,
assume the role of ‘go-betweens’ to help other people cross their cognitive
distances.
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1W e were inspired partly by the establishment, by the Dutch foundation ‘Neder-
land Kennisland’, of a ‘Kafka brigade’ to help people who are caught up in institu-
tional tangles.
2T h e  D u t c h  ‘ Innovation Platform’ was advertised in terms that suggest that it
should have acted as a ‘de-blocking brigade’, but in fact it did not quite get around
to carrying out that function.
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